Principia Ethica 4

Principia Ethica 4

84.= The fact that the metaphysical writers who, like Green,

attempt to _base_ Ethics on Volition, do not even attempt this

independent investigation, shews that they start from the false

assumption that goodness is _identical_ with being willed, and

hence that their ethical reasonings have no value whatsoever. 138

 

=85.= Summary of chapter. 139

 

 

CHAPTER V.

 

ETHICS IN RELATION TO CONDUCT.

 

=86.= The question to be discussed in this chapter must

be clearly distinguished from the two questions hitherto

discussed, namely (1) What is the nature of the proposition:

‘This is good in itself’? 142

 

=87.= and (2) What things are good in themselves? to which we

gave one answer in deciding that pleasure was not the only

thing good in itself. 144

 

=88.= In this chapter we shall deal with the _third_ object of

ethical enquiry: namely answers to the question ‘What conduct

is a _means_ to good results?’ or ‘What ought we to do?’ This

is the question of _Practical_ Ethics, and its answer involves

an assertion of _causal_ connection. 146

 

=89.= It is shewn that the assertions ‘This action is right’

or ‘is my duty’ are equivalent to the assertion that the total

results of the action in question will be the best possible; 146

 

=90.= and the rest of the chapter will deal with certain

conclusions, upon which light is thrown by this fact. Of which

the first is (1) that Intuitionism is mistaken; since no

proposition with regard to duty can be self-evident. 148

 

=91.= (2) It is plain that we cannot hope to prove which

among all the actions, which it is possible for us to perform

on every occasion, will produce the best total results:

to discover what is our ‘duty,’ in this strict sense, is

impossible. It may, however, be possible to shew which among

the actions, which we are _likely_ to perform, will produce

the best results. 149

 

=92.= The distinction made in the last § is further explained;

and it is insisted that all that Ethics has done or can do, is,

_not_ to determine absolute duties, but to point out which,

among a _few_ of the alternatives, possible under _certain_

circumstances, will have the better results. 150

 

=93.= (3) Even this latter task is immensely difficult, and

no adequate proof that the total results of one action are

superior to those of another, has ever been given. For (_a_)

we can only calculate actual results within a comparatively

near future: we must, therefore, assume that no results of the

same action in the infinite future beyond, will reverse the

balance--an assumption which perhaps _can_ be, but certainly

has not been, justified; 152

 

=94.= and (_b_) even to decide that, of any two actions, one

has a better total result than the other _in the immediate

future_, is very difficult; and it is very improbable, and

quite impossible to prove, that any single action is _in all

cases_ better as means than its probable alternative. Rules

of duty, even in this restricted sense, can only, at most, be

_general_ truths. 154

 

=95.= But (_c_) most of the actions, most universally approved

by Common Sense, may perhaps be shewn to be _generally_ better

as means than any probable alternative, on the following

principles. (1) With regard to some rules it may be shewn

that their general observance would be useful in any state of

society, where the instincts to preserve and propagate life and

to possess property were as strong as they seem always to be;

and this utility may be shewn, independently of a right view as

to what is good in itself, since the observance is a means to

things which are a necessary condition for the attainment of

_any_ great goods in considerable quantities. 155

 

=96.= (2) Other rules are such that their general observance

can only be shewn to be useful, as means to the preservation

of society, under more or less temporary conditions: if any of

these are to be proved useful in _all_ societies, this can only

be done by shewing their causal relation to things good or evil

in themselves, which are not generally recognised to be such. 158

 

=97.= It is plain that rules of class (1) may _also_ be

justified by the existence of such temporary conditions as

justify those of class (2); and among such temporary conditions

must be reckoned the so-called _sanctions_. 159

 

=98.= In this way, then, it may be possible to prove the

_general_ utility, for the present, of those actions, which in

our society are _both_ generally recognised as duties _and_

generally practised; but it seems very doubtful whether a

conclusive case can be established for any proposed change in

social custom, without an independent investigation of what

things are good or bad in themselves. 159

 

=99.= And (_d_) if we consider the distinct question of how a

single individual should decide to act (α) in cases where the

_general_ utility of the action in question is certain, (β) in

other cases: there seems reason for thinking that, with regard

to (α), where the generally useful rule is also generally

observed, he should _always_ conform to it; but these reasons

are not conclusive, if _either_ the general observance _or_ the

general utility is wanting: 162

 

=100.= and that (β) in all other cases, _rules of action_

should not be followed at all, but the individual should

consider what positive goods, _he_, in his particular

circumstances, seems likely to be able to effect, and what

evils to avoid. 164

 

=101.= (4) It follows further that the distinction denoted by

the terms ‘duty’ and ‘expediency’ is not primarily ethical:

when we ask ‘Is this really expedient?’ we are asking precisely

the same question as when we ask ‘Is this my duty?,’ viz.

‘Is this a means to the best possible?.’ ‘Duties’ are mainly

distinguished by the non-ethical marks (1) that many people

are often tempted to avoid them, (2) that their most prominent

effects are on others than the agent, (3) that they excite

the moral sentiments: so far as they _are_ distinguished by

an ethical peculiarity, this is not that they are peculiarly

useful to perform, but that they are peculiarly useful to

sanction. 167

 

=102.= The distinction between ‘duty’ and ‘interest’ is

also, in the main, the same non-ethical distinction: but

the term ‘interested’ does also refer to a distinct ethical

predicate--that an action is to ‘my interest’ asserts only that

it will have the best possible effects of one particular kind,

not that its total effects will be the best possible. 170

 

=103.= (5) We may further see that ‘virtues’ are not to be

defined as dispositions that are good in themselves: they are

not necessarily more than dispositions to perform actions

generally good as means, and of these, for the most part,

only those classed as ‘duties’ in accordance with section

(4). It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is

not ‘virtuous’ involves the difficult causal investigation

discussed in section (3); and that what is a virtue in one

state of society may not be so in another. 171

 

=104.= It follows also that we have no reason to presume, as

has commonly been done, that the exercise of virtue in the

performance of ‘duties’ is ever good in itself--far less, that

it is the sole good: 173

 

=105.= and, if we consider the intrinsic value of such

exercise, it will appear (1) that, in most cases, it has no

value, and (2) that even the cases, where it has some value,

are far from constituting the sole good. The truth of the

latter proposition is generally inconsistently implied, even by

those who deny it; 174

 

=106.= but in order fairly to decide upon the intrinsic value

of virtue, we must distinguish three different kinds of