Iberia Won 3
Indomitable energy and hearty courage are an old strain in the
English blood. They are thus attested by Cromwell:--“Indeed we
never find our men so cheerful as when there is work to do.”
Carlyle, _Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell_, Supplement.
That no specific decoration has yet been accorded to our Peninsular
veterans appears a most amazing oversight.
The courage displayed in our Peninsular sieges was of the highest
order. There can be no question that, since the commencement
of the world, no military daring, no dauntless valour, has
been witnessed, Greek or Roman, Saracenic or Chivalrous, to
exceed--perhaps none to equal, that of our storming parties
at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastian. But it is very
doubtful whether human life was not unnecessarily squandered, and
whether the fire of the besieged should not have been silenced,
and their defences in the first instance destroyed. This opinion
seems now to be generally maintained both by engineer officers
and by experienced officers of the army. The dictum of the great
master of the art of fortification is in one respect vindicated,
though in another it has been broken down by British heroism:
“La précipitation dans les sièges ne hâte point la prise des
places, la retarde souvent, et ensanglante toujours la scène.”
Vauban, _Maximes_. General Foy, who sometimes emancipates himself
from his prejudices against England, and is often candid, while
he praises the courage of our men, says that it was needlessly
expended, and that the taking of fortified places by the rules of
art is reduced to a mathematical problem. But the bravery of our
troops is still unquestionable. “On eût dit que les ingénieurs
étaient là seulement pour construire les places d’armes desquelles
s’élanceraient les troupes destinées a l’assaut ou à l’escalade;
et encore eût-on pu à la rigueur, avec des soldats si déterminés,
se passer de leur ministère.” Foy, _Hist. Guerre Pénins._ liv. ii.
I must transcribe his testimony as to the conduct of our officers:
“L’officier anglais conduisait les troupes au feu sans effort, et
avec une bravoure admirable. * * La gloire de l’armée britannique
lui vient avant tout de son excellente discipline et de la bravoure
calme et franche de la nation.” But Foy adds a stigma which these
sieges affixed to our army, and these sieges alone in all our
Peninsular campaigns, and the impartiality which I am determined
to preserve, and from which in some years to come I am convinced
not the slightest departure will be tolerated, requires that it
be rigorously unveiled for the reprobation of a more enlightened
age:--“Une fois sortis de la discipline, les soldats anglais se
livrent à des excès qui étonneraient les Cosaques; ils s’enivrent
dès qu’ils le peuvent, et leur ivresse est froide, apathique,
anéantissante.” Humanity shudders at the brutalities perpetrated by
our soldiers at Badajoz and San Sebastian.
It was not without much reason that the general opinion throughout
Europe attributed the extraordinary successes of the revolutionary
armies of France to the admirable arrangement of the light infantry
service. Napoléon may be said to have created the corps of
_voltigeurs_ and _tirailleurs_, upon which model were subsequently
formed the Carabineers and Rifles of the British service, and the
Caçadores of Spain and Portugal. The Prussian General Bulow in
1795, stated his opinion that “l’emploi de l’infanterie légère
est le dernier perfectionnement de la guerre, et qu’à la rigueur
on pourrait désormais se passer d’infanterie de ligne dans les
armées!” _Esprit du Système de Guerre moderne, par un ancien
officier prussien._ We may laugh at the extravagant absurdity of
the latter part of this statement, but it shows the effect which
Napoléon’s new system had produced. An opinion nearly similar
prevailed about the same time in England. “The continent has been
subdued by the French _tirailleurs_, and battles are sought to
be won by killing one after another the officers of the enemy’s
army.” _Letter to a General-Officer on the Establishment of Rifle
Corps in the British Army._ By Col. Robinson. These rifle corps
were established, and became eminently successful, being detached
in companies to the different infantry brigades. The coolness,
however, of our ordinary infantry skirmishers in the Peninsula
rendered an extensive introduction of rifle corps unnecessary.
The rifle, as used in modern warfare, is the most terrible because
most treacherous of weapons. It would have fallen especially under
the ban of the Bayards and Montlucs of the sixteenth century,
who chivalrously deprecated the use even of the common firelock,
and formed vows worthy of _Don Quixote_, “pour qu’on abandonnât
l’usage de ces armes traîtresses au moyen desquelles un lâche, tapi
derrière un buisson, donne la mort au brave qu’il n’aurait pas
regardé en face!”
Colonel H. A. Dillon says that for what the French call _le moral
d’une armée_ he can find no equivalent in the English language, and
must explain his thought by paraphrase. He defines this _moral_
to be the liveliest courage produced by the purest patriotism.
_Commentary on the Military Establishments and Defences of the
British Empire_, vol. i. This _moral_ the French lost by their
repeated defeats in the Peninsula, and by the conviction forced
on them that even the Pyrenees were no longer a barrier. Napoléon
placed in _le moral_ three fourths of the power of an army.
Celerity of movement was the principal secret of the early French
successes, and of this the rapid marching of the French soldier and
his wonderful power of sustaining fatigue were the main elements.
The French soldier is small of stature, as General Foy himself
confesses, but he marches quick and long, and this the General in
great part attributes to the French eating much more bread than any
other European troops: “Les soldats qui mangent le plus de pain et
le moins de viande sont en général plus musculeux, et marchent plus
vite et plus long temps que les autres. * * Le Français a besoin
en campagne de deux livres de pain par jour.”--Foy, _Hist. Guerre
Pénins._ liv. i.
The astonishing developement which Napoléon gave to the infantry
service has been dwelt on by more than one writer. “L’infanterie
française, cette nation des camps,” says De Barante, _Des Communes
et de l’Aristocratie_. Napoléon gave to this arm a power and
vigour to which it was before a stranger. “Napoléon augmenta
le bataillon d’infanterie d’une autre compagnie d’élite, les
voltigeurs. Ce fut une idée heureuse que de rehausser dans l’estime
publique les hommes de petite taille, qui en général sont les plus
intelligens et les plus alertes.” (Foy, _Hist. Guerre Pénins._)
The consummation of the Emperor’s gigantic views was found in the
Imperial Guard. “La garde impériale représentait la gloire de
l’armée et la majesté de l’empire. On choisissait les officiers et
les soldats parmi ceux que les braves avaient signalés comme les
plus braves: tous étaient couverts de cicatrices.”--(Foy, _Hist.
Guerre Pénins._ liv. i.) Napoléon after the battle of Marengo
called them his “granite column.” At the height of his power his
Imperial Guard consisted of 68 battalions, 31 squadrons, and 80
pieces of artillery--in itself a powerful army. Never will the
exclamation of these devoted men on the field of Waterloo be
forgotten: “_La garde meurt et ne se rend pas!_”
The peculiar constitution of the French grenadier corps is likewise
to be remarked. These bodies were the combined excerpts of all
the best men from every regiment. “L’éclat et la prééminence des
grenadiers Français * * l’usage de réunir tous ceux d’une ou de
plusieurs brigades pour tenter des actions de vigueur.” (Foy,
_Hist. Guerre Pénins._, liv. ii.) To these we never opposed more
than our average regimental forces, and their picked men were for
the most part overcome by our rank and file. What this rank and
file was composed of let the following passage attest. “Les Anglais
n’escaladent pas la montagne et n’effleurent pas la plaine, lestes
et rapides comme les Français; mais ils sont plus silencieux, plus
calmes, plus obéissants; pour ce motif leurs feux sont plus assurés
et plus meurtriers.” (Foy, _Hist. Guerre Pénins._, liv. ii.) Such
is the brilliant testimony to the merits of the British soldier by
one of Napoléon’s own Generals. Our footmen are still the sturdy
yeomen who accomplished such marvels at Crecy. If in a state little
removed from brute ignorance they have done such wonders, what
may be expected from them in the not far distant day, when they
shall become elevated by education to a more fitting standard?
Splendid as our horses are, and our dragoons both heavy and light,
the strength of our army will be always in its powerful infantry,
in their steady fire, indomitable endurance, and incomparable use
of the bayonet. These are the _robur peditum_, like the _triarii_
of the Roman legions, who were chosen from the strongest men, and
ever fought on foot. It was remarked that in moments of peril they
set their limbs so strongly, that their knees were somewhat bowed
(precisely like our modern pugilists), as if they would rather die
than remove from their places; and it passed into a proverb, when a
thing came to extremity: “_ad triarios res venit_.”
The use of tents, like many another classic incumbrance, has
been swept away from campaigning by our modern tactics, which
originated at the commencement of the Peninsular War, and, arrived
at the bivouac, the “lodging is on the cold ground” and _sub Jove
frigido_. “L’usage des tentes préservait les troupes des maladies
pernicieuses. Tout cela est vrai, et cependant on ne reviendra ni
aux petites armées, ni aux sièges de convention ni aux maisons de
toile.” (Foy, _Hist. Guerre Pénins._ liv. i.) The commander who
makes a campaign with tents is fettered with embarrassments as
to means of transport, which must always place him in a state of
inferiority to an adversary not thus encumbered. This is one of
the great changes wrought by the wonderful genius of Napoléon,
which even amidst the new hardships which he imposed, secured
almost the adoration of his soldiers. “Ils frémissent encore
d’alégresse en exprimant le transport dont on fut saisi, quand
l’empereur, qu’on croyait bien loin, apparut tout-à-coup devant le
front des grenadiers, monté sur son cheval blanc et suivi de son
mamelouck.” (Foy, _Hist. Guerre Pénins._ liv. ii.) At the close of
the War, the person of Wellington commanded almost equal admiration.
I am a great admirer of General Napier, whom I regard as the
counterpart of Thucydides, the soldier-historian of Athens, and to
whom may be not infelicitously applied the character assigned to
Xenophon (another Athenian narrator of military exploits in which
he himself participated) by our earliest Latin lexicographer,
Thomas Thomas, the contemporary of Shakspeare: “Xenophon was a
noble and wyse captaine, and of a delectable style in wrytynge.”
Napier’s style is enchanting and stirs like the sound of a trumpet.
My obligations to him are unbounded. But Heaven forbid that his
enthusiasm for War should become general, for it is of a truly
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