The Story of Nelson 25

The Story of Nelson 25

It was not until the

17th February that he received definite instructions to “put himself

under the command” of Parker. Shortly afterwards he changed his ship

for the _St George_ (98). “The _St George_ will stamp an additional

ray of glory to England’s fame, if Nelson survives;” he writes to Lady

Hamilton, “and that Almighty Providence, who has hitherto protected

me in all dangers, and covered my head in the day of battle, will

still, if it be his pleasure, support and assist me.” To his old friend

Berry he says, “I hope we shall be able as usual to get so close to

our Enemies that our shot cannot miss their object, and that we shall

again give our Northern Enemies that hail-storm of bullets which is so

emphatically described in the ‘Naval Chronicle,’ and which gives our

dear Country the Dominion of the Seas. We have it, and all the Devils

in Hell cannot take it from us, if our Wooden walls have fair play.”

As this letter was penned on the 9th March, before the armament left

Yarmouth, it is clear that the Admiral did not set much store by the

proposed negotiations, for which purpose Mr Vansittart,[53] reputed to

be a skilful diplomatist, sailed with the fleet when it weighed anchor

three days later.

 

The first general rendezvous was the Skaw, which was made on the 19th.

A period of heavy weather--bad winds, sleet, snow, frost, and rain--had

set in. Believers in omens not unnaturally predicted the ill-success of

the expedition, which was intensified by the loss of the _Invincible_

(74) with some 400 souls. She struck a sandbank, floated off into deep

water, and then went down. Nelson’s own ship was not in the best of

condition; she was both leaky and uncomfortable. However, a vessel

is but a means to an end, and so long as the _St George_ could float

and her men could fire a broadside Nelson was content. In his eager,

passionate way, the Admiral strongly disapproved of what he had been

able to ascertain of Parker’s plans: “honour may arise from them, good

cannot. I hear we are likely to anchor outside Cronenburg Castle,

instead of Copenhagen, which would give weight to our negotiation: a

Danish Minister would think twice before he would put his name to war

with England, when the next moment he would probably see his Master’s

Fleet in flames, and his Capital in ruins; but ‘out of sight out of

mind,’ is an old saying. The Dane should see our Flag waving every

moment he lifted up his head.”

 

A council of war was held on the 23rd. On the following day Nelson

wrote a lengthy letter to the Commander-in-chief detailing his opinion

of what should be done, Vansittart’s latest report being to the effect

that the Danish Government was hostile “in the greatest possible

degree.” He urged that not a moment should be lost in attacking the

enemy. He brings all the persuasiveness of which he was capable to bear

on Parker. “Here you are,” he says, “with almost the safety, certainly

with the honour of England more intrusted to you, than ever yet fell

to the lot of any British Officer.” This is exaggerating somewhat, but

doubtless the writer felt deeply the urgency of the matter. “On your

decision depends,” he adds with nearer approach to truth, “whether

our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she

shall rear her head higher than ever: again do I repeat, never did our

Country depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this.” He then

proceeds to sketch a plan of campaign, starting with the supposition

that the fleet enters by the Passage of the Sound. He allows for a

certain amount of damage “amongst our masts and yards” taking place

before Cronenburg is reached. There the ships and Crown Island are

attacked, “Ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost.” This mode

Nelson calls “taking the bull by the horns,” and does not prevent the

ships from Revel, or the Swedish squadron, from joining their allies.

He therefore proposes passing Cronenburg, “taking the risk of damage,”

to “pass up the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle

Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King’s Channel, to attack their

Floating batteries, &c., &c., as we find it convenient. It must have

the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes, and

Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen.” He

also suggests a passage to the northward of Southolm. An alternative

mode of attack is by the passage of the Belt, an attack on Draco, thus

preventing the junction of the Russians, and “with every probability of

success against the Danish Floating batteries.” His concluding words

are in the true Nelson spirit: “Supposing us through the Belt with

the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with

the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one Bomb

and two Fire-Ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that

place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the

remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be

thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are the safest;

and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed

with judgment.” Nelson concludes with the assurance that “no exertion

of head or heart” shall be wanting on his part.

 

The proposed terms were definitely refused by Denmark, but Nelson’s

“bold measure” of detaching part of the British fleet to attack the

Russian squadron at Revel while the other attacked the Capital did not

appeal to the unimaginative Parker. Copenhagen must first be overcome.

The pilots also assured the Commander-in-chief that the passage of the

Belt was the safest, which drew from Nelson the abrupt but thoroughly

characteristic reply, “Let it be by the Sound, by the Belt, or any how,

only lose not an hour!” Eventually the Sound was chosen.

 

Having shifted his flag from the _St George_ to the _Elephant_ (74),

a more serviceable ship for the difficult passage, the British fleet,

in order of battle, slowly threaded its way through the shoals on the

30th March, Nelson commanding the van, Parker the centre, and Graves

the rear. The guns of Cronenburg Castle, dominating the Sound, blazed

away, as did those on the armed hulks with which the Danes had hoped

to defend the narrow channel, but the Swedish guns maintained a stolid

silence. The fleet then anchored a few miles below Copenhagen. Parker,

Nelson, and several other officers boarded a lugger to reconnoitre the

enemy’s defences. Various soundings were made to the accompaniment of

gun-firing, and it was found that the enemy had placed a formidable

flotilla, including two 70-gun ships, a frigate, and two dismasted

64-gun ships, in the front of the harbour and arsenal. The Trekroner

Battery had also been strengthened. A second council of war was held

on the 31st, some interesting particulars of which are furnished by

Colonel William Stewart, who was in command of some of the troops.

After some difficulties had been stated anent “the three Powers we

should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those seas,”

Stewart tells us that “Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified

at everything that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the

above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, ‘The more

numerous the better’; and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said,

‘So much the better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the

victory, depend on it.’”

 

“At the battle of Copenhagen,” writes Mr Ferguson, surgeon of the

_Elephant_, “I was amongst the companions of the hero. The attempt was

arduous in the extreme: no common mind would have dared to conceive it;

but it was suited to the exalted enterprise of Lord Nelson. As _his_

was the invigorating spirit of the council that planned the attack, so

in the execution _he_ only could have commanded success. During the

interval that preceded the battle, I could only silently admire when

I saw the first man in all the world spend the hours of the day and

night in boats, amid floating ice, and in the severest weather; and

wonder when the light shewed me a path marked by buoys, which had been

trackless the preceding evening.

 

“On the first day of April, in the afternoon, we took our departure

with twelve sail-of-the-line, and a proportionate number of smaller

vessels, from the main body of the fleet, then lying about four miles

below Copenhagen; and coasted along the outer edge of the shoal called

the middle ground, until we doubled its farthest extremities, when the

fleet cast anchor. This shoal, of the same extent as the sea front of

the town, lies exactly before it, at about three-quarters of a mile in

distance; the interval between it and the shore had deep water, and is

called the King’s Channel.

 

“In this channel the Danes had arranged their defence, as near the town

as possible. It consisted of nineteen ships and floating batteries,

flanked at the town’s extremity by two artificial islands at the mouth

of the harbour, called the Crown batteries, and extending for a mile

along the whole front of the town, leaving intervals for the batteries

on shore to play.

 

“As our anchor dropped at eight in the evening, Nelson emphatically

called out, ‘I will fight them the moment I have a fair wind.’ He spent

the whole night in consultation.

 

“About half-past nine a.m. of the 2nd of April, the signals of the

different ships having been made, repeated, and answered, we had the

mortification to see the _Agamemnon_ get upon the shoal on the first

attempt to leave her anchorage, where she remained immovable. A similar

misfortune followed in succession to the _Russell_ and _Polyphemus_;

and in addition to all this, the _Jamaica_ frigate, with a convoy of

gunboats and the small craft having fallen in with the counter current,

and being unable to stem it, made the signal of inability to proceed. A

mind less invincible than Nelson’s might have been discouraged: though

the battle had not commenced, yet he had approached the enemy; and he

felt that he could not retreat or wait for reinforcements, without

compromising the glory of his country. The signal to bear down was

still kept flying. His agitation during these moments was extreme; I

shall never forget the impression it made on me. It was not, however,

the agitation of indecision, but of ardent animated patriotism, panting

for glory, which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from

his grasp.”

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER XV

 

The Battle of Copenhagen

 

(1801)

 

“_I have a right to be blind sometimes._”

 

NELSON.

 

 

Admiral Mahan, the most scientific of biographical historians, assures

us that the fullest and most interesting account of the Battle of

Copenhagen is that of Colonel William Stewart, an eye-witness of the

thrilling scene and “a very fine gallant man” according to Nelson.

The following particulars are therefore extracted from his graphic

narrative:

 

“The Action began at five minutes past ten. In about half an hour

afterwards, the first half of our Fleet was engaged, and before

half-past eleven, the Battle became general. The _Elephant’s_ station

was in the centre, opposite to the Danish Commodore.... The judgment

with which each Ship calculated her station in that intricate Channel,

was admirable throughout. The failure of the three Ships that were

aground, and whose force was to have been opposed to the Trekroner

battery, left this day, as glorious for seamanship as for courage,

incomplete.... The gallant Riou, perceiving the blank in the original

plan for the attack of the Crown Battery, proceeded down the Line with

his Squadron of Frigates, and attempted, but in vain, to fulfil the

duty of the absent Ships of the Line. His force was unequal to it; and

the general signal of recall, which was made about mid-action by the

Commander-in-Chief, had the good effect of, at least, saving Riou’s Squadron from destruction.