Rodney 24

Rodney 24

For the rest, none of the English ships were so damaged as to be unable

to take part in the battle of the 12th. Our fire, too, had been very

steady and quick. The French had masts and spars to replace, so that

their flight was as much hampered as our pursuit. The action is, in

fact, an admirable example of the rule that half-hearted operations in

war are always disastrous. Grasse would not risk his fleet in order to

crush a part of the English, and so he left his enemy intact to ruin him

and his “ultimate object” together three days later.

 

The night of the 9th and whole of the 10th were spent by the two fleets

in repairing damages. Calms and cat’s-paws of wind kept them rolling

harmlessly in sight of one another. During the night of the 10th the

_Zélé_, which was built to bring the French fleet into trouble, ran into

the _Junon_, and so damaged her that she had to be sent off to

Guadaloupe. The _Caton_, too, was found to be so ill rigged that Grasse

got rid of her likewise, and thus reduced his fleet to thirty-one

vessels. All through the 11th the wind gave Rodney no chance of forcing

on an action. The French were beating to windward through the passage,

or gradually wriggling out from under the land. By evening most of them

were out of sight. Rodney had hitherto kept his fleet in line of battle,

but when he saw that the escape of the French had become a question of

an hour or two, he ordered a general chase of the few which still

remained to leeward of the Saints. The best sailers of the English fleet

were soon close upon them, and they were signalling for help. It was, of

course, impossible for Grasse to leave them to their fate, and he came

bowling back before the wind to protect them. He saved them from

capture, but he lost all the advance he had made by a day of laborious

tacking. Before dark the whole French fleet was back to leeward of the

Saints. Rodney recalled his chasing ships, and stood with his whole

fleet to the south. It was too late to fight a battle now, but he wished

to draw the French on and so make it double sure that he would find them

on the, for them, wrong side of the passage next morning. The orders of

the English fleet were to stand to the south till two in the morning,

and then tack to the north. Rodney turned in with the well-grounded

conviction that when day broke the French would be seen by the morning

watch much where they had been left over-night.

 

It was extremely unlikely that the French fleet would in any case

succeed in doing by night what it had failed to do by day, but at two in

the morning, just when the English fleet was coming round to the north

again, an event happened which made the battle of the following day

inevitable. The _Zélé_ with the others was tacking at the mouth of the

passage, endeavouring not to lose if she could not gain ground in the

trade wind. In the dark she met the _Ville de Paris_, Grasse’s own

splendid flag-ship. The _Zélé_ was on the port, the _Ville de Paris_ on

the starboard tack. According to the express orders of the admiral, and

according to what is now the universal rule of the road at sea, it was

the duty of the Zélé to put her helm up and go under the stern of the

flag-ship. But the great gods were weary of Grasse’s peddling. They

blinded the officer of the watch on the _Zélé_. He luffed, endeavoured

to cross the bow of the flag-ship, and ran smash into her. The _Zélé_

had her bowsprit snapped off short, and her foremast carried away just

above the deck. The two vessels were entangled, wind and current swept

them to leeward before they could be got clear. Then Grasse ordered the

_Astrée_ frigate, commanded by the famous and unlucky La Perouse, to

take the _Zélé_ in tow.

 

It was two hours before the cable was made fast, and they were on their

way to Guadaloupe. By daylight, about five o’clock, Grasse and the ships

closest to him had fallen to leeward. When the first rays of the sun

showed them to the English fleet, now heading towards them, they were

stretching over from nine to fifteen miles of water to westward of the

Saints. Sir Charles Douglas, who was already up on board the

_Formidable_, saw that the course of the English would cut right through

them. He hurried down to the Admiral’s cabin to report that “God had

given him his enemy on the lee bow.” From Rodney to the youngest middy

in the fleet, all men saw that the battle was coming now.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER XII

 

THE BREAKING OF THE LINE[A]

 

 

The great importance of this battle seems to justify a survey of the

strength of the two fleets which took part in it. As the result of that

survey, common honesty extorts the confession that the English were

distinctly the stronger of the two in ships and guns. Very legitimate

national pride enables us to add that it was also much the better. On

that day Rodney had under his command thirty-six sail of the line,

including five three-deckers, carrying in all two thousand six hundred

and seventy-four guns. In addition to these weapons, some at least of

the English ships carried carronades--short guns with a large bore, very

effective at close quarters--which, being mounted on hitherto vacant

spaces on the upper-deck as an experiment, were not counted in the

nominal armament, but did add materially to the weight of the fire.

Grasse had thirty sail of the line, including one three-decker, carrying

in all two thousand two hundred and forty-six guns. The carronade was

not as yet in use in the French service. We had therefore a superiority

of six ships and two hundred and fourteen guns in a broadside, without

counting the carronades. On the other hand, the French ships were

generally larger vessels rate for rate than ours, and the calibre of

their guns heavier. Ingenious attempts have been made to show that by

virtue of the size of their ships, and the weight of the individual

guns, the French were really equal if not superior to us. Sir Charles

Douglas even calculated that they were two seventy-fours to the good.

But our guns were quite big enough for the work they had to do, and

battles are won by a superiority of sufficient blows. That we were

materially stronger than our enemy cannot, I think, be honestly denied.

 

In this calculation, too, Sir Charles was less than just to himself.

The improvements which he had introduced into our gunnery were part of

our effective strength. His locks and his carriages enabled such of our

ships as had adopted them both to fire quicker and to train their guns

farther fore and aft than the French, whereby an Englishman passing an

enemy on opposite tacks could get him under fire sooner, and keep him

under it longer than he could answer. This was a kind of superiority

which may be quoted with pride, for it was the fruit of intelligent and

zealous work. The spirit which animated Sir Charles was shared by other

captains also. There had been a great development of professional zeal

during the war, and in many ways the fittings of our ships had been

improved--for which let thanks be once more given to the power enjoyed

by our captains. The crews, too, collected early in the war by hook and

by crook, in the fashion already described, had been brought into

admirable discipline. Long cruising in fleets had given our officers a

complete knowledge of the qualities of their vessels as compared with

others--a very necessary kind of knowledge indeed when a number of ships

were to manœuvre together. Finally the spirit of the fleet was high.

In spite of the little success gained in the war hitherto, our officers

and men believed themselves to be better seamen and gunners than the

French, and had been confirmed in that belief by the fighting near St.

Kitts. They only wanted a chance. The disaster at Yorktown and the

danger of England had roused the patriotism of our seamen, whether on

quarter-deck or forecastle, and that emotion had swept the “spirit of

faction” out of their hearts. In Sandwich’s words, they knew that the

fate of the Empire was in their hands, and they did not intend that it

should be lost for want of fierce fighting. Whatever Hood might think of

Rodney, it was certain that he would obey punctually, and would do his

utmost to damage the King’s enemies. In that respect he had a

superiority over the French better than many ships and guns. There was

no such spirit among the French officers and men. There was the

gallantry of their race, there were knowledge and discipline; but there

was no enthusiasm, and not much real aptitude for the work of

sea-fighting. The jealousies which divided officers of all ranks were

not controlled by a high patriotic spirit, and the qualities of the

crews had sunk since the beginning of the war as the well-trained men

were swept off and replaced by others drawn from a poorer maritime

population than ours.

 

That every man may have his fair share of honour, the list of the two

fleets is here given in the order in which they went into battle.

 

 

THE ENGLISH FLEET

 

SHIPS GUNS CAPTAINS

 

Marlborough 74 Taylor Penny.

Arrogant 74 Samuel Cornish.

Alcide 74 Charles Thompson.

Nonsuch 74 William Truscott.

Conqueror 74 George Balfour.

Princesse 70 { Samuel Drake, Rear-Admiral.

{ Charles Knatchbull.

Prince George 98 James Williams.

Torbay 74 John Gidoin.

Anson 64 William Blair.

Janie 74 Robert Barber.

Russel 74 James Saumarez.

America 64 Samuel Thompson.

Hercules 74 Henry Savage.

Prothée 64 Charles Buckner.

Résolution 74 Robert Manners.

Agamemnon 64 Benjamin Caldwell.

Duke 98 Alan Gardner.

{ G. B. Rodney, Admiral.

{ Charles Douglas.

Formidable 98 { John Symonds.

{ Cranstoun.

Namur 90 Inglis.

Saint Albans 64 William Cornwallis.

Canada 74 Thomas Dumaresq.

Repulse 64 Charrington.

Ajax 74 Robert Fanshawe.

Bedford 74 { Affleck, Commodore,

{ Grave.

Prince William 64 George Wilkinson.

M