Philip II. of Spain 9

Philip II. of Spain 9

Philip’s army, of various nationalities, was then divided amongst the

French towns he had captured. The rascally German mercenaries quarrelled

and left him in large numbers, many to join the French. The English were

sulky--the Spaniards complained of their conduct before St. Quintin.

Wages were in arrears, their hearts were not in the fight, and they

demanded leave to go home. Philip could not risk unpopularity in England

by refusal, and let them go.

 

The French, on the other hand, by the end of the year had a fine army in

north-eastern France, which Guise had hastily brought back from Italy.

The English fortress of Calais had been neglected, and was in a poor

condition for defence. Guise suddenly appeared before it, to the

surprise of the defenders. The outworks were stormed and captured on

January 2 and 3, 1558, and on the 8th the citadel itself was captured.

Lord Wentworth was in command, but the resources at his disposal were

utterly inadequate, and it was impossible with them to hold the place.

As a natural result, the other English fortress of Guisnes, under Lord

Grey, fell a few days afterwards, and the last foothold of the English

in France was gone. Before this disaster had happened Philip had begged

the English council to send him a fresh reinforcement of English troops,

with the ostensible object of ensuring the safety of Calais; but there

were no troops and little money available in England. The war was

extremely unpopular; all the country insisted that they had been dragged

into it to please Philip, and the queen, desirous as she was of pleasing

her husband, was weak and weary, utterly unable to dominate her council,

with whom religious matters in England were the first consideration, and

the predominance of Spain in Europe a matter of no concern. When Guise’s

designs upon Calais were evident, Philip sent his favourite. Count de

Feria, post-haste to England to insist upon the need of sending troops,

at least to defend the fortress. Before he started on his journey news

came of the fall of Calais, but as Guisnes still held out, he proceeded

on his way. Before he embarked from Dunkirk he heard of the surrender of

Guisnes, and delayed his arrival in England, in order not to be the

bearer of the evil tidings. He saw the council in Cardinal Pole’s

chamber on January 28, and presented his master’s demands. Heath was the

spokesman. He was apologetic and sorrowful, but the state of England was

such, he said, that instead of sending men away, they needed troops to

be sent for defence. The south coast and the Isle of Wight were at the

mercy of the French, the Scottish frontier was unprotected and

threatened, and much to the same effect. But if King Philip would send

them 3000 German mercenaries, for which they would pay, they would place

them in Newcastle, and they could then arm 100 ships in the Channel, and

embark 16,000 men, some of whom might be used for Philip’s purposes. The

country was in complete disorder, and Feria says that if 100 men were to

land on the south coast, the country would probably join them against

its friends, by which he doubtless meant the Catholic Government.

 

Before this interview the king had written to Feria that Calais and

Guisnes having fallen, it would be better to abandon the idea of sending

English troops to France, but that the whole efforts of the council

should be directed towards the defence of the country itself. From

Feria’s own observation when he first landed at Dover it was indeed

clear, both to him and his master, that in no case would any effective

aid in men reach him from England.

 

With much ado Parliament was induced to vote the supplies necessary for

the defence of the country. Feria’s scorn at such cumbrous methods knew

no bounds, and his picture of the complete disorganisation of the

government is most vivid. It was evident now to all that the queen had

not very long to live, and that her renewed dreams of progeny were to be

as baseless as before. What was to come after her was the question, and

each man was thinking of his own future. Philip was in dire want of

money, and begged his wife not to depend upon Parliament alone for

supplies. In vain Gresham tried to borrow large sums at Antwerp on the

queen’s credit; only £10,000 could be got. Devices of all sorts were

suggested, but to no purpose. But still the sums voted by Parliament,

and what else could be collected or borrowed, were sent to Flanders to

pay for the German levies, and spent in fitting out and manning the

English fleet. The distracted English councillors were deluded into an

idea that an attempt would be made to recover Calais; they were

frightened with the false rumour that there was a large French fleet at

Dieppe, that the Hanse towns and Denmark would attack them--anything to

get them to provide a strong English fleet, not ostensibly for Philip’s

purposes. But Philip took care that when the fleet was ready Clinton

should use it as he desired, and the much-talked-of 3000 Germans never

came to England, but when they were ready were utilised for Philip’s

service. “I am writing nothing of this to the queen,” he informs Feria,

“as I would rather that you should prudently work with the councillors

to induce them to ask us to relieve them of these troops.”

 

When Feria had frightened the queen and council out of all that was

possible, he left in July to join his master in Brussels, taking care to

pay his visit to “Madam Elizabeth” at Hatfield, with all sorts of

affectionate and significant messages from her loving brother-in-law.

The plan had been, from the time of Mary’s own marriage, to fix Spanish

influence in England, no matter what happened, by marrying Elizabeth to

the Duke of Savoy. But Mary would not restore her sister in blood--she

could not indeed without bastardising herself--and without this the

marriage would have been useless, from Philip’s point of view. But he

temporised still, determined to keep Elizabeth in hand if possible, and

lost no opportunity of showing his amiability to her.

 

When Feria left in July there remained in England a member of Philip’s

Flemish council, named Dassonleville. On November 7 he wrote to the king

informing him that Parliament had been called together to discuss the

question of the succession, and pointing out the desirability of Philip

himself being present to influence it in the way he desired, it being

understood that the queen’s death was approaching.

 

But Philip had his hands full, and could not go, even on so important an

errand as this. The success of Guise at Calais had emboldened the

French, and at one time a march upon Brussels had appeared inevitable.

Providentially, however, for Philip, the English naval squadron of

twelve ships, already mentioned, was able at a critical moment to turn

the tide of victory in an engagement near Gravelines (July 13, 1558).

Marshal Termes was completely routed, and Guise thenceforward had to

stand on the defensive. Philip’s treasury was quite empty, he was deeply

in debt, his soldiers unpaid, and he hated war. The French king was in

similar straits, and had, moreover, begun to look with apprehension on

the increasing strength of the reform party in France. So a talk of

arrangement began to prevail, and on October 15 the first meeting of

commissioners for peace was held, De Granvelle, with Alba and the Prince

of Orange, representing Philip, and Cardinal Lorraine, with Constable

Montmorenci and Marshal St. André, the French king; whilst English

interests were safeguarded by the Earl of Arundel, Dr. Thirlby, and Dr.

Wotton. Under these circumstances, Philip was obliged to send to England

in his place his friend, the Count de Feria. He arrived on November 9,

and found the queen almost unconscious, so he lost no time in trying to

propitiate the coming queen. He summoned the council, and approved in

Philip’s name of Elizabeth’s succession, and then took horse to salute

the new sovereign. On the 17th, Mary Tudor died, and Philip had a new

set of problems to face. England had slipped through his hands, but

might still be regained if the new queen could be married to his

nominee. Elizabeth showed in her very first interview with Feria that

she would not allow herself to be patronised. She stopped him at once

when he began to hint that she owed her new crown to his master’s

support. “She would,” she said, “owe it only to her people.” The Duke of

Savoy was the first idea of a husband for her in the Spanish interest,

but he was warlike, and the French were still in possession of his

territories, so the English dreaded that he might drag them into another

war, and would not hear of him. Feria hinted to the queen that Philip

himself might marry her, but she was diplomatically irresponsive.

Philip’s conditions, indeed, as conveyed to his ambassador, were such

that Elizabeth could not have accepted them. But it never came so near

as the discussion of conditions. This is not the place to relate at

length the endless intrigues by which it was sought to draw Elizabeth

into a marriage which should render her amenable, or at least innocuous,

to Spain, but it will suffice to say that she was fully a match for the

wily diplomatists who sought to entrap her, and never for a moment,

through all her tergiversation, intended to allow Spanish interests to

dominate English policy. The peace between Spain and France was easily

settled at Cateau Cambresis, Henry being even more anxious for it than

Philip, and he gave way upon nearly every point; but with regard to

England the case was different, and for a long while the English envoys

stood out persistently for the restoration of Calais. So long as there

appeared any prospect of his being allowed to influence English

government, Philip refused to make a separate peace, but at length he

gave Elizabeth clearly to understand that if peace could not be made

without the loss of Calais, then Calais must go. England was in a state

of confused transition, the queen’s position was uncertain, the treasury

was empty, and the war unpopular, so at last the bitter pill, slightly

disguised, had to be swallowed, and the peace of Cateau Cambresis was

signed on April 2, 1559.

 

The position was a critical one for Philip and his policy. This was the

parting of the ways, and the course now adopted was to decide the fate

of the Spanish domination. Feria, and after him the Bishop of Aquila,

wrote incessantly during the first months of Elizabeth’s reign that

Spain must dominate England, by force of arms, if need be. Most of the

country was Catholic, many of the principal councillors were in Spanish

pay or had Spanish sympathies, the queen was as yet an uncertain

quantity, and there were several pretenders whose claim to the crown

seemed better than hers. Philip was assured again and again that this

was his chance. If England broke away from him, his own Low Countries

were in danger. Let him, said his councillors, subsidise the Catholic

party, if necessary backed up by force, patronise one of the rival

claimants--Catharine Grey for choice--and remove the troublesome young

queen before her position became consolidated. But Philip was slow. The

merits and objections of every course had to be weighed and discussed

infinitely. By his side was already the young Bishop of Arras, De

Granvelle, fresh from his diplomatic triumph at Cateau Cambresis, whose

methods were modelled upon those of his master, and from whom no

decision could be expected without protracted delay. There was also Ruy

Gomez, always on the side of peace and moderation. In vain haughty Feria

sneered at the timid councils of churchmen, and chafed at his master’s

inaction. Philip would not be hurried. His one wish was to get back to

his dear Spain, and stay there; and from this design, favoured as it was

by Ruy Gomez, Feria and the politicians of the Alba party were powerless

to move him. So England slipped further and further from hands too tardy

to grasp it whilst there was yet time, and those who held as an article

of political faith that the owner of the Netherlands must be in close