The Battle of the Falkland Islands 21

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 21

The bugle call "Cease fire" does not necessarily imply that all is

over; it may only mean a temporary cessation or lull in the action;

but when the "Secure" is sounded, there is no mistaking that the

fight is finished. This is followed by the "Disperse," when all guns

are secured, ammunition returned, and all the magazines and shell

rooms locked up. Then a large number of the men are free; orders are

given to the engine-room department regarding the speed required,

enabling some of the stokers told off as relief parties and employed

in trimming coal to be released.

 

As a general rule, however, the guns are kept manned and speed is

not reduced after a modern naval action, so that the number of

men released from duty is comparatively small. Perhaps the enemy

is sinking, when the seamen will be engaged in turning out boats

preparatory to saving life. The men who are unemployed watch the

sinking of an enemy ship with very different sentiments. All

experience a glow of satisfaction, and most men will pity the poor

wretches who are drowning or clinging more or less hopelessly to

floating pieces of wreckage. A few are entirely callous, deeming such

emotions a sign of weakness in view of the many atrocities committed

by the enemy. This scarcely applied after the battle of the Falkland

Islands, where the "Hymn of Hate" and other German propaganda

fostering feelings of enmity had not embittered men's minds.

 

Lastly, there comes the utter physical weariness both of mind and

body, attended by an intense longing for food, drink, and sleep,

accompanied by the pleasant thought that the war will now soon be

over. Officers crowd into the wardroom to get a drink and something

to eat. The galley fire will be out, for the chef has been passing up

ammunition, so no hot food, tea, or cocoa will be available for some

little time. A walk round the ship reveals men lying in all sorts of

impossible postures, too done up to bother about eating; others are

crowding round the canteen, or getting any food that they can on the

mess deck.

 

After the battle of the Falkland Islands one of the boy stewards

who had been passing up shell during the action was found in the

ammunition passage, "dead to the world," lying athwart an old

washtub. There he was, in that stale and stuffy atmosphere, in the

most uncomfortable position imaginable, fast asleep, completely worn

out from sheer exhaustion, with his head and arms dangling over one

side of the tub.

 

A large number have to continue their labours on watch in the engine

room or on deck, in spite of having the greatest difficulty in

keeping their eyes open. The extreme tension and strain is over, and

it requires a strong effort to resist the temptation to let things

slide and relapse into a state of inanition.

 

That the men brace themselves to grapple with their further duties

in a spirit which allows no sign of reluctance or fatigue to

show itself, does them infinite credit. They must look forward

nevertheless to the moment when the ship will pass safely into some

harbour guarded by net-defence from submarine attack, where all

the guns' crews are not required to be constantly awake at their

guns, and fires can be put out. Then, after coaling, prolonged and

undisturbed sleep may be indulged in to make up for the lost hours,

and "peace, perfect peace," will reign--for a while.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER XVI

 

VON SPEE'S AIMS AND HOPES

 

 

The British Public and our gallant Allies have no doubt fully

appreciated the commercial importance of the battle of the Falkland

Islands. The relief that was thereby given to our shipping and trade

not only in South American waters, but throughout our overseas

Empire, can only be realised by those who have large interests

therein. British trade with South America was first upset by the

exploits of the _Karlsruhe_, later on prestige was still more

affected by the Coronel disaster, and, finally, most of all by the

expectation of the arrival of von Spee's squadron in the Atlantic.

The freedom since enjoyed by our merchant shipping on all the

sea-trade routes of the world was in great part due to the success of

this portion of our Navy, the blockade having been firmly established

by our powerful fleet in home waters. The toll of ships sunk and

captured in the early months of the war would have been much greater,

trade would have been seriously dislocated for the time being, and

the pinch of a shortage in food supplies would probably have been

felt had it not been for this very opportune victory.

 

What were von Spee's intentions after the destruction of Admiral

Cradock's squadron we shall probably never know, but it is evident

that he could not remain in the Pacific; it is fairly certain, also,

that he intended to seize the Falkland Islands if he found them

insufficiently guarded, as he had reason to infer was the case.

Obviously the most tempting course then open to him, whether he took

the Falklands or not, was to hold up our trade along the whole of the

east coast of South America. But the possibility of doing this was

diminished by his fatal delay after Coronel, before making a move.

Had he acted at once he might have been able to do this with impunity

for at least a month, by dividing up his squadron into small units.

His coal and other supplies would have been easily assured through

the armed merchant cruisers _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ and _Kronprinz

Wilhelm_, organising the colliers and shoreships along these coasts.

The _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ had been operating for months past on the

north coast of South America in conjunction with the _Karlsruhe_, and

therefore already knew the tricks of this trade.

 

Had he been permitted to pursue this policy, von Spee was inevitably

bound to touch on the delicate subject of neutrality in arranging

supplies for so numerous a squadron. Now, according to the laws laid

down by Article 5 of the Hague Conference, 1907, "belligerents are

forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of operations

against their adversaries." By Article 12 it is laid down that

in default of any other special provisions in the legislation of

a neutral Power, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in

the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for

more than twenty-four hours, except in special cases covered by the

Convention. It is left to the neutral to make regulations as to the

hospitality it will afford, and those laid down by Brazil were that a

belligerent vessel was only allowed to visit one of their ports once

in three months for the purpose of obtaining supplies.

 

Being aware of these conditions, and that neutrality could not be

imposed upon to an unlimited extent, it follows that von Spee would

have been dependent in a great measure on supply ships which were

able to evade the scrutiny of the neutral authorities--a precarious

state of existence. Coal would be his prime necessity, and he might

have hoped to secure a supply of this from captured colliers, but he

could not depend upon it for such a large number of ships. Meanwhile,

however, very considerable damage might have been done to our

shipping, and it is generally believed the Germans were optimistic

enough to hope that England would be brought to her knees from

starvation by being cut off from both North and South American ports

during this period, although there was really no ground whatsoever

for such a surmise. Perhaps we shall in the future be careful not

to frame so many laws for the conduct of war, since the Power that

neglects these laws rides roughshod over her more conscientious

opponent.

 

Such a scheme may have been the natural outcome of von Spee's

success at Coronel. On the other hand, it is impossible to state

with certainty that he did not intend to go ultimately to the Cape

of Good Hope or some other part of Africa, but the pros and cons

have already been discussed, and it scarcely appears probable. Von

Spee, of course, had no notion of the prompt measure taken by our

Admiralty in dispatching two powerful battle-cruisers of high speed

to these waters without loss of time and in complete secrecy, though

he must have concluded that no time would be lost in sending out

reinforcements. Apparently his judgment was here at fault; hence the

proposed attack on our colony in the Falkland Islands, the capture

of which would have yielded him coal for his squadron's immediate

requirements.

 

Von Spee is said to have been over-persuaded by his staff to

undertake this latter venture. His movements here certainly led to

the conclusion that he had no fixed plan. When the _Invincible_

reached Pernambuco on her way home, there was a strong rumour that

three colliers had been waiting off the coast for the _Scharnhorst_

and _Gneisenau_; this points to the capture of the Falklands not

being included in the original plan. Admiral Sturdee searched the

area for these ships but found nothing.

 

Both the British and German squadrons refrained from using wireless,

and so had no knowledge of their proximity during the first week in

December. Had the German ships passed our squadron whilst coaling at

the Falklands, they would in all likelihood have separated, and would

then have had a free hand--for some time, at any rate--along the east

coast, whilst our ships would have gone round the Horn and searched

for them in vain in the Pacific. The first intimation of their having

eluded our squadron would have been that much of our shipping would

be reported overdue in England from South American ports (for von

Spee would most assuredly have avoided approaching within sight of

land). This would very probably have been put down in the first few

instances to the depredations of the _Karlsruhe_, whose fate was at

this time quite unknown. The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were

sufficiently powerful to cope with anything which von Spee thought

was likely to be in these seas. As a matter of fact, however, the

battle-cruiser _Princess Royal_ was in North American waters at this

time, having left England in secrecy soon after the _Invincible_ and

_Inflexible_ were dispatched south.

 

In further support of this theory of what was the German Admiral's

plan of campaign, it may be mentioned that a fully laden German

collier was forced to intern at a South American port south of the

Plate in order to avoid capture by the _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_,

who were searching the coast there just after the battle of the

Falklands took place. Another collier, the _Mera_, put back into

Montevideo very hurriedly and interned herself, and lastly, the

tender _Patagonia_ ended her career in like manner. The presence of

all these ships in this locality is evidence of the organisation

arranged for the supply of the German squadron along this coast, and

precludes the idea of its going to Africa.