Principia Ethica 39

Principia Ethica 39

nor yet that, if it were directed to a different object, the whole thus

formed might not be positively bad. And, in fact, it seems to be the

case that if we distinguish the emotional element, in any aesthetic

appreciation, from the cognitive element, which accompanies it and

is, in fact, commonly thought of as a part of the emotion; and if

we consider what value this emotional element would have, _existing

by itself_, we can hardly think that it has any great value, even

if it has any at all. Whereas, if the same emotion be directed to a

different object, if, for instance, it is felt towards an object that

is positively ugly, the whole state of consciousness is certainly often

positively bad in a high degree.

 

 

=115.= (2) In the last paragraph I have pointed out the two facts,

that the presence of some emotion is necessary to give any very high

value to a state of aesthetic appreciation, and that, on the other

hand, this same emotion, in itself, may have little or no value: it

follows that these emotions give to the wholes of which they form a

part a value far greater than that which they themselves possess.

The same is obviously true of the cognitive element which must be

combined with these emotions in order to form these highly valuable

wholes; and the present paragraph will attempt to define what is meant

by this cognitive element, so far as to guard against a possible

misunderstanding. When we talk of seeing a beautiful object, or, more

generally, of the cognition or consciousness of a beautiful object,

we may mean by these __EXPRESSION__s something which forms no part of

any valuable whole. There is an ambiguity in the use of the term

‘object,’ which has probably been responsible for as many enormous

errors in philosophy and psychology as any other single cause. This

ambiguity may easily be detected by considering the proposition, which,

though a contradiction in terms, is obviously true: That when a man

sees a beautiful picture, he may see nothing beautiful whatever. The

ambiguity consists in the fact that, by the ‘object’ of vision (or

cognition), may be meant _either_ the qualities actually seen _or_ all

the qualities possessed by the thing seen. Thus in our case: when it

is said that the picture is beautiful, it is meant that it contains

qualities which are beautiful; when it is said that the man sees the

picture, it is meant that he sees a great number of the qualities

contained in the picture; and when it is said that, nevertheless,

he sees nothing beautiful, it is meant that he does _not_ see those

qualities of the picture which are beautiful. When, therefore, I speak

of the cognition of a beautiful object, as an essential element in a

valuable aesthetic appreciation, I must be understood to mean only the

cognition of _the beautiful qualities_ possessed by that object, and

_not_ the cognition of other qualities of the object possessing them.

And this distinction must itself be carefully distinguished from the

other distinction expressed above by the distinct terms ‘seeing the

beauty of a thing’ and ‘seeing its beautiful qualities.’ By ‘seeing

the beauty of a thing’ we commonly mean the having an emotion towards

its beautiful qualities; whereas in the ‘seeing of its beautiful

qualities’ we do not include any emotion. By the cognitive element,

which is equally necessary with emotion to the existence of a valuable

appreciation, I mean merely the actual cognition or consciousness of

any or all of an object’s _beautiful qualities_--that is to say any or

all of those elements in the object which possess any positive beauty.

That such a cognitive element is essential to a valuable whole may be

easily seen, by asking: What value should we attribute to the proper

emotion excited by hearing Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, if that emotion

were entirely unaccompanied by any consciousness, either of the notes,

or of the melodic and harmonic relations between them? And that the

mere _hearing_ of the Symphony, even accompanied by the appropriate

emotion, is not sufficient, may be easily seen, if we consider what

would be the state of a man, who should hear all the notes, but should

_not_ be aware of any of those melodic and harmonic relations, which

are necessary to constitute the smallest beautiful elements in the

Symphony.

 

 

=116.= (3) Connected with the distinction just made between ‘object’

in the sense of the qualities actually before the mind, and ‘object’

in the sense of the whole thing which possesses the qualities actually

before the mind, is another distinction of the utmost importance for

a correct analysis of the constituents necessary to a valuable whole.

It is commonly and rightly thought that to see beauty in a thing which

has no beauty is in some way inferior to seeing beauty in that which

really has it. But under this single description of ‘seeing beauty

in that which has no beauty,’ two very different facts, and facts

of very different value, may be included. We may mean _either_ the

attribution to an object of really beautiful qualities which it does

not possess _or_ the feeling towards qualities, which the object does

possess but which are in reality not beautiful, an emotion which is

appropriate only to qualities really beautiful. Both these facts are

of very frequent occurrence; and in most instances of emotion both

no doubt occur together: but they are obviously quite distinct, and

the distinction is of the utmost importance for a correct estimate of

values. The former may be called an error of judgment, and the latter

an error of taste; but it is important to observe that the ‘error

of taste’ commonly involves a false judgment _of value_; whereas the

‘error of judgment’ is merely a false judgment _of fact_.

 

Now the case which I have called an error of taste, namely, where the

actual qualities we admire (whether possessed by the ‘object’ or not)

are ugly, can in any case have no value, except such as may belong

to the emotion _by itself_; and in most, if not in all, cases it is

a considerable positive evil. In this sense, then, it is undoubtedly

right to think that seeing beauty in a thing which has no beauty is

inferior in value to seeing beauty where beauty really is. But the

other case is much more difficult. In this case there is present all

that I have hitherto mentioned as necessary to constitute a great

positive good: there is a cognition of qualities really beautiful,

together with an appropriate emotion towards these qualities. There

can, therefore, be no doubt that we have here a great positive good.

But there is present also something else; namely, a belief that these

beautiful qualities exist, and that they exist in a certain relation

to other things--namely, to some properties of the object to which

we attribute these qualities: and further the object of this belief

is false. And we may ask, with regard to the whole thus constituted,

whether the presence of the belief, and the fact that what is believed

is false, make any difference to its value? We thus get three different

cases of which it is very important to determine the relative values.

Where both the cognition of beautiful qualities and the appropriate

emotion are present we may _also_ have either, (1) a belief in the

existence of these qualities, of which the object, _i.e._ that they

exist, is true: or (2) a mere cognition, without belief, when it is

(_a_) true, (_b_) false, that the object of the cognition, _i.e._ the

beautiful qualities, exists: or (3) a belief in the existence of the

beautiful qualities, when they do not exist. The importance of these

cases arises from the fact that the second defines the pleasures of

imagination, including a great part of the appreciation of those

works of art which are _representative_; whereas the first contrasts

with these the appreciation of what is beautiful in Nature, and the

human affections. The third, on the other hand, is contrasted with

both, in that it is chiefly exemplified in what is called misdirected

affection; and it is possible also that the love of God, in the case of

a believer, should fall under this head.

 

 

=117.= Now all these three cases, as I have said, have something in

common, namely, that, in them all, we have a cognition of really

beautiful qualities together with an appropriate emotion towards

those qualities. I think, therefore, it cannot be doubted (nor is it

commonly doubted) that all three include great positive goods; they

are all things of which we feel convinced that they are worth having

for their own sakes. And I think that the value of the second, in

either of its two subdivisions, is precisely the same as the value

of the element common to all three. In other words, in the case of

purely imaginative appreciations we have merely the cognition of really

beautiful qualities together with the appropriate emotion; and the

question, whether the object cognised exists or not, seems here, where

there is no belief either in its existence or in its non-existence, to

make absolutely no difference to the value of the total state. But it

seems to me that the two other cases do differ in intrinsic value both

from this one and from one another, even though the object cognised and

the appropriate emotion should be identical in all three cases. I think

that the additional presence of a belief in the reality of the object

makes the total state much better, if the belief is true; and worse,

if the belief is false. In short, where there is belief, in the sense

in which we _do_ believe in the existence of Nature and horses, and do

_not_ believe in the existence of an ideal landscape and unicorns, the

_truth_ of what is believed does make a great difference to the value

of the organic whole. If this be the case, we shall have vindicated

the belief that _knowledge_, in the ordinary sense, as distinguished

on the one hand from belief in what is false and on the other from

the mere awareness of what is true, does contribute towards intrinsic

value--that, at least in some cases, its presence as a part makes a

whole more valuable than it could have been without.

 

Now I think there can be no doubt that we do judge that there is

a difference of value, such as I have indicated, between the three

cases in question. We do think that the emotional contemplation of a

natural scene, supposing its qualities equally beautiful, is in some

way a better state of things than that of a painted landscape: we

think that the world would be improved if we could substitute for the

best works of representative art _real_ objects equally beautiful. And

similarly we regard a misdirected affection or admiration, even where

the error involved is a mere error of judgment and not an error of

taste, as in some way unfortunate. And further, those, at least, who

have a strong respect for truth, are inclined to think that a merely

poetical contemplation of the Kingdom of Heaven _would_ be superior

to that of the religious believer, _if_ it were the case that the

Kingdom of Heaven does not and will not really exist. Most persons,

on a sober, reflective judgment, would feel some hesitation even in

preferring the felicity of a madman, convinced that the world was

ideal, to the condition either of a poet imagining an ideal world, or

of themselves enjoying and appreciating the lesser goods which do and

will exist: But, in order to assure ourselves that these judgments are

really judgments of intrinsic value upon the question before us, and

to satisfy ourselves that they are correct, it is necessary clearly to

distinguish our question from two others which have a very important

bearing upon our total judgment of the cases in question.

 

 

=118.= In the first place (_a_) it is plain that, where we believe, the