The Boys Life of Lafayette 19

The Boys Life of Lafayette 19

Phillips and Arnold had joined forces near Norfolk, and, since the

British were in control of Chesapeake Bay, could go where they chose.

Lafayette believed they would soon move up the James River toward

Norfolk to destroy supplies the Americans had collected. He resolved to

get to Richmond before them, though he had twice the distance to [Pg

152]travel. With this in view he set out from Baltimore on the 19th of

April, moving with such haste that his artillery and even the tents for

his men were left to follow at a slower pace. On the day before he left

Baltimore the British, under General Phillips, who outranked Arnold,

began the very march he had foreseen. Steuben's Virginia militia put up

the best defense it could, but, being inferior in numbers and training,

could only retire inch by inch, moving supplies to places of greater

safety as it went. But it retired hopefully, knowing Lafayette to be on

the way.

 

Continuing to advance, partly by land and partly by water, the British

reached Petersburg, only twenty-three miles from Richmond. They passed

Petersburg and pressed on. On April 30th they reached Manchester on the

south bank of the James, directly opposite Richmond. There, to General

Phillips's amazement, he beheld more than the town he had come to take;

drawn up on the hills above the river was Lafayette's force, which had

arrived the night before. He had only about nine hundred Continentals

in addition to his militia, and the British numbered twenty-three

hundred, but Phillips did not choose to attack. He contented himself

with swearing eloquently and giving orders to retire. Lafayette had the

satisfaction of learning, through an officer who visited the British

camp under flag of truce, that his enemy had been completely surprised.

But the young Frenchman felt it necessary to explain to Washington just

how he had been able to do it. "The leaving of my artillery appears a

[Pg 153]strange whim, but had I waited for it Richmond was lost.... It

was not without trouble I have made this rapid march."

 

Lafayette was to be under General Greene and expected to find orders

from him waiting at Richmond. Not finding them, he decided he could

best serve the cause by keeping General Phillips uneasy, and followed

him down the James; but, being too weak to attack except with great

advantage of position, he prudently kept the river between them. The

military journal kept by Colonel Simcoe, one of the British officers

charged with the unpleasant duty of watching Arnold, admits that this

was "good policy," though he longed to take advantage of what he called

his French adversary's "gasconading disposition and military ignorance"

and make some counter-move which his own superior officers failed to

approve.

 

This retreat of the British down the James, followed by Lafayette,

was the beginning of that strange contra-dance which the two armies

maintained for nine weeks. Sketched upon a map of Virginia, the

route they took resembles nothing except the aimless markings of a

little child. The zigzag lines extend as far west as the mountains

at Charlottesville, as far south as Portsmouth, as far north as

Fredericksburg and Culpeper, and end at Yorktown.

 

Cornwallis had not approved of General Clinton's conduct of the

war, believing the British commander-in-chief frittered away his

opportunity. Cornwallis said he was "quite tired of marching about the

[Pg 154]country in search of adventure." The experiences he was to have

in Virginia must have greatly added to that weariness.

 

He sent word to Phillips to join him at Petersburg. General Phillips

turned his forces in that direction, but it proved to be his last

order. He was already ill and soon lapsed into unconsciousness and

died. His death placed Arnold again in command until Cornwallis should

arrive. It was during this interval that Arnold took occasion to

write Lafayette about prisoners of war. Mindful of his instructions

to have nothing to do with Arnold except to punish him, Lafayette

refused to receive the letter, saying to the messenger who brought

it that he would gladly read a communication from any other British

officer. Arnold had a keen interest in the treatment of prisoners--for

very personal reasons. A story was current to the effect that one of

Lafayette's command who was taken prisoner was questioned by Arnold

himself and asked what the Americans would do to him in case he was

captured. "Cut off the leg which was wounded in your country's service,

and hang the rest of you!" was the prompt reply. The renegade general

was not popular in either army. Soon after Cornwallis's arrival he was

ordered elsewhere, and his name fades out of history.

 

Lafayette counted the hours until Wayne should join him, but Cornwallis

reached Virginia first, with troops enough to make Lafayette's

situation decidedly grave. All the Americans could do was to follow the

plan Steuben had adopted before Lafayette's arrival; retreat slowly,

[Pg 155]removing stores to places of safety whenever possible. General

Greene gave Lafayette permission to act independently, but, while

this enabled him to make quick decisions, it increased his load of

responsibility and did not in the least augment his strength.

 

In the North he had longed for more to do; here it was different.

He wrote Alexander Hamilton, "For the present, my dear friend, my

complaint is quite of the opposite nature," and he went on with a

half-humorous account of his duties, his situation, and the relative

strength of the two armies. The British, he thought, had between four

thousand and five thousand men. "We have nine hundred Continentals.

Their infantry is near five to one, their cavalry ten to one. Our

militia is not numerous, some without arms, and are not used to war."

Wayne's men were necessary even to allow the Americans to be beaten

"with some decency." "But," he added, "if the Pennsylvanians come, Lord

Cornwallis shall pay something for his victory!" The Virginia militia

showed symptoms of deserting as harvest-time approached and the call

of home duties grew strong. Then there was the danger of contagious

disease. "By the utmost care to avoid infected ground, we have hitherto

got rid of the smallpox," Lafayette wrote in another letter. "I wish

the harvest-time might be as easily got over."

 

Cornwallis was fully aware of his superior numbers and had a simple

plan. "I shall now proceed to dislodge Lafayette from Richmond,

and with my light troops to destroy magazines or stores in the

[Pg 156]neighborhood.... From thence I propose to move to the neck

at Williamsburg, which is represented as healthy ... and keep myself

unengaged from operations which might interfere with your plan for the

campaign until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you," he wrote

Clinton. He was very sure that the "aspiring boy," as he contemptuously

called Lafayette, could not escape him. But the "boy" had no intention

of being beaten--"indecently"--if he could hold out until Wayne

arrived. He knew that one false move would be his ruin and there was

no wild planning. "Independence has rendered me more cautious, as I

know my warmth," he told Hamilton. He knew how to travel swiftly,

and sometimes it was necessary to move as swiftly as possible. Even

so the British advance might come up just as the last of his little

force disappeared. If Cornwallis tried a short cut to head him off, he

changed his direction; and more of those apparently aimless lines were

traced upon the map.

 

On the 10th of June Wayne joined him about thirty-five miles west of

Fredericksburg. His force was smaller than Lafayette had hoped for,

"less than a thousand men in all"; but from that time the Continental

troops no longer fled. Indeed, Cornwallis no longer pursued them,

but veered off, sending General Tarleton's famous cavalry on a raid

toward Charlottesville, where it made prisoners of several members

of the Virginia legislature and almost succeeded in capturing Gov.

Thomas Jefferson. Another portion of his force turned its attention

[Pg 157]upon Steuben where he was guarding supplies. But gradually

pursuit became retreat and the general direction of the zigzag was

back toward the sea. The chances were still uncertain enough to make

the game exciting. There was one moment when Lafayette's flank was in

imminent danger; his men, however, marched by night along a forgotten

wood road and reached safety. Six hundred mounted men who came to join

him from neighboring counties were warmly welcomed, for he sorely

needed horses. At one time, to get his men forward more speedily for

an attack--attacks were increasingly frequent--each horse was made to

carry double. After he and General Steuben joined forces on the 19th of

June the English and Americans each had about four thousand men, though

in the American camp there were only fifteen hundred regulars and fifty

dragoons.

 

Weapons for cavalry were even scarcer than horses. Swords could not be

bought in the state; but Lafayette was so intent upon mounted troops

that he planned to provide some of them with spears, "which," he

argued, "in the hands of a gentleman must be a formidable weapon." Thus

reverting to type, as biologists say, this descendant of the Crusaders

drove his enemy before him with Crusaders' weapons down the peninsula

between the York and the James rivers.

 

 

[Pg 158]XVIII

 

YORKTOWN

 

 

One of General Wayne's officers, Captain Davis of the First

Pennsylvania, whose military skill, let us hope, exceeded his knowledge

of spelling, kept a diary full of enthusiasm and superfluous capital

letters. By this we learn that the Fourth of July, 1781, was a wet

morning which cleared off in time for a "Feu-de-joy" in honor of

the day. The Americans had by this time forced the British down the

peninsula as far as Williamsburg, and were themselves camped about

fifteen miles from that town. While the "Feu-de-joy" went up in smoke

the British were busy; for Cornwallis had received letters which

decided him to abandon Williamsburg, send a large part of his men

north to reinforce Clinton, and consolidate the rest with the British

garrison at Portsmouth, near Norfolk.

 

The battle of Green Springs, the most serious encounter of Lafayette's

Virginia campaign, took place on the 6th of July, near Jamestown, when

the British, in carrying out this plan, crossed to the south side of

the river James. Cornwallis was sure that Lafayette would attack, and

[Pg 159]arranged an ambush, meaning to lure him with the belief that

all except the British rear-guard had passed to the other bank. The

ruse only half succeeded, for Lafayette observed that the British

clung tenaciously to their position and replaced the officers American

riflemen picked off one after the other. Riding out on a point of land,

he saw the British soldiers waiting under protection of their guns

and spurred back to warn General Wayne, but by that time the battle

had opened. Wayne's men suffered most, being nearly surrounded. In a

tight place Wayne always preferred "among a choice of difficulties, to

advance and charge"; and this was exactly what he did, straight into

the British lines. The unexpectedness of it brought success; and in the

momentary confusion he fell back to a place of safety. Afterward he had