The Joyful Wisdom 6
Translated by Miss M. D. Petre.
Footnote 6:
Translated by Miss M. D. Petre.
BOOK FIRST
1.
_The Teachers of the Object of Existence._—Whether I look with a good or
an evil eye upon men, I find them always at one problem, each and all of
them: to do that which conduces to the conservation of the human
species. And certainly not out of any sentiment of love for this
species, but simply because nothing in them is older, stronger, more
inexorable, and more unconquerable than that instinct,—because it is
precisely _the essence_ of our race and herd. Although we are accustomed
readily enough, with our usual short-sightedness, to separate our
neighbours precisely into useful and hurtful, into good and evil men,
yet when we make a general calculation, and on longer reflection on the
whole question, we become distrustful of this defining and separating,
and finally leave it alone. Even the most hurtful man is still perhaps,
in respect to the conservation of the race, the most useful of all; for
he conserves in himself or by his effect on others, impulses without
which mankind might long ago have languished or decayed. Hatred, delight
in mischief, rapacity and ambition, and whatever else is called
evil—belong to the marvellous economy of the conservation of the race;
to be sure a costly, lavish, and on the whole very foolish
economy:—which has, however, hitherto preserved our race, _as is
demonstrated to us_. I no longer know, my dear fellow-man and neighbour,
if thou _canst_ at all live to the disadvantage of the race, and
therefore, "unreasonably" and "badly"; that which could have injured the
race has perhaps died out many millenniums ago, and now belongs to the
things which are no longer possible even to God. Indulge thy best or thy
worst desires, and above all, go to wreck!—in either case thou art still
probably the furtherer and benefactor of mankind in some way or other,
and in that respect thou mayest have thy panegyrists—and similarly thy
mockers! But thou wilt never find him who would be quite qualified to
mock at thee, the individual, at thy best, who could bring home to thy
conscience its limitless, buzzing and croaking wretchedness so as to be
in accord with truth! To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in
order to laugh _out of the veriest truth_,—to do this the best have not
hitherto had enough of the sense of truth, and the most endowed have had
far too little genius! There is perhaps still a future even for
laughter! When the maxim, "The race is all, the individual is
nothing,"—has incorporated itself in humanity, and when access stands
open to every one at all times to this ultimate emancipation and
irresponsibility.—Perhaps then laughter will have united with wisdom,
perhaps then there will be only "joyful wisdom." Meanwhile, however, it
is quite otherwise, meanwhile the comedy of existence has not yet
"become conscious" of itself, meanwhile it is still the period of
tragedy, the period of morals and religions. What does the ever new
appearing of founders of morals and religions, of instigators of
struggles for moral valuations, of teachers of remorse of conscience and
religious war, imply? What do these heroes on this stage imply? For they
have hitherto been the heroes of it, and all else, though solely visible
for the time being, and too close to one, has served only as preparation
for these heroes, whether as machinery and coulisse, or in the rôle of
confidants and valets. (The poets, for example, have always been the
valets of some morality or other.)—It is obvious of itself that these
tragedians also work in the interest of the _race_, though they may
believe that they work in the interest of God, and as emissaries of God.
They also further the life of the species, _in that they further the
belief in life_. "It is worth while to live"—each of them calls
out,—"there is something of importance in this life; life has something
behind it and under it; take care!" That impulse, which rules equally in
the noblest and the ignoblest, the impulse towards the conservation of
the species, breaks forth from time to time as reason and passion of
spirit; it has then a brilliant train of motives about it, and tries
with all its power to make us forget that fundamentally it is just
impulse, instinct, folly and baselessness. Life _should_ be loved, _for_
...! Man _should_ benefit himself and his neighbour, _for_ ...! And
whatever all these _shoulds_ and _fors_ imply, and may imply in future!
In order that that which necessarily and always happens of itself and
without design, may henceforth appear to be done by design, and may
appeal to men as reason and ultimate command,—for that purpose the
ethiculturist comes forward as the teacher of design in existence; for
that purpose he devises a second and different existence, and by means
of this new mechanism he lifts the old common existence off its old
common hinges. No! he does not at all want us to _laugh_ at existence,
nor even at ourselves—nor at himself; to him an individual is always an
individual, something first and last and immense, to him there are no
species, no sums, no noughts. However foolish and fanatical his
inventions and valuations may be, however much he may misunderstand the
course of nature and deny its conditions—and all systems of ethics
hitherto have been foolish and anti-natural to such a degree that
mankind would have been ruined by any one of them had it got the upper
hand,—at any rate, every time that "the hero" came upon the stage
something new was attained: the frightful counterpart of laughter, the
profound convulsion of many individuals at the thought, "Yes, it is
worth while to live! yes, I am worthy to live!"—life, and thou, and I,
and all of us together became for a while _interesting_ to ourselves
once more.—It is not to be denied that hitherto laughter and reason and
nature have _in the long run_ got the upper hand of all the great
teachers of design: in the end the short tragedy always passed over once
more into the eternal comedy of existence; and the "waves of innumerable
laughters"—to use the __EXPRESSION__ of Æschylus—must also in the end beat
over the greatest of these tragedies. But with all this corrective
laughter, human nature has on the whole been changed by the ever new
appearance of those teachers of the design of existence,—human nature
has now an additional requirement, the very requirement of the ever new
appearance of such teachers and doctrines of "design." Man has gradually
become a visionary animal, who has to fulfil one more condition of
existence than the other animals: man _must_ from time to time believe
that he knows _why_ he exists; his species cannot flourish without
periodically confiding in life! Without the belief in _reason in life_!
And always from time to time will the human race decree anew that "there
is something which really may not be laughed at." And the most
clairvoyant philanthropist will add that "not only laughing and joyful
wisdom, but also the tragic, with all its sublime irrationality, counts
among the means and necessities for the conservation of the race!"—And
consequently! Consequently! Consequently! Do you understand me, oh my
brothers? Do you understand this new law of ebb and flow? We also shall
have our time!
2.
_The Intellectual Conscience._—I have always the same experience over
again, and always make a new effort against it; for although it is
evident to me I do not want to believe it: _in the greater number of men
the intellectual conscience is lacking_; indeed, it would often seem to
me that in demanding such a thing, one is as solitary in the largest
cities as in the desert. Everyone looks at you with strange eyes, and
continues to make use of his scales, calling this good and that bad; and
no one blushes for shame when you remark that these weights are not the
full amount,—there is also no indignation against you; perhaps they
laugh at your doubt. I mean to say that _the greater number of people_
do not find it contemptible to believe this or that, and live according
to it, _without_ having been previously aware of the ultimate and surest
reasons for and against it, and without even giving themselves any
trouble about such reasons afterwards,—the most gifted men and the
noblest women still belong to this "greater number." But what is
kind-heartedness, refinement and genius to me, if the man with these
virtues harbours indolent sentiments in belief and judgment, if _the
longing for certainty_ does not rule in him, as his innermost desire and
profoundest need—as that which separates higher from lower men! In
certain pious people I have found a hatred of reason, and have been
favourably disposed to them for it: their bad, intellectual conscience
still betrayed itself, at least in this manner! But to stand in the
midst of this _rerum concordia discors_ and all the marvellous
uncertainty and ambiguity of existence, _and not to question_, not to
tremble with desire and delight in questioning, not even to hate the
questioner—perhaps even to make merry over him to the extent of
weariness—that is what I regard as _contemptible_, and it is this
sentiment which I first of all search for in every one:—some folly or
other always persuades me anew that every man has this sentiment, as
man. This is my special kind of unrighteousness.
3.
_Noble and Ignoble._—To ignoble natures all noble, magnanimous
sentiments appear inexpedient, and on that account first and foremost,
as incredible: they blink with their eyes when they hear of such
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