Rodney 23

Rodney 23

For some weeks these various land and sea forces remained in a curiously

complicated position. Fraser at Brimstone Hill was besieged by Bouillé,

who was threatened by Prescott from Basseterre. Hood while covering

Prescott was threatened by Grasse, who lay out at sea watching him.

Reinforcements had arrived which raised the French to over thirty

vessels. At last Brimstone Hill surrendered. There was nothing to be

gained by holding on to Basseterre any longer. On February 17th Hood

re-embarked Prescott’s men, and summoned his captains on board the

_Barfleur_. Every man’s watch was set by the Admiral’s, and orders were

given that at ten o’clock exactly every cable was to be cut, and the

fleet was to slip to sea under the shadow of the land. At sundown the

riding lights of the English fleet were hoisted on boats anchored

outside of them. At the appointed time the axes of the carpenter’s gangs

fell on the cables from end to end of the fleet, and Hood slipped to sea

leaving the lights on the boats to mislead the French till daylight.

When it came, a few flecks of white on the horizon made by the topsails

of Hood’s ships told Grasse that the enemy, who had outmanœuvred him

all along, had baffled him again. The effort to save St. Kitts had

failed from want of means, but it was gallantly made. The success with

which an inferior English force had defied the French, and had

outmanœuvred them, greatly raised our spirits after the last unlucky

months. His failure had discredited Grasse, and had tended to increase

the already existing ill-will between him and his second and third in

command, Vaudreuil and Bougainville.

 

The junction with Rodney had raised the English force nearer to an

equality with the French. Grasse was not minded, however, to fight a

battle. His orders were to make ready for that attack on Jamaica which

was to put a triumphant finish to the war. So, taking Bouillé on board

again, he returned to Fort Royal in Martinique. Rodney went south to

Gros Islet Bay in Santa Lucia--his old headquarters--and there resumed

his watch on the enemy.

 

It was known on both sides that a decisive battle lay ahead of them.

Rodney had written to Parker at Jamaica immediately on reaching the West

Indies, warning him of the approaching attack. The French, he informed

him, would certainly make an effort to fall on the Greater Antilles

soon. For his part he would do his best to fight them to windward, but

if they slipped through his fingers there, then he would follow them to

the west, would join Parker, and the battle would be fought off Jamaica.

In any case there would be a battle. During March both fleets were

making ready. Both expected and received reinforcements. The ships which

were fitting out in England when Rodney left, followed him soon, and

their arrival raised his force to thirty-six sail of the line with a

good proportion of frigates. In the meantime another expedition had been

fitted out at Brest to replace that broken up by Kempenfelt in December.

It was commanded by Captain Mithon de Genouilly, and it reached Fort

Royal safely in spite of us before the end of March. On this occasion,

also, one has to confess that Rodney differed in opinion from Hood, and

that his measures did not succeed. Hood argued that the French in their

anxiety to arrive safely would avoid the neighbourhood of the English

station at Santa Lucia, and he asked for leave to cruise well to the

north among the Antilles. Rodney replied that the French had always

entered the West Indies by the passage between Martinique and Dominica,

and would certainly do so again. He therefore stationed Hood off this

passage, and ordered him to stay there. The calculation that the French

would adhere to the old routine was shrewd enough, and fairly justified

by their conduct of the war, but on this occasion it turned out to be

mistaken. Mithon de Genouilly steered a more northerly course. He

entered the West Indies by Deseada, which is just off Guadaloupe to the

east, and then, hugging the leeward side of the islands, got safe into

Fort Royal. Whether the disposition preferred by Hood would have barred

his road we cannot tell. To have divided our force as widely as he

recommended might have been a dangerous step in the presence of a bold

enemy, and Rodney perhaps did well to avoid the risk that even Grasse

would throw over the cautious French tactics once in a way. But he was

certainly keenly disappointed by the escape of Mithon de Genouilly, all

the more because he had expressed the fullest confidence in the measures

taken to stop him. A squadron being no longer needed to windward of

Martinique, Hood was recalled to Santa Lucia, and the English fleet was

kept ready to start in pursuit the instant the look-out frigates saw

Grasse standing out from Fort Royal. It was Rodney’s last

disappointment.

 

The two fleets were now within one ship equal in point of numbers.

Grasse was, however, hampered by a great convoy of merchant vessels

which had to be seen safely to San Domingo--a charge which very

materially affected his manœuvres when he did at last get to sea.

They were trading vessels, not transports. The troops which were to be

landed in Jamaica were embarked on the war-ships, and with them the

battering-train. Bouillé was not to go in command this time, as the

Spanish Government insisted that an island which, by the terms of their

compact with France, was to be conquered for Spain, should be attacked

under the direction of a Spanish general. His supersession made no

difference, as things turned out; but if the combined expedition had

actually reached Jamaica, it would have been all to our advantage. Until

April 8th the two fleets remained at anchor--the French getting ready at

Fort Royal; the English waiting to start in pursuit from Santa Lucia,

some forty miles to the south. All leave was stopped on our ships.

Neither officer nor man landed except on duty. A line of frigates

patrolled the space between the two ports within signalling distance of

one another.

 

At last, on the 8th, the _Andromache_ frigate, commanded by Captain

Byron--“an active, brisk, and intelligent officer,” according to

Rodney--was seen standing in for Santa Lucia with the signal flying

which told that the French were getting to sea. Within two hours the

English were out, and in pursuit. The shortest route for the French

would have been across the Caribbean Sea to their rendezvous with the

Spaniards on the coast of San Domingo. But Grasse could not take that

course without incurring the certainty of being caught up by the

pursuer. There is much dispute between the writers of the time as to

which of the two fleets, French and English, sailed better, each

asserting that the other had the quicker heels. In this case, however,

there could be no doubt that the English, having a greater number of

coppered ships, could have overhauled the enemy. Besides, Grasse would

have been hampered by his lumbering merchantmen. As it was his duty to

save them, and his cue to avoid a battle till he had effected his

junction with the Spaniards, it was probable that he would take the

alternative route--that he would hug the western or leeward side of the

islands and stand to the north, partly because this course would give

him the better chance of keeping the weather-gage, and partly because it

would enable him to stand in guard over his convoy by keeping it between

himself and the land. So Rodney acted on the supposition that Grasse

would go northward, and through the night of April 8th he steered in

that direction past Martinique. On the morning of the 9th the English

fleet was off Dominica, and it was seen that Rodney had judged rightly.

There to north and east of our ships were the French fleet and convoy.

 

Rodney and Grasse were now face to face on their decisive field of

battle. This field is the stretch of water which extends along the west

side of Dominica to the southern point of Guadaloupe--a length of nearly

fifty miles. It is subject to conditions which dictated the course of

the next four days of fighting and manœuvres as effectually as ever

mountain, wood, or river shaped a battle on land. The island of Dominica

is twenty-seven miles long, it runs from east of south to west of north,

and it is full of hills. The Morne Diablotin, about nine miles from the

northern point, is four thousand seven hundred and forty-seven feet

high. These hills had not a little to do with the coming battles.

Twenty-one miles to the north, and a little to the west of Dominica, is

the southern point of the French island of Guadaloupe. The passage

between the two is not, however, for purposes of navigation twenty-one

miles wide. At about fifteen miles from the northern point of Dominica

it is interrupted by a string of small islands called the Saints, which

extend five miles from E.N.E. to W.S.W. They give its name to the

strait--the Saints’ Passage. These fifty miles of water are divided very

sharply into two zones, so to speak, by the winds which blow over them.

The open water between Dominica and Guadaloupe is swept by the Easterly

Trades. But these winds are broken by the high land of Dominica. All

along the western side of the island there is a belt of water which is

subject to calms, or to variable land and sea breezes. It is obvious,

therefore, that a great fleet, manœuvring in these waters, and

extended in a line of battle miles long, might be in two winds. One end

of it might be in the “true breeze” blowing through the Saints’ Passage,

while the other was in the variable breezes blowing off, or along, or on

to the shore. It might even happen that one half of the fleet might have

the wind while the other was becalmed under the land. As a matter of

fact we shall see that both fleets were subject to these various

conditions from the 9th to the 12th April, and that the whole course of

the fighting was largely dictated by them.

 

At daylight on the 9th, English and French were alike becalmed under

Dominica. Grasse had his convoy of merchant ships huddled together in

Prince Rupert’s Bay, an anchorage about three miles long and one deep on

the north-western side of the island. To seaward and to the south of

them were the thirty-five liners and the frigates of his fleet. The

English were opposite the central and southern parts of the island,

arranged in a long roughly-formed line. Sir Samuel Hood with the ships

of the van was farthest to the north; Rodney was in the centre to the

south of him; farthest south and farthest from the enemy was

Rear-Admiral Drake with his division. Two of the French ships, the

_Auguste_ and the _Zélé_, were at some distance from their own fleet and

near the English. As the sun rose the southerly breezes got up along the

coast of the island. They were very partial, and broken all day long by

calms. The first of the great host of ships now collected under the

island to feel them were the nine immediately around Sir Samuel Hood. He

at once formed his line, and stretched ahead, aiming to cut off the

isolated French ships. One of them might have been actually separated

but for the rigidity of the discipline which prevailed in the English

fleet. As the breeze reached her, this vessel stood in towards her own

fleet, steering close-hauled across the head of the English. She came so

near that the leading ship, the _Alfred_, was compelled to bear up to

avoid a collision. Officers and men in Hood’s ships waited eagerly for

the order to open fire, but it never came. Hood was watching the mast of

the _Formidable_ for the order to begin, but it was never hoisted, for

some unexplained reason, and the bold Frenchman rejoined Grasse

untouched. This was an instance of the punctilious obedience which is

only just better than disobedience--the action of a man who is resolved

to accept no responsibility, and to leave his commander all the burden;

but it was not disapproved by Rodney.

 

When the wind reached the