Principia Ethica 25

Principia Ethica 25

since, if it were so, a world in which nothing else existed might be

absolutely perfect: Sidgwick fails to put to himself this question,

which is the only clear and decisive one (53-57). (4) What are commonly

considered to be the two main types of Hedonism, namely, Egoism and

Utilitarianism, are not only different from, but strictly contradictory

of, one another; since the former asserts ‘My own greatest pleasure

is the _sole_ good,’ the latter ‘The greatest pleasure of all is the

_sole_ good.’ Egoism seems to owe its plausibility partly to the

failure to observe this contradiction--a failure which is exemplified

by Sidgwick; partly to a confusion of Egoism as doctrine of end, with

the same as doctrine of means. If Hedonism is true, Egoism cannot

be so; still less can it be so, if Hedonism is false. The end of

Utilitarianism, on the other hand, would, if Hedonism were true, be,

not indeed the best conceivable, but the best possible for us to

promote; but it is refuted by the refutation of Hedonism (58-64).

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER IV.

 

METAPHYSICAL ETHICS.

 

 

=66.= In this chapter I propose to deal with a type of ethical theory

which is exemplified in the ethical views of the Stoics, of Spinoza,

of Kant, and especially of a number of modern writers, whose views in

this respect are mainly due to the influence of Hegel. These ethical

theories have this in common, that they use some _metaphysical_

proposition as a ground for inferring some fundamental proposition of

Ethics. They all imply, and many of them expressly hold, that ethical

truths follow logically from metaphysical truths--that Ethics should be

based on _Metaphysics_. And the result is that they all describe the

Supreme Good in _metaphysical_ terms.

 

What, then, is to be understood by ‘metaphysical’? I use the term,

as I explained in Chapter II., in opposition to ‘natural.’ I call

those philosophers preeminently ‘metaphysical’ who have recognised

most clearly that not everything which _is_ is a ‘natural object.’

‘Metaphysicians’ have, therefore, the great merit of insisting that

our knowledge is not confined to the things which we can touch and

see and feel. They have always been much occupied, not only with that

other class of natural objects which consists in mental facts, but also

with the class of objects or properties of objects, which certainly do

not exist in time, are not therefore parts of Nature, and which, in

fact, do not exist at all. To this class, as I have said, belongs what

we mean by the adjective ‘good.’ It is not _goodness_, but only the

things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time--can have

duration, and begin and cease to exist--can be objects of _perception_.

But the most prominent members of this class are perhaps numbers. It

is quite certain that two natural objects may exist; but it is equally

certain that _two_ itself does not exist and never can. Two and two

_are_ four. But that does not mean that either two or four exists.

Yet it certainly means _something_. Two _is_ somehow, although it

does not exist. And it is not only simple terms of propositions--the

objects _about_ which we know truths--that belong to this class. The

truths which we know about them form, perhaps, a still more important

subdivision. No truth does, in fact, _exist_; but this is peculiarly

obvious with regard to truths like ‘Two and two are four,’ in which

the objects, _about_ which they are truths, do not exist either. It

is with the recognition of such truths as these--truths which have

been called ‘universal’--and of their essential unlikeness to what

we can touch and see and feel, that metaphysics proper begins. Such

‘universal’ truths have always played a large part in the reasonings of

metaphysicians from Plato’s time till now; and that they have directed

attention to the difference between these truths and what I have

called ‘natural objects’ is the chief contribution to knowledge which

distinguishes them from that other class of philosophers--‘empirical’

philosophers--to which most Englishmen have belonged.

 

But though, if we are to define ‘metaphysics’ by the contribution

which it has actually made to knowledge, we should have to say that

it has emphasized the importance of objects which do not exist at

all, metaphysicians themselves have not recognised this. They have

indeed recognised and insisted that there are, or may be, objects

of knowledge which do not _exist in time_, or at least which we

cannot perceive; and in recognising the _possibility_ of these, as

an object of investigation, they have, it may be admitted, done a

service to mankind. But they have in general supposed that whatever

does not exist in time, must at least _exist_ elsewhere, if it is to

_be_ at all--that, whatever does not exist in Nature, must exist in

some supersensible reality, whether timeless or not. Consequently

they have held that the truths with which they have been occupied,

over and above the objects of perception, were in some way truths

about such supersensible reality. If, therefore, we are to define

‘metaphysics’ not by what it has attained, but by what it has

attempted, we should say that it consists in the attempt to obtain

knowledge, by processes of reasoning, of what exists but is _not_ a

part of Nature. Metaphysicians have actually held that they could give

us such knowledge of non-natural existence. They have held that their

science consists in giving us such knowledge as can be supported by

reasons, of that supersensible reality of which religion professes to

give us a fuller knowledge, without any reasons. When, therefore, I

spoke above of ‘metaphysical’ propositions, I meant propositions about

the existence of something supersensible--of something which is not

an object of perception, and which cannot be inferred from what is an

object of perception by the same rules of inference by which we infer

the past and future of what we call ‘Nature.’ And when I spoke of

‘metaphysical’ terms, I meant terms which refer to qualities of such

a supersensible reality, which do not belong to anything ‘natural.’

I admit that ‘metaphysics’ should investigate what reasons there may

be for belief in such a supersensible reality; since I hold that

its peculiar province is the truth about all objects which are not

natural objects. And I think that the most prominent characteristic of

metaphysics, in history, has been its profession to _prove_ the truth

about non-natural _existents_. I define ‘metaphysical,’ therefore, by

a reference to supersensible _reality_; although I think that the only

non-natural objects, about which it has _succeeded_ in obtaining truth,

are objects which do not exist at all.

 

So much, I hope, will suffice to explain what I mean by the term

‘metaphysical,’ and to shew that it refers to a clear and important

distinction. It was not necessary for my purpose to make the

definition exhaustive or to shew that it corresponds in essentials

with established usage. The distinction between ‘Nature’ and a

supersensible reality is very familiar and very important: and since

the metaphysician endeavours to _prove_ things with regard to a

supersensible reality, and since he deals largely in truths which are

_not_ mere natural facts, it is plain that his arguments, and errors

(if any), will be of a more subtle kind than those which I have dealt

with under the name of ‘Naturalism.’ For these two reasons it seemed

convenient to treat ‘Metaphysical Ethics’ by themselves.

 

 

=67.= I have said that those systems of Ethics, which I propose to

call ‘Metaphysical,’ are characterised by the fact that they describe

the Supreme Good in ‘metaphysical’ terms; and this has now been

explained as meaning that they describe it in terms of something

which (they hold) does exist, but does not exist in Nature--in terms

of a supersensible reality. A ‘Metaphysical Ethics’ is marked by the

fact that it makes the assertion: That which would be perfectly good

is something which exists, but is not natural; that which has some

characteristic possessed by a supersensible reality. Such an assertion

was made by the Stoics when they asserted that a life in accordance

with Nature was perfect. For they did not mean by ‘Nature,’ what I have

so defined, but something supersensible which they inferred to exist,

and which they held to be perfectly good. Such an assertion, again,

is made by Spinoza when he tells us that we are more or less perfect,

in proportion as we are more or less closely united with Absolute

Substance by the ‘intellectual love’ of God. Such an assertion is made

by Kant when he tells us that his ‘Kingdom of Ends’ is the ideal. And

such, finally, is made by modern writers who tell us that the final and

perfect end is to realise our _true_ selves--a self different both from

the whole and from any part of that which exists here and now in Nature.

 

Now it is plain that such ethical principles have a merit, not

possessed by Naturalism, in recognising that for perfect goodness

much more is required than any quantity of what exists here and now

or can be inferred as likely to exist in the future. And moreover it

is quite possible that their assertions should be true, if we only

understand them to assert that something which is real possesses all

the characteristics necessary for perfect goodness. But this is not

all that they assert. They also imply, as I said, that this ethical

proposition _follows_ from some proposition which is metaphysical: that

the question ‘What is real?’ has some logical bearing upon the question

‘What is good?’ It was for this reason that I described ‘Metaphysical

Ethics’ in Chapter II. as based upon the naturalistic fallacy. To

hold that from any proposition asserting ‘Reality is of this nature’

we can infer, or obtain confirmation for, any proposition asserting

‘This is good in itself’ is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. And

that a knowledge of what is real supplies reasons for holding certain

things to be good in themselves is either implied or expressly

asserted by all those who define the Supreme Good in metaphysical

terms. This contention is part of what is meant by saying that Ethics

should be ‘based’ on Metaphysics. It is meant that some knowledge

of supersensible reality is necessary _as a premise_ for correct

conclusions as to what ought to exist. This view is, for instance,

plainly expressed in the following statements: ‘The truth is that the

theory of Ethics which seems most satisfactory has a metaphysical

basis.... If we rest our view of Ethics on the idea of the development

of the ideal self or of the rational universe, the significance of

this cannot be made fully apparent without a metaphysical examination

of the nature of self; _nor can its validity be established except

by a discussion of the reality of the rational universe_[21].’ The

validity of an ethical conclusion about the nature of the ideal, it

is here asserted, cannot be established except by considering the

question whether that ideal is _real_. Such an assertion involves

the naturalistic fallacy. It rests upon the failure to perceive that

any truth which asserts ‘This is good in itself’ is quite unique in

kind--that it cannot be reduced to any assertion about reality, and

therefore must remain unaffected by any conclusions we may reach

about the nature of reality. This confusion as to the unique nature

of ethical truths is, I have said, involved in all those ethical

theories which I have called metaphysical. It is plain that, but for