Philip II. of Spain 25

Philip II. of Spain 25

It was an artful plan, but it was not to be expected that the Guises

would stand by inactive whilst they saw their king’s only brother and

heir being drawn further into the toils of the Huguenots and the

Protestant Queen of England, and they soon delivered their counter-blow.

As Catharine’s enmity to Philip became more pronounced, the Guises had

drawn closer to him as the champion of Catholicism, of which cause they

were the representatives in France. In February 1580, accordingly, the

Archbishop of Glasgow, the Scottish ambassador in Paris, told Philip’s

ambassador there that he and Guise had prevailed upon Mary Stuart to

place her interests and influence unreservedly in Philip’s hands, and to

send her son James to Spain, to have him brought up and married there,

as the King of Spain wished. This was very important, because Philip had

always been paralysed in his action with regard to Mary by the

consideration that her accession to the throne of England would make the

Guises--Frenchmen--paramount there. But if Mary and the Guises were

henceforward to be his humble servants, the whole position was changed.

Vargas, the ambassador, so understood it. “Such,” he says, “is the

present condition of England, with signs of revolt everywhere, the

queen in alarm, the Catholic party numerous, Ireland disturbed, and

distrust aroused by your Majesty’s fleet, ... that if so much as a cat

moved, the whole fabric would crumble down in three days, beyond

repair.... If your Majesty had England and Scotland attached to you,

directly or indirectly, you might consider the States of Flanders

conquered, in which case you ... could lay down the law for the whole

world.” Guise’s detachment from French interests made all the

difference, and this marked a change of Philip’s policy towards England,

which, as will be shown, ultimately led him into the quagmire of the

Armada. Mary, unfortunately for herself, was always ready for a plot

against her enemy; and Beaton assured Vargas shortly afterwards that she

would not leave prison except as Queen of England. The Catholics were so

numerous, said Beaton, that if they rose, it would be easy, even without

assistance; but if the King of Spain helped, the result would be prompt

and undoubted. Almost simultaneously with this Morton fell, and the

Catholic party in Scotland gained the upper hand.

 

James’s cousin, D’Aubigny, Lennox, was now paramount in Scotland, and

with his connivance the country had been flooded by Jesuit missionaries

from seminaries largely depending upon Philip’s bounty. The priests had

gone with the single-hearted desire to re-convert Scotland to the faith,

and innocent of political aims at first; but the Jesuit organisation,

which in its earlier years had met with much opposition from the Spanish

clergy, and especially the Inquisition, had now been assimilated with

Philip’s policy, and doubtless its leaders foresaw the political uses

to which the propaganda might be turned, as certainly did Mary Stuart

and Mendoza, Philip’s ambassador in London, who were prime movers in it.

Philip was willing enough to accept the tempting offer of Mary and

Guise, especially when it reached him soon after in a more direct way by

the despatch of Fernihurst by D’Aubigny to Madrid. The death of Vargas,

the Spanish ambassador in Paris, shelved the matter for a time, but in

April 1581 Mary Stuart reopened negotiations with the new ambassador,

Tassis. She assured him, for Philip’s information, that things were

never more favourably disposed for Scotland to be taken in hand, with a

view to dealing with England subsequently. She begged that a formal

alliance should be signed between Scotland and Spain, and that a Spanish

force should then be sent to Ireland, to be ready for the invasion of

Scotland when summoned. Her son, she said, was determined to return to

the Catholic faith, and she intended that he should be sent to Spain for

that purpose, and for his marriage to Philip’s satisfaction.

 

Philip, however, wished to be quite sure that James was sincere in his

religious professions before helping him to the English succession. He

knew that the King of Scots, young as he was, had already established

his fame as a master of deceit. He, James, had told the Jesuit fathers

who were labouring in Scotland that “though for certain reasons it was

advisable for him to appear publicly in favour of the French, he in his

heart would rather be Spanish”; but he knew Father Persons and his

companions were sustained by Spanish money, and that his __EXPRESSION__s

would eventually reach Philip. But, to his mother’s despair, he would

never pledge himself too firmly. In January 1582 Mary herself was

somewhat doubtful of her son’s religious sincerity. “The poor child,”

she said, “is so surrounded by heretics that she had only been able to

obtain the assurance that he would listen to the priests she sent him.”

For her own part, she was determined that in future she would bind

herself and her son exclusively to Philip, and to none other.

 

James blew hot and cold, and the Catholic nobles began to recognise that

he was too slippery to be depended upon; so they came to a very

momentous conclusion. They sent Father Holt to London to convey a

message to a person to whom he was to be introduced by a disguised

priest. To Holt’s surprise and alarm, the person was Mendoza, the

Spanish ambassador, for he, like most of the missionaries, had up to

that time no idea that a political object underlay their propaganda. His

message was to the effect that if James remained obstinate, the Catholic

nobles had decided to depose him, and either convey him abroad or hold

him prisoner until Mary arrived in Scotland. They besought the guidance

of Philip in the matter, and begged that 2000 foreign troops might be

sent to them to carry out their design. The message was conveyed to Mary

in a softened form, in order not to arouse her maternal solicitude, and

Mendoza begged Philip to send the troops, “with whom the Scots might

encounter Elizabeth, and the whole of the English north country, where

the Catholics are in a majority, would be disturbed. The opportunity

would be taken by the Catholics in the other parts of the country to

rise when they knew they had on their side a more powerful prince than

the King of Scotland.”

 

Philip was on the Portuguese frontier at the time, and De Granvelle was

the principal minister in Madrid. He warmly seconded Mendoza’s

recommendations that troops should be sent to the Scots Catholics. “The

affair is so important,” he says, “both for the sake of religion and to

bridle England, that no other can equal it, because by keeping the Queen

of England busy we shall be ensured against her helping Alençon or

daring to obstruct us in any other way.” The Scots nobles were anxious

that the foreign force should not be large enough to threaten their

liberties, and De Granvelle agreed with this. “This is not what his

Majesty wants, nor do I approve of it, but that we should loyally help

the King of Scots and his mother to maintain their rights, and by

promoting armed disturbance, keep the Queen of England and the French

busy at a comparatively small cost to ourselves, and so enable us to

settle our own affairs better.... It is very advantageous that the

matter should be taken in hand by the Duke of Guise, as it will ensure

us against French obstruction. Since we cannot hope to hold the island

for ourselves. Guise will not try to hand it over to the King of France

to the detriment of his own near kinswoman.” Thus far it is evident that

there was no thought in Philip’s councils of invading and absorbing

England in his own dominions.

 

It will be noted that these new proposals of the Scots Catholics had not

been made through Tassis and Guise in Paris, as the previous approaches

had been, but through Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London, who

had been very active in the matter of the religious propaganda, and who

had entirely gained Mary’s confidence. So long as the negotiations were

kept in their hands, all was conducted wisely and prudently, and

doubtless some such arrangement as that suggested would have resulted.

But the folly of Lennox and the political ineptitude of the Jesuit

missionaries frustrated the whole design. In March 1582 the former wrote

a foolish letter to Tassis, which he sent to Paris by Creighton, laying

bare the whole plan and giving his adhesion to it, but making all manner

of inflated demands. Creighton, he said, had promised him 15,000 foreign

troops, of which he was to have the command; and he asked for a vast sum

of money, and a personal guarantee against loss of fortune. Creighton

also sent to Guise and brought him into the business, and Jesuit

emissaries were appointed to go direct to Rome and Madrid to ask for

aid. Mary and Mendoza were furious, particularly the former, that she

should be endangered by her name being used as the head of the

conspiracy. Creighton had no authority whatever to promise 15,000 men,

nor would the Scottish nobles have accepted such a number, and the idea

that Lennox should command them was absurd. Philip took fright at the

large number of persons who were now privy to the affair, and gave

orders that nothing further was to be done. Guise, ambitious and

officious, as usual, also wanted to take a prominent share in the

direction of the enterprise. He began to make large and vague proposals

for a strong mixed force to be sent from Italy under the papal flag,

whilst he and his Frenchmen made a descent upon the coast of Sussex, his

evident object being to prevent a purely Spanish expedition being sent.

Granvelle and Philip very soon saw whither the affair was drifting, and

nipped it in the bud. They had only been induced to listen to it on the

assumption that the Guises where to work exclusively for Spanish

interests. The moment the contrary appeared, the proposal lost its

attractions for them. It is true that at this time Philip had no

intention of conquering England for himself, but Mary and James must owe

their crown to him alone, and be forced to restore the close alliance

between England and the House of Burgundy, or the change would be

useless to him. Too much French or Italian aid or Guisan influence

spoilt the business for his purpose. But there was still another reason.

He had a large number of English Catholic refugees living on pensions

from him in France, Flanders, and Spain; and they and Sir Francis

Englefield, his English secretary, ceaselessly represented to him their

national dislike and distrust of the French, their secular enemies, and

their jealousy of any plan that should make the Frenchified Scots

masters of England. Almost with one accord the English Catholics urged

this view upon Philip and the Spaniards. All England, they said, would

welcome a Catholic restoration if it came from their old friends, the

Spaniards, but the attempt would fail if it were made under the auspices

of their old enemies, the French. Philip’s policy thenceforward

gradually changed. With the Raid of Ruthven and the fall of Lennox he

saw that for the time the Protestants had conquered, and the plans of

the Scottish Catholics were at an end. Guise was to be flattered and

conciliated, but all Philip’s efforts in future were to confine his

attentions to France, and to alienate him from English and Scottish

affairs. He was told how dangerous it would be for him to leave France

with the Huguenots in possession, and Spanish support was lavishly

promised to him for his ambitious plans at home.

 

Guise was flattered but dissatisfied, and sent emissaries to Scotland

and the pope to endeavour to keep alive the plan of landing foreign

troops in Scotland. James pretended to be strongly favourable, but

Philip purposely threw cold water on the plans whilst appearing to

entertain them, to prevent anything being done without his knowledge. In

May 1583 Guise had a new design. Philip and the pope were to find

100,000 crowns, and Guise would have Elizabeth murdered, whilst he

landed in England and raised the country. Father Allen and the English