Principia Ethica 43

Principia Ethica 43

This want of analogy between the relation of pain to intrinsic evil and

of pleasure to intrinsic good, seems also to be exhibited in a second

respect. Not only is it the case that consciousness of intense pain

is, by itself, a great evil, whereas consciousness of intense pleasure

is, by itself, no great good; but also the _converse_ difference

appears to hold of the contribution which they make to the value of

the whole, when they are combined respectively with another great evil

or with a great good. That is to say, the presence of pleasure (though

not in proportion to its intensity) does appear to enhance the value

of a whole, in which it is combined with any of the great unmixed

goods which we have considered: it might even be maintained that it

is _only_ wholes, in which _some_ pleasure is included, that possess

any great value: it is certain, at all events, that the presence of

pleasure makes a contribution to the value of good wholes greatly in

excess of its own intrinsic value. On the contrary, if a feeling of

pain be combined with any of the evil states of mind which we have been

considering, the difference which its presence makes to the value of

the whole, _as a whole_, seems to be rather for the better than the

worse: in any case, the only additional evil which it introduces, is

that which it, by itself, intrinsically constitutes. Thus, whereas pain

is _in itself_ a great evil, but makes no addition to the badness of a

whole, in which it is combined with some other bad thing, except that

which consists in its own intrinsic badness; pleasure, conversely, is

not _in itself_ a great good, but does make a great addition to the

goodness of a whole in which it is combined with a good thing, quite

apart from its own intrinsic value.

 

 

=128.= But finally, it must be insisted that pleasure and pain are

completely analogous in this: that we cannot assume either that the

presence of pleasure always makes a state of things better _on the

whole_, or that the presence of pain always makes it worse. This is the

truth which is most liable to be overlooked with regard to them; and

it is because this is true, that the common theory, that pleasure is

the only good and pain the only evil, has its grossest consequences in

misjudgments of value. Not only is the pleasantness of a state _not_

in proportion to its intrinsic worth; it may even add positively to

its vileness. We do not think the successful hatred of a villain the

less vile and odious, because he takes the keenest delight in it; nor

is there the least need, in logic, why we should think so, apart from

an unintelligent prejudice in favour of pleasure. In fact it seems to

be the case that wherever pleasure is added to an evil state of either

of our first two classes, the whole thus formed is _always_ worse than

if no pleasure had been there. And similarly with regard to pain. If

pain be added to an evil state of either of our first two classes, the

whole thus formed is _always_ better, _as a whole_, than if no pain

had been there; though here, if the pain be too intense, since that

is a great evil, the state may not be better _on the whole_. It is in

this way that the theory of vindictive punishment may be vindicated.

The infliction of pain on a person whose state of mind is bad may, if

the pain be not too intense, create a state of things that is better

_on the whole_ than if the evil state of mind had existed unpunished.

Whether such a state of things can ever constitute a _positive_ good,

is another question.

 

 

=129.= II. The consideration of this other question belongs properly to

the second topic, which was reserved above for discussion namely the

topic of ‘mixed’ goods. ‘Mixed’ goods were defined above as things,

which, though positively good _as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as

essential elements, something intrinsically evil or ugly. And there

certainly seem to be such goods. But for the proper consideration

of them, it is necessary to take into account a new distinction the

distinction just expressed as being between the value which a thing

possesses ‘_as a whole_,’ and that which it possesses ‘_on the whole_.’

 

When ‘mixed’ goods were defined as things positively good _as wholes_,

the __EXPRESSION__ was ambiguous. It was meant that they were positively

good _on the whole_; but it must now be observed that the value which

a thing possesses _on the whole_ may be said to be equivalent to the

sum of the value which it possesses _as a whole_, _together with_ the

intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts. In fact, by the

‘value which a thing possesses as a whole,’ there may be meant two

quite distinct things. There may be meant either (1) That value which

arises solely _from the combination_ of two or more things; or else (2)

The total value formed by the addition to (1) of any intrinsic values

which may belong to the things combined. The meaning of the distinction

may perhaps be most easily seen by considering the supposed case of

vindictive punishment. If it is true that the combined existence of two

evils may yet constitute a less evil than would be constituted by the

existence of either singly, it is plain that this can only be because

there arises from the combination a positive good which is greater than

the _difference_ between the sum of the two evils and the demerit of

either singly: this positive good would then be the value of the whole,

_as a whole_, in sense (1). Yet if this value be not so great a good

as the sum of the two evils is an evil, it is plain that the value of

the whole state of things will be a positive evil; and this value is

the value of the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (2). Whatever view may

be taken with regard to the particular case of vindictive punishment,

it is plain that we have here _two distinct things_, with regard to

_either_ of which a separate question may be asked in the case of every

organic unity. The first of these two things may be expressed as _the

difference_ between the value _of the whole thing_ and the sum of the

value of its parts. And it is plain that where the parts have little or

no intrinsic value (as in our first class of goods, §§ 114, 115), this

difference will be nearly or absolutely identical with the value of

the whole thing. The distinction, therefore, only becomes important in

the case of wholes, of which one or more parts have a great intrinsic

value, positive or negative. The first of these cases, that of a

whole, in which one part has a great _positive_ value, is exemplified

in our 2nd and 3rd classes of great unmixed goods (§§ 120, 122); and

similarly the Summum Bonum is a whole of which _many_ parts have a

great _positive_ value. Such cases, it may be observed, are also very

frequent and very important objects of Aesthetic judgment; since the

essential distinction between the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ styles

consists in the fact that the former aims at obtaining the greatest

possible value for the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (1), whereas

the latter sacrifices this in order to obtain the greatest possible

value for some _part_, which is itself an organic unity. It follows

that we cannot declare either style to be necessarily superior, since

an equally good result _on the whole_, or ‘as a whole’ in sense (2),

may be obtained by either method; but the distinctively _aesthetic_

temperament seems to be characterised by a tendency to prefer a good

result obtained by the classical, to an equally good result obtained by

the romantic method.

 

 

=130.= But what we have now to consider are cases of wholes, in which

one or more parts have a great _negative_ value--are great positive

evils. And first of all, we may take the _strongest_ cases, like that

of retributive punishment, in which we have a whole, exclusively

composed of two great positive evils--wickedness and pain. Can such a

whole ever be positively good _on the whole_?

 

(1) I can see no reason to think that such wholes ever are positively

good _on the whole_. But from the fact that they may, nevertheless, be

less evils, than either of their parts taken singly, it follows that

they have a characteristic which is most important for the correct

decision of practical questions. It follows that, quite apart from

_consequences_ or any value which an evil may have as a mere means,

it may, _supposing_ one evil already exists, be worth while to create

another, since, by the mere creation of this second, there may be

constituted a whole less bad than if the original evil had been left

to exist by itself. And similarly, with regard to all the wholes which

I am about to consider, it must be remembered, that, even if they are

not goods _on the whole_, yet, where an evil already exists, as in this

world evils do exist, the existence of the other part of these wholes

will constitute a thing desirable _for its own sake_--that is to say,

not merely a means to future goods, but one of the _ends_ which must

be taken into account in estimating what that best possible state of

things is, to which every right action must be a means.

 

 

=131.= (2) But, as a matter of fact, I cannot avoid thinking that there

are wholes, containing something positively evil and ugly, which are,

nevertheless, great positive goods on the whole. Indeed, it appears

to be to this class that those instances of virtue, which contain

anything intrinsically good, chiefly belong. It need not, of course,

be denied that there is sometimes included in a virtuous disposition

more or less of those unmixed goods which were first discussed--that

is to say, a real love of what is good or beautiful. But the typical

and characteristic virtuous dispositions, so far as they are not

mere means, seem rather to be examples of mixed goods. We may take

as instances (_a_) Courage and Compassion, which seem to belong to

the second of the three classes of virtues distinguished in our last

chapter (§ 107); and (_b_) the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, by

reference to which the third of those three classes was defined (§ 108).

 

Courage and compassion, in so far as they contain an intrinsically

desirable state of mind, seem to involve essentially a cognition of

something evil or ugly. In the case of courage the object of the

cognition may be an evil of any of our three classes; in the case of

compassion, the proper object is pain. Both these virtues, accordingly,

must contain precisely the same cognitive element, which is also

essential to evils of class (1); and they are differentiated from these

by the fact that the emotion directed to these objects is, in their

case, an emotion of the same kind which was essential to evils of class

(2). In short, just as evils of class (2) seemed to consist in a hatred

of what was good or beautiful, and evils of class (1) in a love of what

was evil or ugly; so these virtues involve a _hatred_ of what is evil

or ugly. Both these virtues do, no doubt, also contain other elements,

and, among these, each contains its specific emotion; but that their

value does not depend solely upon these other elements, we may easily

assure ourselves, by considering what we should think of an attitude of

endurance or of defiant contempt toward an object intrinsically good

or beautiful, or of the state of a man whose mind was filled with pity

for the happiness of a worthy admiration. Yet pity for the undeserved

sufferings of others, endurance of pain to ourselves, and a defiant

hatred of evil dispositions in ourselves or in others, seem to be

undoubtedly admirable in themselves; and if so, there are admirable

things, which must be lost, if there were no cognition of evil.

 

Similarly the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, in all cases where it has

any considerable intrinsic value, appears to include a hatred of evils

of the first and second classes. It is true that the emotion is here

excited by the idea that an action is right or wrong; and hence the

object of the idea which excites it is generally not an intrinsic evil.

But, as far as I can discover, the emotion with which a conscientious

man views a real or imaginary right action, contains, as an essential

element, the same emotion with which he views a wrong one: it seems,

indeed, that this element is necessary to make his emotion specifically

_moral_. And the specifically moral emotion excited by the idea of a

wrong action, seems to me to contain essentially a more or less vague

cognition of the kind of intrinsic evils, which are usually caused

by wrong actions, whether they would or would not be caused by the

particular action in question. I am, in fact, unable to distinguish, in

its main features, the moral sentiment excited by the idea of rightness

and wrongness, wherever it is intense, from the total state constituted

by a cognition of something intrinsically evil together with the

emotion of hatred directed towards it. Nor need we be surprised that

this mental state should be the one chiefly associated with the idea

of rightness, if we reflect on the nature of those actions which are

most commonly recognised as duties. For by far the greater part of the

actions, of which we commonly think as duties, are _negative_: what we

feel to be our duty is to _abstain_ from some action to which a strong

natural impulse tempts us. And these wrong actions, in the avoidance

of which duty consists, are usually such as produce, very immediately,

some bad consequence in pain to others; while, in many prominent

instances, the inclination, which prompts us to them, is itself an

intrinsic evil, containing, as where the impulse is lust or cruelty,

an anticipatory enjoyment of something evil or ugly. That right action

does thus so frequently entail the suppression of some evil impulse,

is necessary to explain the plausibility of the view that virtue