The Story of Nelson 10

The Story of Nelson 10

During the night the _Sans Culottes_ (120) separated from her consorts,

and the _Censeur_ (74), with the damaged _Ça-Ira_ in tow, was also

unable to keep up with the remainder of the French fleet. This enabled

the _Bedford_ (74) and the _Captain_ (74) to attempt to capture them

on the following morning. The British ships, as they bore down on

the enemy, were received by a tremendous fire, which they could not

return. For nearly an hour and a half the fight was sustained until the

_Captain_ was little more than a floating wreck, and the distressed

state of the _Bedford_ made her recall imperative. Eventually the

_Ça-Ira_ and the _Censeur_ surrendered to other vessels of the fleet.

“On the 14th,” Nelson relates with reference to the _Agamemnon_,

“although one of the Van-ships, and in close Action on one side and

distant Action on the other for upwards of three hours, yet our

neighbours suffered most exceedingly, whilst we comparatively suffered

nothing. We had only six men slightly wounded. Our sails were ribbons,

and all our ropes were ends. Had our good Admiral have followed the

blow, we should probably have done more, but the risk was thought too

great.” His ambition is aflame when he considers the possibilities of

the day. “In short, I wish to be an Admiral, and in the command of the

English Fleet; I should very soon either do much, or be ruined. My

disposition cannot bear tame and slow measures.... At one period I am

‘the dear Nelson,’ ‘the amiable Nelson,’ ‘the fiery Nelson’: however

nonsensical these __EXPRESSION__s are, they are better than censure, and we

are all subject and open to flattery.”

 

Several weeks were spent in refitting, a necessary process too slowly

carried out. Meanwhile six French vessels slipped out of Brest

harbour and made their way to Toulon. Then there was delay in sending

reinforcements not at all to Nelson’s liking. He desires “a complete

victory,” and his correspondence betrays his anxiety for the appearance

of Hood, “the best Officer, take him altogether, that England has to

boast of.” His absence was “a great national loss;” Hotham’s continued

appearance, although he did not definitely say so, a calamity.

 

On the 6th June 1795 Nelson was appointed a Colonel of Marines, the

welcome intelligence being conveyed to him by his father. This meant

an increase of income not to be despised, as well as “an appointment

certainly most flattering to me, as it marks to the world an

approbation of my conduct.”

 

Nelson, with the _Agamemnon_ and a small squadron of frigates, was now

sent “to co-operate with the Austrian General de Vins, in driving the

French out of the Riviera of Genoa,” and “to put an actual stop to all

trade between Genoa, France, and the places occupied by the armies of

France,” the invasion of Italy then being an object much to be desired

by the Republicans. On the 6th of July he sighted a French fleet of

seventeen sail and six frigates, an overpowering force it would have

been madness to attack had the opportunity been given to him. His

little squadron was chased to San Fiorenzo, where Hotham was stationed

but unable to get out owing to contrary winds. It was not until the

13th that the enemy was again seen. There was a general chase and a

partial action: “Hotham has no head for enterprise, perfectly satisfied

that each month passes without any losses on our side,” is Nelson’s

criticism.

 

He still endeavoured to be more or less of a freelance. “I am acting,

not only without the orders of my Commander-in-chief,” he tells his

wife, “but in some measure contrary to them. However, I have not only

the support of his Majesty’s Ministers, both at Turin and Genoa, but a

consciousness that I am doing what is right and proper for the service

of our King and Country. Political courage in an Officer is as highly

necessary as military courage.” His position was difficult in the

extreme, for while Genoa posed as a neutral the French did very much as

they pleased, and the Austrian Army, subsidised by England, was “slow

beyond all description.” He found it impossible to patrol the coast as

he would have done had he been able to procure sufficient cruisers and

transports. However, he managed to secure a convoy of provisions and

ammunition, various attacks were made, and for more than a year his

service was one of continual worry and dissatisfaction.

 

With the resignation of Hotham and the coming of Sir John Jervis in

November 1795 the naval policy in the Mediterranean underwent a change.

The latter officer believed in watching an enemy’s port at a convenient

distance so as to render pursuit easy if necessary. With the exception

of two or three squadrons on special service the fleet therefore took

up its station off Toulon.

 

The victory of the French at the battle of Loano, on the 24th November

1795, was followed by their occupation of the Riviera of Genoa as a

matter of course, the Austrians retreating into Piedmont. A certain

amount of blame was laid on Nelson, who, as already noted, was in the

neighbourhood of Genoa in order to see that the pretended neutrality

was observed. Rumour had it that he and his officers had connived at

the landing of supplies for the French army. This drew from him an

indignant letter to Lord Grenville. It was certain that Genoa was a

hot-bed of sedition and French partisanship. An Austrian commissary

had been robbed, and Voltri temporarily captured; it was said that

an insurrection of the peasantry was imminent and that men were

publicly enlisted for service in the French army. The recruits were

to embark in French ships lying in the port of Genoa and in coasters

at Borghetto and to proceed to a landing-place near Voltri. Nelson,

far from sympathising with the malcontents, prevented the sailing of

the expedition by leaving Vado Bay and proceeding to the scene of the

trouble. He placed the _Agamemnon_ across the harbour-mouth and allowed

none of the enemy’s vessels to leave.

 

It is a mournful letter which he pens to Sir Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy

of Corsica, on the 4th December 1795. “My campaign is closed,” he

begins, “by the defeat of the Austrian Army, and the consequent loss

of Vado and every place in the Riviera of Genoa, and I am on my way to

refit poor _Agamemnon_ and her miserable Ship’s company at Leghorn. We

are, indeed, Sir, worn out; except six days I have never been one hour

off the station.” The despatch is too lengthy to quote in full, but it

is significant that he adds, “My being at Genoa, although contrary to

my inclination, has been the means of saving from 8000 to 10,000 men,

and amongst others, General de Vins himself, who escaped by the road,

which, but for me, the Enemy would have occupied. I must, my dear Sir,

regret not having more force.”

 

Nelson, who now made the acquaintance of Jervis, early discerned that

his senior officer was a man more after his own heart than either

Hotham or Sir Hyde Parker, who had held the command during the interim.

He was offered either a 90-gun or a 74-gun ship, but preferred to

keep to the well-tried _Agamemnon_, for whose crew he cherished a

fond affection. He was confident that in the succeeding Spring the

victorious French would “make a great exertion to get into Italy.”

This they did, but by land and not by sea as Nelson anticipated. After

refitting Nelson was still kept on the lookout, descents on Italy being

thought not improbable, but in February 1796 he was off Toulon for a

short time to spy on the doings of the French fleet. His health was

by no means good: “I am grown old and battered to pieces, and require

some repairs. However, on the whole, I have stood the fag better than

could be expected.” In the following month Nelson became a Commodore,

hoisting his distinguishing pennant on the _Captain_ (74) a little

later, the condition of the ship which had served him so long and so

well being such that she could no longer be patched up to withstand the

gales without being overhauled in England.

 

The war was going from bad to worse so far as the allies were

concerned. The armies of the King of Sardinia and Piedmont and of the

Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire acted in separate bodies, whereas

they would have been superior to the enemy had they concentrated. The

battle of Montenotte, fought on the 12th April 1796, took the Austrians

completely by surprise, and enabled Napoleon to boast that his “title

of nobility” dated from this great victory. Millesimo, Dego, Mondovi,

and Cherasco fell, France and Sardinia made peace, followed by an

armistice between Naples and the Republic which preluded a cessation of

hostilities in the following October.

 

Although Nelson was gradually rising in the service he was by no means

a wealthy man. “If we have a Spanish war,” he confides to his brother

on the 20th June 1796, “I shall yet hope to make something this war.

At present, I believe I am worse than when I set out--I mean in point

of riches, for if credit and honour in the service are desirable, I

have my full share. Opportunities have been frequently offered me, and

I have never lost one of distinguishing myself, not only as a gallant

man, but as having a head; for, of the numerous plans I have laid, not

one has failed, nor of opinions given, has one been in the event wrong.

It is this latter which has perhaps established my character more than

the others; and I hope to return in as good health as I set out with.”

 

The French having taken possession of Leghorn, Nelson was ordered to

blockade that important port. At the same time he received intelligence

from Sir Gilbert Elliot that there was a likelihood of the enemy making

an attempt on the fortress of Porto Ferrajo in order that Elba might

be used as a stepping-stone to Corsica. The place was secured by the

British without resort to the sword, the good understanding between

the military and naval forces being in marked contrast to Nelson’s

previous experience at Bastia, “a farther proof of what may be effected

by the hearty co-operation of the two services.” He was soon back at

his former station, carrying out his work efficiently and to Jervis’s

complete satisfaction. The Commodore’s letter to his wife, dated the

2nd August 1796, reflects his high spirits and relates two anecdotes of

more than ordinary interest. After telling Mrs Nelson that “Wherever

there is anything to be done, there Providence is sure to direct my

steps. Credit must be given me in spite of envy,” he proceeds as

follows:

 

“Even the French respect me: their Minister at Genoa, in answering

a Note of mine, when returning some wearing apparel that had been

taken, said, ‘Your Nation, Sir, and mine, are made to show examples of

generosity, as well as of valour, to all the people of the earth.’...

 

“I will also relate another anecdote, all vanity to myself, but you

will partake of it: A person sent me a letter, and directed as follows,

‘Horatio Nelson, Genoa.’ On being asked how he could direct in such

a manner, his answer, in a large party, was ‘Sir, there is but one

Horatio Nelson in the world.’ The letter certainly came immediately.

At Genoa, where I have stopped all their trade, I am beloved and

respected, both by the Senate and lower Order. If any man is fearful of

his Vessel being stopped, he comes and asks me; if I give him a Paper,

or say, ‘All is right,’ he is contented. I am known throughout Italy;

not a Kingdom, or State, where my name will be forgotten. This is my

Gazette.”

 

Towards the end of September Jervis was directed by the Home

Authorities to assist the Viceroy in the evacuation of Corsica, “and

with the fleet to retreat down the Mediterranean.” This was deemed

advisable by the knowledge that war was likely to be declared against

Great Britain by Spain, that Power having entered into an offensive and

defensive alliance with the ever victorious French Republic on the 12th

September 1796. Nelson, who had but recently assisted at the capture

of the little island of Capraja, which he hoped with some reason would

“give additional security to the Kingdom of Corsica,” was not pleased

when duty called him to undertake the evacuation of the country so

inseparably associated with Napoleon. “God knows what turn the minds of

the Corsicans may take when the measure comes to be known,” he tells

Jervis. Leaving the Mediterranean was a sore trial, “a measure which I

cannot approve. They at home do not know what this Fleet is capable of

performing; anything, and everything. Much as I shall rejoice to see

England”--he was writing to his wife--“I lament our present orders in

sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable to the dignity of England, whose

Fleets are equal to meet the World in arms; and of all the Fleets I

ever saw, I never beheld one in point of officers and men equal to Sir

John Jervis’s, who is a Commander-in-chief able to lead them to glory.”