2015년 7월 29일 수요일

The Battle of Gettysburg 6

The Battle of Gettysburg 6


It was not until nightfall of the 30th, or forty-eight hours after
it was begun, that Meade knew of the enemy's movement toward
Gettysburg; and even then he did not feel at all sure of having
detected the true point of concentration. Indeed, his want of
accurate information on this head seems surprising. By that time
his own army was stretched out from Emmettsburg, on the northwest,
to Manchester at the east, thus putting it out of Meade's power to
concentrate it at Gettysburg in one day. By endeavoring to cover
too much ground his army had been dangerously scattered. Even
without cavalry Lee had fairly stolen a march on him. And it is
not improbable that Hooker might now have been "shocked," in his
turn.[32]
 
[Sidenote: Union Left Wing in Advance.]
 
Our present business is now wholly with the left wing of the Union
army,--its right being quite out of reach--that is to say, with the
three infantry and one cavalry corps commanded by that thorough
soldier, so beloved by the whole army, General Reynolds, the actual
chief of the First Corps.
 
[Sidenote: Buford finds the Enemy.]
 
Buford had spent the 29th in scouring the passes of South Mountain
as far north as Monterey, without getting sight of the enemy,
however, until he halted for the night at Fountaindale, when he then
perceived the camp-fires of a numerous body of troops stretching
along in his front and lighting up the road toward Gettysburg.
Evidently they had just crossed South Mountain from the valley.
 
[Sidenote: He attacks.]
 
To Buford this sight was indeed as a ray of light in a dark place.
No friendly force could be in that quarter. He determined to know
who and what it was without loss of time. Before dawn his troopers
were again in the saddle. They soon fell in with a strong column
of infantry moving toward Gettysburg on the Fairfield (Hagerstown)
road. After exchanging a few shots, and having learned what he
wanted to know, Buford hastened back to Reynolds, at Emmettsburg,
with the news.
 
Reynolds immediately sent Buford back to Gettysburg, in order, if
possible, to head off the enemy before he should reach that place,
for which he was evidently making. A courier was also despatched to
headquarters. This was the first trustworthy intelligence of Lee's
movement to the east that Meade had thus far received. Could the
enemy be massing on his left? It certainly looked like it. After
this night there was only one word on the tongues of all men in that
army--Gettysburg! Gettysburg!
 
[Sidenote: Reynolds marches up.]
 
The First Corps, also marching for Gettysburg, went into camp some
five miles short of that town; the Eleventh lay at Emmettsburg; the
Third at Taneytown. It is with them alone that we shall have to deal
in what follows.
 
[Illustration: Positions, June 30th.]
 
[Sidenote: Pipe Creek.]
 
We have already seen that Meade had not designed advancing one
step farther than might be found effectual for turning Lee back
from overrunning the State. This was the first great object to
be attained. And this had now been done. To avoid being struck
from behind, Lee had been forced to halt, face about, and look for
a place to fight in. When the enemy should be fairly in motion
southward, Meade meant to take up the position along Pipe Creek,
and await an attack there. But he no longer had the disposing of
events. In order to gain this position now, Reynolds must have
fallen back one or two marches; nor could Meade know that Lee was
then coming half way to meet him; or that--strange confusion of
ideas!--Lee had promised his generals not to fight a pitched battle
except on ground of his own choosing; certainly not on one his
adversary had chosen for him; least of all where defeat would carry
down with it the cause of the Southern Confederacy itself.
 
[Sidenote: Reynolds.]
 
Reynolds, therefore, held the destinies of both armies in his
keeping on that memorable last night of June. He now knew that any
further advance on his part would probably result in bringing on
a combat--a combat, moreover, in which both armies might become
involved, for his military instinct truly foreshadowed what was
coming. There was still time to fall back on the main army, to avoid
an engagement. But Reynolds was not that kind of general. He was the
man of all others to whom the whole army had looked in the event
of Hooker's incapacity from any cause, as well as the first whom
the President had designed to replace him. He now shared Meade's
confidence to the fullest extent. He was a soldier of the finest
temper, a Pennsylvanian, like Meade himself, neither rash on the one
hand, nor weighed down by the feeling that he or his soldiers were
overmatched in any respect on the other. To him, at least, Lee was
no bugbear. Having come there expressly to find the enemy, he was
not going to turn his back now that the enemy was found. Reynolds
was, therefore, emphatically the man for the hour. He knew that
Meade would support him to the last man and the last cartridge. He
fall back? There was no such word in Reynolds' vocabulary. His order
was "Forward!"
 
So history has indissolubly linked together the names of Reynolds
and of Gettysburg, for had he decided differently there would have
been no battle of Gettysburg.
 
Thus it was that all through the silent watches of that moonlit
summer's night the roads leading to Gettysburg from north and south,
from east and west, were lighted up by a thousand camp-fires.
Without knowing it, the citizens of that peaceful village were
sleeping on a volcano.
 
[25] Besides Meade, there were Hancock, Reynolds, and Humphreys--a
triumvirate of some power with that army. Pennsylvania had also
seventy-three regiments and five batteries with Meade.
 
[26] While thus feeling for Lee along the mountain passes with his
left hand, Meade was reaching out the right as far as possible
toward the Susquehanna, or toward Early at York.
 
[27] This was Longstreet's scout, Harrison. "He said there were
three corps near Frederick when he passed there, one to the right
and one to the left; but he did not succeed in getting the position
of the other."--_Longstreet._
 
[28] This shows how little foundation exists for the statements
of the Comte de Paris and others that Hooker's strategy compelled
Lee to cross the mountain, when it is clear that he knew nothing
whatever of Hooker's intentions. This is concurred in by both Lee
and Longstreet. Moreover, Hooker had scarcely put his strategy in
effect when he was relieved.
 
[29] In point of fact, the concentration was first ordered for
Cashtown, "at the eastern base of the mountain."--_Lee._ Ewell
and Hill took the responsibility of going on to Gettysburg, after
hearing that the Union cavalry had been seen there.
 
[30] On the night of June 30th, Meade's headquarters and the
artillery reserve were at Taneytown, the First Corps at Marsh
Run, Eleventh at Emmettsburg, Third at Bridgeport, Twelfth at
Littlestown, Second at Uniontown, Fifth at Union Mills, Sixth and
Gregg's Cavalry at Manchester, Kilpatrick's at Hanover--a line over
thirty miles long.
 
[31] By being compelled to ford streams without taking off shoes or
stockings, the men's feet were badly blistered.
 
[32] Upon taking command, Meade is said to have expressed himself as
"shocked" at the scattered condition of the army.
 
 
 
 
V
 
THE FIRST OF JULY
 
 
[Sidenote: Buford.]
 
Since early in the afternoon of June 30th, the inhabitants of
Gettysburg had seen pouring through their village, taking position
on the heights that dominate it, and spreading themselves out over
all the roads leading into it from the west and north, squadron
after squadron of horse, dusty and travel-stained, but alert,
vigilant, and full of ardor at the prospect of coming to blows with
the enemy at last.
 
This was a portion of that splendid cavalry which, under the lead
of Pleasonton, Buford, Gregg, and Kilpatrick, at last disputed the
boasted superiority of Stuart's famous troopers. At last the Union
army had a cavalry force. These men formed the van of that army
which was pursuing Lee by forced marches for the purpose of bringing him to battle.

많은 사랑의 박애 폴리 아모리와 출산율 배 튼살치료

많은 사랑의 박애 폴리 아모리와 출산율 배 튼살치료


‘많은’이라는 뜻의 그리스어 ‘폴리(poly)’와 ‘사랑’이라는 뜻의 라틴어‘아모르(amor)’의 변형태인 ‘아모리(amory)’의 합성어로, 서로를 독점하지 않는 다자간(多者間) 사랑, 즉 두 사람 이상을 동시에 사랑하는 것을 뜻하는 말이다. 파트너의 동의 하에 다른 사람을 사랑한다는 점에서 ‘바람 피우기’ 또는 ‘스와핑’과는 구별된다. 폴리아모리를 지향하는 사상을 폴리아모리즘(polyamorism), 폴리아모리를 행하는 이들을 폴리아모리스트(polyamorist)라고 한다.
폴리아모리스트들은 전통적인 혼인 관계에 집착하지 않고 한 사람에 얽매이지 않는 연애 생활을 추구한다. 이들은 모노가미(monogamy) 즉 일부일처제가 인간의 본성에 맞지 않는 결혼 제도라 하여 이를 비판하고, 타인에게 피해를 주지 않는 한 여러 파트너와의 다양한 관계를 통해 삶이 더욱 풍요로워질 수 있다고 믿는다. 많은 사람들이 성적 관계에 초점을 맞추어 폴리아모리를 바라보고 있지만 폴리아모리스트들은 파트너에 대한 헌신과 친밀감 등의 정신적 유대를 더 중요하게 생각한다.
폴리아모리를 행하는 이들 중 일부는 여러 파트너로 이루어진 그룹을 형성하여 해당 그룹 안에서 다양한 정신적·육체적 관계를 맺으며 일종의 가족 관계를 이룬다. 이들은 공동체 생활을 하면서 아이를 함께 키우고, 재산도 공유하는데 이런 형태의 집단혼을 폴리피델리티(polyfidelity)라고 부른다.
일부다처제 또는 일처다부제 등의 복혼제를 뜻하는 폴리가미(polygamy)가 종교적 또는 지역적 전통에 의하여 규범화된 결혼 제도라면, 일부일처제라는 기존의 규범에서 벗어나 공동체 가족 관계의 새로운 결혼 형태를 제시하는 폴리아모리는 문화적 소산이라고 할 수 있다.
폴리아모리 운동은 1970년대부터 태동하였고, 1990년대에 들어 성정치적·문화적 화두로 대두되었으며, 2000년대에 이르러서는 동성결혼에 이은 차세대 인권운동의 패러다임으로 여겨지고 있다. 미국의 사회심리 전문가들은 2009년 현재 미국 대도시 지역을 중심으로 50만 명이 넘는 폴리아모리스트들이 있을 것으로 추정한다. 폴리아모리를 옹호하고 지원하는 모임 중 가장 오래된 것은 1984년 설립된 ‘러빙 모어(Loving More)’라는 단체이다. 이 단체는 잡지를 발행하고 웹사이트를 운영하며 일 년에 두 차례씩 정기 모임을 연다.
 
Anton J.님의 글중에서
 
복혼(複婚, polygamy)은 배우자가 2명 이상인 혼인형태, 즉 복수의 아내나 남편을 가지는 형태이다. 배우자가 한 명인 단혼의 반대말이다. 복혼제는 일부다처혼(一夫多妻婚, polygyny), 일처다부혼(一妻多夫婚, polyandry), 집단혼(集團婚, group marriage)의 형태로 나타나고 있다.
일부다처제는 한 남편에 다수의 아내가 있는 혼인 형태로, 아시아, 아프리카, 태평양의 섬들, 아메리카 인디언 사회의 일부에 이 제도가 남아 있는데, 특히 이슬람 지역에 많다. 이슬람 지역에서 일부다처제 전통이 있는 이유는 이슬람이 세금징수를 통한 공동체의 생존을 위해 정복전쟁을 할 당시 과부들이 많이 생겼기 때문에 이들을 배려하기 위한 것이었다. 현대사회에서는 복지를 국가의 의무로 생각하여 직업교육등의 복지제도가 마련되어 있지만, 이슬람이 태동한 고대사회에서는 여성가장을 위한 복지가 없었다.
일처다부제는 한 아내에 다수의 남편이 있는 혼인 형태로, 인도의 토다족과 티베트의 하층민 사회가 일처다부제로 유명하다. 주로 가난한 계층에서 얼마 안 되는 재산을 여러 형제가 나누어 가지면 모두가 살기 어렵기 때문에 재산을 공유하는 것처럼, 여러 형제가 한명의 아내와 생활한다. 이때 남자가 여러 명이므로 각각 기간을 정해 생활한다.
집단혼은 여러 명의 남녀가 서로 공동의 배우가 되는 혼인 형태이다.
1861년 스위스의 J.바흐호펜이 <<모권론>>에서 원시시대에는 난교적 성관계과 모권제가 행하여졌다고 기술한 것을 계기로, 유럽과 미국의 학자들이 혼인=가족 이라는 진화의 도식을 발표하였다. 미국의 L.H.모건의 저서 <<고대사회>>(1877)는 난교→집단혼→대우혼→단혼의 역사적 발전도식을 주장해 학계의 큰 영향을 끼쳤다. 19세기말 이래 호주의 W.슈미트, 영국의 B.말리노프스키, 핀란드의 F.웨스터마크 등이 원시시대에서도 단혼제가 보편적이었다고 주장한 뒤로, 오늘날 원시시대의 난교나 집단혼을 부정하는 학설이 지배적이다. 다만 부부만이 성을 독점하지 않고, 공동체 성원에게 개방되어 있었다. 이를 모건은 '프나르아혼'이라 하여 집단혼의 1형식이라 보았으나 실제로는 성의 공유였다. 형제형 일처다부제나 자매형 일부다처제의 복혼형태와, 그 수반현상인 레비레이트혼이나 소로레이트혼이라는 선호적 재혼형식도 이성적 공유관계에서 파생된 것이다. 한국 역사에서 가족, 호의 범위가 형태가 제도화되는 것은 조선왕조에 들어와서이다. 왕조는 복혼을 금지하고 단혼을 제도화하였다. 하지만 이러한 제도화로 처첩제가 생기는 문제도 있었다.
일부다처제가 허용되는 국가로는 사우디아라비아, 쿠웨이트, 리비아, 요르단, 모로코, 레바논, 이집트, 이라크, 알제리 등이 있다.
<꾸란 4:3> 만약 너희가 고아에게 공평하게 대해 줄 수 없을 것 같은 두려움이 있다면 결혼을 할 것이니 너희 마음에 드는 여인으로 둘, 셋, 또는 넷을 취할 것이다. 그러나 그녀들을 공평하게 대해 줄 수 없을 것 같은 두려움이 있다면 한 여인이나 아니면 너희 오른 손이 소유한 것을 취할 것이다. 만약 너희가 그들을 공정하게 대할 수 없다는 두려움이 있거든, 오직 한 여자와 결혼하라.
일처다부제가 허용되는 지역은 히말라야 산맥을 중심으로 한 네팔 일부 지역과 아마존 몇 개 부족 등이 있다.
필자 생각에는 일부일처는 폐지되고 폴리 아모리등 여러 형태가 나타날 것이다. 아내가 결혼했다는 영화를 보면 손예진이 두 남자와 사는 폴리가미polygamie ‘[pɔligami] 1. 일부다처제,일처다부제 ’가 등장하는데 사문화되었던 일부다처제[polygyny]도 다시 등장할 수 있다.
필자 생각에는 연애는 논어의 자기가 싫어하는 일을 남에게 하지 말라는 도덕률에 따라 해야 한다. 만약 자신의 아내가 다른 남자와 바람을 피우는 것을 놔둘정도로 관대한 사람만이 자신도 해도 된다고 본다. 하지만 조선시대 남자처럼 자신은 기생과 바람을 피우고 여인이 바람난 것을 제재하는 이중적 도덕률로 재단을 하면 안된다고 본다. 또 필자 생각에는 복혼제도는 개인의 자유이지만 복혼이나 일부다처, 일처다부, 동성혼등을 법적으로 보장해서는 안된다고 본다. 법적인 보장이 오히려 조장이나 혜택으로 돌아갈 수 있기 때문이다.
그런데 이렇게 특이한 결혼이나 애정 형태가 늘어날수록 전통적인 결혼인 일부일처제는 낡은 유물인듯하고 점차 가정은 파괴된다는 점이다. 필자는 기독교인이 아니지만 흡사 개신교에서 말하는 악의 세력이 가정 파괴를 하려고 동성연애를 포함하여 일부러 이런 남녀사이의 다양한 복잡한 함수관계를 설정하려는 시도를 하지 않는가 싶다.
그런데 필자 생각에 대한민국 정부에서는 폴리 아모리등 여러 가지 부부와 결혼제도를 설정할 수밖에 없다고 본다. 저 출산율을 제고하기 위해서 결혼제도를 총 정비하려는 시도를 할수도 있다. 2014년 미국 중앙정보국(CIA)의 월드팩트북(The World Factbook)에 따르면 올해 추정치 기준으로 한국의 합계출산율은 1.25명에 그쳐 분석 대상 224개국 중 219위였다.
합계출산율은 여자 1명이 평생 낳을 것으로 예상하는 평균 출생아 수를 뜻한다.
싱가포르가 0.80명으로 꼴찌였고 마카오가 0.93명으로 223위였다. 대만이 1.11명으로 222위, 홍콩이 1.17명으로 221위였으며 영국령버진아일랜드는 1.25명으로 한국과 공동 219위였다. 그 만큼 출산율을 올리는 것이 중요하다. 이미지한의원에서는 산후에 발생한 배 튼살치료를 하는데 미혼여성의 종아리나 허벅지등 기타 임신과 무관하게 생긴 튼살과 비율이 2:8정도로 오히려 산후 출산으로 튼살이 발생하는 여성 자체도 출산율 저하로 감소하고 있음을 알수 있다. 임신후 튼살과 하지나 가슴 팔뚝등 일반적인 튼살 모두 이미지한의원의 튼살침인 ST침으로 치료할 수 있다. 

The Battle of Gettysburg 5

The Battle of Gettysburg 5


Thus a triumphant and advancing enemy was being followed by a beaten
and not over-confident one, its wounds scarcely healed,[24] not
much stronger than its opponent, and led by a general new to his
place, against the greatest captain of the Confederacy. How could
the situation fail to impose caution upon a general so fully and so
recently impressed with the consequences of taking a false step?
Meade's every move shows that from the beginning this thought was
uppermost in his mind.
 
With the effects of Lee's simple presence thus laid before us,
it is entirely safe to ask what should have stopped this general
from dictating his own terms of peace, either in Philadelphia
or Baltimore, provided he could first beat the Union army in
Pennsylvania?
 
[17] At Pittsburg defensive works were begun. In Philadelphia
all business was suspended, and work vigorously pushed on the
fortifications begun in the suburbs. At Baltimore the impression
prevailed that Lee was marching on that city. The alarm bells were
rung, and the greatest consternation prevailed.
 
[18] A great lukewarmness in the action of the people of
Pennsylvania is testified to on all sides. See Professor Jacobs'
"Rebel Invasion," etc. About sixteen thousand men of the New York
State militia were sent to Harrisburg between the 16th of June and
the 3d of July; also several thousand from New Jersey (but ordered
home on the 22d). General Couch was put in command of the defences
of Harrisburg.
 
[19] Hooker would not cross the Potomac until assured that Lee's
whole army was across. He kept the Blue Ridge between himself and
Lee in obedience to his orders to keep Washington covered.
 
[20] The presence of Lee's cavalry would have allowed greater
latitude to his operations, distressed the Pennsylvanians more, and
enabled Lee to select his own fighting-ground.
 
[21] So long as these passes were securely held, Lee would be shut
up in his valley.
 
[22] Open to serious objections; but then, so are all plans. Tied
down by his orders, Hooker would have taken some risks for the sake
of some great gains. By closing every avenue of escape, it would
have ensured Lee's utter ruin, provided he could have been as badly
beaten as at Gettysburg.
 
[23] This feeling was so well understood at Washington that a report
was spread among the soldiers that McClellan, their old commander,
was again leading them, and the report certainly served its purpose.
 
[24] The army was not up to its highest point of efficiency. It
had just lost fifty-eight regiments by expiration of service. This
circumstance was known to Lee. The proportion of veterans was not
so great as in the Confederate army, or the character of the new
enlistments as high as in 1861 and 1862.
 
 
 
 
IV
 
REYNOLDS
 
 
[Sidenote: Meade's Problem].
 
The problem presented to Meade's mind, on taking command, was this:
What are the enemy's plans, and where shall I strike him? He knew
that part of Lee's army was at Chambersburg, part at Carlisle, and
part at York. Was it Lee's purpose to concentrate his army upon the
detachment at York or upon that at Carlisle, or would he draw these
two detachments back into the Cumberland Valley, there to play a
merely defensive game? Should the junction be at Carlisle, it would
mean an attack on Harrisburg: if at York, or at some point between
the main body and York, it would indicate an advance in force toward
Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington. As all these things were
possible, all must be duly weighed and guarded against. With a wily,
brave, and confident enemy before him, Meade did not find himself
on a bed of roses, truly; and he may well be pardoned the remark
attributed to him when ordered to take the command, that he was
being led to execution.
 
Meade needed no soothsayer to tell him that if Lee crossed the
mountains, it would be because he meant to fight his way toward his
object through every obstacle.
 
What was that object?
 
In answering this question the political considerations must be
first weighed. In short, the purpose--the great purpose--of the
invasion must be penetrated. That being done, the military problem
would easily solve itself.
 
It was not to be supposed that Lee had invaded Pennsylvania solely
for the purpose of taking a few small towns, or even a large one,
like Harrisburg, or of filling up his depleted magazines. He was
evidently after larger game. His ultimate aim, clearly, was to
capture Washington, as a signal defeat of the Union army would
easily enable him to do. It would crown the campaign brilliantly,
would fulfil the hopes, and beyond doubt or cavil ensure the
triumph, of the Confederacy. It is true that Meade's orders held
him down to a defence of the national capital first and foremost;
in no sense, then, was he the master of his own acts: yet he
showed none the less sagacity, we think, in concluding that Lee
would presently be found on the east side of the mountains, and in
preparing to meet him there, not astride the mountains as Hooker had
proposed doing, but with his whole army more within his reach. Meade
was prudent. He would err, if at all, on that side; yet the result
vindicated his judgment sooner than was thought for.
 
This being settled, there still remained the question of relieving
Pennsylvania. The enemy's presence there was an indignity keenly
enough felt on all sides, but to none was it such a home-thrust as
to the Pennsylvanians in the Union army, at the head of whom was
Meade himself.[25]
 
[Sidenote: Meade's Plans.]
 
Though Hooker's plan promised excellent results here, Meade was
fearful lest Lee should cross the Susquehanna, and take Harrisburg
before he could be stopped. To prevent this the army must be
pushed forward. Meade, therefore, at once drew back the left wing
toward Frederick, thus giving up that plan in favor of one which
he himself had formed; namely, of throwing the army out more to
the northeast, the better to cover Baltimore from attack, should
that be Lee's purpose, as Meade more than suspected. Selecting
Westminster, therefore, as his base from this time forth, and the
line of Big Pipe Creek, a little to the north of that place, as his
battle-ground, Meade now set most of the army in motion in that
direction, leaving Frederick to the protection of a rear-guard.
 
[Sidenote: Left Flank Forward.]
 
[Sidenote: Right Flank refused.]
 
The army now marched with its left wing thrown forward toward South
Mountain, Buford's cavalry toward Fairfield, to clear that flank,
the First and Eleventh Corps toward Emmettsburg, the Third and
Twelfth toward Middleburg, the Fifth to Taneytown, the Second to
Uniontown, and the Sixth, on the extreme right, to New Windsor.
 
Two other divisions of Union cavalry, Kilpatrick's and Gregg's,
marched one on the right flank, the other in front, with orders to
keep the front and flanks of the army well scouted and protected.
 
It will be seen from this order of march that, in proportion as
they went forward, Buford's cavalry, with the three infantry corps
forming the left wing, were approaching the enemy's main body at
Chambersburg. South Mountain was, therefore, the wall behind which
the two contending armies were playing at hide-and-seek.[26]
 
[Sidenote: Lee hears Meade is coming.]
 
Lee had only just given orders for his whole force to move on
Harrisburg, when, late in the night of the 28th, a scout brought
news to him of the Union army being across the Potomac, and on
the march toward South Mountain.[27] This report could not fail
to throw the Confederate headquarters into a fever of excitement,
ignorant to that hour of that army's being across the Potomac. The
mystery was cleared up at last. In a moment the plan of campaign
was changed.[28] Lee soon said to some of the officers about
him, "To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we
expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade
is about."
 
[Sidenote: March on Gettysburg begun.]
 
By placing himself on the direct road to Baltimore, Lee's purpose of
first drawing the Union army away from his line of retreat, and of
then assailing it on its own, stands fully revealed. The previous
orders were therefore countermanded on the spot. Hill and Longstreet
were ordered from Chambersburg to Gettysburg,[29] Ewell was called
back from Carlisle, and Early from York.
 
[Sidenote: Faulty Tactics.]
 
If Meade had known Lee's whereabouts, it is safe to assume that
the Union army would have been massed toward its left rather than
its right; and if Lee had been correctly informed on his part, it
is unlikely that he would have risked throwing his columns out at
random against the Union army, as he was now doing. Only the fatuity
of the Union generals saved Lee's vanguard on the 1st of July. Yet
he held the very important advantage of having already begun the
concentration of his army--an easy thing for him to do, inasmuch as
but one of his three corps was separated from the others--before
Meade discovered by chance what was so near proving his ruin. One
day's march would bring all three up within supporting distances,
two in position for giving battle.
 
[Sidenote: Confederate Positions June 29th.]
 
Heth's division of Hill's Corps got as far as Cashtown, eight miles
from Gettysburg, on the 29th; Rodes' division of Ewell's Corps
was coming down by the direct road from Carlisle, east of South
Mountain; Early's division of this corps began its march back
from York to Gettysburg on the morning of the 30th. These three
divisions, or one-third of Lee's whole army, therefore, formed the
enemy's vanguard which would first strike an approaching force. But,
as we have seen, the whole army was in march behind it, and by the
next day well closed up on the advance.
 
Leaving them to pursue their march, which was by no means hurried,
let us, to borrow Lee's very expressive phrase, "see what General
Meade was about."
 
[Sidenote: Union Positions June 30th.]
 
On the 29th all seven of the Union corps were advancing northward
like fingers spread apart, and exactly in an inverse order from
Lee's three, which were converging on the palm of the hand. On the
30th this divergent order of march continued to conduct the corps
still farther apart, with the result also, considering Gettysburg
as the ultimate point of concentration, that the bulk of the army
was away off to the right of Gettysburg.[30] Moreover, Meade's
efforts to get the army up to this position, or in front of his
chosen line of defence on Pipe Creek, had covered the roads with
stragglers, and compelled at least one corps to halt for nearly a whole day.

The Battle of Gettysburg 4

The Battle of Gettysburg 4


FIRST EFFECTS OF THE INVASION
 
 
Meantime, from before and behind the Confederate columns, two
streams flowed out of the doomed valley: one to the north, an army
of fugitives hurrying their flocks, herds, and household goods out
of the enemy's reach; the other carrying off to Virginia the plunder
of towns and villages.
 
[Sidenote: Harrisburg alarmed.]
 
As the swarm of fugitives made straight for Harrisburg, it was
but natural that the inpouring of such panic-stricken throngs,
all declaring that the enemy was close behind them, should throw
that city into the wildest commotion, which every hour tended to
increase. We will let an eye-witness describe the events of a single
day.
 
"The morning broke upon a populace all astir, who had been called
out of bed by the beat of the alarming drum, the blast of the bugle,
and the clanging of bells. The streets were lively with men, who
were either returning from a night's work on the fortifications or
going over to relieve those who were toiling there. As the sun rose
higher the excitement gathered head. All along the streets were
omnibuses, wagons, and wheelbarrows, taking in trunks and valuables
and rushing them down to the dépôt to be shipped out of rebel
range. The stores, the female seminaries, and almost every private
residence were busy all of the forenoon in swelling the mountain
of freight that lay at the dépôt. Every horse was impressed into
service and every porter groaned beneath his burdens.
 
[Sidenote: People desert the City.]
 
"The scene at the dépôts was indescribable, if not disgraceful. A
sweltering mass of humanity thronged the platforms, all furious to
escape from the doomed city. At the bridge and across the river
the scene was equally exciting. All through the day a steady
stream of people, on foot and in wagons, young and old, black and
white, was pouring across it from the Cumberland Valley, bearing
with them their household goods and live-stock. Endless trains,
laden with flour, grain, and merchandise, hourly emerged from the
valley and thundered across the bridge and through the city. Miles
of retreating baggage-wagons, filled with calves and sheep tied
together, and great, old-fashioned furnace-wagons loaded with tons
of trunks and boxes, defiled in continuous procession down the 'pike
and across the river, raising a dust as far as the eye could see."
 
[Sidenote: Precautions taken.]
 
It may be added that the records of the State and the money in
the bank-vaults were also removed to places of safety, and the
construction of defensive works was begun, as much, perhaps, with
the purpose of allaying the popular excitement as from any hope of
holding the city against Lee, since Harrisburg was in no condition
either to stand a siege or repel an assault at this time.
 
[Sidenote: Militia hurried to Harrisburg.]
 
The wave of invasion made itself felt even as far as Pittsburg
on the one side and Baltimore on the other.[17] Governor Curtin
promptly called on the people of Pennsylvania to arm and repel the
invader. Yet neither the imminence of the danger nor the stirring
appeal of the executive of the State could arouse them at first. In
the emergency the neighboring States were appealed to for help. In
response the militia of those States were soon hastening toward the
threatened points[18] by every available route; yet it was only too
evident that raw soldiers, no matter how zealous or patriotic, would
prove little hinderance to Lee's marching where he would, or long
dispute with his veterans the possession of Harrisburg were it once
seriously attacked.
 
But where was the army of the Potomac all this time--the army whose
special task it was to stand between this invader and his prey? Must
unarmed citizens be called upon to arise and defend their homes when
a hundred thousand veterans were in the field?
 
[Sidenote: Lee mystified.]
 
[Sidenote: His Cavalry absent.]
 
For more than a week Lee had thus been laying waste a most rich and
fertile section of Pennsylvania at his leisure. Practically, indeed,
the whole State was in his grasp. Would Harrisburg or Philadelphia
be the first fruits of his audacity? The prize was indeed tempting,
the way open. The only real impediment was the Army of the Potomac,
and Lee, too, was now anxiously asking himself what had become of
that army.[19] He had foreseen that it must follow him up; that
every effort would be bent to compass his destruction; and it was
a foregone conclusion that he must fight somewhere, if there was
either enterprise or courage left on the Union side. He had even
calculated on drawing the Union army so far away from fortified
places that its defeat would ensure the fall of Baltimore and
Washington. But as regarding its whereabouts at the present moment,
Lee was completely in the dark. In an evil hour he had allowed the
bulk of his cavalry to run off on a wild-goose chase around the
rear of the Federal army, so that now, in his hour of need, though
without his knowing it, the whole Federal army interposed to prevent
its return.[20] It is quite true that up to this time Stuart, who
led this cavalry, had given so many signal proofs of his dexterity
that Lee was perhaps justified in inferring that if he heard nothing
from Stuart, it was because the Union army was still in Virginia.
And in that belief he was acting.
 
[Sidenote: Among Spies.]
 
Moreover, instead of being among a population eager to give him
every scrap of information, Lee was now among one where every man,
woman, and child was a spy on his own movements. In the absence,
then, of definite knowledge touching the Union army, he decided
to march on Harrisburg with his whole force, and issued orders
accordingly.
 
[Sidenote: Union Army crosses the Potomac.]
 
When there was no longer a shadow of doubt that Lee's whole army was
on the march up the Cumberland Valley, sweeping that valley clean as
it went, the Union army also crossed the Potomac, on the 25th and
26th of June, and at once began moving up east of South Mountain, so
as to discharge the double duty laid upon it all along of keeping
between the enemy and Washington, while at the same time feeling for
him through the gaps of South Mountain as it marched. For this task
the Union general kept his cavalry well in hand, instead of letting
it roam about at will in quest of adventures.
 
[Sidenote: Hooker's Plan.]
 
This order of march threw the left wing out as far as Boonsborough
and Middletown, with Buford's cavalry division watching the passes
by which the enemy would have to defile, should he think of making
an attack from that flank.[21] The rest of the army was halted,
for the moment, around Frederick. The plan of operations, as first
fixed, did not lack in boldness or originality. It was to follow Lee
up the Cumberland Valley with two corps, numbering twenty thousand
men, while the rest of the army should continue its march toward
the enemy on the east side of South Mountain, but within supporting
distance. As this would be doing just what Lee[22] had most reason
to dread, it would seem most in accordance with the rules of war. At
any rate, it initiated a vigorously aggressive campaign.
 
At this critical moment the Union army was, most unexpectedly,
deprived of its head.
 
[Sidenote: Hooker is thwarted.]
 
In its pursuit of Lee this army had been much hampered by divided
counsels, when, if ever united counsels were imperatively called
for, now was the time. Worse still, it had too many commanders,
both civil and military. The President, the Cabinet, the
General-in-Chief (Halleck), and even some others, in addition
to the actual commander, not to speak of the newspapers, had all
taken turns in advising or suggesting what should, or what should
not, be done. United action, sincere and generous co-operation,
as between government and army, were therefore unattainable here.
The government did not trust its general: the general respected
the generalship of the Cabinet most when it was silent. Nobody in
authority seemed willing to grant Hooker what he asked for, let it
be ever so reasonable, or permit him to carry out his own plans
unobstructed, were they ever so promising or brilliant. He could not
get the fifteen or twenty thousand soldiers who were then dawdling
about the camps at Baltimore, Washington, and Alexandria. He was
brusquely snubbed when he asked for leave to break up the post at
Harper's Ferry, when by doing so ten thousand good troops would have
been freed to act against the enemy's line of retreat.
 
Harmony being impossible, Lee seemed likely to triumph through the
dissensions of his enemies.
 
[Sidenote: And leaves the Army.]
 
Mortified at finding himself thus distrusted and overruled, Hooker
threw up the command on the 27th, and on the 28th General Meade
succeeded him. So suddenly was the change brought about, that when
the officer bearing the order awakened Meade out of a sound sleep at
midnight, he thought he was being put in arrest.
 
[Sidenote: Spirit of the Army.]
 
It is asserted by those who had the best means of knowing--indeed,
it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise--that the army had
lost faith in Hooker, and that the men were asking of each other,
"Are we going to have another Chancellorsville?" Be that as it
may, there were few better soldiers in that army than Meade; none,
perhaps, so capable of uniting it at this particular juncture, when
unity was so all-important and yet so lamentably deficient. This
was the third general the army had known within six months, and the
seventh since its formation. It was truly the graveyard of generals;
and each of the disgraced commanders had his following. If, under
these conditions, the Army of the Potomac could still maintain its
efficiency unimpaired, it must have been made of different stuff
from most armies.
 
It was not that the Union soldiers feared to meet Lee's veterans.
Lee might beat the generals, but the soldiers--never! Yet it can
hardly be doubted that repeated defeat had more or less unsettled
their faith in their leaders, if not in themselves; since even the
gods themselves struggle in vain against stupidity.[23]
 
[Sidenote: General Meade.]
 
If the new appointment did not silence all jealousies among the
generals, or infuse great enthusiasm into the rank and file,--and we
are bound to admit that Meade's was not a name to conjure with,--it
is difficult to see how a better selection could have been made, all
things considered. In point of fact, there was no one of commanding
ability to appoint; but every man in the army felt that Meade would
do his best, and that Meade at his best would not fall far behind
the best in the field.
 
Meade could not become the idol of his soldiers, like Lee, because
he was not gifted by nature with that personal magnetism which
attracts men without their knowing why; but he could and did command
unhesitating obedience and respect.
 
[Sidenote: Best-disciplined Army.]
 
In point of discipline, however, the Union army was vastly the
superior of its adversary, and that counts for much; and in spite of
some friction here and there, like a well-oiled machine the army was
now again in motion, with a cool head and steady hand to guide it
on. But as no machine is stronger than its weakest part, it remained to be seen how this one would bear the strain.