The Battle of the Falkland Islands 9

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 9

At the outset of the engagement the _Good Hope_ made a signal down

the line to the _Otranto_, the only words received being, "Leaving

_Otranto_." The latter, therefore, hauled out to endeavour to get

this signal direct from the flagship, but as the _Good Hope_ had

been badly hit, nothing further was received. As projectiles were

falling all round her, and it was realised that the _Otranto_, being

a large ship, would be used by the enemy as a rangefinder to enable

him to calculate the distance of the _Glasgow_, she hauled out still

farther to upset the accuracy of his gun-fire. The enemy proceeded

to carry this method of ranging into effect; the first salvo passed

over the _Otranto's_ bridge, the second missed the bows by 50 yards,

the third fell 150 yards astern, while others which followed fell,

some over, some short. By this time she had worked out of the line

about 1,200 yards, so turned to the same course, as far as could be

judged, as the remainder of the squadron. She was now out of range.

The _Otranto_ ran the gauntlet of the enemy's most successfully,

since she emerged from this storm of shell quite unscathed, but it

must have been touch and go. Moreover--and hardest of all--she had to

submit to this treatment without being in a position to retaliate.

After the flagship blew up, nothing was seen of the _Monmouth_;

subsequently the _Glasgow_ was reported crossing her stern. Seeing

that she could be of no assistance, the _Otranto_ dodged her

opponents by straining full speed to the westward for 200 miles, and

thence to the southward. Rounding Cape Horn, she passed between

the Falklands and the mainland and arrived at Montevideo. Both she

and the _Glasgow_ must have accounted themselves most fortunate in

escaping safely from this unequal contest.

 

The _Canopus_, which had been steaming northward with two colliers,

intercepted a wireless message from the _Glasgow_ to the _Good Hope_

reporting the enemy in sight. She immediately increased to her full

speed, dispatching the colliers to Juan Fernandez, and proceeded

on her course northward in the hope that she would arrive in time

to engage the enemy. About 9 P.M. she received a signal from the

_Glasgow_ that it was feared the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ had been

sunk, and that the squadron was scattered. Seeing the hopelessness of

continuing on her course, the _Canopus_ turned round, picked up her

colliers, and made for the Magellan Straits via Smyth's Channel, the

successful navigation of which reflects great credit, since she was

probably the first battleship ever to make use of it. By this means

she succeeded in reaching Port Stanley without molestation, although

the German ships were constantly in close proximity.

 

Admiral Cradock appears to have had definite orders to prevent the

enemy coming round to the east coast of America. The _Canopus_ was

only 120 miles away when he met the enemy. But had the Admiral

waited for her the Germans might have slipped past him during the

night, and, moreover, her slow speed would have seriously hampered

the mobility of his squadron. Speaking of Admiral Cradock, Sir Henry

Newbolt[7] says, "He had asked for reinforcements, and the Admiralty

had sent him what they thought sufficient. It was not for him to hold

back."

 

The advantages of speed and modern guns of superior range were

perhaps the outstanding features of the Coronel action. It was not

the vain sacrifice which at first sight it might appear to be, as it

probably saved our ships operating on the east coast of South America

from a similar fate.

 

Admiral Cradock carried out unflinchingly his search for a force

which he knew would almost certainly be superior to his own. His

unhesitating acceptance of the action and the gallantry of the fight

uphold the finest traditions of the Royal Navy, and will always be

recalled by it with pride. Surely, before God and man, such deeds of

heroism go far to mitigate the infamy of war.

 

"At set of sun,

Even as below the sea-line the broad disc

Sank like a red-hot cannon-ball through surf

Of seething molten lead, the _Santa Maria_,

Uttering one cry that split the heart of heaven,

Went down with all hands, roaring into the dark."

 

ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_).

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VII

 

CONCENTRATION

 

"And Drake growled, ...

... 'So, lest they are not too slow

To catch us, clear the decks. God, I would like

To fight them!'"

 

--ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_).

 

 

Several disquieting wireless messages were received by the British

warships on the east coast of South America, giving garbled and

unreliable accounts of the Coronel action. It was not till November

5th that a statement which appeared to be fairly authoritative, in

spite of its German origin, was received from Valparaiso. It said

that the _Monmouth_ was sunk and that the _Good Hope_ had probably

shared her fate; no mention was made of the _Canopus_, _Glasgow_, or

_Otranto_.

 

The command in these waters now devolved upon Rear-Admiral Stoddart

(flying his flag in the _Carnarvon_), who was still busily engaged

in the search for the _Karlsruhe_. His ships had been operating

over a wide area extending from the neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro

to the northward of St. Paul's Rocks and the Rocas, and thence to

the westward along the north coast of South America. This otherwise

fruitless search achieved one notable result in compelling the

_Karlsruhe_ to abandon her system of obtaining supplies through

German storeships coming from Pernambuco, as that port was kept

under rigid observation. She was thus forced to leave the trade

route between Great Britain and South America for longer periods in

order to meet her consort, the armed liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, who

now became a link between her and her sources of supply in Central

America. There was, in consequence, a marked falling off at this

period in the number of her captures.

 

Assuming that the worst had happened, and that the German squadron

was now on its way round to the east coast, it became imperative to

unite our remaining ships into one squadron as quickly as possible.

It was obvious that with the Australian and Japanese ships behind

them, the Germans could not afford to linger where they were;

moreover, they had learned at Valparaiso that we had no naval force

of any preponderance with which to oppose them. Flushed with their

recent victory, it seemed probable that if they were not much damaged

they would most likely hasten their movements in the hope of meeting

our ships before we had had time to unite or to gather reinforcements.

 

The German squadron would not be able to separate with any safety

once we had succeeded in joining together our scattered forces,

so that the damage they might do to our commerce would be thereby

reduced to a minimum.

 

For these reasons it will be seen that the River Plate was admirably

situated for the rendezvous of our ships that had escaped from

Coronel to the Falklands, and of the northern squadron. Again, it

was possible to coal there without infringing territorial rights,

as there is an excellent anchorage well outside the three mile limit

from the foreshore.

 

The following calculations, written on November 6th, 1914, were made

by the author:

 

"The German Admiral will expect us to get reinforcements out from

England, so that it seems probable that he will lose no time in

coming round to the east coast.

 

"He arrived at Valparaiso on November 3rd. Supposing he coals there

and leaves at earliest on November 4th, the distance from Valparaiso

to the Plate is roughly 2,600 miles, or nine days at 12 knots;

therefore, allowing one day for coaling _en route_, the earliest that

he could be off the Plate would be the 13th, more likely not before

November 15th."

 

The strategical aspect in this sphere of operations was completely

changed by the success of the German squadron off Cape Coronel, and

necessitated not only a complete change of plans, but also an entire

redistribution of our ships. These consisted of the _Carnarvon_,

_Cornwall_, _Bristol_, _Macedonia_, and _Edinburgh Castle_, also the

_Defence_ and _Orama_, who were near Montevideo, and the _Canopus_,

_Glasgow_, and _Otranto_.

 

Admiral Stoddart, therefore, decided to go south to Montevideo at

once in order to meet the remainder of our scattered ships. The

_Bristol_, _Macedonia_, and _Edinburgh Castle_ were left to continue

the search for the _Karlsruhe_, although as a matter of fact she had

blown up on November 4th. Colliers were sent down south to Montevideo

to be in readiness for our ships, and were ordered to sail at

twelve-hour intervals to diminish the chance of capture.

 

The _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_ left the base on November 6th, the

former calling at Rio de Janeiro on the way for telegrams. Arriving

at the Plate on the 10th, where we found the _Defence_ and _Orama_,

the Admiral immediately transferred his flag to the former ship,

which was the newest and most powerful of our cruisers. All ships

filled up with coal and awaited the arrival of the _Glasgow_ and

_Otranto_; meanwhile, patrols were constantly maintained at the mouth

of the river.

 

The following evening the _Glasgow_ arrived amidst congratulations

from us all; she had put in to the Falkland Islands to coal, in which

assistance was provided by volunteers from amongst the inhabitants.

After coaling, she was detached to Rio de Janeiro to go into dry

dock, so that the damage to her side might be properly repaired. The

same day the _Orama_, whilst patrolling, met and sank the German

storeship _Navarra_ which was set on fire by the Germans when escape

was seen to be impossible. We also got the cheering news that the

_Emden_ had been sunk and that the _Königsberg_ had been bottled up,

tidings which augured well for the future.

 

The Admiralty seem to have had a premonition that the Germans

intended to attack the Falklands for the _Canopus_, although on her