The Story of Nelson 15

The Story of Nelson 15

It is necessary at this point to briefly refer to the naval strength of

Great Britain as compared with that of France. At the beginning of 1798

the Republic possessed fifty-seven sail-of-the-line, forty-six frigates

and seventy-two smaller vessels, to which must be added nine remnants

of the Venetian navy and whatever forces could be commanded from Spain

and Holland. Fourteen sail-of-the-line, seventeen frigates, and three

cutters were on the stocks in French shipyards. During the same year

England had no fewer than one hundred and twenty line-of-battle ships

and over five hundred smaller vessels at her disposal. The recent

mutiny at the Nore had shown that there was some dissatisfaction in

the British naval service, but the ships were not undermanned as in

France, they were in finer condition, and the victories off Cape St

Vincent and Camperdown had acted as a stimulant. If those before the

mast occasionally grumbled, nothing further was heard of organised

insubordination.

 

The Admiralty had now sent a reinforcement of eight battle-ships

and two fire-ships to the Admiral, who was told “to lose no time

in detaching from your Fleet a Squadron, consisting of twelve

Sail-of-the-line, and a competent number of Frigates, under the

command of some discreet Flag-Officer, into the Mediterranean, with

instructions to him to proceed in quest of the said Armament;[25] and

on falling in with it, or any other Force belonging to the Enemy, to

take or destroy it.” The officer was also “to remain upon this service

so long as the provisions of the said Squadron will last, or as long

as he may be enabled to obtain supplies from any of the ports in the

Mediterranean.” According to later orders supplies were to be exacted

“from the territories of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of the

Two Sicilies, the Ottoman Territory, Malta, and ci-devant Venetian

Dominions now belonging to the Emperor of Germany.” The Dey of Algiers,

the Bey of Tunis, and the Bashaw of Tripoli were also believed to

be friendly. Lord Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, suggested

Nelson as the most likely man for this extremely important service.

Several eminent personages claimed to have aided him in his selection,

including Sir Gilbert Elliot and the King.

 

Sir Horatio was accordingly given command of a squadron which numbered

thirteen line-of-battle ships, all carrying seventy-four guns, and

one fifty-gun ship, the _Leander_. St Vincent’s selection awoke the

ire of Nelson’s two seniors in the Earl’s fleet, namely, Sir William

Parker and Sir John Orde. As we have seen, the Admiral had scarcely a

voice in the matter, and subsequent events abundantly confirmed the

wisdom of the appointment. Unfortunately there were no frigates, “the

eyes of a fleet.” As to the destination of Napoleon and his army of

adventurers, the Rear-Admiral was not far wrong when he wrote to Lord

Spencer on the 15th June, after interrogating the captain of a Tunisian

cruiser who had seen them on the 4th off Trapani, that “If they pass

Sicily, I shall believe they are going on their scheme of possessing

Alexandria, and getting troops to India--a plan concerted with Tippoo

Saib, by no means so difficult as might at first view be imagined; but

be they bound to the Antipodes, your Lordship may rely that I will not

lose a moment in bringing them to Action, and endeavour to destroy

their Transports.” Off Messina he heard that the French had taken

possession of Malta. After discussing the matter with his captains he

decided to sail for Alexandria, which he reached two days before the

enemy’s arrival. He then “stretched the Fleet over to the Coast of

Asia,” and “passed close to the southern side of Candia, but without

seeing one Vessel in our route.” This was the position on the 12th

July, when he was still “without the smallest information of the French

Fleet since their leaving Malta.” A week later the squadron anchored

in Syracuse harbour to obtain water and provisions, set off again on

the 25th, and on the 28th the important news was obtained that about a

month before the French fleet had been seen sailing in the direction of

the south-east from Candia. To Nelson this intelligence meant but one

destination--Alexandria. His surmise was correct: “I attacked at sunset

on the 1st of August, off the Mouth of the Nile.”

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER IX

 

The Battle of the Nile

 

1798

 

_As long as Egypt’s pyramids shall stand,

Long as the Nile shall fertilize her land;

So long the voice of never-dying fame

Shall add to England’s glory Nelson’s name!_

 

W. T. FITZGERALD.

 

 

It is difficult for a landsman to appreciate the joy with which

Nelson’s captains, his “Band of Brothers,” as he called them, as

well as the men of lower rank, beheld the enemy moored in line of

battle parallel with the shore in Aboukir Bay on what might well be

termed “the glorious first of August.” They had been searching the

Mediterranean for long, weary weeks, anxious to try conclusions with

Napoleon’s fleet, but thwarted at every turn by lack of information. At

last they were face to face, led by an admiral of unequalled resolution

in whom they placed implicit confidence.

 

“The utmost joy,” says Berry,[26] “seemed to animate every breast on

board the Squadron, at sight of the Enemy; and the pleasure which the

Admiral himself felt, was perhaps more heightened than that of any

other man, as he had now a certainty by which he could regulate his

future operations. The Admiral had, and it appeared most justly, the

highest opinion of, and placed the firmest reliance on, the valour

and conduct of every Captain in his Squadron. It had been his practice

during the whole of the cruize, whenever the weather and circumstances

would permit, to have his Captains on board the _Vanguard_, where he

would fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best

modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to execute upon falling

in with the Enemy, whatever their position or situation might be, by

day or by night. There was no possible position in which they could

be found, that he did not take into his calculation, and for the most

advantageous attack of which he had not digested and arranged the

best possible disposition of the force which he commanded. With the

masterly ideas of their Admiral, therefore, on the subject of Naval

tactics, every one of the Captains of his Squadron was most thoroughly

acquainted; and upon surveying the situation of the Enemy, they could

ascertain with precision what were the ideas and intentions of their

Commander, without the aid of any further instructions; by which

means signals became almost unnecessary, much time was saved, and the

attention of every Captain could almost undistractedly be paid to

the conduct of his own particular Ship, a circumstance from which,

upon this occasion, the advantages to the general service were almost

incalculable.”

 

We must now try to understand the strength and position of the French

fleet. It consisted of thirteen line-of-battle ships, three carrying

eighty guns and one one hundred and twenty guns, and four frigates.

Napoleon, who was far away adding triumph to triumph, had left Admiral

Brueys with three alternative plans. He could enter the port of

Alexandria, Aboukir Roads, or sail for Corfu, leaving the transports at

Alexandria. Brueys soon found that the harbour scarcely held sufficient

water for the navigation of his largest ships. Once inside, it would

be next to impossible to get them out in front of a hostile fleet on

account of the narrow exit. He chose Aboukir Bay, in a position some

ten miles from the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. Here he anchored his

thirteen battle-ships, with great gaps between them, in a line roughly

parallel with the shore, and flanked by gunboats and frigates. His van

was placed as close to Aboukir Island as was practicable. Dr Fitchett

has rather overstated the case in saying that “a battery of mortars

on the island guarded, as with a sword of fire, the gap betwixt the

headmost ship and the island.”[27] In another place he also refers

to the head of the French line being “protected by a powerful shore

battery.”[28] There were certainly a few guns, but “a sword of fire”

suggests a heavy armament, and Napoleon had occasion later to severely

criticise the Admiral’s arrangement in this matter.[29] Brueys was ill,

his marines had almost got out of hand, many of the sailors were raw

recruits, and subversive of discipline, and some of the vessels were

scarcely seaworthy. In tonnage and guns the French had the advantage,

in _morale_ and fighting capacity, the British were first.

 

Nelson determined to sail between Brueys’ line and the shallows. Five

British ships, led by the _Goliath_, crossed the bows of the first ship

of the French van, inshore of the enemy’s line, and anchored abreast of

one of the Frenchmen, while three more, including Nelson’s _Vanguard_,

stationed themselves on the outer side. Some of the captains for

various reasons were unable to take up their correct fighting

positions, the _Culloden_, for instance, struck a shoal and took no

part in the battle. The enemy’s van was surrounded and conquered;

the centre became engaged; the rear alone escaped, Villeneuve, its

commander, making off with two battleships and two frigates without

attempting to fight.

 

“The actions,” Captain Berry relates, “commenced at sunset, which was

at thirty-one minutes past six, p.m., with an ardour and vigour which

it is impossible to describe. At about seven o’clock total darkness

had come on, but the whole hemisphere was, with intervals, illuminated

by the fire of the hostile Fleets. Our Ships, when darkness came on,

had all hoisted their distinguishing lights, by a signal from the

Admiral. The Van ship of the Enemy, _Le Guerrier_, was dismasted in

less than twelve minutes, and, in ten minutes after, the second ship,

_Le Conquérant_, and the third, _Le Spartiate_, very nearly at the same

moment were almost dismasted. _L’Aquilon_ and _Le Peuple Souverain_,

the fourth and fifth Ships of the Enemy’s line, were taken possession

of by the British at half-past eight in the evening. Captain Berry,

at that hour, sent Lieutenant Galwey, of the _Vanguard_, with a party

of marines, to take possession of _Le Spartiate_, and that officer

returned by the boat, the French Captain’s sword, which Captain

Berry immediately delivered to the Admiral, who was then below, in

consequence of the severe wound which he had received in the head

during the heat of the attack. At this time it appeared that victory

had already declared itself in our favour, for, although _L’Orient_,

_L’Heureux_, and _Tonnant_ were not taken possession of, they were

considered as completely in our power, which pleasing intelligence

Captain Berry had likewise the satisfaction of communicating in person

to the Admiral. At ten minutes after ten, a fire was observed on board

_L’Orient_, the French Admiral’s Ship, which seemed to proceed from

the after part of the cabin, and which increased with great rapidity,

presently involving the whole of the after part of the Ship in flames.

This circumstance Captain Berry immediately communicated to the

Admiral, who, though suffering severely from his wound, came up upon

deck, where the first consideration that struck his mind was concern

for the danger of so many lives, to save as many as possible of whom he

ordered Captain Berry to make every practicable exertion. A boat, the

only one that could swim, was instantly dispatched from the _Vanguard_,

and other Ships that were in a condition to do so, immediately followed

the example; by which means, from the best possible information, the

lives of about seventy Frenchmen were saved.[30] The light thrown by

the fire of _L’Orient_ upon the surrounding objects, enabled us to

perceive with more certainty the situation of the two Fleets, the

colours of both being clearly distinguishable. The cannonading was

partially kept up to leeward of the Centre till about ten o’clock, when

_L’Orient_ blew up with a most tremendous explosion. An awful pause and

death-like silence for about three minutes ensued, when the wreck of

the masts, yards, etc., which had been carried to a vast height, fell

down into the water, and on board the surrounding Ships. A port fire

from _L’Orient_ fell into the main royal of the _Alexander_, the fire

occasioned by which was, however, extinguished in about two minutes, by the active exertions of Captain Ball.