Principia Ethica 36

Principia Ethica 36

described. We must be able to prove that the disposition or action in

question is generally better as a means than any alternatives possible

and likely to occur; and this we shall only be able to prove for

particular states of society: what is a virtue or a duty in one state

of society may not be so in another.

 

 

=104.= But there is another question with regard to virtues and duties

which must be settled by intuition alone--by the properly guarded

method which was explained in discussing Hedonism. This is the question

whether the dispositions and actions, commonly regarded (rightly or

not) as virtues or duties, are good in themselves; whether they have

intrinsic value. Virtue or the exercise of virtue has very commonly

been asserted by moralists to be either the sole good, or, at least,

the best of goods. Indeed, so far as moralists have discussed the

question what is good in itself at all, they have generally assumed

that it must be either virtue or pleasure. It would hardly have been

possible that such a gross difference of opinion should exist, or that

it should have been assumed the discussion _must_ be limited to two

such alternatives, if the meaning of the question had been clearly

apprehended. And we have already seen that the meaning of the question

has hardly ever been clearly apprehended. Almost all ethical writers

have committed the naturalistic fallacy--they have failed to perceive

that the notion of intrinsic value is simple and unique; and almost all

have failed, in consequence, to distinguish clearly between means and

end--they have discussed, as if it were simple and unambiguous, the

question, ‘What ought we to do?’ or ‘What ought to exist now?’ without

distinguishing whether the reason why a thing ought to be done or to

exist now, is that it is itself possessed of intrinsic value, or that

it is a means to what has intrinsic value. We shall, therefore, be

prepared to find that virtue has as little claim to be considered the

sole or chief good as pleasure; more especially after seeing that, so

far as definition goes, to call a thing a virtue is merely to declare

that it is a means to good. The advocates of virtue have, we shall see,

this superiority over the Hedonists, that inasmuch as virtues are very

complex mental facts, there are included in them many things which are

good in themselves and good in a much higher degree than pleasure.

The advocates of Hedonism, on the other hand, have the superiority

that their method emphasizes the distinction between means and ends;

although they have not apprehended the distinction clearly enough to

perceive that the special ethical predicate, which they assign to

pleasure as _not_ being a mere means, must also apply to many other

things.

 

 

=105.= With regard, then, to the intrinsic value of virtue, it may be

stated broadly: (1) that the majority of dispositions, which we call

by that name, and which really do conform to the definition, so far as

that they are dispositions generally valuable as means, at least in our

society, have no intrinsic value whatever; and (2) that no one element

which is contained in the minority, nor even all the different elements

put together, can without gross absurdity be regarded as the sole good.

As to the second point it may be observed that even those who hold the

view that the sole good is to be found in virtue, almost invariably

hold other views contradictory of this, owing chiefly to a failure to

analyse the meaning of ethical concepts. The most marked instance of

this inconsistency is to be found in the common Christian conception

that virtue, though the sole good, can yet be rewarded by something

other than virtue. Heaven is commonly considered as the reward of

virtue; and yet it is also commonly considered, that, in order to be

such a reward, it must contain some element, called happiness, which

is certainly not completely identical with the mere exercise of those

virtues which it rewards. But if so, then something which is not virtue

must be either good in itself or an element in what has most intrinsic

value. It is not commonly observed that if a thing is really to be a

reward, it must be something good in itself: it is absurd to talk of

rewarding a person by giving him something, which is less valuable than

what he already has or which has no value at all. Thus Kant’s view that

virtue renders us _worthy_ of happiness is in flagrant contradiction

with the view, which he implies and which is associated with his name,

that a Good Will is the only thing having intrinsic value. It does

not, indeed, entitle us to make the charge sometimes made, that Kant

is, inconsistently, an Eudaemonist or Hedonist: for it does not imply

that happiness is the sole good. But it does imply that the Good Will

is _not_ the sole good: that a state of things in which we are both

virtuous and happy is better in itself than one in which the happiness

is absent.

 

 

=106.= In order, however, justly to consider the claims of virtue to

intrinsic value, it is necessary to distinguish several very different

mental states, all of which fall under the general definition that they

are habitual dispositions to perform duties. We may thus distinguish

three very different states, all of which are liable to be confused

with one another, upon each of which different moral systems have laid

great stress, and for each of which the claim has been made that it

alone constitutes virtue, and, by implication, that it is the sole

good. We may first of all distinguish between (_a_) that permanent

characteristic of mind, which consists in the fact that the performance

of duty has become in the strict sense a habit, like many of the

operations performed in the putting on of clothes, and (_b_) that

permanent characteristic, which consists in the fact that what may be

called good motives habitually help to cause the performance of duties.

And in the second division we may distinguish between the habitual

tendency to be actuated by one motive, namely, the desire to do duty

for duty’s sake, and all other motives, such as love, benevolence, etc.

We thus get the three kinds of virtue, of which we are now to consider

the intrinsic value.

 

(_a_) There is no doubt that a man’s character may be such that he

habitually performs certain duties, without the thought ever occurring

to him, when he wills them, either that they are duties or that any

good will result from them. Of such a man we cannot and do not refuse

to say that he possesses the virtue consisting in the disposition to

perform those duties. I, for instance, am honest in the sense that

I habitually abstain from any of the actions legally qualified as

thieving, even where some other persons would be strongly tempted to

commit them. It would be grossly contrary to common usage to deny

that, for this reason, I really have the virtue of honesty: it is

quite certain that I have an habitual disposition to perform a duty.

And that as many people as possible should have a like disposition

is, no doubt, of great utility: it is good as a means. Yet I may

safely assert that neither my various performances of this duty, nor

my disposition to perform them, have the smallest intrinsic value.

It is because the majority of instances of virtue seem to be of this

nature, that we may venture to assert that virtues have, in general,

no intrinsic value whatsoever. And there seems good reason to think

that the more generally they are of this nature the more useful they

are; since a great economy of labour is effected when a useful action

becomes habitual or instinctive. But to maintain that a virtue, which

includes no more than this, is good in itself is a gross absurdity. And

of this gross absurdity, it may be observed, the Ethics of Aristotle is

guilty. For his definition of virtue does not exclude a disposition to

perform actions in this way, whereas his descriptions of the particular

virtues plainly _include_ such actions: that an action, in order to

exhibit virtue, must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα is a qualification which

he allows often to drop out of sight. And, on the other hand, he seems

certainly to regard the exercise of _all_ virtues as an end in itself.

His treatment of Ethics is indeed, in the most important points, highly

unsystematic and confused, owing to his attempt to base it on the

naturalistic fallacy; for strictly we should be obliged by his words

to regard θεωρία as the _only_ thing good in itself, in which case

the goodness which he attributes to the practical virtues cannot be

intrinsic value; while on the other hand he does not seem to regard

it merely as utility, since he makes no attempt to shew that they are

means to θεωρία. But there seems no doubt that on the whole he regards

the exercise of the practical virtues as a good of the same kind as

(_i.e._ having intrinsic value), only in a less degree than, θεωρία; so

that he cannot avoid the charge that he recommends as having intrinsic

value, such instances of the exercise of virtue as we are at present

discussing--instances of a disposition to perform actions which, in

the modern phrase, have merely an ‘external rightness.’ That he is

right in applying the word ‘virtue’ to such a disposition cannot be

doubted. But the protest against the view that ‘external rightness’ is

sufficient to constitute either ‘duty’ or ‘virtue’--a protest which is

commonly, and with some justice, attributed as a merit to Christian

morals--seems, in the main, to be a mistaken way of pointing out an

important truth: namely, that where there is only ‘external rightness’

there is certainly no intrinsic value. It is commonly assumed (though

wrongly) that to call a thing a virtue means that it has intrinsic

value: and on this assumption the view that virtue does not consist

in a mere disposition to do externally right actions does really

constitute an advance in ethical truth beyond the Ethics of Aristotle.

The inference that, if virtue includes in its meaning ‘good in itself,’

then Aristotle’s definition of virtue is not adequate and expresses a

false ethical judgment, is perfectly correct: only the premiss that

virtue does include this in its meaning is mistaken.

 

 

=107.= (_b_) A man’s character may be such that, when he habitually

performs a particular duty, there is, in each case of his performance,

present in his mind, a love of some intrinsically good consequence

which he expects to produce by his action or a hatred of some

intrinsically evil consequence which he hopes to prevent by it. In

such a case this love or hatred will generally be part cause of his

action, and we may then call it one of his _motives_. Where such a

feeling as this is present habitually in the performance of duties, it

cannot be denied that the state of the man’s mind, in performing it,

contains something intrinsically good. Nor can it be denied that, where

a disposition to perform duties consists in the disposition to be moved

to them by such feelings, we call that disposition a virtue. Here,

therefore, we have instances of virtue, the exercise of which really

contains something that is good in itself. And, in general, we may say

that wherever a virtue does consist in a disposition to have certain