Principia Ethica 12

Principia Ethica 12

the fact that a whole may possess it in a degree different from that

which is obtained by summing the degrees in which its parts possess it

(18-22).

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II.

 

NATURALISTIC ETHICS.

 

 

=24.= It results from the conclusions of Chapter I, that all ethical

questions fall under one or other of three classes. The first class

contains but one question--the question What is the nature of that

peculiar predicate, the relation of which to other things constitutes

the object of all other ethical investigations? or, in other words,

What is _meant_ by good? This first question I have already attempted

to answer. The peculiar predicate, by reference to which the sphere of

Ethics must be defined, is simple, unanalysable, indefinable. There

remain two classes of questions with regard to the relation of this

predicate to other things. We may ask either (1) To what things and

in what degree does this predicate directly attach? What things are

good in themselves? or (2) By what means shall we be able to make what

exists in the world as good as possible? What causal relations hold

between what is best in itself and other things?

 

In this and the two following chapters, I propose to discuss certain

theories, which offer us an answer to the question What is good in

itself? I say advisedly--_an_ answer: for these theories are all

characterised by the fact that, if true, they would simplify the study

of Ethics very much. They all hold that there is only _one_ kind of

fact, of which the existence has any value at all. But they all also

possess another characteristic, which is my reason for grouping them

together and treating them first: namely that the main reason why the

single kind of fact they name has been held to define the sole good,

is that it has been held to define what is meant by ‘good’ itself. In

other words they are all theories of the end or ideal, the adoption of

which has been chiefly caused by the commission of what I have called

the naturalistic fallacy: they all confuse the first and second of the

three possible questions which Ethics can ask. It is, indeed, this fact

which explains their contention that only a single kind of thing is

good. That a thing should be good, it has been thought, _means_ that

it possesses this single property: and hence (it is thought) only what

possesses this property is good. The inference seems very natural; and

yet what is meant by it is self-contradictory. For those who make it

fail to perceive that their conclusion ‘what possesses this property is

good’ is a significant proposition: that it does not mean either ‘what

possesses this property, possesses this property’ or ‘the word “good”

denotes that a thing possesses this property.’ And yet, if it does

_not_ mean one or other of these two things, the inference contradicts

its own premise.

 

I propose, therefore, to discuss certain theories of what is good in

itself, which are _based_ on the naturalistic fallacy, in the sense

that the commission of this fallacy has been the main cause of their

wide acceptance. The discussion will be designed both (1) further to

illustrate the fact that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy, or, in

other words, that we are all aware of a certain simple quality, which

(and not anything else) is what we mainly mean by the term ‘good’;

and (2) to shew that not one, but many different things, possess this

property. For I cannot hope to recommend the doctrine that things which

are good do not owe their goodness to their common possession of any

other property, without a criticism of the main doctrines, opposed

to this, whose power to recommend themselves is proved by their wide

prevalence.

 

 

=25.= The theories I propose to discuss may be conveniently divided

into two groups. The naturalistic fallacy always implies that when

we think ‘This is good,’ what we are thinking is that the thing in

question bears a definite relation to some one other thing. But this

one thing, by reference to which good is defined, may be either

what I may call a natural object--something of which the existence

is admittedly an object of experience--or else it may be an object

which is only inferred to exist in a supersensible real world. These

two types of ethical theory I propose to treat separately. Theories

of the second type may conveniently be called ‘metaphysical,’ and I

shall postpone consideration of them till Chapter IV. In this and

the following chapter, on the other hand, I shall deal with theories

which owe their prevalence to the supposition that good can be defined

by reference to a _natural object_; and these are what I mean by the

name, which gives the title to this chapter, ‘Naturalistic Ethics.’ It

should be observed that the fallacy, by reference to which I define

‘Metaphysical Ethics,’ is the same in kind; and I give it but one name,

the naturalistic fallacy. But when we regard the ethical theories

recommended by this fallacy, it seems convenient to distinguish those

which consider goodness to consist in a relation to something which

exists here and now, from those which do not. According to the former,

Ethics is an empirical or positive science: its conclusions could be

all established by means of empirical observation and induction. But

this is not the case with Metaphysical Ethics. There is, therefore,

a marked distinction between these two groups of ethical theories

based on the same fallacy. And within Naturalistic theories, too, a

convenient division may also be made. There is one natural object,

namely pleasure, which has perhaps been as frequently held to be the

sole good as all the rest put together. And there is, moreover, a

further reason for treating Hedonism separately. That doctrine has, I

think, as plainly as any other, owed its prevalence to the naturalistic

fallacy; but it has had a singular fate in that the writer, who first

clearly exposed the fallacy of the naturalistic arguments by which

it had been attempted to _prove_ that pleasure was the sole good,

has maintained that nevertheless it _is_ the sole good. I propose,

therefore, to divide my discussion of Hedonism from that of other

Naturalistic theories; treating of Naturalistic Ethics in general in

this chapter, and of Hedonism, in particular, in the next.

 

 

=26.= The subject of the present chapter is, then, ethical theories

which declare that no intrinsic value is to be found except in the

possession of some one _natural_ property, other than pleasure; and

which declare this because it is supposed that to be ‘good’ _means_ to

possess the property in question. Such theories I call ‘Naturalistic.’

I have thus appropriated the name Naturalism to a particular method

of approaching Ethics--a method which, strictly understood, is

inconsistent with the possibility of any Ethics whatsoever. This

method consists in substituting for ‘good’ some one property of a

natural object or of a collection of natural objects; and in thus

replacing Ethics by some one of the natural sciences. In general, the

science thus substituted is one of the sciences specially concerned

with man, owing to the general mistake (for such I hold it to be)

of regarding the matter of Ethics as confined to human conduct. In

general, Psychology has been the science substituted, as by J. S. Mill;

or Sociology, as by Professor Clifford, and other modern writers.

But any other science might equally well be substituted. It is the

same fallacy which is implied, when Professor Tyndall recommends us

to ‘conform to the laws of matter’: and here the science which it is

proposed to substitute for Ethics is simply Physics. The name then is

perfectly general; for, no matter what the something is that good is

held to mean, the theory is still Naturalism. Whether good be defined

as yellow or green or blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as

sweet or bitter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as

willed or desired or felt: whichever of these or of any other object in

the world, good may be held to _mean_, the theory, which holds it to

_mean_ them, will be a naturalistic theory. I have called such theories

naturalistic because all of these terms denote properties, simple

or complex, of some simple or complex natural object; and, before I

proceed to consider them, it will be well to define what is meant by

‘nature’ and by ‘natural objects.’

 

By ‘nature,’ then, I do mean and have meant that which is the

subject-matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology. It may

be said to include all that has existed, does exist, or will exist in

time. If we consider whether any object is of such a nature that it may

be said to exist now, to have existed, or to be about to exist, then

we may know that that object is a natural object, and that nothing, of

which this is not true, is a natural object. Thus for instance, of our

minds we should say that they did exist yesterday, that they do exist

to-day, and probably will exist in a minute or two. We shall say that

we had thoughts yesterday, which have ceased to exist now, although

their effects may remain: and in so far as those thoughts did exist,

they too are natural objects.

 

There is, indeed, no difficulty about the ‘objects’ themselves, in

the sense in which I have just used the term. It is easy to say which

of them are natural, and which (if any) are not natural. But when we

begin to consider the properties of objects, then I fear the problem

is more difficult. Which among the properties of natural objects are

natural properties and which are not? For I do not deny that good is a

property of certain natural objects: certain of them, I think, _are_

good; and yet I have said that ‘good’ itself is not a natural property.

Well, my test for these too also concerns their existence in time.

Can we imagine ‘good’ as existing _by itself_ in time, and not merely

as a property of some natural object? For myself, I cannot so imagine

it, whereas with the greater number of properties of objects--those

which I call the natural properties--their existence does seem to me to

be independent of the existence of those objects. They are, in fact,

rather parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which

attach to it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not

even a bare substance: for they are in themselves substantial and give

to the object all the substance that it has. But this is not so with

good. If indeed good were a feeling, as some would have us believe,

then it would exist in time. But that is why to call it so is to commit

the naturalistic fallacy. It will always remain pertinent to ask,

whether the feeling itself is good; and if so, then good cannot itself

be identical with any feeling.

 

 

=27.= Those theories of Ethics, then, are ‘naturalistic’ which declare

the sole good to consist in some one property of things, which exists

in time; and which do so because they suppose that ‘good’ itself can

be defined by reference to such a property. And we may now proceed to

consider such theories.

 

And, first of all, one of the most famous of ethical maxims is that

which recommends a ‘life according to nature.’ That was the principle

of th