The Battle of the Falkland Islands 10

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 10

The possibility of our encountering and having to fight von Spee was

the subject uppermost in all minds at this time, and led to a great

deal of discussion. The outstanding feature in the situation was the

extraordinary lack of homogeneity of the composition of our squadron.

It consisted of three armoured cruisers of entirely different

classes, each carrying a different armament, one light cruiser and

four armed merchantmen. The latter could not, of course, be pitted

against warships even of the light-cruiser type, and therefore had to

be left out of the reckoning. Amongst the four fighting ships there

were four descriptions of guns, viz. two 9.2-inch, fourteen 7.5-inch,

twenty-two 6-inch, and ten 4-inch, while the German squadron had

only three descriptions, viz. sixteen 8.2-inch, twelve 5.9-inch,

and thirty-two 4.1-inch. A prominent question, therefore, was what

range we should endeavour to maintain during an action; the answer to

which was very varied, preference being given to ranges from 14,000

yards downwards. From the gunnery point of view the enemy undoubtedly

held an advantage, as not only was his squadron more homogeneous,

having only two classes of ships, but also the range of his guns was

greater. As regards speed, there was nothing to choose between the

two squadrons, who were evenly matched in this respect. Much would

depend upon whether he would choose to keep his squadron together

for the purpose of an action or to disperse them on reaching the

east coast. Opinions on this and on many other points were divided.

All were agreed, however, that we ought to give a good account of

ourselves.

 

The wildest reports about von Spee's movements were constantly

received from Chilean and other sources. Whilst at Montevideo rumours

were circulated that the German ships had been seen coming round Cape

Horn.

 

The Admiralty now informed Admiral Stoddart that reinforcements were

being sent out from England at once; they had actually started just

after our arrival at the Plate. The secret of this news was well

kept, not an inkling leaking out at home or abroad--a fact which

contributed very largely to our subsequent victory. It was decided,

therefore, to return northwards in order to effect a junction with

the two battle-cruisers that were on their way out. The squadron

sailed on November 12th, spread out in line abreast, and put in some

useful exercises on the way. Arriving at the base five days later,

we found the _Kent_, which was expected as we had heard that she was

being sent out to reinforce us; she had brought a mail, which made

her doubly welcome. The _Bristol_ and _Edinburgh Castle_ rejoined,

but the latter was ordered off northwards on other service, and

sailed on November 19th, taking a mail for England. It was blazing

hot, but the next few days passed quickly enough in carrying out

gunnery practices, patrolling, and coaling ship, during which the

_Glasgow_ returned from Rio, spick and span.

 

Most of November was a time of some suspense for our ships, as we

were hourly expecting an encounter with the enemy, and it was with

mixed feelings that we learned of the nature of the reinforcements

that were coming out with such despatch. Our feelings of relief were

also tempered with regret at not having been afforded an opportunity

to prove our mettle. Further, there was an awful and terrible thought

that it might be considered necessary to leave one of us cruisers

behind to guard the base.

 

Most of our ships had had steam on their main engines incessantly

since war broke out, and a rest to let fires out so as to make

necessary adjustments was badly needed, but was quite impossible near

a neutral coast.

 

On November 26th our hearts were gladdened by the sight of the

_Invincible_, bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Sturdee, and the

_Inflexible_; these two formidable-looking ships had come out from

England at a mean speed of over 18 knots for fifteen days. Truly a

fine performance!

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VIII

 

POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES

 

 

The various possible courses open to Admiral Count von Spee, both

before and after Coronel, have already been discussed, but the

movements of his squadron have not been subjected to examination in

the light that they bear on the policy which he adopted, nor have the

results of that action been considered from his point of view.

 

The German squadron sailed from Mas-a-Fuera on October 27th, and

three days later arrived about noon at a position some fifty miles

to the westward of Valparaiso, where it remained for upwards of

twenty-four hours. On October 31st--the same day that the _Glasgow_

went into Coronel with telegrams and the day before that action

was fought--the squadron steamed off south, leaving the _Nürnberg_

to wait off Valparaiso for a few hours and probably to get

information of importance. The German Admiral undoubtedly went to the

neighbourhood of Valparaiso with the express intention of obtaining

news and was in communication with the shore, for he begins his

official report on the action fought off Coronel by saying that his

three light cruisers reached on November 1st a point about twenty

"sea miles from the Chilean coast, in order to attack a British

cruiser (_Glasgow_), which, according to trustworthy information, had

reached the locality on the previous evening."

 

It is, of course, impossible to know what were von Spee's intentions

at this moment; they can only be surmised from a general survey of

the situation and the means that he had of obtaining information. The

latter was acquired by an organised system, for there were German

agents in every South American port. It may be taken as certain that

any ship calling at or passing Punta Arenas (Magellan Straits) would

be reported to him, and that the names of the ships and certain of

their movements on the south-east coast would also be known to him.

 

Easter Island--which was von Spee's original base--is approximately

2,300 miles from Valparaiso, and therefore out of range of wireless

communication, although it is possible he might occasionally be able

to take in a message under favourable conditions. However, it is

known from an officer survivor of the _Gneisenau_ that on October

19th the German Admiral received a message--possibly through a German

supply ship--stating that a British Squadron consisting of "_Good

Hope_, _Monmouth_, and _Glasgow_ was to the south." Now we know that

this squadron was at Punta Arenas on September 28th, and leaving on

that date was employed searching inlets and bays round Tierra del

Fuego for some days. The _Good Hope_ then returned to the Falklands,

finally leaving them on October 22nd, whilst the others went on to

the coast of Chile and were there from October 11th onwards, making

use of a sequestered spot as a base. The _Glasgow_ was at Coronel on

October 14th and at Valparaiso the day following, so the fact of a

British Squadron being "south" was well known, though the information

did not reach von Spee till the 19th.

 

On receiving this news von Spee sailed immediately. He knew he was in

superior force to Cradock's squadron, and the presumption is that he

went over to prospect and, if possible, to force an action. He went

straight to Mas-a-Fuera, only remained two days to coal, and then on

to a position off Valparaiso to pick up further information.

 

Immediately on hearing that the _Glasgow_ was at Coronel on the 31st,

he proceeded south to cut her off, and, as was likely to be the case,

to meet Cradock. He must have judged that the rest of the squadron

could not be far behind the _Glasgow_. The probability was that he

received information of the _Good Hope_ passing through the Straits

about the 24th or 25th, and he might also have heard of the _Canopus_

doing so a day or two later, in which case he would have calculated

that the latter could scarcely be so far north by this time.

 

There is no indication that by this date von Spee had made up his

mind to quit the South Pacific. He had hardly had time to make his

arrangements for so doing, and there is no doubt that they were not

then completed.

 

Von Spee was at his full strength, having recently added the

_Dresden_ and _Leipzig_ to the squadron while at Easter Island, he

possessed the advantage of homogeneity, and his squadron was far more

modern. The result we know, our ships were out-gunned and completely

outclassed. Fate played right into the hands of von Spee on this

occasion.

 

It was undoubtedly a severe blow to British prestige in these

parts, and the Germans in all the large towns were not slow in

making the most of this temporary success in order to advance their

own interests. The rumours that were circulated caused no little

perturbation amongst the neutral shipping agents, who feared that von

Spee would lose no time in attacking British trade, and that those

cargoes which were consigned to Great Britain would be in jeopardy.

Insurance rates rose with a bound, and it is said that the Germans

went about openly deriding the British and causing the most fantastic

articles to be inserted in the local Press. The exaggerated reports

that were published, both of the action and of its effects, certainly

lends colour to this source of information.

 

It will be interesting to consider what von Spee would have done if

he had missed Admiral Cradock and the action off Coronel had not

been fought. In view of his superior speed, von Spee would in all

probability have continued on his southerly course and rounded Cape

Horn, leaving Admiral Cradock behind him. There seem to be grounds

for supposing that he might go to the Cape of Good Hope, but the

campaign in German South West Africa could scarcely be said to be

progressing favourably for the Germans, and it is not unreasonable

to suppose he would have preferred to go north along the eastern

side of South America to harass our trade. It is legitimate to

suppose that in this case he would not have delayed to attack the

Falkland Islands, with Cradock's squadron on his heels and Stoddart's

ships converging on him from the north; in fact, it would have been

suicidal, for the wireless station there would have given our ships

warning of his approach, and the delay might have enabled our two

forces to unite. From Stoddart's squadron alone he had nothing to

fear, and most likely would have welcomed an opportunity of bringing

it to action. The presence of the _Defence_ at Montevideo would

certainly have been known to him at that time, and he would probably

have hoped to intercept her before she joined Cradock. Had all this

come to pass, the Germans might then have separated, and when it was

found that the theatre of operations in the South Atlantic became

too hot for them, they might have endeavoured to make their way home