Commodore Paul Jones 22

Commodore Paul Jones 22

On the 21st, off the southwest coast of Ireland, they captured a brig,

the Mayflower, loaded with butter, which was also manned and sent in.

On the 23d they rounded Cape Clear, the extreme southwestern point of

Ireland. The day being calm, Jones manned his boats and sent them

inshore to capture a brigantine. The ship, not having steerage way,

began to drift in toward the dangerous shore after the departure of

the boats, and it became necessary to haul her head offshore, for

which purpose the captain's barge was sent ahead with a towline. As

the shades of evening descended, the crew of the barge, who were

apparently English, took advantage of the absence of the other boats

and the opportunity presented, to cut the towline and desert. As they

made for the shore, Mr. Cutting Lunt, third lieutenant, with four

marines, jumped into a small boat remaining, and chased the fugitives

without orders; but, pursuing them too far from the ship, a fog came

down which caused him to lose his bearings, and prevented him from

joining the Richard that night.

 

The crew of a commodore's barge, like the crew of a captain's gig, is

usually made up of picked men, and the character of the Richard's crew

is well indicated by this desertion. The other boats luckily managed

to rejoin the Richard, after succeeding in cutting out the brigantine.

The ships beat to and fro off the coast until the next day, when the

captains assembled on the Richard. Landais behaved outrageously on

this occasion. He reproached Jones in the most abusive manner, as if

the desertion of the barge and the loss of the two boats was due to

negligence on his part. One can imagine with what grim silence the

irate little American listened to the absurd tirade, and in what

strong control he held himself to keep from arresting Landais where he

stood. It gives us a vivid picture of the situation of the fleet to

find that Jones was actually compelled to consult with his captains

and obtain the consent of de Varage before he could order the Cerf to

reconnoiter the coast, if possible to find the two boats and their

crews.

 

Thus, as Commodore Mackenzie, himself a naval officer, grimly remarks:

 

 

"Before giving orders of indispensable necessity, as a superior

officer, we find him taking the advice of one captain and obtaining

the consent and approbation of another."

 

 

But we may be sure that it was only dire necessity that required such

a course of action. Evidently the situation was not to the liking of

the commodore, but it was one that he could not remedy.

 

As the Cerf approached the shore to reconnoiter, she hoisted the

English colors to disguise her nationality, and was seen by Mr. Lunt,

who had evidently overtaken the deserters. Mistaking her character, he

pulled in toward the shore to escape the fancied danger, and was

easily captured by the English with the two boats and their crews. By

this unfortunate mishap the Richard lost two of her boats, containing

an officer and twenty-two men. The Cerf, losing sight of the squadron

in the evening, turned tail and went back to France, instead of

proceeding to the first of the various rendezvous which had been

agreed upon. The Granvelle, having made a prize on her own account,

took advantage of her entirely independent position and the fact that

she was far away from the Richard to disregard signals and make off

with her capture. This reduced the squadron to the Richard, Alliance,

Pallas, and Vengeance. It was Jones' desire to cruise to and fro off

the harbor of Limerick to intercept the West Indian ships, which, to

the number of eight or ten, were daily expected. These vessels, richly

laden, were of great value, and their capture could have easily been

effected, but Landais protested vehemently against remaining in any

one spot. Among other things, the Frenchman was undoubtedly a coward,

and, of course, by remaining steadily in one place opportunities for

being overhauled were greatly increased. Jones finally succumbed to

Landais' entreaties and protestations, which were backed up by those

of Captains Cottineau and Ricot.

 

Of course, it is impossible to say how far his authority would have

lasted had he peremptorily refused to accede to their demands, as

paper concordats are not very binding ties; but he might perhaps have

made a more determined effort to induce them to carry out his plans

and remain with him. To leave the position he had chosen, which

presented such opportunities, was undoubtedly an error in judgment,

and Jones tacitly admits it in the following words, written long

afterward:

 

 

"Nothing prevented me from pursuing my design but the reproach that

would have been cast upon my character as a man of prudence.[11] It

would have been said: 'Was he not forewarned by Captain Cottineau and

others?'"

 

The excuse is as bad as, if not worse than, the decision. But this is

almost the only evidence of weakness and irresolution which appears in

Jones' conduct in all the emergencies in which he was thrown. It is

impossible to justify this action, but, in view of the circumstances,

which we can only imagine and hardly adequately comprehend, we need

not censure him too greatly for his indecision. In fact, the decision

itself was a mistake which the ablest of men might naturally make. The

weakness lay in the excuse which he himself offers, and which it pains

one to read. In this connection the noble comment of Captain Mahan is

interesting:

 

 

"The subordination of public enterprises to considerations of personal

consequences, even to reputation, is a declension from the noblest in

a public man. Not life only, but personal credit, is to be fairly

risked for the attainment of public ends."

 

 

It can not be said that Jones was altogether disinterested in his

actions. The mere common, vulgar, mercenary motives were absent from

his undertakings, but it must be admitted that he never lost sight of

the results, not only to his country and its success, but to his own

reputation as well. If Jones had proceeded in his intention, and

Landais had finally deserted him, the results would have been very

much better for the cruise--always provided that the Pallas at least

remained with the Richard. We shall see later on that all the ships

deserted him on one occasion.

 

On the 26th of August a heavy gale blew up from the southwest, and

Jones scudded before it to the northward along the Irish coast.

Landais deliberately changed the course of the Alliance in the

darkness, and, the tiller of the Pallas having been carried away

during the night, Jones found himself alone with the Vengeance the

next morning. The gale having abated, these two remaining vessels

continued their course in a leisurely manner along the Irish coast. On

the 31st the Alliance hove in sight, followed by a valuable West

Indiaman called the Betsy, mounting twenty-two guns, which she had

captured--a sample of what might have resulted if the squadron had

stayed off Limerick.

 

The Pallas having also joined company again, on the 1st of September

the Richard brought to the Union, a government armed ship of

twenty-two guns, bound for Halifax with valuable naval stores. Before

boats were called away and the prize taken possession of, with

unparalleled insolence Landais sent a messenger to Jones asking

whether the Alliance should man the prize, in which case he should

allow no man from the Richard to board her! With incredible

complaisance the long-suffering Jones allowed Landais to man this

capture also, while he himself received the prisoners on the Richard.

These two vessels, in violation of Jones' explicit orders, were sent

in to Bergen, Norway, where they were promptly released by the Danish

Government and returned to England on the demand of the British

minister. Their value was estimated at forty thousand pounds sterling.

The unwarranted return of the vessels was the foundation of a claim

for indemnity against Denmark, of which we shall hear later. On the

day of the capture Landais disregarded another specific signal from

the flagship to chase; instead of doing which, he wore ship and headed

directly opposite the direction in which he should have gone. The next

morning he again disregarded a signal to come within hail of the

Richard, on which occasion he did not even set an answering pennant.

 

On September 3d and 4th the squadron captured a brig and two sloops

off the Shetland Islands. On the evening of this day Jones summoned

the captains to the flagship. Landais refused to go, and when de

Cottineau tried to persuade him to do so he became violently abusive,

and declared that the matters at issue between the commodore and

himself were so grave that they could only be settled by a personal

meeting on shore, at which one or the other should forfeit his life.

Fortunately for the peace of mind of the commodore, whose patience had

reached the breaking point, the Alliance immediately after parted

company, and did not rejoin the command until the 23d of September. If

Landais had stayed away altogether, or succeeded in getting himself

lost or captured, it would have been a great advantage to the country.

 

Another gale blew up on the 5th, and heavy weather continued for

several days. The little squadron of three vessels labored along

through the heavy seas to the northward, passed the dangerous Orkneys,

doubled the wild Hebrides, rounded the northern extremity of Scotland,

and on the evening of the 13th approached the east coast near the

Cheviot Hills. On the 14th they arrived off the Firth of Forth, where

they were lucky enough to capture one ship and one brigantine loaded

with coal. From them they learned that the naval force in the harbor

of Leith was inconsiderable, consisting of one twenty-gun sloop of war

and three or four cutters. Jones immediately conceived the idea of

destroying this force, holding the town under his batteries, landing a

force of marines, and exacting a heavy ransom under threat of

destruction.

 

[Illustration: Map showing the cruises of the Ranger and the Bon Homme

Richard, and the dash of the Alliance from the Texel.]

 

Although weakened in force by the desertion of the ships, by the

number of prizes he had manned, and the large number of prisoners on

board the Richard, he still hoped, as he says, to teach English

cruisers the value of humanity on the other side of the water, and by

this bold attack to demonstrate the vulnerability of their own coasts.

He also counted upon this diversion in the north to call attention

from the expected grand invasion in the south of England by the French

and Spanish fleets. The wind was favorable for his design, but

unfortunately the Pallas and the Vengeance, which had lagged as usual,

were some distance in the offing. Jones therefore ran back to meet

them in order to advise them of his plan and concert measures for the

attack. He found that the French had but little stomach for the