The Boys Life of Lafayette 14

The Boys Life of Lafayette 14

The real encounter of the serio-comic affair took place between the

most gaudily dressed bands of fighters in the whole Revolution,

Lafayette's Iroquois in their war regalia and Clinton's advance-guard

of Hessian cavalry. As the latter advanced, the Indians rose from their

hiding-places uttering their piercing war-whoops. The horses of the

troopers were terrified by the brilliant, shrieking creatures, and

bolted. But terror was not all upon one side. The Indians had never

seen men like these Hessians, with their huge bearskin shakos and

fierce dyed mustaches. They in their turn were seized with panic and

rushed away, fleeing incontinently from "bad medicine."

 

Absurd as the affair proved, with little harm done to anything except

the feelings of the British, its consequences might easily have been

serious, both to the Revolution and to Lafayette. The loss of two

thousand of his best men would have dangerously crippled Washington's

[Pg 108]little army; while the capture of Lafayette, on the very first

occasion he was intrusted with a command of any size, must almost

of necessity have ended his military usefulness forever. As it was,

Barren Hill demonstrated that he was quick and resourceful in time

of danger; and these were very valuable qualities in a war like the

American Revolution, which was won largely through the skill of its

generals in losing battles. To realize the truth of this and how well

it was carried out, we have only to recall Washington's masterly work

in the winter campaign in New Jersey, when he maneuvered and marched

and gave way until the right moment came to stand; how General Schuyler

lured Burgoyne to disaster; and how, in a later campaign in the South,

General Greene was said to have "reduced the art of losing battles to a

science." Years afterward, in talking with Napoleon, Lafayette called

our Revolution "the grandest of contests, won by the skirmishes of

sentinels and outposts." About a month after this affair at Barren Hill

the English evacuated Philadelphia and moved slowly northward with a

force of seventeen thousand men and a baggage-train nearly twelve miles

long. The length of this train indicated that it was moving-day for the

British army, which wanted to be nearer the Hudson, but certain other

indications pointed to the opening of an active campaign in New Jersey.

A majority of the American officers, including Gen. Charles Lee, who

was second in command, argued against an attack because both in numbers

and organization the British force was superior to their own. General

[Pg 109]Lee went so far as to say that, instead of trying to interfere

with General Clinton's retreat, it ought to be aided in every possible

way, "even with a bridge of gold." Subsequent developments proved

that it was not fear of a British victory, but sympathy with British

plans, which prompted this view. Several other officers, however,

Washington himself, Gen. Anthony Wayne, who was always ready to fight,

General Greene, General Cadwallader, and Lafayette, were in favor

of following and attacking at the earliest opportunity. It was this

course that Washington chose, in spite of the majority of votes against

it. It seemed to him that the difficulty Clinton must experience in

maneuvering his army over the roads of that region, and the fact that

almost half of his force would need to be employed in guarding the

unwieldy baggage-train, justified the expectation of success. His plan

was to throw out a strong detachment ahead of the main army to harass

the British flanks and rear and to follow this up so closely that the

main army would be ready to go to its support in case Clinton turned to

fight.

 

The command of the advanced detachment was the post of honor, and to

this Lee was entitled because of his rank. He refused it and Washington

offered it to Lafayette, who accepted joyously. He had already begun

his march when Lee reconsidered and sent Washington word that he

desired the command, after all, appealing at the same time to Lafayette

with the words, "I place my fortune and my honor in your hands; you

are too generous to destroy both the one and the other." Lee was

[Pg 110]one of the few men Lafayette did not like, though he had no

suspicion of his loyalty. He thought him ugly in face and in spirit,

full of avarice and ambition. But Lee was his superior officer, and

Lafayette was a soldier as well as a gentleman. He relinquished the

command at once and offered to serve under Lee as a volunteer.

 

It would have been better had he found it in his heart and in the

military regulations to refuse, for on that sultry unhappy 28th of

June when the two armies met and the battle of Monmouth Court House

was fought, General Lee's indecision and confusion of orders, to give

his conduct no harsher name, turned the advance of the Americans,

who were in the best of spirits and eager to fight, into what their

generals admitted was "a disgraceful rout." Officer after officer came

to Lee beseeching him to let them carry out their original instructions

and not to give orders to fall back; but he did everything to hinder

success, answering stubbornly, "I know my business."

 

At Lafayette's first intimation that things were going wrong, he sent

a message to Washington, who was with the main army, some miles in the

rear. Whether he learned the news first from this messenger or from a

very scared fifer running down the road, Washington could not believe

his eyes or his ears. Hurrying forward, he found Lee in the midst of

the retreating troops and a brief but terrible scene took place between

them; Washington in a white heat of anger, though outwardly calm,

[Pg 111]Lee stammering and stuttering and finally bursting out with

the statement that the whole movement had been made contrary to his

advice. Washington's short and scorching answer ended Lee's military

career. Then, turning away from him as though from a creature unworthy

of further notice, the Commander-in-chief took up the serious task at

hand. The soldiers responded to his presence instantly. With those on

the field he and Lafayette were able to make a stand until reserves

came up and a drawn battle was fought which lasted until nightfall. The

conditions had been unusually trying, for the heat was so oppressive

that men died of that alone, without receiving a wound. Both armies

camped upon the field, Washington meaning to renew the contest next

morning; but during the night the enemy retired to continue the march

toward New York.

 

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH, JUNE 28, 1778]

 

Lee was tried by court martial and suspended from any command in the

armies of the United States for the period of one year. Afterward

Congress dismissed him altogether. The judgment of history is that he

deserved severer punishment and that his sympathies were undoubtedly

with the British. He was of English birth, and from the beginning

of his service in the American army he tried to thwart Washington.

Lafayette was convinced that, though his name does not appear

prominently in the doings of the Conway cabal, it was he and not

General Gates who would have profited by the success of that plot.

 

Since the British were able to continue their march as planned, they

[Pg 112]claimed Monmouth as a victory. Washington also continued

northward and, crossing the Hudson, established himself near White

Plains, which brought the British and American forces once more into

the relative positions they had occupied two years earlier, after the

battle of Long Island.

 

Monmouth proved to be the last engagement of consequence fought that

year, and the last large battle of the Revolution to be fought in the

Northern states. Very soon after this the British gave up their attempt

to cut the rebellion in two by opening the Hudson, and substituted for

it the plan of capturing the Southern states one by one, beginning with

Georgia and working northward. They continued to keep a large force

near New York, however, and that necessitated having an American army

close by. These two forces were not idle; some of the most dramatic

incidents of the whole war occurred here, though the main contest raged

elsewhere, and in a larger sense, these armies were only marking time.

 

 

[Pg 113]XIII

 

A LIAISON OFFICER

 

 

Lafayette's influence and duties took on a new character about the

middle of July, 1778, when a fleet of twenty-six French frigates and

ships of the line arrived, commanded by Admiral d'Estaing.

 

These ships had sailed in such secrecy that even their captains did

not know whither they were bound until they had been at sea some

days. Then, while a solemn Mass was being sung aboard the flagship,

the signal was hoisted to break the seals upon their orders. When the

full meaning of these orders dawned upon the sailors and the thousand

soldiers who accompanied the expedition shouts of joy and cries of

_"Vive le Roi!"_ spread from ship to ship. But it was an expedition

fated to ill luck. Storms and contrary winds delayed them five weeks

in the Mediterranean, and seven more in crossing the Atlantic. Food

and water were almost gone when they reached Delaware Bay, where

the disappointing news awaited their commander that the British,

fearing his blockade, had withdrawn to New York, taking the available

food-supplies of the neighborhood with them. That was the explanation

[Pg 114]of Clinton's long wagon-train. He left little behind for hungry

sailors.

 

D'Estaing landed Silas Deane, and the first minister sent from France

to the United States, who had come over with; him sent messages

announcing his arrival to Congress and to Washington, and proceeded up

the coast. For eleven days he remained outside the bar at Sandy Hook

in a position bad for his ships and worse for his temper; for inside

the bar he could see many masts flying the British flag. But pilots

were hard to find, most of them being in the service of his enemies;

and without pilots he could not enter. When at last they were obtained

it was only to tell him that the largest of his vessels drew too much

water to enter without removing part of their guns, and this he could

not afford to do with English ships lying inside. D'Estaing would not

believe it until he himself had made soundings. "It is terrible to be

within sight of your object and yet unable to attain it," he wrote. To

add to his unhappiness he heard that an English fleet under Admiral

Byron had sailed for American waters, and he knew that its arrival

would raise the number of British ships and guns to a figure far

exceeding his own. He put to sea again, his destination this time being

Newport, where the British had a few ships and about six thousand men.

Washington had suggested a combined attack here in case it was found

impossible to accomplish anything at New York.

 

Admiral d'Estaing came from Auvergne, as did Lafayette. Indeed,

their families were related by marriage, and to his first official

[Pg 115]communication Lafayette had added, at Washington's request, a

long postscript giving personal and family details that the British

could not possibly know, doing this to prove to the admiral that the

proposed plans were genuine and not an invention of the enemy. The

correspondence thus begun had continued with pleasure on both sides,

and, after the fleet reached Newport, Lafayette spent a happy day on