The Battle of Gettysburg 5

The Battle of Gettysburg 5

Thus a triumphant and advancing enemy was being followed by a beaten

and not over-confident one, its wounds scarcely healed,[24] not

much stronger than its opponent, and led by a general new to his

place, against the greatest captain of the Confederacy. How could

the situation fail to impose caution upon a general so fully and so

recently impressed with the consequences of taking a false step?

Meade's every move shows that from the beginning this thought was

uppermost in his mind.

 

With the effects of Lee's simple presence thus laid before us,

it is entirely safe to ask what should have stopped this general

from dictating his own terms of peace, either in Philadelphia

or Baltimore, provided he could first beat the Union army in

Pennsylvania?

 

[17] At Pittsburg defensive works were begun. In Philadelphia

all business was suspended, and work vigorously pushed on the

fortifications begun in the suburbs. At Baltimore the impression

prevailed that Lee was marching on that city. The alarm bells were

rung, and the greatest consternation prevailed.

 

[18] A great lukewarmness in the action of the people of

Pennsylvania is testified to on all sides. See Professor Jacobs'

"Rebel Invasion," etc. About sixteen thousand men of the New York

State militia were sent to Harrisburg between the 16th of June and

the 3d of July; also several thousand from New Jersey (but ordered

home on the 22d). General Couch was put in command of the defences

of Harrisburg.

 

[19] Hooker would not cross the Potomac until assured that Lee's

whole army was across. He kept the Blue Ridge between himself and

Lee in obedience to his orders to keep Washington covered.

 

[20] The presence of Lee's cavalry would have allowed greater

latitude to his operations, distressed the Pennsylvanians more, and

enabled Lee to select his own fighting-ground.

 

[21] So long as these passes were securely held, Lee would be shut

up in his valley.

 

[22] Open to serious objections; but then, so are all plans. Tied

down by his orders, Hooker would have taken some risks for the sake

of some great gains. By closing every avenue of escape, it would

have ensured Lee's utter ruin, provided he could have been as badly

beaten as at Gettysburg.

 

[23] This feeling was so well understood at Washington that a report

was spread among the soldiers that McClellan, their old commander,

was again leading them, and the report certainly served its purpose.

 

[24] The army was not up to its highest point of efficiency. It

had just lost fifty-eight regiments by expiration of service. This

circumstance was known to Lee. The proportion of veterans was not

so great as in the Confederate army, or the character of the new

enlistments as high as in 1861 and 1862.

 

 

 

 

IV

 

REYNOLDS

 

 

[Sidenote: Meade's Problem].

 

The problem presented to Meade's mind, on taking command, was this:

What are the enemy's plans, and where shall I strike him? He knew

that part of Lee's army was at Chambersburg, part at Carlisle, and

part at York. Was it Lee's purpose to concentrate his army upon the

detachment at York or upon that at Carlisle, or would he draw these

two detachments back into the Cumberland Valley, there to play a

merely defensive game? Should the junction be at Carlisle, it would

mean an attack on Harrisburg: if at York, or at some point between

the main body and York, it would indicate an advance in force toward

Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington. As all these things were

possible, all must be duly weighed and guarded against. With a wily,

brave, and confident enemy before him, Meade did not find himself

on a bed of roses, truly; and he may well be pardoned the remark

attributed to him when ordered to take the command, that he was

being led to execution.

 

Meade needed no soothsayer to tell him that if Lee crossed the

mountains, it would be because he meant to fight his way toward his

object through every obstacle.

 

What was that object?

 

In answering this question the political considerations must be

first weighed. In short, the purpose--the great purpose--of the

invasion must be penetrated. That being done, the military problem

would easily solve itself.

 

It was not to be supposed that Lee had invaded Pennsylvania solely

for the purpose of taking a few small towns, or even a large one,

like Harrisburg, or of filling up his depleted magazines. He was

evidently after larger game. His ultimate aim, clearly, was to

capture Washington, as a signal defeat of the Union army would

easily enable him to do. It would crown the campaign brilliantly,

would fulfil the hopes, and beyond doubt or cavil ensure the

triumph, of the Confederacy. It is true that Meade's orders held

him down to a defence of the national capital first and foremost;

in no sense, then, was he the master of his own acts: yet he

showed none the less sagacity, we think, in concluding that Lee

would presently be found on the east side of the mountains, and in

preparing to meet him there, not astride the mountains as Hooker had

proposed doing, but with his whole army more within his reach. Meade

was prudent. He would err, if at all, on that side; yet the result

vindicated his judgment sooner than was thought for.

 

This being settled, there still remained the question of relieving

Pennsylvania. The enemy's presence there was an indignity keenly

enough felt on all sides, but to none was it such a home-thrust as

to the Pennsylvanians in the Union army, at the head of whom was

Meade himself.[25]

 

[Sidenote: Meade's Plans.]

 

Though Hooker's plan promised excellent results here, Meade was

fearful lest Lee should cross the Susquehanna, and take Harrisburg

before he could be stopped. To prevent this the army must be

pushed forward. Meade, therefore, at once drew back the left wing

toward Frederick, thus giving up that plan in favor of one which

he himself had formed; namely, of throwing the army out more to

the northeast, the better to cover Baltimore from attack, should

that be Lee's purpose, as Meade more than suspected. Selecting

Westminster, therefore, as his base from this time forth, and the

line of Big Pipe Creek, a little to the north of that place, as his

battle-ground, Meade now set most of the army in motion in that

direction, leaving Frederick to the protection of a rear-guard.

 

[Sidenote: Left Flank Forward.]

 

[Sidenote: Right Flank refused.]

 

The army now marched with its left wing thrown forward toward South

Mountain, Buford's cavalry toward Fairfield, to clear that flank,

the First and Eleventh Corps toward Emmettsburg, the Third and

Twelfth toward Middleburg, the Fifth to Taneytown, the Second to

Uniontown, and the Sixth, on the extreme right, to New Windsor.

 

Two other divisions of Union cavalry, Kilpatrick's and Gregg's,

marched one on the right flank, the other in front, with orders to

keep the front and flanks of the army well scouted and protected.

 

It will be seen from this order of march that, in proportion as

they went forward, Buford's cavalry, with the three infantry corps

forming the left wing, were approaching the enemy's main body at

Chambersburg. South Mountain was, therefore, the wall behind which

the two contending armies were playing at hide-and-seek.[26]

 

[Sidenote: Lee hears Meade is coming.]

 

Lee had only just given orders for his whole force to move on

Harrisburg, when, late in the night of the 28th, a scout brought

news to him of the Union army being across the Potomac, and on

the march toward South Mountain.[27] This report could not fail

to throw the Confederate headquarters into a fever of excitement,

ignorant to that hour of that army's being across the Potomac. The

mystery was cleared up at last. In a moment the plan of campaign

was changed.[28] Lee soon said to some of the officers about

him, "To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we

expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade

is about."

 

[Sidenote: March on Gettysburg begun.]

 

By placing himself on the direct road to Baltimore, Lee's purpose of

first drawing the Union army away from his line of retreat, and of

then assailing it on its own, stands fully revealed. The previous

orders were therefore countermanded on the spot. Hill and Longstreet

were ordered from Chambersburg to Gettysburg,[29] Ewell was called

back from Carlisle, and Early from York.

 

[Sidenote: Faulty Tactics.]

 

If Meade had known Lee's whereabouts, it is safe to assume that

the Union army would have been massed toward its left rather than

its right; and if Lee had been correctly informed on his part, it

is unlikely that he would have risked throwing his columns out at

random against the Union army, as he was now doing. Only the fatuity

of the Union generals saved Lee's vanguard on the 1st of July. Yet

he held the very important advantage of having already begun the

concentration of his army--an easy thing for him to do, inasmuch as

but one of his three corps was separated from the others--before

Meade discovered by chance what was so near proving his ruin. One

day's march would bring all three up within supporting distances,

two in position for giving battle.

 

[Sidenote: Confederate Positions June 29th.]

 

Heth's division of Hill's Corps got as far as Cashtown, eight miles

from Gettysburg, on the 29th; Rodes' division of Ewell's Corps

was coming down by the direct road from Carlisle, east of South

Mountain; Early's division of this corps began its march back

from York to Gettysburg on the morning of the 30th. These three

divisions, or one-third of Lee's whole army, therefore, formed the

enemy's vanguard which would first strike an approaching force. But,

as we have seen, the whole army was in march behind it, and by the

next day well closed up on the advance.

 

Leaving them to pursue their march, which was by no means hurried,

let us, to borrow Lee's very expressive phrase, "see what General

Meade was about."

 

[Sidenote: Union Positions June 30th.]

 

On the 29th all seven of the Union corps were advancing northward

like fingers spread apart, and exactly in an inverse order from

Lee's three, which were converging on the palm of the hand. On the

30th this divergent order of march continued to conduct the corps

still farther apart, with the result also, considering Gettysburg

as the ultimate point of concentration, that the bulk of the army

was away off to the right of Gettysburg.[30] Moreover, Meade's

efforts to get the army up to this position, or in front of his

chosen line of defence on Pipe Creek, had covered the roads with

stragglers, and compelled at least one corps to halt for nearly a whole day.