Principia Ethica 24

Principia Ethica 24

which is the principle of Universalistic Hedonism, would introduce

another contradiction. And that these propositions should all be true

might well be called ‘the profoundest problem in Ethics’: it would be

a problem necessarily insoluble. But they _cannot_ all be true, and

there is no reason, but confusion, for the supposition that they are.

Prof. Sidgwick confuses this contradiction with the mere fact (in which

there is no contradiction) that our own greatest happiness and that

of all do not seem always attainable by the same means. This fact, if

Happiness were the sole good, would indeed be of some importance; and,

on any view, similar facts are of importance. But they are nothing but

instances of the one important fact that in this world the quantity of

good which is attainable is ridiculously small compared to that which

is imaginable. That I cannot get the most possible pleasure for myself,

if I produce the most possible pleasure on the whole, is no more _the_

profoundest problem of Ethics, than that in any case I cannot get as

much pleasure altogether as would be desirable. It only states that,

if we get as much good as possible in one place, we may get less on

the whole, because the quantity of attainable good is limited. To say

that I have to choose between my own good and that of _all_ is a false

antithesis: the only rational question is how to choose between my own

and that of _others_, and the principle on which this must be answered

is exactly the same as that on which I must choose whether to give

pleasure to this other person or to that.

 

 

=62.= It is plain, then, that the doctrine of Egoism is

self-contradictory; and that one reason why this is not perceived,

is a confusion with regard to the meaning of the phrase ‘my own

good.’ And it may be observed that this confusion and the neglect

of this contradiction are necessarily involved in the transition

from Naturalistic Hedonism, as ordinarily held, to Utilitarianism.

Mill, for instance, as we saw, declares: ‘Each person, so far as he

believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness’ (p. 53). And

he offers this as a reason why the general happiness is desirable. We

have seen that to regard it as such, involves, in the first place,

the naturalistic fallacy. But moreover, even if that fallacy were

not a fallacy, it could only be a reason for Egoism and not for

Utilitarianism. Mill’s argument is as follows: A man desires his own

happiness; therefore his own happiness is desirable. Further: A man

desires nothing but his own happiness; therefore his own happiness is

alone desirable. We have next to remember, that everybody, according

to Mill, so desires his own happiness: and then it will follow

that everybody’s happiness is alone desirable. And this is simply

a contradiction in terms. Just consider what it means. Each man’s

happiness is the only thing desirable: several different things are

_each_ of them the _only_ thing desirable. This is the fundamental

contradiction of Egoism. In order to think that what his arguments tend

to prove is not Egoism but Utilitarianism, Mill must think that he can

infer from the proposition ‘Each man’s happiness is his own good,’ the

proposition ‘The happiness of all is the good of all’; whereas in fact,

if we understand what ‘his own good’ means, it is plain that the latter

can only be inferred from ‘The happiness of all is the good of each.’

Naturalistic Hedonism, then, logically leads only to Egoism. Of course,

a Naturalist might hold that what we aimed at was simply ‘pleasure’

not our own pleasure; and _that_, always assuming the naturalistic

fallacy, would give an unobjectionable ground for Utilitarianism. But

more commonly he will hold that it is his own pleasure he desires, or

at least will confuse this with the other; and then he must logically

be led to adopt Egoism and not Utilitarianism.

 

 

=63.= The second cause I have to give why Egoism should be thought

reasonable, is simply its confusion with that other kind of

Egoism--Egoism as a doctrine of means. This second Egoism has a right

to say: You ought to pursue your own happiness, sometimes at all

events; it may even say: Always. And when we find it saying this we

are apt to forget its proviso: But only as a means to something else.

The fact is we are in an imperfect state; we cannot get the ideal all

at once. And hence it is often our bounden duty, we often _absolutely_

‘_ought_,’ to do things which are good only or chiefly as means: we

have to do the best we can, what is absolutely ‘right,’ but not what

is absolutely good. Of this I shall say more hereafter. I only mention

it here because I think it is much more plausible to say that we ought

to pursue our own pleasure as a means than as an end, and that this

doctrine, through confusion, lends some of its plausibility to the

utterly different doctrine of Egoism proper: My own greatest pleasure

is the only good thing.

 

 

=64.= So much for Egoism. Of Utilitarianism not much need be said; but

two points may seem deserving of notice.

 

The first is that this name, like that of Egoism, does not naturally

suggest that all our actions are to be judged according to the degree

in which they are a means to _pleasure_. Its natural meaning is that

the standard of right and wrong in conduct is its tendency to promote

the _interest_ of everybody. And by _interest_ is commonly meant a

variety of different goods, classed together only because they are

what a man commonly desires for himself, so far as his desires have

not that psychological quality which is meant by ‘moral.’ The ‘useful’

thus means, and was in ancient Ethics systematically used to mean,

what is a means to the attainment of goods other than moral goods. It

is quite an unjustifiable assumption that these goods are only good

as means to pleasure or that they are commonly so regarded. The chief

reason for adopting the name ‘Utilitarianism’ was, indeed, merely to

emphasize the fact that right and wrong conduct must be judged by its

results--as a means, in opposition to the strictly Intuitionistic view

that certain ways of acting were right and others wrong, whatever their

results might be. In thus insisting that what is right must mean what

produces the best possible results Utilitarianism is fully justified.

But with this correct contention there has been historically, and very

naturally, associated a double error. (1) The best possible results

were assumed to consist only in a limited class of goods, roughly

coinciding with those which were popularly distinguished as the

results of merely ‘useful’ or ‘interested’ actions; and these again

were hastily assumed to be good only as means to pleasure. (2) The

Utilitarians tend to regard everything as a mere means, neglecting the

fact that some things which are good as means are also good as ends.

Thus, for instance, assuming pleasure to be a good, there is a tendency

to value present pleasure only as a means to future pleasure, and

not, as is strictly necessary if pleasure is good as an end, also to

_weigh it against_ possible future pleasures. Much utilitarian argument

involves the logical absurdity that what is here and now, never has

any value in itself, but is only to be judged by its consequences;

which again, of course, when they are realised, would have no value in

themselves, but would be mere means to a still further future, and so

on _ad infinitum_.

 

The second point deserving notice with regard to Utilitarianism is

that, when the name is used for a form of Hedonism, it does not

commonly, even in its description of its _end_, accurately distinguish

between means and end. Its best-known formula is that the result by

which actions are to be judged is ‘the greatest happiness of the

greatest number.’ But it is plain that, if pleasure is the sole good,

provided the quantity be equally great, an equally desirable result

will have been obtained whether it be enjoyed by many or by few, or

even if it be enjoyed by nobody. It is plain that, if we ought to aim

at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, this can only, on the

hedonistic principle, be because the existence of pleasure in a great

number of persons seems to be the best _means_ available for attaining

the existence of the greatest quantity of pleasure. This may actually

be the case; but it is fair to suspect that Utilitarians have been

influenced, in their adoption of the hedonistic principle, by this

failure to distinguish clearly between pleasure or consciousness of

pleasure and its possession by a person. It is far easier to regard the

possession of pleasure by a number of persons as the sole good, than so

to regard the mere existence of an equally great quantity of pleasure.

If, indeed, we were to take the Utilitarian principle strictly, and to

assume them to mean that the possession of pleasure by many persons

was good in itself, the principle is not hedonistic: it includes as

a necessary part of the ultimate end, the existence of a number of

persons, and this will include very much more than mere pleasure.

 

Utilitarianism, however, as commonly held, must be understood to

maintain that either mere consciousness of pleasure, or consciousness

of pleasure together with the minimum adjunct which may be meant by

the existence of such consciousness in at least one _person_, is the

_sole good_. This is its significance as an ethical doctrine; and as

such it has already been refuted in my refutation of Hedonism. The

most that can be said for it is that it does not seriously mislead in

its practical conclusions, on the ground that, as an empirical fact,

the method of acting which brings most good on the whole does also

bring most pleasure. Utilitarians do indeed generally devote most of

their arguments to shewing that the course of action which will bring

most pleasure is in general such as common sense would approve. We

have seen that Prof. Sidgwick appeals to this fact as tending to shew

that pleasure is the sole good; and we have also seen that it does not

tend to shew this. We have seen how very flimsy the other arguments

advanced for this proposition are; and that, if it be fairly considered

by itself, it appears to be quite ridiculous. And, moreover, that the

actions which produce most good on the whole do also produce most

pleasure is extremely doubtful. The arguments tending to shew it are

all more or less vitiated by the assumption that what appear to be

necessary conditions for the attainment of most pleasure in the near

future, will always continue so to be. And, even with this vicious

assumption, they only succeed in making out a highly problematical

case. How, therefore, this fact is to be explained, if it be a fact,

need not concern us. It is sufficient to have shewn that many complex

states of mind are much more valuable than the pleasure they contain.

If this be so, _no form of Hedonism can be true_. And, since the

practical guidance afforded by pleasure as a _criterion_ is small in

proportion as the calculation attempts to be accurate, we can well

afford to await further investigation, before adopting a guide, whose

utility is very doubtful and whose trustworthiness we have grave reason

to suspect.

 

 

=65.= The most important points which I have endeavoured to establish

in this chapter are as follows. (1) Hedonism must be strictly

defined as the doctrine that ‘Pleasure is the only thing which is

good in itself’: this view seems to owe its prevalence mainly to the

naturalistic fallacy, and Mill’s arguments may be taken as a type of

those which are fallacious in this respect; Sidgwick alone has defended