Principia Ethica 14

Principia Ethica 14

31.= But now let us hear what Mr Spencer says about the application of

Evolution to Ethics.

 

‘I recur,’ he says[6], ‘to the main proposition set forth in these

two chapters, which has, I think, been fully justified. Guided by

the truth that as the conduct with which Ethics deals is part of

conduct at large, conduct at large must be generally understood

before this part can be specially understood; and guided by the

further truth that to understand conduct at large we must understand

the evolution of conduct; we have been led to see that Ethics has

for its subject-matter, that form which universal conduct assumes

during the last stages of its evolution. We have also concluded that

these last stages in the evolution of conduct are those displayed

by the _highest_[7] type of being when he is forced, by increase of

numbers, to live more and more in presence of his fellows. And there

has followed _the corollary that conduct gains ethical sanction_[7]

in proportion as the activities, becoming less and less militant and

more and more industrial, are such as do not necessitate mutual injury

or hindrance, but consist with, and are furthered by, co-operation and

mutual aid.

 

[6] _Data of Ethics_, Chap. II, § 7, _ad fin._

 

[7] The italics are mine.

 

‘These implications of the Evolution-Hypothesis, we shall now see

harmonize with the leading moral ideas men have otherwise reached.’

 

Now, if we are to take the last sentence strictly--if the propositions

which precede it are really thought by Mr Spencer to be _implications_

of the Evolution-Hypothesis--there can be no doubt that Mr Spencer has

committed the naturalistic fallacy. All that the Evolution-Hypothesis

tells us is that certain kinds of conduct are more evolved than others;

and this is, in fact, all that Mr Spencer has attempted to prove in

the two chapters concerned. Yet he tells us that one of the things it

has proved is that _conduct gains ethical sanction_ in proportion as it

displays certain characteristics. What he has tried to prove is only

that, in proportion as it displays those characteristics, it is _more

evolved_. It is plain, then, that Mr Spencer _identifies_ the gaining

of ethical sanction with the being more evolved: this follows strictly

from his words. But Mr Spencer’s language is extremely loose; and we

shall presently see that he seems to regard the view it here implies

as false. We cannot, therefore, take it as Mr Spencer’s definite view

that ‘better’ means nothing but ‘more evolved’; or even that what is

‘more evolved’ is _therefore_ ‘better.’ But we are entitled to urge

that he is influenced by these views, and therefore by the naturalistic

fallacy. It is only by the assumption of such influence that we can

explain his confusion as to what he has really proved, and the absence

of any attempt to prove, what he says he has proved, that conduct

which is more evolved is better. We shall look in vain for any attempt

to shew that ‘ethical sanction’ is in proportion to ‘evolution,’ or

that it is the ‘highest’ type of being which displays the most evolved

conduct; yet Mr Spencer concludes that this is the case. It is only

fair to assume that he is not sufficiently conscious how much these

propositions stand in need of proof--what a very different thing is

being ‘more evolved’ from being ‘higher’ or ‘better.’ It may, of

course, be true that what is more evolved is also higher and better.

But Mr Spencer does not seem aware that to assert the one is in any

case not the same thing as to assert the other. He argues at length

that certain kinds of conduct are ‘more evolved,’ and then informs

us that he has proved them to gain ethical sanction in proportion,

without any warning that he has omitted the most essential step in such

a proof. Surely this is sufficient evidence that he does not see how

essential that step is.

 

 

=32.= Whatever be the degree of Mr Spencer’s own guilt, what has

just been said will serve to illustrate the kind of fallacy which

is constantly committed by those who profess to ‘base’ Ethics on

Evolution. But we must hasten to add that the view which Mr Spencer

elsewhere most emphatically recommends is an utterly different one. It

will be useful briefly to deal with this, in order that no injustice

may be done to Mr Spencer. The discussion will be instructive partly

from the lack of clearness, which Mr Spencer displays, as to the

relation of this view to the ‘evolutionistic’ one just described; and

partly because there is reason to suspect that in this view also he is

influenced by the naturalistic fallacy.

 

We have seen that, at the end of his second chapter, Mr Spencer seems

to announce that he has already proved certain characteristics of

conduct to be a measure of its ethical value. He seems to think that

he has proved this merely by considering the evolution of conduct; and

he has certainly not given any such proof, unless we are to understand

that ‘more evolved’ is a mere synonym for ‘ethically better.’ He

now promises merely to _confirm_ this certain conclusion by shewing

that it ‘harmonizes with the leading moral ideas men have otherwise

reached.’ But, when we turn to his third chapter, we find that what

he actually does is something quite different. He here asserts that

to establish the conclusion ‘Conduct is better in proportion as it

is more evolved’ an entirely new proof is necessary. That conclusion

will be _false_, unless a certain proposition, of which we have heard

nothing so far, is true--unless it be true that life is _pleasant_ on

the whole. And the ethical proposition, for which he claims the support

of the ‘leading moral ideas’ of mankind, turns out to be that ‘life

is good or bad, according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus

of agreeable feeling’ (§ 10). Here, then, Mr Spencer appears, not as

an Evolutionist, but as a Hedonist, in Ethics. No conduct is better,

_because_ it is more evolved. Degree of evolution can at most be a

_criterion_ of ethical value; and it will only be that, if we can prove

the extremely difficult generalisation that the more evolved is always,

on the whole, the pleasanter. It is plain that Mr Spencer here rejects

the naturalistic identification of ‘better’ with ‘more evolved’;

but it is possible that he is influenced by another naturalistic

identification--that of ‘good’ with ‘pleasant.’ It is possible that Mr

Spencer is a naturalistic Hedonist.

 

 

=33.= Let us examine Mr Spencer’s own words. He begins this third

chapter by an attempt to shew that _we call_ ‘good the acts conducive

to life, in self or others, and bad those which directly or indirectly

tend towards death, special or general’ (§ 9). And then he asks: ‘Is

there any assumption made’ in so calling them? ‘Yes’; he answers,

‘an assumption of extreme significance has been made--an assumption

underlying all moral estimates. The question to be definitely raised

and answered before entering on any ethical discussion, is the question

of late much agitated--Is life worth living? Shall we take the

pessimist view? or shall we take the optimist view?... On the answer

to this question depends every decision concerning the goodness or

badness of conduct.’ But Mr Spencer does not immediately proceed to

give the answer. Instead of this, he asks another question: ‘But now,

have these irreconcilable opinions [pessimist and optimist] anything

in common?’ And this question he immediately answers by the statement:

‘Yes, there is one postulate in which pessimists and optimists agree.

Both their arguments assume it to be self-evident that life is good or

bad, according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable

feeling’ (§ 10). It is to the defence of this statement that the rest

of the chapter is devoted; and at the end Mr Spencer formulates his

conclusion in the following words: ‘No school can avoid taking for the

ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever

name--gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at

some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the

conception’ (§ 16 _ad fin._).

 

Now in all this, there are two points to which I wish to call

attention. The first is that Mr Spencer does not, after all, tell us

clearly what he takes to be the relation of Pleasure and Evolution in

ethical theory. Obviously he should mean that pleasure is the _only_

intrinsically desirable thing; that other good things are ‘good’ only

in the sense that they are means to its existence. Nothing but this

can properly be meant by asserting it to be ‘_the_ ultimate moral

aim,’ or, as he subsequently says (§ 62 _ad fin._), ‘_the_ ultimately

supreme end.’ And, if this were so, it would follow that the more

evolved conduct was better than the less evolved, only because, and in

proportion as, it gave more pleasure. But Mr Spencer tells us that two

conditions are, taken together, _sufficient_ to prove the more evolved

conduct better: (1) That it should tend to produce more life; (2) That

life should be worth living or contain a balance of pleasure. And the

point I wish to emphasise is that if these conditions are sufficient,

then pleasure cannot be the sole good. For though to produce more life

is, if the second of Mr Spencer’s propositions be correct, _one way_ of

producing more pleasure, it is not the only way. It is quite possible

that a small quantity of life, which was more intensely and uniformly

present, should give a greater quantity of pleasure than the greatest

possible quantity of life that was only just ‘worth living.’ And in

that case, on the hedonistic supposition that pleasure is the only

thing worth having, we should have to prefer the smaller quantity of

life and therefore, according to Mr Spencer, the less evolved conduct.

Accordingly, if Mr Spencer is a true Hedonist, the fact that life gives

a balance of pleasure is _not_, as he seems to think, sufficient to

prove that the more evolved conduct is the better. If Mr Spencer means

us to understand that it _is_ sufficient, then his view about pleasure

can only be, not that it is the sole good or ‘ultimately supreme end,’

but that a balance of it is a necessary constituent of the supreme end.

In short, Mr Spencer seems to maintain that more life is decidedly

better than less, _if only_ it give a balance of pleasure: and that

contention is inconsistent with the position that pleasure is ‘_the_

ultimate moral aim.’ Mr Spencer implies that of two quantities of life,

which gave an equal amount of pleasure, the larger would nevertheless

be preferable to the less. And if this be so, then he must maintain

that quantity of life or degree of evolution is itself an ultimate

condition of value. He leaves us, therefore, in doubt whether he is

not still retaining the Evolutionistic proposition, that the more

evolved is better, simply because it is more evolved, alongside of

the Hedonistic proposition, that the more pleasant is better, simply

because it is more pleasant.

 

But the second question which we have to ask is: What reasons has Mr

Spencer for assigning to pleasure the position which he does assign

to it? He tells us, we saw, that the ‘arguments’ both of pessimists

and of optimists ‘assume it to be self-evident that life is good or

bad, according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable

feeling’; and he betters this later by telling us that ‘since avowed or

implied pessimists, and optimists of one or other shade, taken together