Principia Ethica 32
his prediction. With any ethical law, the same must be the case; it can
be no more than a generalisation: and here, owing to the comparative
absence of accurate hypothetical knowledge, on which the prediction
should be based, the probability is comparatively small. But finally,
for an ethical generalisation, we require to know not only what effects
will be produced, but also what are the comparative values of those
effects; and on this question too, it must be admitted, considering
what a prevalent opinion Hedonism has been, that we are very liable to
be mistaken. It is plain, then, that we are not soon likely to know
more than that one kind of action will _generally_ produce better
effects than another; and that more than this has certainly never been
proved. In no two cases will _all_ the effects of any kind of action be
precisely the same, because in each case some of the circumstances will
differ; and although the effects, that are important for good or evil,
may be generally the same, it is extremely unlikely that they will
always be so.
=95.= (_c_) If, now, we confine ourselves to a search for actions which
are _generally_ better as means than any probable alternative, it
seems possible to establish as much as this in defence of most of the
rules most universally recognised by Common Sense. I do not propose to
enter upon this defence in detail, but merely to point out what seem to
be the chief distinct principles by the use of which it can be made.
In the first place, then, we can only shew that one action is
generally better than another as a means, provided that certain other
circumstances are given. We do, as a matter of fact, only observe its
good effects under certain circumstances; and it may be easily seen
that a sufficient change in these would render doubtful what seem the
most universally certain of general rules. Thus, the general disutility
of murder can only be proved, provided the majority of the human race
will certainly persist in existing. In order to prove that murder, if
it were so universally adopted as to cause the speedy extermination of
the race, would not be good as a means, we should have to disprove the
main contention of pessimism--namely that the existence of human life
is on the whole an evil. And the view of pessimism, however strongly we
may be convinced of its truth or falsehood, is one which never has been
either proved or refuted conclusively. That universal murder would not
be a good thing at this moment can therefore not be proved. But, as a
matter of fact, we can and do assume with certainty that, even if a few
people are willing to murder, most people will not be willing. When,
therefore, we say that murder is in general to be avoided, we only
mean that it is so, so long as the majority of mankind will certainly
not agree to it, but will persist in living. And that, under these
circumstances, it is generally wrong for any single person to commit
murder seems capable of proof. For, since there is in any case no hope
of exterminating the race, the only effects which we have to consider
are those which the action will have upon the increase of the goods
and the diminution of the evils of human life. Where the best is not
attainable (assuming extermination to be the best) one alternative may
still be better than another. And, apart from the immediate evils which
murder generally produces, the fact that, if it were a common practice,
the feeling of insecurity, thus caused, would absorb much time, which
might be spent to better purpose, is perhaps conclusive against it. So
long as men desire to live as strongly as they do, and so long as it is
certain that they will continue to do so, anything which hinders them
from devoting their energy to the attainment of positive goods, seems
plainly bad as a means. And the general practice of murder, falling so
far short of universality as it certainly must in all known conditions
of society, seems certainly to be a hindrance of this kind.
A similar defence seems possible for most of the rules, most
universally enforced by legal sanctions, such as respect of property;
and for some of those most commonly recognised by Common Sense, such
as industry, temperance and the keeping of promises. In any state of
society in which men have that intense desire for property of some
sort, which seems to be universal, the common legal rules for the
protection of property must serve greatly to facilitate the best
possible expenditure of energy. And similarly: Industry is a means
to the attainment of those necessaries, without which the further
attainment of any great positive goods is impossible; temperance merely
enjoins the avoidance of those excesses, which, by injuring health,
would prevent a man from contributing as much as possible to the
acquirement of these necessaries; and the keeping of promises greatly
facilitates cooperation in such acquirement.
Now all these rules seem to have two characteristics to which it is
desirable to call attention. (1) They seem all to be such that, in any
known state of society, a _general_ observance of them _would_ be good
as a means. The conditions upon which their utility depends, namely the
tendency to preserve and propagate life and the desire of property,
seem to be so universal and so strong, that it would be impossible to
remove them; and, this being so, we can say that, under any conditions
which could actually be given, the general observance of these rules
would be good as a means. For, while there seems no reason to think
that their observance ever makes a society worse than one in which they
are not observed, it is certainly necessary as a means for any state of
things in which the greatest possible goods can be attained. And (2)
these rules, since they can be recommended as a means to that which is
itself only a necessary condition for the existence of any great good,
can be defended independently of correct views upon the primary ethical
question of what is good in itself. On any view commonly taken, it
seems certain that the preservation of civilised society, which these
rules are necessary to effect, is necessary for the existence, in any
great degree, of anything which may be held to be good in itself.
=96.= But not by any means all the rules commonly recognised combine
these two characteristics. The arguments offered in defence of Common
Sense morality very often presuppose the existence of conditions,
which cannot be fairly assumed to be so universally necessary as the
tendency to continue life and to desire property. Such arguments,
accordingly, only prove the utility of the rule, so long as certain
conditions, which may alter, remain the same: it cannot be claimed of
the rules thus defended, that they would be generally good as means in
every state of society: in order to establish this _universal_ general
utility, it would be necessary to arrive at a correct view of what is
good or evil in itself. This, for instance, seems to be the case with
most of the rules comprehended under the name of Chastity. These rules
are commonly defended, by Utilitarian writers or writers who assume as
their end the conservation of society, with arguments which presuppose
the necessary existence of such sentiments as conjugal jealousy and
paternal affection. These sentiments are no doubt sufficiently strong
and general to make the defence valid for many conditions of society.
But it is not difficult to imagine a civilised society existing without
them; and, in such a case, if chastity were still to be defended,
it would be necessary to establish that its violation produced evil
effects, other than those due to the assumed tendency of such violation
to disintegrate society. Such a defence may, no doubt, be made; but it
would require an examination into the primary ethical question of what
is good and bad in itself, far more thorough than any ethical writer
has ever offered to us. Whether this be so in this particular case or
not, it is certain that a distinction, not commonly recognised, should
be made between those rules, of which the social utility depends upon
the existence of circumstances, more or less likely to alter, and those
of which the utility seems certain under all possible conditions.
=97.= It is obvious that all the rules, which were enumerated above as
likely to be useful in _almost any_ state of society, can _also_ be
defended owing to results which they produce under conditions which
exist only in particular states of society. And it should be noticed
that we are entitled to reckon among these conditions the sanctions of
legal penalties, of social disapproval, and of private remorse, where
these exist. These sanctions are, indeed, commonly treated by Ethics
only as motives for the doing of actions of which the utility can be
proved independently of the existence of these sanctions. And it may
be admitted that sanctions _ought_ not to be attached to actions which
would not be right independently. Nevertheless it is plain that, where
they do exist, they are not only motives but also justifications for
the actions in question. One of the chief reasons why an action should
not be done in any particular state of society is that it will be
punished; since the punishment is in general itself a greater evil than
would have been caused by the omission of the action punished. Thus
the existence of a punishment may be an adequate reason for regarding
an action as generally wrong, even though it has no other bad effects
but even slightly good ones. The fact that an action will be punished
is a condition of exactly the same kind as others of more or less
permanence, which must be taken into account in discussing the general
utility or disutility of an action in a particular state of society.
=98.= It is plain, then, that the rules commonly recognised by Common
Sense, in the society in which we live, and commonly advocated as if
they were all equally and universally right and good, are of very
different orders. Even those which seem to be most universally good
as means, can only be shewn to be so, because of the existence of
conditions, which, though perhaps evils, may be taken to be necessary;
and even these owe their more obvious utilities to the existence of
other conditions, which cannot be taken to be necessary except over
longer or shorter periods of history, and many of which are evils.
Others seem to be justifiable _solely_ by the existence of such more or
less temporary conditions, unless we abandon the attempt to shew that
they are means to that preservation of society, which is itself a mere
means, and are able to establish that they are directly means to things
good or evil in themselves, but which are not commonly recognised to be
such.
If, then, we ask what rules are or would be useful to be observed in
the society in which we live, it seems possible to prove a definite
utility in most of those which are in general both recognised and
practised. But a great part of ordinary moral exhortation and social
discussion consists in the advocating of rules, which are _not_
generally practised; and with regard to these it seems very doubtful
whether a case for their general utility can ever be conclusively made
out. Such proposed rules commonly suffer from three main defects. In
the first place, (1) the actions which they advocate are very commonly
such as it is impossible for most individuals to perform by any
volition. It is far too usual to find classed together with actions,
which can be performed, if only they be willed, others, of which the
possibility depends upon the possession of a peculiar disposition,
which is given to few and cannot even be acquired. It may, no doubt,
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