Principia Ethica 5

Principia Ethica 5

CHAPTER VI.

 

THE IDEAL.

 

=110.= By an ‘ideal’ state of things may be meant either (1)

the Summum Bonum or absolutely best, or (2) the best which the

laws of nature allow to exist in this world, or (3) anything

greatly good in itself: this chapter will be principally

occupied with what is ideal in sense (3)--with answering the

fundamental question of Ethics; 183

 

=111.= but a correct answer to this question is an essential

step towards a correct view as to what is ‘ideal’ in senses (1)

and (2). 184

 

=112.= In order to obtain a correct answer to the question

‘What is good in itself?’ we must consider what value things

would have if they existed absolutely by themselves; 187

 

=113.= and, if we use this method, it is obvious that personal

affection and aesthetic enjoyments include by far the greatest

goods with which we are acquainted. 188

 

=114.= If we begin by considering I. _Aesthetic Enjoyments_, it

is plain (1) that there is always _essential_ to these some one

of a great variety of different emotions, though these emotions

may have little value _by themselves_: 189

 

=115.= and (2) that a cognition of really beautiful qualities

is equally essential, and has equally little value by itself. 190

 

=116.= But (3) granted that the appropriate combination of

these two elements is always a considerable good and may be

a very great one, we may ask whether, where there is _added_

to this _a true belief in the existence of the object of the

cognition_, the whole thus formed is not much more valuable

still. 192

 

=117.= I think that this question should be answered in the

affirmative; but in order to ensure that this judgment is

correct, we must carefully distinguish it 194

 

=118.= from the two judgments (_a_) that knowledge is valuable

_as a means_, (_b_) that, where the object of the cognition

is itself a good thing, its existence, of course, adds to the

value of the whole state of things: 195

 

=119.= if, however, we attempt to avoid being biassed by these

two facts, it still seems that mere true belief may be a

condition essential to great value. 197

 

=120.= We thus get a _third_ essential constituent of many

great goods; and in this way we are able to justify (1) the

attribution of value to _knowledge_, over and above its value

as a means, and (2) the intrinsic superiority of the proper

appreciation of a _real_ object over the appreciation of an

equally valuable object of mere imagination: emotions directed

towards real objects may thus, even if the object be inferior,

claim equality with the highest imaginative pleasures. 198

 

=121.= Finally (4) with regard to the _objects_ of the

cognition which is essential to these good wholes, it is the

business of Aesthetics to analyse their nature: it need only be

here remarked (1) that, by calling them ‘beautiful,’ we mean

that they have this relation to a _good_ whole; and (2) that

they are, for the most part, themselves complex wholes, such

that the admiring contemplation of the whole greatly exceeds

in value the sum of the values of the admiring contemplation of

the parts. 200

 

=122.= With regard to II. _Personal Affection_, the object is

here not merely beautiful but also good in itself; it appears,

however, that the appreciation of what is thus good in itself,

viz. the mental qualities of a person, is certainly, by itself,

not so great a good as the whole formed by the combination

with it of an appreciation of corporeal beauty; it is doubtful

whether it is even so great a good as the mere appreciation of

corporeal beauty; but it is certain that the combination of

both is a far greater good than either singly. 203

 

=123.= It follows from what has been said that we have every

reason to suppose that a cognition of _material qualities_, and

even their existence, is an essential constituent of the Ideal

or Summum Bonum: there is only a bare possibility that they are

not included in it. 205

 

=124.= It remains to consider _positive evils_ and _mixed

goods_. I. _Evils_ may be divided into three classes, namely 207

 

=125.= (1) evils which consist in the love, or admiration, or

enjoyment of what is evil or ugly 208

 

=126.= (2) evils which consist in the hatred or contempt of

what is good or beautiful 211

 

=127.= and (3) the consciousness of intense pain: this appears

to be the only thing, either greatly good or greatly evil,

which does not involve _both_ a cognition _and_ an emotion

directed towards its object; and hence it is not analogous to

pleasure in respect of its intrinsic value, while it also seems

not to add to the vileness of a whole, _as a whole_, in which

it is combined with another bad thing, whereas pleasure does

add to the goodness of a whole, in which it is combined with

another good thing; 212

 

=128.= but pleasure and pain are completely analogous in this,

that pleasure by no means always increases, and pain by no

means always decreases, the total value of a whole in which it

is included: the converse is often true. 213

 

=129.= In order to consider II. _Mixed Goods_, we must first

distinguish between (1) the value of a whole _as a whole_,

and (2) its value _on the whole_ or total value: (1) = the

difference between (2) and the sum of the values of the parts.

In view of this distinction, it then appears: 214

 

=130.= (1) That the mere combination of two or more evils is

never positively good _on the whole_, although it may certainly

have great intrinsic value _as a whole_; 216

 

=131.= but (2) That a whole which includes a cognition of

something evil or ugly may yet be a great positive good _on the

whole_: most virtues, which have any intrinsic value whatever,

seem to be of this kind, _e.g._ (_a_) courage and compassion,

and (_b_) moral goodness; all these are instances of the hatred

or contempt of what is evil or ugly; 216

 

=132.= but there seems no reason to think that, where the evil

object _exists_, the total state of things is ever positively

good _on the whole_, although the existence of the evil may add

to its value _as a whole_. 219

 

=133.= Hence (1) no actually existing evil is necessary to the

Ideal, (2) the contemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to

it, and (3) where evils already exist, the existence of mixed

virtues has a value independent both of its consequences and of

the value which it has in common with the proper appreciation

of imaginary evils. 220

 

=134.= Concluding remarks. 222

 

=135.= Summary of chapter. 224

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER I.

 

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS.

 

 

=1.= It is very easy to point out some among our every-day judgments,

with the truth of which Ethics is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever

we say, ‘So and so is a good man,’ or ‘That fellow is a villain’;

whenever we ask, ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘Is it wrong for me to do

like this?’; whenever we hazard such remarks as ‘Temperance is a virtue

and drunkenness a vice’--it is undoubtedly the business of Ethics

to discuss such questions and such statements; to argue what is the

true answer when we ask what it is right to do, and to give reasons

for thinking that our statements about the character of persons or

the morality of actions are true or false. In the vast majority of

cases, where we make statements involving any of the terms ‘virtue,’

‘vice,’ ‘duty,’ ‘right,’ ‘ought,’ ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ we are making

ethical judgments; and if we wish to discuss their truth, we shall be

discussing a point of Ethics.

 

So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of

defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as

the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such

judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: