Principia Ethica 42

Principia Ethica 42

124.= In order to complete this discussion of the main principles

involved in the determination of intrinsic values, the chief remaining

topics, necessary to be treated, appear to be two. The first of these

is the nature of great intrinsic _evils_, including what I may call

_mixed_ evils; that is to say, those evil wholes, which nevertheless

contain, as essential elements, something positively good or beautiful.

And the second is the nature of what I may similarly call _mixed_

goods; that is to say, those wholes, which, though intrinsically good

_as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something

positively evil or ugly. It will greatly facilitate this discussion,

if I may be understood throughout to use the terms ‘beautiful’ and

‘ugly,’ not necessarily with reference to things of the kind which

most naturally occur to us as instances of what is beautiful and ugly,

but in accordance with my own proposed definition of beauty. Thus I

shall use the word ‘beautiful’ to denote that of which the admiring

contemplation is good in itself; and ‘ugly’ to denote that of which the

admiring contemplation is evil in itself.

 

I. With regard, then, to great positive evils, I think it is evident

that, if we take all due precautions to discover _precisely what_ those

things are, of which, _if they existed absolutely by themselves_, we

should judge the existence to be a great evil, we shall find most of

them to be organic unities of exactly the same nature as those which

are the greatest positive goods. That is to say, they are cognitions of

some object, accompanied by some emotion. Just as neither a cognition

nor an emotion, _by itself_, appeared capable of being greatly good,

so (with one exception), neither a cognition nor an emotion, _by

itself_, appears capable of being greatly evil. And just as a whole

formed of both, even without the addition of any other element,

appeared undoubtedly capable of being a great good, so such a whole,

_by itself_, appears capable of being a great evil. With regard to the

_third_ element, which was discussed as capable of adding greatly to

the value of a good, namely, _true belief_, it will appear that it has

different relations towards different kinds of evils. In some cases the

addition of true belief to a positive evil seems to constitute a far

worse evil; but in other cases it is not apparent that it makes any

difference.

 

The greatest positive evils may be divided into the following three

classes.

 

 

=125.= (1) The first class consists of those evils, which seem always

to include an enjoyment or admiring contemplation of things which

are themselves either evil or ugly. That is to say these evils are

characterised by the fact that they include precisely the same emotion,

which is also essential to the greatest unmixed goods, from which they

are differentiated by the fact that this emotion is directed towards an

inappropriate object. In so far as this emotion is either a slight good

in itself or a slightly beautiful object, these evils would therefore

be cases of what I have called ‘mixed’ evils; but, as I have already

said, it seems very doubtful whether an emotion, completely isolated

from its object, has either value or beauty: it certainly has not much

of either. It is, however, important to observe that the very same

emotions, which are often loosely talked of as the greatest or the only

goods, may be essential constituents of the very worst wholes: that,

according to the nature of the cognition which accompanies them, they

may be conditions either of the greatest good, or of the greatest evil.

 

In order to illustrate the nature of evils of this class, I may take

two instances--cruelty and lasciviousness. That these are great

intrinsic evils, we may, I think, easily assure ourselves, by imagining

the state of a man, whose mind is solely occupied by either of these

passions, in their worst form. If we then consider what judgment we

should pass upon a universe which consisted _solely_ of minds thus

occupied, without the smallest hope that there would ever exist in it

the smallest consciousness of any object other than those proper to

these passions, or any feeling directed to any such object, I think

we cannot avoid the conclusion that the existence of such a universe

would be a far worse evil than the existence of none at all. But, if

this be so, it follows that these two vicious states are not only, as

is commonly admitted, bad as means, but also bad in themselves.--And

that they involve in their nature that complication of elements,

which I have called a love of what is evil or ugly, is, I think, no

less plain. With regard to the pleasures of lust, the nature of the

cognition, by the presence of which they are to be defined, is somewhat

difficult to analyse. But it appears to include both cognitions of

organic sensations and perceptions of states of the body, of which

the enjoyment is certainly an evil in itself. So far as these are

concerned, lasciviousness would, then, include in its essence an

admiring contemplation of what is ugly. But certainly one of its

commonest ingredients, in its worst forms, is an enjoyment of the same

state of mind in other people: and in this case it would therefore also

include a love of what is evil. With regard to cruelty, it is easy

to see that an enjoyment of pain in other people is essential to it;

and, as we shall see, when we come to consider pain, this is certainly

a love of evil: while, in so far as it also includes a delight in

the bodily signs of agony, it would also comprehend a love of what

is ugly. In both cases, it should be observed, the evil of the state

is heightened not only by an increase in the evil or ugliness of the

object, but also by an increase in the enjoyment.

 

It might be objected, in the case of cruelty, that our disapproval of

it, even in the isolated case supposed, where no considerations of

its badness as a means could influence us, may yet be really directed

to the pain of the persons, which it takes delight in contemplating.

This objection may be met, in the first place, by the remark that it

entirely fails to explain the judgment, which yet, I think, no one, on

reflection, will be able to avoid making, that even though the amount

of pain contemplated be the same, yet the greater the delight in its

contemplation, the worse the state of things. But it may also, I think,

be met by notice of a fact, which we were unable to urge in considering

the similar possibility with regard to goods--namely the possibility

that the reason why we attribute greater value to a worthy affection

for a _real_ person, is that we take into account the additional good

consisting in the existence of that person. We may I think urge, in

the case of cruelty, that its intrinsic odiousness is equally great,

whether the pain contemplated really exists or is purely imaginary. I,

at least, am unable to distinguish that, in this case, the presence

of _true belief_ makes any difference to the intrinsic value of the

whole considered, although it undoubtedly may make a great difference

to its value _as a means_. And so also with regard to other evils of

this class: I am unable to see that a true belief in the _existence_

of their objects makes any difference in the degree of their positive

demerits. On the other hand, the presence of another class of beliefs

seems to make a considerable difference. When we enjoy what is evil

or ugly, in spite of our knowledge that it is so, the state of things

seems considerably worse than if we made no judgment at all as to the

object’s value. And the same seems also, strangely enough, to be the

case when we make a false judgment of value. When we admire what is

ugly or evil, believing that it is beautiful and good, this belief

seems also to enhance the intrinsic vileness of our condition. It must,

of course, be understood that, in both these cases, the judgment in

question is merely what I have called a judgment of taste; that is to

say, it is concerned with the worth of the qualities actually cognised

and not with the worth of the object, to which those qualities may be

rightly or wrongly attributed.

 

Finally it should be mentioned that evils of this class, _beside_ that

emotional element (namely enjoyment and admiration) which they share

with great unmixed goods, appear always also to include some specific

emotion, which does not enter in the same way into the constitution

of any good. The presence of this specific emotion seems certainly

to enhance the badness of the whole, though it is not plain that, by

itself, it would be either evil or ugly.

 

 

=126.= (2) The second class of great evils are undoubtedly mixed

evils; but I treat them next, because, in a certain respect, they

appear to be the _converse_ of the class last considered. Just as it

is essential to this last class that they should include an emotion,

appropriate to the cognition of what is good or beautiful, but directed

to an inappropriate object; so to this second class it is essential

that they should include a cognition of what is good or beautiful, but

accompanied by an inappropriate emotion. In short, just as the last

class may be described as cases of the love of what is evil or ugly, so

this class may be described as cases of the hatred of what is good or

beautiful.

 

With regard to these evils it should be remarked: First, that the vices

of hatred, envy and contempt, where these vices are evil in themselves,

appear to be instances of them; and that they are frequently

accompanied by evils of the first class, for example, where a delight

is felt in the pain of a good person. Where they are thus accompanied,

the whole thus formed is undoubtedly worse than if either existed

singly.

 

And secondly: That in their case a true belief in the existence of the

good or beautiful object, which is hated, does appear to enhance the

badness of the whole, in which it is present. Undoubtedly also, as in

our first class, the presence of a true belief as to the _value_ of the

objects contemplated, increases the evil. But, contrary to what was the

case in our first class, a _false_ judgment of value appears to lessen

it.

 

 

=127.= (3) The third class of great positive evils appears to be the

class of _pains_.

 

With regard to these it should first be remarked that, as in the case

of pleasure, it is not pain itself, but only the consciousness of pain,

towards which our judgments of value are directed. Just as in Chap.

III., it was said that pleasure, however intense, which no one felt,

would be no good at all; so it appears that pain, however intense, of

which there was no consciousness, would be no evil at all.

 

It is, therefore, only the consciousness of intense pain, which can

be maintained to be a great evil. But that this, _by itself_, may be

a great evil, I cannot avoid thinking. The case of pain thus seems to

differ from that of pleasure: for the mere consciousness of pleasure,

however intense, does not, _by itself_, appear to be a _great_ good,

even if it has some slight intrinsic value. In short, pain (if we

understand by this __EXPRESSION__, the consciousness of pain) appears to

be a far worse evil than pleasure is a good. But, if this be so, then

_pain_ must be admitted to be an exception from the rule which seems to

hold both of all _other_ great evils and of _all_ great goods: namely

that they are all organic unities to which _both_ a cognition of an

object _and_ an emotion directed towards that object are essential. In

the case of pain and of pain alone, it seems to be true that a mere

cognition, by itself, may be a great evil. It is, indeed, _an_ organic

unity, since it involves both the cognition and the object, neither of

which, by themselves, has either merit or demerit. But it is a less

complex organic unity than any other great evil and than any great

good, _both_ in respect of the fact that it does not involve, _beside_

the cognition, an emotion directed towards its object, _and also_ in

respect of the fact that the _object_ may here be absolutely simple,

whereas in most, if not all, other cases, the object itself is highly complex.