Principia Ethica 33
One or other of these objections seems generally to apply to proposed
changes in social custom, advocated as being better rules to follow
than those now actually followed; and, for this reason, it seems
doubtful whether Ethics can establish the utility of any rules
other than those generally practised. But its inability to do so is
fortunately of little practical moment. The question whether the
general observance of a rule not generally observed, would or would not
be desirable, cannot much affect the question how any individual ought
to act; since, on the one hand, there is a large probability that he
will not, by any means, be able to bring about its general observance,
and, on the other hand, the fact that its general observance would
be useful could, in any case, give him no reason to conclude that he
himself ought to observe it, in the absence of such general observance.
With regard, then, to the actions commonly classed in Ethics, as
duties, crimes, or sins, the following points seem deserving of notice.
(1) By so classing them we mean that they are actions which it is
possible for an individual to perform or avoid, if he only _wills_ to
do so; and that they are actions which _everybody_ ought to perform
or avoid, when occasion arises. (2) We can certainly not prove of
any such action that it ought to be done or avoided under _all_
circumstances; we can only prove that its performance or avoidance will
_generally_ produce better results than the alternative. (3) If further
we ask of what actions as much as this can be proved, it seems only
possible to prove it with regard to those which are actually generally
practised among us. And of these some only are such that their general
performance would be useful in any state of society that seems
possible; of others the utility depends upon conditions which exist
now, but which seem to be more or less alterable.
=99.= (_d_) So much, then, for moral rules or laws, in the ordinary
sense--rules which assert that it is generally useful, under more or
less common circumstances, for _everybody_ to perform or omit some
definite kind of action. It remains to say something with regard to the
principles by which _the individual_ should decide what he ought to
do, (α) with regard to those actions as to which some general rule is
certainly true, and (β) with regard to those where such a certain rule
is wanting.
(α) Since, as I have tried to shew, it is impossible to establish
that any kind of action will produce a better total result than
its alternative _in all cases_, it follows that in some cases the
neglect of an established rule will probably be the best course of
action possible. The question then arises: Can the individual ever be
justified in assuming that his is one of these exceptional cases? And
it seems that this question may be definitely answered in the negative.
For, if it is certain that in a large majority of cases the observance
of a certain rule is useful, it follows that there is a large
probability that it would be wrong to break the rule in any particular
case; and the uncertainty of our knowledge both of effects and of their
value, in particular cases, is so great, that it seems doubtful whether
the individual’s judgment that the effects will probably be good in
his case can ever be set against the general probability that that
kind of action is wrong. Added to this general ignorance is the fact
that, if the question arises at all, our judgment will generally be
biassed by the fact that we strongly desire one of the results which we
hope to obtain by breaking the rule. It seems, then, that with regard
to any rule which is _generally_ useful, we may assert that it ought
_always_ to be observed, not on the ground that in _every_ particular
case it will be useful, but on the ground that in _any_ particular
case the probability of its being so is greater than that of our being
likely to decide rightly that we have before us an instance of its
disutility. In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where
the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are,
and ought, therefore, never to break it. It is this fact which seems
to justify the stringency with which moral rules are usually enforced
and sanctioned, and to give a sense in which we may accept as true the
maxims that ‘The end never justifies the means’ and ‘That we should
never do evil that good may come.’ The ‘means’ and the ‘evil,’ intended
by these maxims, are, in fact, the breaking of moral rules generally
recognised and practised, and which, therefore, we may assume to be
generally useful. Thus understood, these maxims merely point out that,
in any particular case, although we cannot clearly perceive any balance
of good produced by keeping the rule and do seem to see one that would
follow from breaking it, nevertheless the rule should be observed. It
is hardly necessary to point out that this is so only because it is
certain that, in general, the end does justify the means in question,
and that therefore there is a _probability_ that in this case it will
do so also, although we cannot see that it will.
But moreover the universal observance of a rule which is generally
useful has, in many cases, a special utility, which seems deserving of
notice. This arises from the fact that, even if we can clearly discern
that our case is one where to break the rule is advantageous, yet, so
far as our example has any effect at all in encouraging similar action,
it will certainly tend to encourage breaches of the rule which are not
advantageous. We may confidently assume that what will impress the
imagination of others will not be the circumstances in which our case
differs from ordinary cases and which justify our exceptional action,
but the points in which it resembles other actions that are really
criminal. In cases, then, where example has any influence at all, the
effect of an exceptional right action will generally be to encourage
wrong ones. And this effect will probably be exercised not only on
other persons but on the agent himself. For it is impossible for any
one to keep his intellect and sentiments so clear, but that, if he has
once approved of a generally wrong action, he will be more likely to
approve of it also under other circumstances than those which justified
it in the first instance. This inability to discriminate exceptional
cases offers, of course, a still stronger reason for the universal
enforcement, by legal or social sanctions, of actions generally useful.
It is undoubtedly well to punish a man, who has done an action, right
in his case but generally wrong, even if his example would not be
likely to have a dangerous effect. For sanctions have, in general,
much more influence upon conduct than example; so that the effect
of relaxing them in an exceptional case will almost certainly be an
encouragement of similar action in cases which are not exceptional.
The individual can therefore be confidently recommended _always_
to conform to rules which are both generally useful and generally
practised. In the case of rules of which the general observance _would_
be useful but does not exist, or of rules which are generally practised
but which are not useful, no such universal recommendations can be
made. In many cases the sanctions attached may be decisive in favour
of conformity to the existing custom. But it seems worth pointing out
that, even apart from these, the general utility of an action most
commonly depends upon the fact that it is generally practised: in a
society where certain kinds of theft are the common rule, the utility
of abstinence from such theft on the part of a single individual
becomes exceedingly doubtful, even though the common rule is a bad one.
There is, therefore, a strong probability in favour of adherence to an
existing custom, even if it be a bad one. But we cannot, in this case,
assert with any confidence that this probability is always greater
than that of the individual’s power to judge that an exception will be
useful; since we are here supposing certain one relevant fact--namely,
that the rule, which he proposes to follow, _would_ be better than
that which he proposes to break, _if_ it were generally observed.
Consequently the effect of his example, so far as it tends to break
down the existing custom, will here be for the good. The cases, where
another rule would certainly be better than that generally observed,
are, however, according to what was said above, very rare; and cases of
doubt, which are those which arise most frequently, carry us into the
next division of our subject.
=100.= (β) This next division consists in the discussion of the
method by which an individual should decide what to do with regard to
possible actions of which the general utility cannot be proved. And
it should be observed, that, according to our previous conclusions,
this discussion will cover almost all actions, except those which,
in our present state of society, are generally practised. For it has
been urged that a proof of general utility is so difficult, that it
can hardly be conclusive except in a very few cases. It is certainly
not possible with regard to all actions which _are_ generally
practised; though here, if the sanctions are sufficiently strong,
they are sufficient by themselves to prove the general utility of the
individual’s conformity to custom. And if it is possible to prove a
general utility in the case of some actions, _not_ generally practised,
it is certainly not possible to do so by the ordinary method, which
tries to shew in them a tendency to that preservation of society, which
is itself a mere means, but only by the method, by which in any case,
as will be urged, the individual ought to guide his judgment--namely,
by shewing their direct tendency to produce what is good in itself or
to prevent what is bad.
The extreme improbability that any general rule with regard to the
utility of an action will be correct seems, in fact, to be the chief
principle which should be taken into account in discussing how the
individual should guide his choice. If we except those rules which are
both generally practised and strongly sanctioned among us, there seem
to be hardly any of such a kind that equally good arguments cannot be
found both for and against them. The most that can be said for the
contradictory principles which are urged by moralists of different
schools as universal duties, is, in general, that they point out
actions which, for persons of a particular character and in particular
circumstances, would and do lead to a balance of good. It is, no
doubt, possible that the particular dispositions and circumstances
which generally render certain kinds of action advisable, might to
some degree be formulated. But it is certain that this has never
yet been done; and it is important to notice that, even if it were
done, it would not give us, what moral laws are usually supposed to
be--rules which it would be desirable for every one, or even for most
people, to follow. Moralists commonly assume that, in the matter of
actions or habits of action, usually recognised as duties or virtues,
it is desirable that every one should be alike. Whereas it is certain
that, under actual circumstances, and possible that, even in a much
more ideal condition of things, the principle of division of labour,
according to special capacity, which is recognised in respect of
employments, would also give a better result in respect of virtues.
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