Rodney 19

Rodney 19

CHAPTER IX

 

ST. EUSTATIUS

 

 

Rodney’s decision to go to New York was not a hasty one. It was part of

a scheme which had long matured in his mind. When he was applying for

command during the summer and autumn of 1778 he had written several

papers to Sandwich, giving his views of the principles on which the

naval war should be conducted by us in the West Indies and on the coast

of North America. They show a power of looking at warlike operations as

a whole, and a sense of the vital importance of plan and aim which cause

some doubt whether the Admiralty made the best use it could of his

services when it appointed him to a command at sea. The capital defect

of our management at that time was precisely the want of coherence in

our operations which Rodney could have supplied. If instead of sending

him to the West Indies the Government had given him the post which was

to have been held by Collingwood, and was actually filled by Lord Keith

in Napoleon’s time--if it had named him commander-in-chief with his

headquarters at Portsmouth, and had given him a general control over the

movements of squadrons--we might have been the poorer for one great

victory, but our navy would have been used with a definiteness of aim

which was conspicuously wanting in fact. This, however, could not be,

and the next best post was the one he actually held. In the West Indies

Rodney was at hand to help our commanders on the American coast. His

plan was to act against the French in the Antilles during the spring and

early summer with vigour enough to keep them well employed, then, when

the hurricane months made cruising too dangerous in the West Indies, to

proceed to the North American coast, and there, uniting all available

forces, to strike hard at the insurgents. If the French followed they

might be forced to fight a battle.

 

Acting on this plan Rodney sailed from the Antilles in July. He took

this step on his own responsibility, though he had good general reason

for believing that it would be approved. In this he was not mistaken.

Sandwich highly approved, observing with much truth that unless His

Majesty’s officers would “take the great line” nothing effectual would

ever be done. He was right; but unfortunately it was somewhat difficult

for His Majesty’s officers to take the great line effectually with such

forces as they were supplied with and such inspiration as they received

from home. Our military forces were ridiculously inadequate to the work

they had to do, and were moreover divided as if to make the utmost of

their weakness. Clinton was holding on to New York with one half of the

army. Cornwallis and the other half were fighting in the Southern States

with a valour, skill, and success which, ungrateful people that we are,

we have too much forgotten. United under Cornwallis our army might have

done something. Divided it could only stand at bay, or at best carry on

a guerrillero warfare which might be, and was, brilliantly successful

for a time, but was none the less doomed to be futile in the long run.

Rodney could do nothing to remedy the defective management of the land

forces. He had little chance to use his squadrons with effect. The

departure of Guichen had made it impossible for the enemy to keep the

sea. Their squadron which did remain on the coast kept close in Rhode

Island Harbour, where it had the protection of powerful batteries and of

an American force. Clinton declined to co-operate in an attack, alleging

that the enemy’s works were too strong, and that the time had gone by in

which anything could be effected against them. He laid the blame of

failure to act sooner on Arbuthnot, the admiral on the station.

Arbuthnot attributed it to the sloth and stupidity of Clinton. There was

a great deal to be said on both sides, for the soldier though brave, now

and then active, and a “good drill,” was a wooden personage; and the

sailor, though no one ever questioned his courage, and he was doubtless

able to manage a ship, was a quarrelsome, narrow-minded, selfish man.

Rodney could do little except comment on the miserable management of the

war and stimulate the activity of our cruisers against the Yankee

privateers. He was moreover in ill health himself--compelled to remain

much on shore at New York, complaining bitterly of the damp and cold of

the climate. His presence in irresistible force on the coast served to

depress the rebels, then at the lowest point of their fortune. Nothing,

however, was done, or could be done, to really weaken the immense

essential strength of the American position.

 

The sad truth is, that the chief outcome of his presence on the station

was a violent quarrel with Arbuthnot. This officer, who was his inferior

in rank, resented his arrival from the West Indies deeply. He thought it

mean in a brother admiral to come and spoil the fun--to come, in plain

words, and take the prize-money. A miserable interest of the pocket was

at the bottom of this as of so many naval quarrels. To the good of the

public service Arbuthnot seems never to have given a thought. All he

cared to see was that the arrival of a senior officer on the station

would deprive him of the commander-in-chief’s share of every prize.

Indeed he had very soon practical demonstration of this unpleasant

truth. Shortly after Rodney’s arrival one of the frigates which he had

taken over from Arbuthnot captured a vessel laden with arms and stores

for the rebels. The admiral’s share of the prize-money was £3000, and

that Rodney pocketed with punctuality and despatch, thereby driving

Arbuthnot into an explosion of fury worthy of Hawser Trunnion. Rodney’s

own view is given by himself in a letter to Jackson the Secretary of the

Admiralty. He points out that if he had looked to money only he might

have made a lucrative cruise on the Spanish main, but “tho’ the hand of

adversity and the base ingratitude of individuals had learnt me the

value of Riches, it has not, or ever shall, eradicate from my mind the

Duty I owe my King and Country.” He would not cruise for money only, but

if in the fair way of duty he came where money was, he would take every

sixpence to which he had a right. Arbuthnot was sulky and rude. He made

difficulties and sent home complaints; but he had to deal with a man

who was resolute to be obeyed. “I find myself, my dear Sir,” wrote

Rodney again to Jackson, “a Butt for Envy and Mallice. I had rather have

Envy than Pity. I will go on and endeavour by exerting myself in the

Service of my King and Country to deserve more Envy and more Mallice. It

cannot hurt me for I am resolved to do my Duty, and no Rank whatever

shall screen any officer under me who does not do his Duty. The Good,

the Worthy, the truly Brave officer will love and Honour me, others are

unworthy my notice. All shall be treated like gentlemen, and none under

my command shall ever have reason to tax me with Disrespect to them; but

I will be the Admiral.” This, as Sandwich might have said, was “the

great line.” Rodney was in the right, and was supported by ministers. If

their support had gone to the length of superseding Arbuthnot it would

have been the better for the public service in the following year.

 

A quarrel about money affords a convenient opportunity for reverting to

Rodney’s own financial position. It had been materially bettered at the

expense of the enemies of his King and country. His letters to his wife

during these months contain satisfactory references to the speed with

which his prize-money was enabling him to clear off the worst of his

debts and provide for his family. There was another purpose for which

funds were greatly needed. When he sailed at the end of 1779 Rodney had

told his wife that a naval officer who wished for proper support must

have a seat in Parliament. So soon, therefore, as the first creditors

were satisfied--none, let us hope, were paid sooner than the

Drummonds--he forwarded funds to Sandwich for the purchase of a seat.

By the decision of his friend, apparently, he was put up for

Westminster, and Sandwich was able to inform him in September that the

funds having come to hand in time, “the free and independent” had duly

returned him at the head of the poll. It is curious that he, a

thorough-going supporter of the Administration and a “King’s friend,”

stood with Fox, the bitterest of all the critics of Lord North’s

Cabinet, who was destined to be a member of the very Ministry which

recalled Rodney himself from the West Indies in 1782 with contumely.

 

At the close of 1781 he sailed again for the West Indies, and arrived

early in December after a stormy passage. During his absence the station

had been swept by one of the most dreadful hurricanes on record. It

burst on October 10th, when, according to sea lore, it ought to have

been “all over.” Not only was it late, but it was far-reaching.

Barbadoes had been supposed to lie beyond the track of the hurricane,

but this year it was terribly smitten. Plantations were desolated, and

the very fortifications were blown down. The other islands were no more

fortunate, and a whole squadron of war-ships was cast away or so

shattered as to need a complete refit. The French islands suffered as

severely as our own. The greatness of the disaster cowed both sides for

a time into fellow-feeling. Spanish prisoners at Barbadoes exerted

themselves “like friends” to help their captors, and were effusively

thanked by the Governor. Bouillé, at Martinique, sent back some

shipwrecked English seamen, declaring that he could not consider the

victims of such a misfortune as prisoners of war.

 

This subdued mood could not last. Rodney was not likely to allow himself

to be stopped by sentiment. In December he had his squadron in good trim

again. He decided to see whether an effective stroke could not be

delivered at the French. St. Vincent seemed to present an opportunity.

The island was reported to have suffered seriously from the hurricane,

and the fortifications were said to be entirely ruined. As the island

lies directly to the south of Santa Lucia, and had been taken from us by

the French early in the war, the temptation to attempt something on it

was irresistible. A body of troops, under General Vaughan, was embarked

on the squadron, and the combined force went south in good hope. But the

expedition was a failure. The reports as to the damage done by the

hurricane turned out to have been grossly exaggerated. The

fortifications were found to be intact, and far too strong to be taken

except by regular siege, for which Vaughan had neither men nor

battering-train. After a few days’ stay on shore the soldiers were

re-embarked, and the squadron returned to Gros Islet Bay.

 

Its stay here was not long. Reinforcements were coming, and there was

work of a tempting kind to be done. The reinforcements included the

prizes Rodney himself had taken from the Spaniards. We had sheathed them

in copper, and they were among the finest ships afloat. Samuel Hood, who

has been named as having served under Rodney in the attack on Havre as

captain of the _Vestal_ twenty-two years earlier, and had just been

promoted rear-admiral, was in command. He had been expressly chosen in

the hope, which was not to be disappointed, that he would prove a

capable second. Samuel Francis Drake, who was as yet only commodore, but

was soon to be rear-admiral, was third. Captain Edmund Affleck came

next to them in seniority. The names of these three will be found

conspicuous during the remainder of Rodney’s fighting. Hood arrived in

January, 1781, and in that month there came also orders to set about a

piece of work which Rodney undertook in joy and hope, not foreseeing

that it was destined to prove to him the source of infinite worry, of

bitter attacks, of loss of credit, and of loss of lawsuits, which

reduced him in his old age to the poverty which he had just shaken off.