The Story of Nelson 30

The Story of Nelson 30

We must now turn our attention for a moment to the other admirals who

watched the movements of the enemy’s squadrons, or guarded our shores.

Cornwallis was off Ushant, where he could mask the Brest fleet, Keith

was in the Downs, Lord Gardner was at Portsmouth, Admiral George

Montagu--shortly afterwards succeeded by Admiral Sir John Colpoys--was

at Plymouth. Squadrons were detached from these fleets to watch off

such important harbours as Ferrol and Rochefort, and also off the

coast of Holland. The British colonies were not neglected. “Floating

bulwarks” guarded them, for there was no knowing what deep-laid

manœuvres Napoleon might evolve when once his super-active brain was

bent on the problem of how to checkmate England on her own native

element.

 

Meanwhile Nelson had reached Ushant and was searching for Cornwallis,

with whom he was to leave the _Victory_, should the former think an

additional sail-of-the-line necessary. As he did not find the Admiral

he left the ship, shifted his flag to the _Amphion_ frigate, called

at Malta, and joined the fleet off Toulon on the 8th July. “With

the casual absence of one or two ships, we shall be always seven

sail-of-the-line,” a none too formidable force to watch the “goings on”

in the great southern arsenal, but he stuck to it with grim tenacity

in fair weather and foul. He soon found that to all appearances from

seven to nine French battle-ships and a considerable number of frigates

and corvettes were sheltered in the harbour. Unfortunately Nelson’s

vessels were far from being in the best of condition; several of them

were scarcely water-tight. His correspondence teems with reference to

their bad state, as, for instance: “It is not a store-ship a week which

could keep them in repair”; they had “crazy masts”; “their hulls want

docking”; “I never saw a fleet altogether so well officered and manned.

Would to God the ships were half as good, but they are what we call

crazy”; “I do not believe that Lord St Vincent would have kept the sea

with such ships,” and so on.

 

With the _personnel_ of the fleet Nelson had little fault to find,

although he had occasion to issue a General Memorandum respecting the

desertion of certain seamen or marines to the service of Spain. In his

eyes nothing could atone for such conduct: “A Briton to put himself

under the lash of a Frenchman or Spaniard must be more degrading to any

man of spirit than any punishment I could inflict on their bodies.”

With this exception all was well. While “miserably short of men,” he

was able to declare, towards the end of September 1803: “We are at

this moment the healthiest squadron I ever served in, for the fact is

we have no sick, and are all in good humour,” moreover they were “in

fine order to give the French a dressing.” Again: “The squadron has

health beyond what I have almost ever seen, except our going to the

Nile; and I hope, if the French will give us the opportunity, that

our beef and pudding will be as well applied.” No Admiral, before or

since, has ever paid more attention to the health and comfort of the

men who served under him. In the Memorandum to which we have just

referred he contrasts the “one shilling per day, and plenty of the

very best provisions, with every comfort that can be thought of,”

with the “twopence a day, black bread, horse-beans, and stinking oil”

allotted to those in the service of the enemy. Scurvy was rife when he

joined the fleet, but Nelson obtained onions and lemons, recognised

aids to the cure of the disorder, “and a sight of the French squadron

twenty leagues at sea will cure all our complaints.” Writing in August

to his friend Dr Baird he seeks to entertain the physician by relating

particulars of his treatment for scurvy. “I am now at work in Spain,”

he remarks, “and have procured some bullocks and a good supply of

onions--the latter we have found the greatest advantage from.” He

adds: “The health of our seamen is invaluable; and to purchase that,

no expense ought to be spared.” He even managed to secure cattle and

vegetables from France. The fleet was watered at the Madalena Islands.

 

At the end of July the _Victory_, having been returned to the fleet

by Cornwallis, again became Nelson’s flagship. As to the ultimate

destination of the Toulon fleet Nelson was in doubt; that it was to

sail before long he felt convinced owing to the activity manifest in

the harbours. He rightly judged Napoleon’s character: “We know he

is not very scrupulous in the honourable means of accomplishing his

darling object.... My firm opinion is, that the Mediterranean will

again be an active scene; and if Ministers do not look out, I shall

have the Brest fleet to pay me a visit; for as the army can only be

moved by the protection of a superior fleet, that fleet they will try

to have, and a month’s start of us would do all the mischief.” At that

time (July) he believed that Napoleon would make an attempt on the

Morea, perhaps in concert with Russia, the downfall of the Turkish

Empire in Europe would follow, and “Candia and Egypt would, of course,

if this plan is followed, be given to the French, when, sooner or

later, farewell India!” Of the enormous flotilla which Napoleon was

building at Boulogne and elsewhere, Nelson thought little, if at all.

“What! he begins to find excuses!” he writes to Ball. “I thought he

would invade England in the face of the sun! Now he wants a three-days’

fog, that never yet happened! and if it did, how are his craft to be

kept together? He will soon find more excuses or there will be an end

of Bonaparte, and may the devil take him!” He was more concerned, and

with reason, as to the whereabouts of the fleet returning from San

Domingo, which he thought would “come to the Mediterranean--perhaps,

first to Cadiz, to get the Spaniards to escort them. If so, I may have

two fleets to fight; but if I have the ships, the more the merrier.”

In August the Admiral tells Addington: “I am looking out for the

French squadron--perhaps you may think impatiently; but I have made up

my mind never to go into port till after the battle, if they make me

wait a year, provided the Admiralty change the ships, who cannot keep

the sea in the winter, except _Victory_, _Canopus_, _Donegal_, and

_Belleisle_.” The fitting out of an expedition at Marseilles led Nelson

to think that the invasion of Sardinia was contemplated. He therefore

detached the only two frigates he had with him at the moment to cruise

off Ajaccio to endeavour to intercept the enemy should they come that

way. “Of course they will say that we have broken the neutrality if

we attack them in the ports of Sardinia before their conquest, and if

we do not I shall be laughed at for a fool. Prevention is better than

cure.... My station to the westward of Toulon, an unusual one, has been

taken upon an idea that the French fleet is bound out of the Straits,

and probably to Ireland. It is said 10,000 men are collecting at

Toulon. I shall follow them to the Antipodes.”

 

To Sir Richard Strachan he thus sums up the situation on the 26th

August: “The French fleet being perfectly ready for sea, seven of the

line, six frigates, and some corvettes--two sail-of-the-line are now

rigging in the arsenal--I think it more than probable that they are

bound to the westward, out of the Mediterranean. Therefore, as I am

determined to follow them, go where they may, I wish you, in case they

escape me, to send a frigate or sloop after them to find out their

route, giving her a station where I may find her, and keep yourself

either at the mouth of the Straits or off Europa Point, for I certainly

shall not anchor at Gibraltar.” In the middle of October he is still

as uncertain as ever as to the destination of the French. Some folk

favoured the Morea, others Egypt, “and they may be bound outside the

Mediterranean.” “Is it Ireland or the Levant?” he asks Ball in the

early days of dreary November.

 

Think for one moment, as you sit reading this book in a comfortable

room or on a little hillock in the open country, of the ceaseless vigil

of Nelson as his weather-beaten vessels lay off Toulon. When a sea fog

obscured his quarry he was in a fever of anxiety. “It was thick for two

days,” he tells his brother William on one occasion, “and our frigates

could not look into Toulon; however, I was relieved, for the first time

in my life, by being informed the French were still in port.” Then

there was always the possibility that the Brest fleet might escape and

make its appearance at an awkward moment, and the likelihood of a visit

from the returning squadron from the West Indies. He early discerned

the outbreak of war with Spain. Pretending to be a neutral, that Power

most assuredly exhibited the most flagrant favouritism for France. We

have noted that Nelson anticipated the aid of the Dons to the French

in the matter of the ships from San Domingo, help that was readily

given when the vessels, evading Rear-admiral Campbell, stole into

Coruña. This, of course, necessitated a strict blockade of the port,

and Pellew was sent there instead of stationing himself off Rochefort

as had been originally intended. References to them are frequent in his

correspondence. Writing to the British Consul at Barcelona under date

of the 13th September Nelson claimed “every indulgence which is shown

to the ships of our enemies. The French squadron at Coruña are acting

almost as they please; the _Aigle_ French ship of war is not turned

out of Cadiz,[63] the French frigate _Revenge_ is permitted to go out

of that port, cruise, and return with prizes, and sell them. I will

not state that every Spanish port is a home for French privateers, for

this is well known; and I am informed that even at Barcelona English

vessels captured by the French have been sold there. You will acquaint

his Excellency [the Captain-general] that I claim for every British

ship, or squadron, the right of lying as long as I please in the ports

of Spain, whilst it is allowed to other powers; that I claim the rights

of hospitality and civility, and every other right which the harmony

subsisting between our sovereigns entitles us to.” This communication

was followed thirteen days later by a despatch to Strachan in which

Nelson is not only prophetic, but exhibits a cautious mood not usually

associated with “the Nelson whom Britons love.” In this respect he has

been much maligned. In battle his genius enabled him to see a little

ahead of more ordinary men, but he never overstepped the bounds of

prudence. “The occurrences which pass every day in Spain forebode, I

fancy, a speedy war with England; therefore it becomes proper for me

to put you upon your guard, and advise you how to act under particular

circumstances. By looking at the former line of conduct on the part of

Spain, which she followed just before the commencement of the last war,

we may naturally expect the same events to happen. The French Admiral

Richery was in Cadiz, blocked up by Admiral Man: on 22 August they

came to sea attended by the Spanish fleet, which saw the French safe

beyond St Vincent, and returned into Cadiz. Admiral Man very properly

did not choose to attack Admiral Richery under such an escort. This is

a prelude to what I must request your strict attention to; at the same

time, I am fully aware that you must be guided, in some measure, by

actual circumstances.

 

“I think it very probable, even before Spain breaks with us, that

they may send a ship or two of the line to see _l’Aigle_ round Cape

St Vincent; and that if you attack her in their presence, they may

attack you; and giving them possession of the _Donegal_ would be more

than either you or I should wish, therefore I am certain it must be

very comfortable for you to know my sentiments. From what you hear

in Cadiz, you will judge how far you may venture yourself in company

with a Spanish squadron; but if you are of opinion that you may trust

yourself near them, keeping certainly out of gun-shot, send your boat

with a letter to the Spanish commodore, and desire to know whether he

means to defend the French ships; and get his answer in writing, and

have it as plain as possible. If it be ‘yes, that he will fire at you

if you attack the French under his protection,’ then, if you have force

enough, make your attack on the whole body, and take them all if you

can, for I should consider such an answer as a perfect declaration of

war. If you are too weak for such an attack, you must desist; but you

certainly are fully authorised to take the ships of Spain whenever

you meet them. Should the answer be ambiguous, you must then act as

your judgment may direct you, and I am sure that will be very proper.

Only recollect, that it would be much better to let the French ships

escape, than to run too great a risk of losing the _Donegal_, yourself,

and ship’s company.” To Addington he states that “The Spaniards are

now so very uncivil to our ships, that I suppose we shall not be much

longer friends.” To John Hookham Frere, _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Madrid,

he admits, “We have given up French vessels taken within gun-shot of

the Spanish shore, and yet French vessels are permitted to attack our

ships from the Spanish shore. Your Excellency may assure the Spanish

Government, that in whatever place the Spaniards allow the French to

attack us, in that place I shall order the French to be attacked. The

old order of 1771, now put in force against us, is infamous; and I

trust your Excellency will take proper steps that the present mode of

enforcing it be done away. It is gross partiality, and not neutrality.”