Principia Ethica 3

Principia Ethica 3

=45.= We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism

as an ‘Intuition,’ as which it has been clearly recognised

by Prof. Sidgwick alone. That it should be thus incapable of

_proof_ is not, in itself, any reason for dissatisfaction. 74

 

=46.= In thus beginning to consider what things are good in

themselves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind, and

enter on the second division of ethical questions. 76

 

=47.= Mill’s doctrine that some pleasures are superior ‘in

quality’ to others implies both (1) that judgments of ends must

be ‘intuitions’; 77

 

=48.= and (2) that pleasure is _not_ the sole good. 79

 

=49.= Prof. Sidgwick has avoided these confusions made by

Mill: in considering his arguments we shall, therefore, merely

consider the question ‘Is pleasure the sole good?’ 81

 

=50.= Prof. Sidgwick first tries to shew that nothing outside

of Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for doubting

this. 81

 

=51.= He then goes on to the far more important proposition

that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. 85

 

=52.= But _pleasure_ must be distinguished from _consciousness

of pleasure_, and (1) it is plain that, when so distinguished,

_pleasure_ is not the sole good; 87

 

=53.= and (2) it may be made equally plain that _consciousness

of pleasure_ is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to

distinguish it from its usual accompaniments. 90

 

=54.= Of Prof. Sidgwick’s two arguments for the contrary view,

the second is equally compatible with the supposition that

pleasure is a mere _criterion_ of what is _right_; 91

 

=55.= and in his first, the appeal to reflective intuition,

he fails to put the question clearly (1) in that he does not

recognise the principle of _organic unities_; 92

 

=56.= and (2) in that he fails to emphasize that the agreement,

which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and

those of Common Sense, only holds of _judgments of means_:

hedonistic judgments of _ends_ are flagrantly paradoxical. 94

 

=57.= I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, if proper

precautions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is

absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as the sole

good. 95

 

C.

 

=58.= It remains to consider Egoism and Utilitarianism. It

is important to distinguish the former, as the doctrine that

‘my own pleasure is sole good,’ from the doctrine, opposed to

Altruism, that to pursue my own pleasure exclusively is right

_as a means_. 96

 

=59.= Egoism proper is utterly untenable, being

self-contradictory: it fails to perceive that when I declare

a thing to be my own good, I must be declaring it to be _good

absolutely_ or else not good at all. 97

 

=60.= This confusion is further brought out by an examination

of Prof. Sidgwick’s contrary view; 99

 

=61.= and it is shewn that, in consequence of this confusion,

his representation of ‘the relation of Rational Egoism to

Rational Benevolence’ as ‘the profoundest problem of Ethics,’

and his view that a certain hypothesis is required to ‘make

Ethics rational,’ are grossly erroneous. 102

 

=62.= The same confusion is involved in the attempt to infer

Utilitarianism from Psychological Hedonism, as commonly held,

_e.g._ by Mill. 104

 

=63.= Egoism proper seems also to owe its plausibility to its

confusion with Egoism, as a doctrine of means. 105

 

=64.= Certain ambiguities in the conception of Utilitarianism

are noticed; and it is pointed out (1) that, as a doctrine

of the end to be pursued, it is finally refuted by the

refutation of Hedonism, and (2) that, while the arguments most

commonly urged in its favour could, at most, only shew it to

offer a correct _criterion_ of right action, they are quite

insufficient even for this purpose. 105

 

=65.= Summary of chapter. 108

 

 

CHAPTER IV.

 

METAPHYSICAL ETHICS.

 

A.

 

=66.= The term ‘metaphysical’ is defined as having reference

primarily to any object of knowledge which is not a part of

Nature--does not exist in time, as an object of perception; but

since metaphysicians, not content with pointing out the truth

about such entities, have always supposed that what does not

exist in Nature, must, at least, _exist_, the term also has

reference to a supposed ‘supersensible reality’: 110

 

=67.= and by ‘metaphysical Ethics’ I mean those systems which

maintain or imply that the answer to the question ‘What is

good?’ _logically depends_ upon the answer to the question

‘What is the nature of supersensible reality?.’ All such

systems obviously involve the same fallacy--the ‘naturalistic

fallacy’--by the use of which Naturalism was also defined. 113

 

=68.= Metaphysics, as dealing with a ‘supersensible reality,’

may have a bearing upon _practical_ Ethics (1) if its

supersensible reality is conceived as something future, which

our actions can affect; and (2) since it will prove that

_every_ proposition of practical Ethics is false, if it can

shew that an eternal reality is either the only real thing

or the only good thing. Most metaphysical writers, believing

in a reality of the latter kind, do thus imply the complete

falsehood of every practical proposition, although they fail to

see that their Metaphysics thus contradicts their Ethics. 115

 

B.

 

=69.= But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical

Ethics, is _not_ that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon

the question involved in _practical_ Ethics ‘What effects will

my action produce?,’ but that it has such a bearing upon the

fundamental ethical question ‘What is good in itself?.’ This

theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the

naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy: it only remains to discuss

certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility. 118

 

=70.= One such source of confusion seems to lie in the failure

to distinguish between the proposition ‘This is good,’ when

it means ‘This _existing_ thing is good,’ and the same

proposition, when it means ‘The existence of this _kind_ of

thing would be good’; 118

 

=71.= and another seems to lie in the failure to distinguish

between that which _suggests_ a truth, or is a _cause_ of

our knowing it, and that upon which it _logically_ depends,

or which is a _reason_ for believing it: in the former

sense fiction has a more important bearing upon Ethics than

Metaphysics can have. 121

 

C.

 

=72.= But a more important source of confusion seems to lie

in the supposition that ‘to be good’ is _identical_ with the

possession of some supersensible property, which is also

involved in the definition of ‘reality.’ 122

 

=73.= One cause of this supposition seems to be the logical

prejudice that all propositions are of the most familiar

type--that in which subject and predicate are both existents. 123

 

=74.= But ethical propositions cannot be reduced to this type:

in particular, they are obviously to be distinguished 125

 

=75.= (1) from Natural Laws; with which one of Kant’s most

famous doctrines confuses them, 126

 

=76.= and (2) from Commands; with which they are confused both

by Kant and by others. 127

 

D.