The Story of Nelson 31

The Story of Nelson 31

There is a pathetic letter dated the 12th December 1803 in which

Nelson confides to his old friend Davison some of the perils which he

encountered daily. “My crazy fleet,” he writes, “are getting in a very

indifferent state, and others will soon follow. The finest ships in the

service will soon be destroyed. I know well enough that if I was to go

into Malta, I should save the ships during this bad season. But if I

am to watch the French, I must be at sea, and if at sea, must have bad

weather; and if the ships are not fit to stand bad weather, they are

useless.... But my time of service is nearly over. A natural anxiety,

of course, must attend my station; but, my dear friend, my eyesight

fails me most dreadfully. I firmly believe that, in a very few years, I

shall be stone-blind. It is this only, of all my maladies, that makes

me unhappy; but God’s will be done.”

 

Nelson had taken up his station “to the westward of Sicie,” a

position enabling him “to prevent the junction of a Spanish fleet

from the westward,” and also “to take shelter in a few hours either

under the Hières Islands or Cape St Sebastian; and I have hitherto

found the advantage of the position. Now Spain, having settled her

neutrality”--he is writing on the 12th December to Lord St Vincent--“I

am taking my winter’s station under St Sebastian, to avoid the heavy

seas in the gulf, and keep frigates off Toulon. From September we have

experienced such a series of bad weather that is rarely met with, and

I am sorry to say that all the ships which have been from England in

the late war severely feel it.... I know no way of watching the enemy

but to be at sea, and therefore good ships are necessary.” On the same

day he informs a third correspondent that the enemy at Toulon “are

perfectly ready to put to sea, and they must soon come out, but who

shall [say] where they are bound? My opinion is, certainly out of the

Mediterranean.”

 

“We have had a most terrible winter: it has almost knocked me up,” he

tells Elliot within a few days of the close of this anxious year. “I

have been very ill, and am now far from recovered, but I hope to hold

out till the battle is over, when I must recruit myself for some future

exertion.”

 

An Indomitable Spirit this, the greatest sailor of all time!

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER XVIII

 

Twelve weary Months in the Mediterranean

 

(1804)

 

“_My wish is to make a grand_ coup.”

 

NELSON.

 

 

A new year had dawned. “The storm is brewing,” Nelson wrote, and he

thought Sardinia “one of the objects of its violence.” If that island

were captured or ceded to the enemy, “Sicily, Malta, Egypt, &c., &c.,

is lost, sooner or later.” The Madalena Islands, to the north of

Sardinia, not only afforded the ships a safe anchorage but ensured

plenty of fresh water and provisions: “Sardinia is the most important

post in the Mediterranean. It covers Naples, Sicily, Malta, Egypt,

and all the Turkish dominions; it blockades Toulon; the wind which

would carry a French fleet to the westward is fair from Sardinia; and

Madalena is the most important station in this most important island. I

am told that the revenues, after paying the expenses of the island, do

not give the king 5000 _l._ sterling a year. If it is so, I would give

him 500,000 _l._ to cede it, which would give him 25,000 _l._ a year

for ever. This is only my conversation, and not to be noticed--but the

king cannot long hold Sardinia.” On the 11th February 1804 he assures

“my dear friend” Ball that “we are ... on the eve of great events; the

sooner they come the better.” Private letters led him to believe that

the squadrons at Brest and Ferrol were to form a junction with that at

Toulon. Should his surmise prove correct he inferred an invasion of

both the Morea and Egypt, a belief fostered by the wily Napoleon by

means of a camp under General St Cyr at Taranto, in the heel of Italy.

 

Nelson communicated his notions to the Grand Vizier. “Your Highness,”

he adds, “knows them too well to put any confidence in what they say.

Bonaparte’s tongue is that of a serpent oiled. Nothing shall be wanting

on my part to frustrate the designs of this common disturber of the

human race.”

 

He pens a little grumble to Dr Moseley in March, complaining that the

Mediterranean fleet seems “forgotten by the great folks at home,” but

adding with pardonable pride that although the vessels have been at sea

a week short of ten months, “not a ship has been refitted or recruited,

excepting what has been done at sea. You will readily believe that all

this must have shaken me. My sight is getting very bad, but _I_ must

not be sick until after the French fleet is taken.” He includes some

facts regarding his manifold interests as Commander-in-chief. He always

had good mutton for invalids, gave half the allowance of grog instead

of all wine in winter, changed the cruising ground so as not to allow

“the sameness of prospect to satiate the mind,” obtained onions, “the

best thing that can be given to seamen,” by sending a ship for them to

Corsica, and always had “plenty of fresh water.” In the stirring days

of the first decade of the nineteenth century a British Admiral was in

very truth “shepherd of his flock.” He thought for the men and their

officers, saw to their creature comforts, even provided amusement for

them. Moreover, he had to be a diplomatist, something of a soldier,

and a man of resource and reliance. The sailors of England alone

made invasion impossible and nullified the superhuman efforts of the

greatest soldier of recorded history to subjugate the Island Kingdom.

Unpreparedness is peculiarly characteristic of British policy. It

will not surprise students to be told at the beginning of 1804 there

were ten fewer sail-of-the-line than had been available before the

Peace of Amiens. Weight of brain has won more battles than weight of

metal, although it is safer and wiser to have a preponderating supply

of both. We shall see what a dearth of frigates, which are “the eyes of

a fleet,” to use Nelson’s apt __EXPRESSION__, meant to the Admiral in the

prelude to the Trafalgar campaign. He was already complaining of their

absence.

 

La Touche Tréville was now in command at Toulon. Nelson disliked the

man as sincerely as he loathed the nation whom he represented; he

could “never trust a Corsican or a Frenchman.” La Touche Tréville had

been commodore, it will be remembered, of the Boulogne flotilla when

Nelson had made his abortive attacks on it. These were lauded all over

France as “glorious contests.” Nelson was what is usually called, by

a strange misnomer, “a good hater.” Thus to duty was added a personal

rivalry that filled him with an ardent longing to “get even” with his

antagonist.

 

Napoleon had now a sufficient number of small boats at Boulogne and

neighbouring ports for the conveyance of his 130,000 troops to England.

He had abandoned his original plan and was determined that the Navy

proper should play an important part in the perilous project. The

Toulon fleet, after releasing the French _l’Aigle_ at Cadiz, was to be

joined by five ships off Rochefort under Villeneuve, and then hasten

to Boulogne to convoy the flotilla. The rôle of the squadron at Brest

was to be passive, although reports were spread far and wide that the

ships there were to take an army to Ireland. This was done so that

Cornwallis, blockading that port, might not form a junction with the

squadron in the Downs for the purpose of opposing the crossing of the

vast armament from the northern seaport. If all these combinations were

successfully carried out Napoleon would have sixteen sail-of-the-line

ready for the master-stroke. Everything depended on whether the English

blockading squadrons off Toulon, Cadiz, Rochefort, and in the Downs

could be eluded.

 

On the 8th April Nelson again wrote, “We are on the eve of

great events,” and proceeded to tell his correspondent that two

sail-of-the-line had “put their heads outside Toulon,” and a little

later “they all came out. We have had a gale of wind and calm since;

therefore I do not know whether they are returned to port or have kept

the sea. I have only to wish to get alongside of them with the present

fleet under my command; so highly officered and manned, the event ought

not to be doubted.”

 

“If we go on playing out and in, we shall some day get at them,” he

tells Frere.

 

Monsieur La Touche was merely exercising his ships; the time for the

grand coup was not yet come. Nelson’s opinion now was that the Brest

fleet and a squadron he does not name, but probably that at Rochefort,

were destined for the Mediterranean “either before or after they may

have thrown their cargo of troops on shore in Ireland. Egypt and the

Morea supposed to be their next object after their English and Irish

schemes.” On the 24th May the French made a further excursion, five

sail-of-the-line, three frigates, and several smaller vessels came

out of the harbour, which was being watched by a small squadron under

Rear-Admiral Campbell. Nelson did not believe in showing the whole of

his available resources to the enemy. By being out of sight he hoped

to entice the enemy to leave their safe anchorage: “My system is the

very contrary of blockading.” He was delighted that Campbell did not

allow the French to bring him to action with the small resources at

his disposal, which is another example of Nelson’s cautious methods.

He thanked the admiral by letter, and concluded by saying, “I have no

doubt but an opportunity will offer of giving them fair battle.”

 

Nelson continued to complain of ill health. “A sort of rheumatic

fever,” “blood gushing up the left side of my head, and the moment it

covers the brain, I am fast asleep,” a “violent pain in my side, and

night-sweats”--this is his condition as he diagnosed it to Dr Baird

on the 30th May. A week later he is buoyant at the thought of battle:

“Some happy day I expect to see his (La Touche Tréville’s) eight sail,

which are in the outer road, come out; and if he will get abreast of

Porquerolle, I will try what stuff he is made of; therefore you see I

have no occasion to be fretful; on the contrary, I am full of hopes,

and command a fleet which never gives me an uneasy moment.”

 

Eight French sail-of-the-line, accompanied by half a dozen frigates,

made an excursion on the 14th June, and Campbell was again chased. The

latter sailed towards the main fleet, but La Touche Tréville was by

no means anxious to try conclusions with his old enemy. After sailing

about four leagues, he crept back to safer quarters. The British

Admiral afterwards referred to this little excursion as a “caper.” “I

was off with five ships-of-the-line,” he adds, “and brought to for his

attack, although I did not believe that anything was meant serious, but

merely a gasconade.” With this conclusion La Touche Tréville begged

to differ. He saw in the “caper” a bold manœuvre and an excellent

opportunity for currying favour in the eyes of his exacting chief,

who by no means overrated the commander’s abilities. His despatch to

Napoleon runs as follows:[64]

 

“I have the honour to give you an account of the _sortie_ of the whole

of the squadron under my orders. Having been advised that several

English privateers were infesting the coast and the Islands of Hyères,

I gave orders, three days ago, to the frigates _Incorruptible_ and

_Siren_ and the brig _Ferret_ to proceed to the Bay of Hyères. The

Easterly wind being against them they anchored under the Castle

of Porqueroles. Yesterday morning the enemy became aware of their

presence. Towards noon they detached two frigates and another vessel,

which entered by the broad passage with the intention of cutting off

the retreat of our frigates. As soon as I saw this manœuvre I signalled

to the whole squadron to make sail, and this was done. In fourteen

minutes all were under sail and I made for the enemy in order to cut

him off from the narrow passage and to follow him up if he attempted

it. But the English Admiral soon gave up his design, recalled his

vessel and his two frigates engaged amongst the Islands and took to

flight. I pursued him till nightfall; he was heading for the S.E. At daybreak I had lost sight of him.”