Principia Ethica 23

Principia Ethica 23

thought. When the plain man says ‘my own interest,’ he does _not_ mean

‘my own pleasure’--he does not commonly even include this--he means

my own advancement, my own reputation, the getting of a better income

etc., etc. That Prof. Sidgwick should not have noticed this, and that

he should give the reason he gives for the fact that the ancient

_moralists_ did not identify ‘my own interest’ with my own pleasure,

seems to be due to his having failed to notice that very confusion

in the conception of ‘my own good’ which I am now to point out. That

confusion has, perhaps, been more clearly perceived by Plato than

by any other moralist, and to point it out suffices to refute Prof.

Sidgwick’s own view that Egoism is rational.

 

What, then, is meant by ‘my own good’? In what sense can a thing be

good _for me_? It is obvious, if we reflect, that the only thing which

can belong to me, which can be _mine_, is something which is good, and

not the fact that it is good. When, therefore, I talk of anything I get

as ‘my own good,’ I must mean either that the thing I get is good, or

that my possessing it is good. In both cases it is only the thing or

the possession of it which is _mine_, and not _the goodness_ of that

thing or that possession. There is no longer any meaning in attaching

the ‘my’ to our predicate, and saying: The possession of this _by me_

is _my_ good. Even if we interpret this by ‘My possession of this is

what _I_ think good,’ the same still holds: for _what_ I think is that

my possession of it is good _simply_; and, if I think rightly, then

the truth is that my possession of it _is_ good simply--not, in any

sense, _my_ good; and, if I think wrongly, it is not good at all. In

short, when I talk of a thing as ‘my own good’ all that I can mean

is that something which will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure

is mine (whatever be the various senses of this relation denoted by

‘possession’), is also _good absolutely_; or rather that my possession

of it is _good absolutely_. The _good_ of it can in no possible sense

be ‘private’ or belong to me; any more than a thing can _exist_

privately or _for_ one person only. The only reason I can have for

aiming at ‘my own good,’ is that it is _good absolutely_ that what I

so call should belong to me--_good absolutely_ that I should _have_

something, which, if I have it, others cannot have. But if it is _good

absolutely_ that I should have it, then everyone else has as much

reason for aiming at _my_ having it, as I have myself. If, therefore,

it is true of _any_ single man’s ‘interest’ or ‘happiness’ that it

ought to be his sole ultimate end, this can only mean that _that_ man’s

‘interest’ or ‘happiness’ is _the sole good, the_ Universal Good,

and the only thing that anybody ought to aim at. What Egoism holds,

therefore, is that _each_ man’s happiness is the sole good--that a

number of different things are _each_ of them the only good thing there

is--an absolute contradiction! No more complete and thorough refutation

of any theory could be desired.

 

 

=60.= Yet Prof. Sidgwick holds that Egoism is rational; and it will be

useful briefly to consider the reasons which he gives for this absurd

conclusion. ‘The Egoist,’ he says (last Chap. § 1), ‘may avoid the

proof of Utilitarianism by declining to affirm,’ either ‘implicitly or

explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merely the ultimate

rational end for himself, but a part of Universal Good.’ And in the

passage to which he here refers us, as having there ‘seen’ this,

he says: ‘It cannot be proved that the difference between his own

happiness and another’s happiness is not _for him_ all-important’ (IV.

ii. § 1). What does Prof. Sidgwick mean by these phrases ‘the ultimate

rational end for himself,’ and ‘_for him_ all-important’? He does not

attempt to define them; and it is largely the use of such undefined

phrases which causes absurdities to be committed in philosophy.

 

Is there any sense in which a thing can be an ultimate rational end for

one person and not for another? By ‘ultimate’ must be meant at least

that the end is good-in-itself--good in our undefinable sense; and

by ‘rational,’ at least, that it is truly good. That a thing should

be an ultimate rational end means, then, that it is truly good in

itself; and that it is truly good in itself means that it is a part of

Universal Good. Can we assign any meaning to that qualification ‘for

himself,’ which will make it cease to be a part of Universal Good?

The thing is impossible: for the Egoist’s happiness must _either_ be

good in itself, and so a part of Universal Good, _or else_ it cannot

be good in itself at all: there is no escaping this dilemma. And if

it is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it? how

can it be a rational end for him? That qualification ‘for himself’ has

no meaning unless it implies ‘_not_ for others’; and if it implies

‘not for others,’ then it cannot be a rational end for him, since

it cannot be truly good in itself: the phrase ‘an ultimate rational

end for himself’ is a contradiction in terms. By saying that a thing

is an end for one particular person, or good for him, can only be

meant one of four things. Either (1) it may be meant that the end

in question is something which will belong exclusively to him; but

in that case, if it is to be rational for him to aim at it, that he

should exclusively possess it must be a part of Universal Good. Or

(2) it may be meant that it is the only thing at which he ought to

aim; but this can only be, because, by so doing, he will do the most

he can towards realising Universal Good: and this, in our case, will

only give Egoism as a doctrine of _means_. Or (3) it may be meant that

the thing is what he desires or thinks good; and then, if he thinks

wrongly, it is not a rational end at all, and, if he thinks rightly,

it is a part of Universal Good. Or (4) it may be meant that it is

peculiarly appropriate that a thing which will belong exclusively to

him should also by him be approved or aimed at; but, in this case,

both that it should belong to him and that he should aim at it must be

parts of Universal Good: by saying that a certain relation between two

things is fitting or appropriate, we can only mean that the existence

of that relation is absolutely good in itself (unless it be so as a

means, which gives case (2)). By no possible meaning, then, that can

be given to the phrase that his own happiness is the ultimate rational

end for himself can the Egoist escape the implication that his own

happiness is absolutely good; and by saying that it is _the_ ultimate

rational end, he must mean that it is the only good thing--the whole of

Universal Good: and, if he further maintains, that each man’s happiness

is the ultimate rational end for _him_, we have the fundamental

contradiction of Egoism--that an immense number of different things

are, _each_ of them, _the sole good_.--And it is easy to see that the

same considerations apply to the phrase that ‘the difference between

his own happiness and another’s is _for him_ all-important.’ This can

only mean either (1) that his own happiness is the only end which

will affect him, or (2) that the only important thing for him (as a

means) is to look to his own happiness, or (3) that it is only his

own happiness which he cares about, or (4) that it is good that each

man’s happiness should be the only concern of that man. And none of

these propositions, true as they may be, have the smallest tendency to

shew that if his own happiness is desirable at all, it is not a part

of Universal Good. Either his own happiness is a good thing or it is

not; and, in whatever sense it may be all-important for him, it must

be true that, if it is not good, he is not justified in pursuing it,

and that, if it is good, everyone else has an equal reason to pursue

it, so far as they are able and so far as it does not exclude their

attainment of other more valuable parts of Universal Good. In short

it is plain that the addition of ‘for him’ ‘for me’ to such words as

‘ultimate rational end,’ ‘good,’ ‘important’ can introduce nothing but

confusion. The only possible reason that can justify any action is that

by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be

realised. And if anyone says that the attainment of his own happiness

justifies his actions, he must mean that this is the greatest possible

amount of Universal Good which he can realise. And this again can only

be true either because _he_ has no power to realise more, in which

case he only holds Egoism as a doctrine of means; or else because his

own happiness is the greatest amount of Universal Good which can be

realised at all, in which case we have Egoism proper, and the flagrant

contradiction that every person’s happiness is singly the greatest

amount of Universal Good which can be realised at all.

 

 

=61.= It should be observed that, since this is so, ‘the relation of

Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence,’ which Prof. Sidgwick regards

‘as the profoundest problem of Ethics’ (III. XIII. § 5, _n._ 1),

appears in quite a different light to that in which he presents it.

‘Even if a man,’ he says, ‘admits the self-evidence of the principle

of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is

an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and

that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of

Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to

be made completely rational. This latter view is that which I myself

hold’ (last Chap. § 1). Prof. Sidgwick then goes on to shew ‘that

the inseparable connection between Utilitarian Duty and the greatest

happiness of the individual who conforms to it cannot be satisfactorily

demonstrated on empirical grounds’ (Ib. § 3). And the final paragraph

of his book tells us that, since ‘the reconciliation of duty and

self-interest is to be regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary

to avoid a fundamental _contradiction_ in one chief department of

our thought, it remains to ask how far this necessity constitutes a

sufficient reason for accepting this hypothesis[20]’ (Ib. § 5). To

‘assume the existence of such a Being, as God, by the _consensus_ of

theologians, is conceived to be’ would, he has already argued, ensure

the required reconciliation; since the Divine Sanctions of such a God

‘would, of course, suffice to make it always every one’s interest to

promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge’ (Ib. § 5).

 

[20] The italics are mine.

 

Now what is this ‘reconciliation of duty and self-interest,’ which

Divine Sanctions could ensure? It would consist in the mere fact that

the same conduct which produced the greatest possible happiness of

the greatest number would always also produce the greatest possible

happiness of the agent. If this were the case (and our empirical

knowledge shews that it is not the case in this world), ‘morality’

would, Prof. Sidgwick thinks, be ‘completely rational’: we should avoid

‘an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions

of what is Reasonable in conduct.’ That is to say, we should avoid

the necessity of thinking that it is as manifest an obligation to

secure our own greatest Happiness (maxim of Prudence), as to secure

the greatest Happiness on the whole (maxim of Benevolence). But it

is perfectly obvious we should not. Prof. Sidgwick here commits the

characteristic fallacy of Empiricism--the fallacy of thinking that

an alteration in _facts_ could make a contradiction cease to be a

contradiction. That a single man’s happiness should be _the sole

good_, and that also everybody’s happiness should be _the sole good_,

is a contradiction which cannot be solved by the assumption that the