2015년 7월 29일 수요일

The Battle of Gettysburg 4

The Battle of Gettysburg 4


FIRST EFFECTS OF THE INVASION
 
 
Meantime, from before and behind the Confederate columns, two
streams flowed out of the doomed valley: one to the north, an army
of fugitives hurrying their flocks, herds, and household goods out
of the enemy's reach; the other carrying off to Virginia the plunder
of towns and villages.
 
[Sidenote: Harrisburg alarmed.]
 
As the swarm of fugitives made straight for Harrisburg, it was
but natural that the inpouring of such panic-stricken throngs,
all declaring that the enemy was close behind them, should throw
that city into the wildest commotion, which every hour tended to
increase. We will let an eye-witness describe the events of a single
day.
 
"The morning broke upon a populace all astir, who had been called
out of bed by the beat of the alarming drum, the blast of the bugle,
and the clanging of bells. The streets were lively with men, who
were either returning from a night's work on the fortifications or
going over to relieve those who were toiling there. As the sun rose
higher the excitement gathered head. All along the streets were
omnibuses, wagons, and wheelbarrows, taking in trunks and valuables
and rushing them down to the dépôt to be shipped out of rebel
range. The stores, the female seminaries, and almost every private
residence were busy all of the forenoon in swelling the mountain
of freight that lay at the dépôt. Every horse was impressed into
service and every porter groaned beneath his burdens.
 
[Sidenote: People desert the City.]
 
"The scene at the dépôts was indescribable, if not disgraceful. A
sweltering mass of humanity thronged the platforms, all furious to
escape from the doomed city. At the bridge and across the river
the scene was equally exciting. All through the day a steady
stream of people, on foot and in wagons, young and old, black and
white, was pouring across it from the Cumberland Valley, bearing
with them their household goods and live-stock. Endless trains,
laden with flour, grain, and merchandise, hourly emerged from the
valley and thundered across the bridge and through the city. Miles
of retreating baggage-wagons, filled with calves and sheep tied
together, and great, old-fashioned furnace-wagons loaded with tons
of trunks and boxes, defiled in continuous procession down the 'pike
and across the river, raising a dust as far as the eye could see."
 
[Sidenote: Precautions taken.]
 
It may be added that the records of the State and the money in
the bank-vaults were also removed to places of safety, and the
construction of defensive works was begun, as much, perhaps, with
the purpose of allaying the popular excitement as from any hope of
holding the city against Lee, since Harrisburg was in no condition
either to stand a siege or repel an assault at this time.
 
[Sidenote: Militia hurried to Harrisburg.]
 
The wave of invasion made itself felt even as far as Pittsburg
on the one side and Baltimore on the other.[17] Governor Curtin
promptly called on the people of Pennsylvania to arm and repel the
invader. Yet neither the imminence of the danger nor the stirring
appeal of the executive of the State could arouse them at first. In
the emergency the neighboring States were appealed to for help. In
response the militia of those States were soon hastening toward the
threatened points[18] by every available route; yet it was only too
evident that raw soldiers, no matter how zealous or patriotic, would
prove little hinderance to Lee's marching where he would, or long
dispute with his veterans the possession of Harrisburg were it once
seriously attacked.
 
But where was the army of the Potomac all this time--the army whose
special task it was to stand between this invader and his prey? Must
unarmed citizens be called upon to arise and defend their homes when
a hundred thousand veterans were in the field?
 
[Sidenote: Lee mystified.]
 
[Sidenote: His Cavalry absent.]
 
For more than a week Lee had thus been laying waste a most rich and
fertile section of Pennsylvania at his leisure. Practically, indeed,
the whole State was in his grasp. Would Harrisburg or Philadelphia
be the first fruits of his audacity? The prize was indeed tempting,
the way open. The only real impediment was the Army of the Potomac,
and Lee, too, was now anxiously asking himself what had become of
that army.[19] He had foreseen that it must follow him up; that
every effort would be bent to compass his destruction; and it was
a foregone conclusion that he must fight somewhere, if there was
either enterprise or courage left on the Union side. He had even
calculated on drawing the Union army so far away from fortified
places that its defeat would ensure the fall of Baltimore and
Washington. But as regarding its whereabouts at the present moment,
Lee was completely in the dark. In an evil hour he had allowed the
bulk of his cavalry to run off on a wild-goose chase around the
rear of the Federal army, so that now, in his hour of need, though
without his knowing it, the whole Federal army interposed to prevent
its return.[20] It is quite true that up to this time Stuart, who
led this cavalry, had given so many signal proofs of his dexterity
that Lee was perhaps justified in inferring that if he heard nothing
from Stuart, it was because the Union army was still in Virginia.
And in that belief he was acting.
 
[Sidenote: Among Spies.]
 
Moreover, instead of being among a population eager to give him
every scrap of information, Lee was now among one where every man,
woman, and child was a spy on his own movements. In the absence,
then, of definite knowledge touching the Union army, he decided
to march on Harrisburg with his whole force, and issued orders
accordingly.
 
[Sidenote: Union Army crosses the Potomac.]
 
When there was no longer a shadow of doubt that Lee's whole army was
on the march up the Cumberland Valley, sweeping that valley clean as
it went, the Union army also crossed the Potomac, on the 25th and
26th of June, and at once began moving up east of South Mountain, so
as to discharge the double duty laid upon it all along of keeping
between the enemy and Washington, while at the same time feeling for
him through the gaps of South Mountain as it marched. For this task
the Union general kept his cavalry well in hand, instead of letting
it roam about at will in quest of adventures.
 
[Sidenote: Hooker's Plan.]
 
This order of march threw the left wing out as far as Boonsborough
and Middletown, with Buford's cavalry division watching the passes
by which the enemy would have to defile, should he think of making
an attack from that flank.[21] The rest of the army was halted,
for the moment, around Frederick. The plan of operations, as first
fixed, did not lack in boldness or originality. It was to follow Lee
up the Cumberland Valley with two corps, numbering twenty thousand
men, while the rest of the army should continue its march toward
the enemy on the east side of South Mountain, but within supporting
distance. As this would be doing just what Lee[22] had most reason
to dread, it would seem most in accordance with the rules of war. At
any rate, it initiated a vigorously aggressive campaign.
 
At this critical moment the Union army was, most unexpectedly,
deprived of its head.
 
[Sidenote: Hooker is thwarted.]
 
In its pursuit of Lee this army had been much hampered by divided
counsels, when, if ever united counsels were imperatively called
for, now was the time. Worse still, it had too many commanders,
both civil and military. The President, the Cabinet, the
General-in-Chief (Halleck), and even some others, in addition
to the actual commander, not to speak of the newspapers, had all
taken turns in advising or suggesting what should, or what should
not, be done. United action, sincere and generous co-operation,
as between government and army, were therefore unattainable here.
The government did not trust its general: the general respected
the generalship of the Cabinet most when it was silent. Nobody in
authority seemed willing to grant Hooker what he asked for, let it
be ever so reasonable, or permit him to carry out his own plans
unobstructed, were they ever so promising or brilliant. He could not
get the fifteen or twenty thousand soldiers who were then dawdling
about the camps at Baltimore, Washington, and Alexandria. He was
brusquely snubbed when he asked for leave to break up the post at
Harper's Ferry, when by doing so ten thousand good troops would have
been freed to act against the enemy's line of retreat.
 
Harmony being impossible, Lee seemed likely to triumph through the
dissensions of his enemies.
 
[Sidenote: And leaves the Army.]
 
Mortified at finding himself thus distrusted and overruled, Hooker
threw up the command on the 27th, and on the 28th General Meade
succeeded him. So suddenly was the change brought about, that when
the officer bearing the order awakened Meade out of a sound sleep at
midnight, he thought he was being put in arrest.
 
[Sidenote: Spirit of the Army.]
 
It is asserted by those who had the best means of knowing--indeed,
it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise--that the army had
lost faith in Hooker, and that the men were asking of each other,
"Are we going to have another Chancellorsville?" Be that as it
may, there were few better soldiers in that army than Meade; none,
perhaps, so capable of uniting it at this particular juncture, when
unity was so all-important and yet so lamentably deficient. This
was the third general the army had known within six months, and the
seventh since its formation. It was truly the graveyard of generals;
and each of the disgraced commanders had his following. If, under
these conditions, the Army of the Potomac could still maintain its
efficiency unimpaired, it must have been made of different stuff
from most armies.
 
It was not that the Union soldiers feared to meet Lee's veterans.
Lee might beat the generals, but the soldiers--never! Yet it can
hardly be doubted that repeated defeat had more or less unsettled
their faith in their leaders, if not in themselves; since even the
gods themselves struggle in vain against stupidity.[23]
 
[Sidenote: General Meade.]
 
If the new appointment did not silence all jealousies among the
generals, or infuse great enthusiasm into the rank and file,--and we
are bound to admit that Meade's was not a name to conjure with,--it
is difficult to see how a better selection could have been made, all
things considered. In point of fact, there was no one of commanding
ability to appoint; but every man in the army felt that Meade would
do his best, and that Meade at his best would not fall far behind
the best in the field.
 
Meade could not become the idol of his soldiers, like Lee, because
he was not gifted by nature with that personal magnetism which
attracts men without their knowing why; but he could and did command
unhesitating obedience and respect.
 
[Sidenote: Best-disciplined Army.]
 
In point of discipline, however, the Union army was vastly the
superior of its adversary, and that counts for much; and in spite of
some friction here and there, like a well-oiled machine the army was
now again in motion, with a cool head and steady hand to guide it
on. But as no machine is stronger than its weakest part, it remained to be seen how this one would bear the strain.

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