Principia Ethica 11

Principia Ethica 11

To say that a thing is an ‘organic whole’ is generally understood

to imply that its parts are related to one another and to itself

as means to end; it is also understood to imply that they have a

property described in some such phrase as that they have ‘no meaning

or significance apart from the whole’; and finally such a whole is

also treated as if it had the property to which I am proposing that

the name should be confined. But those who use the term give us, in

general, no hint as to how they suppose these three properties to be

related to one another. It seems generally to be assumed that they are

identical; and always, at least, that they are necessarily connected

with one another. That they are not identical I have already tried to

shew; to suppose them so is to neglect the very distinctions pointed

out in the last paragraph; and the usage might well be discontinued

merely because it encourages such neglect. But a still more cogent

reason for its discontinuance is that, so far from being necessarily

connected, the second is a property which can attach to nothing, being

a self-contradictory conception; whereas the first, if we insist on its

most important sense, applies to many cases, to which we have no reason

to think that the third applies also, and the third certainly applies

to many to which the first does not apply.

 

 

=21.= These relations between the three properties just distinguished

may be illustrated by reference to a whole of the kind from which

the name ‘organic’ was derived--a whole which is an organism in the

scientific sense--namely the human body.

 

(1) There exists between many parts of our body (though not between

all) a relation which has been familiarised by the fable, attributed

to Menenius Agrippa, concerning the belly and its members. We can

find in it parts such that the continued existence of the one is a

necessary condition for the continued existence of the other; while the

continued existence of this latter is also a necessary condition for

the continued existence of the former. This amounts to no more than

saying that in the body we have instances of two things, both enduring

for some time, which have a relation of mutual causal dependence on one

another--a relation of ‘reciprocity.’ Frequently no more than this is

meant by saying that the parts of the body form an ‘organic unity,’ or

that they are mutually means and ends to one another. And we certainly

have here a striking characteristic of living things. But it would be

extremely rash to assert that this relation of mutual causal dependence

was only exhibited by living things and hence was sufficient to define

their peculiarity. And it is obvious that of two things which have this

relation of mutual dependence, neither may have intrinsic value, or

one may have it and the other lack it. They are not necessarily ‘ends’

to one another in any sense except that in which ‘end’ means ‘effect.’

And moreover it is plain that in this sense the whole cannot be an end

to any of its parts. We are apt to talk of ‘the whole’ in contrast to

one of its parts, when in fact we mean only _the rest_ of the parts.

But strictly the whole must include all its parts and no part can

be a cause of the whole, because it cannot be a cause of itself. It

is plain, therefore, that this relation of mutual causal dependence

implies nothing with regard to the value of either of the objects which

have it; and that, even if both of them happen also to have value, this

relation between them is one which cannot hold between part and whole.

 

But (2) it may also be the case that our body as a whole has a value

greater than the sum of values of its parts; and this may be what is

meant when it is said that the parts are means to the whole. It is

obvious that if we ask the question ‘Why _should_ the parts be such as

they are?’ a proper answer may be ‘Because the whole they form has so

much value.’ But it is equally obvious that the relation which we thus

assert to exist between part and whole is quite different from that

which we assert to exist between part and part when we say ‘This part

exists, because that one could not exist without it.’ In the latter

case we assert the two parts to be causally connected; but, in the

former, part and whole cannot be causally connected, and the relation

which we assert to exist between them may exist even though the parts

are not causally connected either. All the parts of a picture do not

have that relation of mutual causal dependence, which certain parts of

the body have, and yet the existence of those which do not have it may

be absolutely essential to the value of the whole. The two relations

are quite distinct in kind, and we cannot infer the existence of the

one from that of the other. It can, therefore, serve no useful purpose

to include them both under the same name; and if we are to say that

a whole is organic because its parts are (in this sense) ‘means’ to

the whole, we must _not_ say that it is organic because its parts are

causally dependent on one another.

 

 

=22.= But finally (3) the sense which has been most prominent in

recent uses of the term ‘organic whole’ is one whereby it asserts the

parts of such a whole to have a property which the parts of no whole

can possibly have. It is supposed that just as the whole would not

be what it is but for the existence of the parts, so the parts would

not be what they are but for the existence of the whole; and this is

understood to mean not merely that any particular part could not exist

unless the others existed too (which is the case where relation (1)

exists between the parts), but actually that the part is no distinct

object of thought--that the whole, of which it is a part, is in its

turn a part of it. That this supposition is self-contradictory a very

little reflection should be sufficient to shew. We may admit, indeed,

that when a particular thing is a part of a whole, it does possess a

predicate which it would not otherwise possess--namely that it is a

part of that whole. But what cannot be admitted is that this predicate

alters the nature or enters into the definition of the thing which has

it. When we think of the part _itself_, we mean just _that which_ we

assert, in this case, to _have_ the predicate that it is part of the

whole; and the mere assertion that _it_ is a part of the whole involves

that it should itself be distinct from that which we assert of it.

Otherwise we contradict ourselves since we assert that, not _it_, but

something else--namely it together with that which we assert of it--has

the predicate which we assert of it. In short, it is obvious that no

part contains analytically the whole to which it belongs, or any other

parts of that whole. The relation of part to whole is _not_ the same

as that of whole to part; and the very definition of the latter is

that it does contain analytically that which is said to be its part.

And yet this very self-contradictory doctrine is the chief mark which

shews the influence of Hegel upon modern philosophy--an influence which

pervades almost the whole of orthodox philosophy. This is what is

generally implied by the cry against falsification by abstraction: that

a whole is always a part of its part! ‘If you want to know the truth

about a part,’ we are told, ‘you must consider _not_ that part, but

something else--namely the whole: _nothing_ is true of the part, but

only of the whole.’ Yet plainly it must be true of the part at least

that it is a part of the whole; and it is obvious that when we say it

is, we do _not_ mean merely that the whole is a part of itself. This

doctrine, therefore, that a part can have ‘no meaning or significance

apart from its whole’ must be utterly rejected. It implies itself that

the statement ‘This is a part of that whole’ has a meaning; and in

order that this may have one, both subject and predicate must have a

distinct meaning. And it is easy to see how this false doctrine has

arisen by confusion with the two relations (1) and (2) which may really

be properties of wholes.

 

(_a_) The _existence_ of a part may be connected by a natural or

causal necessity with the existence of the other parts of its whole;

and further what is a part of a whole and what has ceased to be such a

part, although differing intrinsically from one another, may be called

by one and the same name. Thus, to take a typical example, if an arm

be cut off from the human body, we still call it an arm. Yet an arm,

when it is a part of the body, undoubtedly differs from a dead arm:

and hence we may easily be led to say ‘The arm which is a part of the

body would not be what it is, if it were not such a part,’ and to think

that the contradiction thus expressed is in reality a characteristic

of things. But, in fact, the dead arm never was a part of the body;

it is only _partially_ identical with the living arm. Those parts of

it which are identical with parts of the living arm are exactly the

same, whether they belong to the body or not; and in them we have an

undeniable instance of one and the same thing at one time forming

a part, and at another not forming a part of the presumed ‘organic

whole.’ On the other hand those properties which _are_ possessed by

the living, and _not_ by the dead, arm, do not exist in a changed form

in the latter: they simply do not exist there _at all_. By a causal

necessity their existence depends on their having that relation to the

other parts of the body which we express by saying that they form part

of it. Yet, most certainly, _if_ they ever did not form part of the

body, they _would_ be exactly what they are when they do. That they

differ intrinsically from the properties of the dead arm and that they

form part of the body are propositions not analytically related to one

another. There is no contradiction in supposing them to retain such

intrinsic differences and yet not to form part of the body.

 

But (_b_) when we are told that a living arm has no _meaning_ or

_significance_ apart from the body to which it belongs, a different

fallacy is also suggested. ‘To have meaning or significance’ is

commonly used in the sense of ‘to have importance’; and this again

means ‘to have value either as a means or as an end.’ Now it is quite

possible that even a living arm, apart from its body, would have no

intrinsic value whatever; although the whole of which it is a part

has great intrinsic value owing to its presence. Thus we may easily

come to say that, _as_ a part of the body, it has great value, whereas

_by itself_ it would have none; and thus that its whole ‘meaning’

lies in its relation to the body. But in fact the value in question

obviously does not belong to _it_ at all. To have value merely as a

part is equivalent to having no value at all, but merely being a part

of that which has it. Owing, however, to neglect of this distinction,

the assertion that a part has value, _as a part_, which it would

not otherwise have, easily leads to the assumption that it is also

different, as a part, from what it would otherwise be; for it is, in

fact, true that two things which have a different value must also

differ in other respects. Hence the assumption that one and the same

thing, because it is a part of a more valuable whole at one time than

at another, therefore has more intrinsic value at one time than at

another, has encouraged the self-contradictory belief that one and the

same thing may be two different things, and that only in one of its

forms is it truly what it is.

 

For these reasons, I shall, where it seems convenient, take the

liberty to use the term ‘organic’ with a special sense. I shall use

it to denote the fact that a whole has an intrinsic value different

in amount from the sum of the values of its parts. I shall use it to