The Fraud of Feminism 13

The Fraud of Feminism 13

Misdemeanours and crimes at common law, when wilfully committed,

have in all countries always remained misdemeanours and crimes,

whatever motive can be conveniently put forward to account for them. A

political offence has always meant the __EXPRESSION__ of opinions or the

advocacy of measures or acts (not of the nature of common law crimes)

which are in contravention of the existing law—_e.g._ a “libel” on

the constituted authorities of the State, or the forcible disregard

of a law or police regulation in hindrance of the right of public

speech or meeting. This is what is meant by political offence in any

country recognising such as a special class of offence entitling

those committing it to special treatment. This is so where the matter

refers to the internal legislation of the country. Where the question

of extradition comes in the definition of political offence is, of

course, wider. Take the extreme case, that of the assassination of a

ruler or functionary, especially in a despotic State, where free Press

and the free __EXPRESSION__ of opinion generally do not exist. This is

undoubtedly a political, not a common law offence, _in so far as other

countries are concerned_, and hence the perpetrator of such a deed has

the right to claim immunity, on this ground, from extradition. The

position assumable is, that under despotic conditions the progressive

man is at war with the despot and those exercising authority under

him; therefore, in killing the despot or the repositories of despotic

authority, he is striking directly at the enemy. It would, however,

be absurd for the agent in a deed of this sort to expect special

political treatment _within the jurisdiction of the State itself

immediately concerned_. As a matter of fact he never does so. Fancy

a Russian Nihilist, when brought to trial, whining that he is a

political offender and hence to be exempted from all harsh treatment!

No, the Nihilist has too much self-respect to make himself ridiculous

in this way. Hardly even the maddest Terrorist Anarchist would make

such a claim. For example, the French law recognises the distinction

between political and common law offences. But for all this the _bande

tragique_, Bonnot and his associates, did not receive any benefit from

the distinction or even claim to do so, though otherwise they were loud

enough in proclaiming the political motives inspiring them. Even as

regards extradition, running amuck at large, setting fire promiscuously

to private buildings or injuring the ordinary non-political citizen,

as a “protest,” would not legally come into the category of political

offences and hence protect their authors from being surrendered as

ordinary criminals.

 

The real fact, of course, is that all this talk on the part of

suffragettes and their backers about “political” offences and

“political” prison treatment is only a mean and underhand way of trying

to secure special sex privileges under false pretences. Those who talk

the loudest in the strain in question know this perfectly well.

 

These falsehoods are dangerous, in spite of what one would think ought

to be their obvious character as such, by reason of the psychological

fact that you only require to repeat a lie often enough, provided you

are uncontradicted, in order for the aforesaid lie to be received as

established truth by the mass of mankind (“mostly fools,” as Carlyle

had it).

 

It is a preposterous claim, I contend, that any misdemeanour and _a

fortiori_ any felony has, law apart, and even from a merely ethical

point of view, any claim to special consideration and leniency on

the bare declaration of the felon or misdemeanant that it had been

dictated by political motive. In no country, at any time, has the mere

assertion of political motive been held to bring an ordinary crime

within the sphere of treatment of political offences. According to the

legal and ethical logic of the suffragettes, it is perfectly open for

them to set on fire theatres, churches and houses, and even to shoot

down the harmless passer-by in the street, and claim the treatment

of first-class misdemeanants on the ground that the act was done as

a protest against some political grievance under which they imagined

themselves to be labouring. The absurdity of the suggestion is evident

on its mere statement. And yet the above preposterous assumption

has been suffered equally with the one last noted to pass virtually

without protest, and what is more serious, it has been acted upon by

the authorities as though it were indubitably sound law as well as

sound ethics! It may be pointed out that what has cost many an Irish

Fenian in the old days, and many a Terrorist Anarchist at a later date,

a sentence of penal servitude for life, can be indulged in by modern

suffragettes at the expense of a few weeks’ imprisonment in the first

or second division. Of course, this whole talk of “political offences,”

when they are, on the face of them, mere common crimes, is purely and

simply a trick designed to shield the cowardly and contemptible female

creatures who perpetrate these senseless and dastardly outrages from

the punishment they deserve and would receive if they had not the good

fortune to be of the privileged sex. In the case of men this impudent

nonsense would, of course, never have been put forward, and, if it

had, would have been summarily laughed out of court. That it should

be necessary to point out these things in so many words is a striking

illustration of the moral and intellectual atrophy produced by Feminism

in the public mind.

 

There is another falsehood we often hear by way of condoning the

infamous outrages of the suffragettes. The excuse is often offered when

the illogical pointlessness of the “militant” methods of the modern

suffragette are in question: “Oh! men have also done the same things:

men have used violence to attain political ends!” Now the fallacy

involved in this retort is plain enough.

 

It may be perfectly true that men have used violence to attain their

ends on occasion. But to assert this fact in the connection in

question is purely irrelevant. There is violence _and_ violence. It

is absolutely false to say that men have ever adopted purposeless and

inane violence _as a policy_. The violence of men has always had an

intelligible relation to the ends they had in view, either proximate

or ultimate. They pulled down Hyde Park railings in 1866. Good! But

why was this? Because they wanted to hold a meeting, and found the

park closed against them, the destruction of the railings being the

only means of gaining access to the park. Again, the Reform Bill riots

of 1831 were at least all directed against Government property and

governmental persons—that is, the enemy with whom they were at war.

In most cases, as at Bristol and Nottingham, there was (as in that of

the Hyde Park railings) a very definite and immediate object in the

violence and destruction committed—namely, the release of persons

imprisoned for the part they had taken in the Reform movement, by the

destruction of the gaols where they were confined. What conceivable

analogy have these things with a policy of destroying private property,

setting fire to tea pavilions, burning boat-builders’ stock-in-trade,

destroying private houses, poisoning pet dogs, upsetting jockeys,

defacing people’s correspondence, including the postal orders of the

poor, mutilating books in a college library, pictures in a public

gallery, etc., etc.? And all these, _bien entendu_, not openly and

in course of a riot, but furtively, in the pursuit of a deliberately

premeditated policy! Have, I ask, men ever, in the course of the

world’s history, committed mean, futile and dastardly crimes such as

these in pursuit of any political or public end? There can be but

one answer to this question. Every reader must know that there is no

analogy whatever between suffragettes’ “militancy” and the violence and

crimes of which men may have been guilty. Even the Terrorist Anarchist,

however wrong-headed he may be, and however much his deeds may be

deemed morally reprehensible, is at least logical in his actions,

in so far as the latter have always had some definite bearing on his

political ends and were not mere senseless “running amuck.” The utterly

disconnected, meaningless and wanton character signalising the policy

of the “militant” suffragettes would of itself suffice to furnish a

conclusive argument for the incapacity of the female intellect to think

logically or politically, and hence against the concession to women of

public powers, political, judicial or otherwise.

 

Another fallacy analogous to the preceding, inasmuch as it seeks to

counterbalance female defects and weaknesses by the false allegation

of corresponding deficiencies in men, is the Feminist retort sometimes

heard when the question of hysteria in women is raised: “Oh! men can

also suffer from hysteria!” This has been already dealt with in an

earlier chapter, but for the sake of completing the list of prominent

Feminist fallacies I restate it concisely here. Now as we have seen it

is exceedingly doubtful whether this statement is true in any sense

whatever. There are eminent authorities who would deny that men ever

have true hysteria. There are others, of course, again, who would

extend the term hysteria so as to include every form of neurasthenic

disturbance. The question is largely, with many persons who discuss the

subject, one of terminology. It suffices here to cut short quibbling on

this score. For the nonce, let us drop the word hysteria and formulate

the matter as follows:—Women are frequently subject to a pathological

mental condition, differing in different cases but offering certain

well-marked features in common, a condition which seldom, if ever,

occurs in men. This I take to be an incontrovertible proposition based

upon experience which will be admitted by every impartial person.

 

Now the existence of the so-called hysterical man I have hitherto

found to be attested on personal experience solely by certain Feminist

medical practitioners who allege that they have met with him in their

consulting-rooms. His existence is thus vouchsafed for just as the

reality of the sea-serpent is vouchsafed for by certain sea captains

or other ancient mariners. Far be it from me to impugn the ability,

still less the integrity, of these worthy persons. But in either

case I may have my doubts as to the accuracy of their observation

or of their diagnosis. It may be that the sea-serpent exists and it

may be that hysteria is at times discoverable in male persons. But

while a conclusive proof of the discovery of a single sea-serpent of

the orthodox pattern would go far to justify the yarn of the ancient

mariner, the proof of the occurrence, in an occasional case, of

hysteria in men, would not by far justify the implied contention that

hysteria is not essentially a female malady. If hysterical men are as

common a phenomenon as certain hard-pressed Feminists would make out,

what I want to know is: Where are they? While we come upon symptoms

which would be commonly attributed to hysteria in well-nigh every

second or third woman of whose life we have any intimate knowledge,

how often do we find in men symptoms in any way resembling these?

In my own experience I have come across but two cases of men giving

indications of a temperament in any way analogous to that of the

“hysterical woman.” After all, the experience of the average layman,

and in this I contend my own is more or less typical, is more important

in the case of a malady manifesting itself in symptoms obvious to