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The Battle of Gettysburg 10
The Battle of Gettysburg 10
Geary's division of this corps having kept straight on up the pike
to Cemetery Hill, Hancock turned it off to the extreme left, partly
to make some show in that as yet unguarded quarter, about which he
felt by no means easy, partly to hold control of the Emmettsburg
and Taneytown roads (see map), by which more of the Union troops
were marching to the field. Stretching itself out in a thin line
as far as Little Round Top, and after sending one regiment out on
picket toward the Emmettsburg road, and just to the right of the
Devil's Den, the division slept on its arms, in a position destined
to become celebrated, first on account of Hancock's foresight in
seizing it, next by reason of its desertion by the general intrusted
with its defence.
[Sidenote: Second Corps nearly up.]
Hancock had the satisfaction of feeling that the position was safe
for the present when he rode back to Taneytown, first to meet his
own corps on the road, and next to find that the whole army had
already been ordered up. Throwing Gibbon an order to halt as he
passed, Hancock kept on to headquarters. His work was done.
[Sidenote: Union Line at Dark.]
Nothing but the importance which this critical period of the battle
has assumed to our own mind could justify the giving of all these
details by which the gradual patching up and lengthening out of the
line, until it took the form it subsequently held, and from a front
of a few hundred yards grew to be two miles long, may be better
followed.
[Sidenote: Part of Third Corps up.]
[Sidenote: Find Sherfy's on Map.]
[Sidenote: Other Corps where?]
As regards the rest of the army, some part of the Third Corps had
now reached the ground by the Emmettsburg road, though too late to
get into line; its pickets, however, were thrown out on that road
as far to the left as a cross-road leading down from Sherfy's house
to Little Round Top. The rest of this corps would come up by this
same road in the morning. The Second Corps was halting for the night
three miles back, also in a position to guard the left of the line.
Nominally, therefore, five of the seven corps were up at dark that
night, or at least near enough to go into position by daybreak. The
Fifth being then at Hanover, twenty-four miles back, and the Sixth,
which was the strongest in the army, at Manchester, thirty-five
miles from Gettysburg, it still became a question whether the
whole Union army could be assembled in season to overcome Lee's
superiority on the field.[50]
[Sidenote: Chances against Meade.]
Indeed, when Meade did finally order the whole army to Gettysburg,
the chances were as ten to one against its getting up in time to
fight as a unit.
Would that portion of the Union forces found on Cemetery Hill on the
morning of the second be beaten in detail, as the First and Eleventh
had been the day before?
[Sidenote: Lee's Plan.]
[Sidenote: Longstreet demurs.]
This seems, in fact, to have been Lee's real purpose, as he told
Longstreet at five o'clock, when they were looking over the ground
together, that if Meade's army was on the heights next day it must
be dislodged. Knowing that but two Union corps had been engaged that
day against him, Lee seemed impressed with the idea that he could
beat Meade before the rest of his army could arrive. Longstreet
strongly opposed making a direct attack, though without shaking his
chief's purpose. As Lee now had his whole army well in hand, one
division only being absent,[51] he seemed little disposed to begin a
new series of combinations, when, in his opinion, he had the Union
army half defeated, half scattered, and wholly at a disadvantage.
And we think he was right.
[Sidenote: Chances favor Lee.]
We have seen that Lee's conclusions with respect to the force before
him were so nearly correct as to justify his confidence in his own
plans. Ever since crossing South Mountain he had expected a battle.
It is true he found it forced upon him sooner than he expected,
yet his own army had been the first to concentrate, his troops had
gained a partial victory by this very means, and both general and
soldiers were eager to consummate it while the chances were still
so distinctly in their favor. Even if Lee was somewhat swayed by a
belief in his own genius, as some of his critics have suggested,--a
belief which had so far carried him from victory to victory,--we
cannot blame him. War is a game of chance, and Lee now saw that
chance had put his enemy in his power.
[Sidenote: Ewell says No.]
[Sidenote: Cemetery Hill too Strong.]
At the close of the day Lee therefore rode over to see if Ewell
could not open the battle by carrying Cemetery Hill. Ewell bluntly
declared it to be an impossibility. The Union troops, he said,
would be at work strengthening their already formidable positions
there all night, so that by morning they would be found well-nigh
impregnable. Culp's Hill had been snatched from his grasp. The
rugged character of these heights, the impossibility of using
artillery to support an attack, the exposure of the assaulting
columns to the fire of the Union batteries at short range, were all
forcibly dwelt upon and fully concurred in by Ewell's lieutenants.
In short, so many objections appeared that, willing or unwilling,
Lee found himself forced to give over the design of breaking through
the Union line at this point and taking the road to Baltimore.
[Sidenote: Ewell says, try the Left.]
It was then suggested that the attack should begin on the Union
left, where, to all appearances, the ridge was far more assailable
or less strongly occupied, because the Union troops seemed massed
more with the view of repelling this projected assault toward their
right.
Inasmuch as Ewell was really ignorant of what force was in his
front at that moment, his advice to Lee may have sprung from a not
unnatural desire to see that part of the army which had not been
engaged do some of the work cut out for him and his corps.
Be that as it may, Lee then and there proposed giving up Gettysburg
altogether, in order to draw Ewell over toward his right, thus
massing the Confederate army in position to strike the Union left,
as well as materially shortening his own long line.
[Sidenote: What, give up Gettysburg.]
But to this proposal Ewell as strongly demurred again. After losing
over three thousand men in taking it, he did not want to give
up Gettysburg. It involved a point of honor to which Jackson's
successor showed himself keenly sensitive. His arrival had decided
the day; and at that moment he held the bulk of the Union army
before him, simply by remaining where he was. If he moved off, that
force would be freed also. So where would be the gain of it?
"Well, then, if I attack from my right, Longstreet will have to make
the attack," said Lee at last; adding a moment later, and as if the
admission came from him in spite of himself, "but he is so slow."
[Sidenote: Lee's Dilemma.]
Finding that Ewell was averse to making an attack himself, averse
to leaving Gettysburg; that Hill was averse to putting his crippled
corps forward so soon again; and that Longstreet was averse to
fighting at all on that ground,--Lee may well have thought, like
Napoleon during the Hundred Days, that his generals were no longer
what they had been.[52] There was certainly more or less pulling at
cross purposes in the Confederate camp.
Meade did not reach the field until one in the morning. It was then
too early to see the ground he was going to fight on.
It thus appears that Lee had well considered all his plans for
attacking before Meade could so much as begin his dispositions for
defence. And this same unpreparedness, this fatality of having
always to follow your adversary's lead, had so far distinguished
every stage of this most unpromising campaign.
In the mellow moonlight of a midsummer's night, looking down into
the unlighted streets of Gettysburg, the tired soldiers dropped to
rest among the graves or in the fields wet with falling dew, while
their comrades were hurrying on over the dusty roads that stretched
out in long, weary miles toward Gettysburg, as if life and death
were in their speed.
[43] It seems plain that next to Reynolds Hancock was the one in
whom Meade reposed most confidence.
[44] This was the Seventh Indiana, which had been acting as escort
to the trains. It brought five hundred fresh men to Wadsworth's
division.
[45] By General Morgan's account, one thousand five hundred
fugitives were collected by the provost guard of the Twelfth Corps,
some miles in rear of the field.
[46] This was a brigade of nine months' men, called in derision the
"Paper Collar Brigade." No troops contributed more to the winning of
this battle, though only three of its five regiments were engaged.
[47] Johnson was then coming up. This is equivalent to an admission
that Ewell did not feel able to undertake anything further that
night with the two divisions that had been in action.
[48] While conveying the idea that the position was good, Hancock's
message was, in reality, sufficiently ambiguous. It, however, served
Meade's turn, as his mind was more than half made up already.
[49] The Seventh Indiana brought up five hundred men; Stannard's
brigade two thousand five hundred more.
[50] The Union corps would not average ten thousand men present in
the ranks, although the Sixth bore sixteen thousand on its muster
rolls. Some corps had three, some two divisions. There were too many
corps, and in consequence too many corps commanders, for the best
and most efficient organization.
[51] This was Pickett's, left at Chambersburg to guard the trains.
[52] Lee's corps commanders in council seem more like a debating society: Meade's more like a Quaker meeting.
The Battle of Gettysburg 9
The Battle of Gettysburg 9
[38] The First Corps finally held a line of about a mile and a half,
from the Hagerstown to the Mummasburg road.
[39] The head of this corps arrived at about 12.45 and the rear
at 1.45 P.M. It would take not less than an hour to get it into
position from a half to three-fourths of a mile out of Gettysburg.
[40] It is a well-settled principle of war as well as of common
sense that a corps commander may disregard his orders whenever
their literal execution would be in his opinion unwarranted by
conditions unknown to, or unforeseen by, the general in command of
the army when he issued them. This refers, of course, to an officer
exercising a separate command, and not when in the presence of his
superior.
[41] The positions of the several corps that afternoon were as
follows, except the First and Eleventh: Second at Taneytown, Third
at Emmettsburg, Fifth at Hanover, Sixth at Manchester, and Twelfth
at Two Taverns.
[42] Heth, Rodes, and Early admit a loss of five thousand eight
hundred without counting prisoners. The prisoners taken by the First
Corps would swell this number to about eight thousand.
VI
CEMETERY HILL
[Sidenote: Lee wants to push Things.]
We have seen Lee arriving on the field his troops had carried just
as ours were streaming over Cemetery Hill in his plain sight. Seeing
Ewell already established within gunshot of this hill, Lee wished
him to push on after the fugitives, seize Cemetery Hill, and so reap
all the fruits of the victory just won.
Ewell hesitated, and the golden opportunity slipped through Lee's
fingers. At four o'clock he would have met with little resistance:
at six it was different.
[Sidenote: Hancock arrives.]
[Sidenote: Finds Situation gloomy.]
By riding hard, Hancock[43] got to Gettysburg soon after Lee did.
The road leading from the battlefield was thronged with fugitives,
wounded men, ammunition wagons, and ambulances, all hurrying to
the rear (the unmistakable débris of a routed army), as Hancock
spurred up Cemetery Hill. His trained eye took in the situation at
a glance. Everywhere he saw the gloom of defeat. A few disordered
battalions sullenly clung around their colors, but the men seemed
stunned and disheartened, not so much by defeat as by the palpable
fact that they had been abandoned to defeat for want of a scrap
of paper, more or less. Instead of cheers, set faces and haggard
eyes greeted Hancock as he rode along the diminished ranks. He saw
divisions reduced to brigades; brigades to battalions; battalions to
companies; batteries to a single gun. One of Steinwehr's brigades
and some of his batteries, with a regiment of the First Corps that
had not been in action,[44] was the only force remaining intact.
These guns were sending an occasional shot down into the streets
of Gettysburg; while more to the left--cheering sight!--Buford's
cavalry stood drawn up before the heights steady as on parade, first
in the field and last out of it.
Hancock's animating presence gradually put heart into the men. He
saw just what ought to be done, and instantly set about doing it.
[Sidenote: Order is restored.]
[Sidenote: First Reinforcements.]
A swift and comprehensive view of the ground--and his grasp of its
capabilities was singularly just--seems to have convinced Hancock
that no better place to fight in was likely to be found, even
should the enemy allow them the time to concentrate in the rear,
which was become the all-important question just then. He gave his
orders rapidly, broken ranks were re-formed, fugitives brought back
to their colors,[45] the tide of retreat stayed. As the last gun
was fired from Cemetery Hill, Stannard's Vermont brigade[46] came
marching up the Emmettsburg road, and was at once put in line south
of the Cemetery, with pickets thrown out in front. Though small,
this reinforcement was thrice welcome at a time when it could not
be known whether the enemy would attack or not, and it had a good
effect.
[Sidenote: Culp's Hill.]
[Sidenote: Commands Cemetery.]
In riding up, Hancock had not failed to notice--indeed, no one
could--a wooded hill standing off at some distance to the right
of Cemetery Hill, from which it was separated by a wide and deep
hollow, yet at the same time joined by a ridge so low and narrow
as to be hardly seen when looking down from above. This low,
connecting ridge is several hundred yards in extent, and, forming as
if does a natural parapet for infantry, was all that stood in the
way of pushing a force through between Cemetery and Culp's Hill to
the rear of the Union troops. Of the two hills it is enough to say
that as Culp's Hill is much the higher, whoever held Culp's Hill
would also hold the key to the Union position, as Hancock found it.
[Sidenote: Ewell sees it too.]
[Sidenote: But Hancock seizes it.]
The enemy had not been slow to perceive this on his part, and while
hesitating what to do Early had pointed it out to Ewell, his chief,
who fully agreed with him that it should be seized as soon as
Johnson's fresh division got up.[47] But while they were hesitating
Hancock was sending what was left of Wadsworth's division,
reinforced by the Seventh Indiana, with a battery, to occupy Culp's
Hill; so that when Johnson's scouts went there after dark, instead
of finding the hill unoccupied and undefended, they fell into the
hands of Wadsworth's men. Meredith's worn but undaunted brigade
dropped into position behind the narrow strip of ridge spoken of,
a sure guaranty that no enemy would break through at that place.
In this instance Hancock's eagle glance and no less prompt action
undoubtedly saved the whole position, since if Ewell had succeeded
in establishing himself on Culp's Hill, it would have taken the
whole Union army to drive him out.
[Sidenote: Hancock reports all safe.]
Considered merely as a rallying point for broken troops, Cemetery
Hill had now served its purpose. Hancock could now say to Meade, not
that the position was the best they could have taken for disputing
the enemy's progress, but that all was safe for the present, or
equally in train for the withdrawal of the troops, should that be
the decision. In a word, he would not commit himself unreservedly to
a simple yes or no.[48]
[Sidenote: Meade's Decision.]
It was now Meade's turn, and right nobly did he rise to the crisis.
Such as it was, Hancock's report enabled him to come to a quick
decision. Instead of ordering a retreat, he instantly ordered the
corps to Gettysburg. From the moment he became satisfied that there
was a fighting chance in front, Meade's conduct was anything but
that of a defeated or even timid general; he seems never to have
looked behind him. Had he been so unalterably wedded to his own
chosen line of defence as some critics profess to believe, it is
difficult to see what stronger excuse could have offered itself for
falling back than the defeat he had just suffered. And if he had
shrunk from the hazard of fighting so far from his base before, how
much more easily could he have justified his refusal to do so after
the loss of ten thousand men, the sudden disruption of his plans,
with the increased sense of responsibility all this involved! We
think few would deny that the bringing up of four-sevenths of the
army over distances varying from thirteen to thirty-six miles must
appear a far bolder act, even to the unmilitary mind, than causing
three-sevenths to fall back some fifteen miles. Fortunately Meade
was one in spirit with his soldiers, who with one voice demanded
to be led against the enemy. The shock of battle seems to have
aroused all the warrior's instinct within him. Reynolds may have
forced the fighting, Hancock suggested, or even advised, but it was
Meade, and Meade alone, on whose deliberate judgment the battle of
Gettysburg was renewed, and who therefore stands before history as
its undoubted sponsor.
[Sidenote: Twelfth Corps comes up, 5 P.M.]
To return to the now historic Cemetery Hill. Here the right,
reinforced by at least three thousand fresh troops,[49] had been
strongly occupied. Everything appeared in surety on this side. But
all the way from the Taneytown Road to Little Round Top there was
not one solitary soldier or gun except some cavalry pickets. By the
time, however, that Hancock had succeeded in bringing order out
of this chaos and courage out of despair, the whole situation was
changed by the arrival of the Twelfth Corps from Two Taverns. As
it came up by the Baltimore pike the leading division (Williams')
turned off to the right, feeling its way out in this direction as
far as Wolf's Hill and the Hanover road; but on finding the enemy
already installed on that side, the division was massed for the
night on the Baltimore pike, so rendering secure our extreme right
at Culp's Hill. There was no longer anything to apprehend on this
side. We cannot refrain from asking what would have been the effect
of the appearance of these troops on Early's flank an hour or two earlier in the afternoon?
The Battle of Gettysburg 8
The Battle of Gettysburg 8
Supposing the day lost from the tenor of Howard's despatch,
lacking perhaps the fullest confidence in that general's ability
and experience, and thinking only of how he should save what was
left, Meade forthwith posted Hancock off to Gettysburg, with full
authority to take command of all the troops he might find there,
decide whether Gettysburg should be held or given up, and to
promptly report his decision, to the end that proper steps might be
taken to counteract this disaster if yet possible.
[Sidenote: Slocum and Sickles.]
Slocum would not stir from Two Taverns without orders, though it
is said the firing was distinctly heard there, and he could have
reached Gettysburg in an hour and a half. A second and still more
urgent appeal decided that commander, late in the afternoon, to
set his troops in motion. It was then too late. Sickles, who might
have been at Gettysburg inside of three hours with the greater part
of his corps, appears to have lingered in a deplorable state of
indecision until between two and three o'clock in the afternoon,
before he could make up his mind what to do. It was then too
late.[40]
By contrast we find Ewell promptly going to Hill's assistance
upon a simple request for such coöperation, though Ewell was
Hill's senior; and we further find that his doing so proved the
turning-point of this very battle.
[Illustration: Union Positions, July 1, 3 P.M.]
Was there a want of cordiality between the Union commanders? Was it
really culpable negligence, or was there only incapacity?
While, therefore, one corps certainly, two probably, might easily
have got to the field in season to take a decisive part in the
battle, but remained inactive, the Confederates were hurrying every
available man forward to the point of danger. This was precisely
where Reynolds' fall proved supremely disastrous, and where an
opportunity to acquire a decisive superiority on the field of battle
was most unfortunately thrown away for want of a head.[41]
[Sidenote: New Union Line.]
The Union line, lengthened out by the arrival of the Eleventh Corps,
had now been carried in a quarter circle around Gettysburg, or from
the Hagerstown road on the left to near Rock Creek on the right, the
Eleventh Corps being deployed across the open fields extending from
the Mummasburg to the Harrisburg road, with Barlow's division on
the extreme right. When this corps formed front in line of battle,
there was a gap of a quarter of a mile left wide open between it and
the First Corps. Furthermore, it was drawn up on open ground which,
if not actually level, is freely overlooked by all the surrounding
heights.
That this corps was badly posted was demonstrated after a very brief
trial.
[Sidenote: Rodes attacks.]
Having got into line facing southward, Rodes began his advance
against the right of the First Corps and left of the Eleventh
shortly before three o'clock, supported by a tremendous artillery
fire from Oak Hill. Our troops stood firm against this new
onslaught. It was only fairly under way, however, when Heth and
Pender joined in the attack.
The fighting now begun was on both sides of the most determined
character.
[Sidenote: Bloody Fighting.]
On his side, Rodes was quick to take advantage of the break existing
between the two Union corps, and promptly pushed his soldiers into
it; but they were not to get possession so easily, for Doubleday
now ordered up his last division to stem the tide surging in upon
his uncovered flank. These troops gallantly rushed into the breach,
where a murderous contest began at close quarters, with the result
that, failing to close up the gap, the division was finally drawn
around the point of the ridge, where the Mummasburg road descends
into the plain, so forming a natural bastion from which the Union
soldiers now drove back their assailants with great slaughter. Many
of Iverson's brigade were literally lying dead in their ranks after
this repulse.
In front of Meredith, who still held the wood, and Stone's
"Bucktails," who lay at their right, "no rebel crossed the run for
one hour and lived." Beyond them Biddle was still holding his own
at the left, though his ranks were fast thinning. On both sides
the losses were enormous. In twenty-five minutes Heth had lost two
thousand seven hundred out of seven thousand men. This division
having been fought out, Pender's was brought up, the artillery
redoubled its fire, Rodes pushed his five brigades forward again,
and a general advance of comparatively fresh troops was begun all
along the line.
But it was on the right that disaster first fell with crushing force.
[Sidenote: Early strikes in.]
Here Rodes' assault on the left of the Eleventh Corps met stout
resistance. But while the troops here were fighting or shifting
positions to repel Rodes' rapid blows, Early's division was seen
advancing down the Harrisburg road against the right, which it
almost immediately struck. Thus reinforced and connected, not quite
one-half of Lee's whole army was now closing in around two-sevenths
of the Union army.
Obstinate fighting now took place all along the line. The First
Corps held out some time longer against repeated assaults, losing
men fast, but also inflicting terrible punishment upon their
assailants, Rodes alone losing two thousand five hundred men before
he could carry the positions before him. The Confederate veterans,
though not used to praising their opponents, freely said that the
First Union Corps did the fiercest fighting on this day of which
they ever had any experience.
[Sidenote: His Attack is decisive.]
But Early's attack on the right, though sternly resisted by Barlow,
proved the last straw in this case. The right division being rolled
back in disorder by an assault made both in front and flank, the
left also gave way in its turn, and soon the whole corps was in full
retreat across the fields to the town, which the exultant enemy
entered along with them, picking up a great many prisoners on the
way or in the streets, notwithstanding a brigade of the reserve came
down from Cemetery Hill to check the pursuit.
[Sidenote: All in Retreat.]
[Sidenote: Union Losses.]
The Eleventh Corps being thus swept away, the First fell back
rather forsaken than defeated, a few regiments on the left making a
final stand at the seminary to enable those on the right to shake
off their pursuers. But at last the winding lines came down from
Seminary Ridge into the plain. Buford's cavalry again came to the
rescue in this part of the field, riding with drawn sabres between
pursuers and pursued, so that the Confederates hastily formed some
squares to repel a charge, while the wreck of the Union line,
disdaining to run, doggedly fell back toward the town, halting now
and then to turn and fire a parting volley or rally its stragglers
round their colors. It was not hard pushed except at the extreme
right, where some of Robinson's division fell into the enemy's
hands; nor did resistance cease until its decimated battalions
again closed up their ranks on the brow of Cemetery Hill--noble
relic of one of the hardest-fought battles of this war. Of the
eight thousand two hundred men who had gone into action in the
morning, five thousand seven hundred and fifty had been left on the
blood-dyed summit of Oak Ridge, or in the enemy's hands. The losses
were frightful. In one brigade alone, one thousand two hundred and
three men had fallen. In all, the losses more than equalled half the
effective strength.
The Eleventh Corps also lost heavily, though mostly in prisoners. In
both corps ten thousand soldiers were missing at roll-call.
[Sidenote: The Enemy in Gettysburg.]
Early's soldiers were now swarming about Gettysburg in great
spirits. Hays' brigade alone entered the town, Avery going into
a field on the East, and the others out on the York road. Rodes
presently came up at the west, much disordered from his pursuit
of Robinson. These Confederates then set about re-forming their
shattered ranks, under the fire of the Union artillery from Cemetery
Hill and of the sharp-shooters posted in the houses along its
slopes. This fire became so galling that the enemy's infantry were
obliged to get under cover of the nearest ridges or houses. In this
way Ewell's Corps came to be planted nearest the approaches to
Cemetery Hill.
[Sidenote: Heth and Pender.]
Heth and Pender did not advance beyond Seminary Ridge. They had had
fighting enough for one day.[42] Lee was also there examining the
new Union position through his glass. Notwithstanding the general
elation visible about him, the victory did not seem quite complete
to Lee so long as the Federals still maintained their defiant
attitude at the Cemetery. There was evidently more, and perhaps
harder, work ahead.
There is no evading the plain, if unwelcome, truth that this
battle had been lost, and two corps of the Union army nearly
destroyed, for want of a little more decision when decision was most
urgently called for, and a little more energy when activity was
all-important. The fate of most great battles has been decided by an
hour or two, more or less. Two of indecision decided this one.
[33] Buford's information was quite exact. "June 30, 10.30 P.M. I am
satisfied that A. P. Hill's corps is massed just back of Cashtown,
about nine miles from this place. Pender's division of this corps
came up to-day, of which I advised you. The enemy's pickets,
infantry and artillery, are within four miles of this place, at the
Cashtown road."--_Buford to Reynolds._
[34] Colonel Chapman Biddle puts the Confederate force in camp
around Cashtown or Heidlersburg, each eight miles from Oak Ridge, at
thirty-five thousand of all arms; perhaps rather an over-estimate of
this careful writer.
[35] His horse carried him a short distance onward before he fell.
His body was carried to the rear, in a blanket, just as Archer was
being brought in a prisoner.
[36] When attacked in this way a battery is at the mercy of its
assailants.
[37] General Abner Doubleday succeeded to the command of the First Corps on Reynolds' death.
The Battle of Gettysburg 7
The Battle of Gettysburg 7
Forewarned that he must look for the enemy to make his appearance
on the Chambersburg and Carlisle roads,[33] and feeling that there
was warm work ahead, Buford was keeping a good lookout in both
directions. To that end he had now taken post on a commanding ridge
over which these roads passed first to Seminary Ridge, and so back
into Gettysburg. First causing his troopers to dismount, he formed
them across the two roads in question in skirmishing order, threw
out his vedettes, planted his horse-artillery, and with the little
valley of Willoughby Run before him, the Seminary and Gettysburg
behind him, and the First Corps in bivouac only five miles away
toward Emmettsburg, this intrepid soldier calmly awaited the coming
of the storm, conscious that if Gettysburg was to be defended at all
it must be from these heights.
A pretty little valley was this of Willoughby Run, with its
green banks and clear-flowing waters, its tall woods and tangled
shrubbery, so soon to be torn and defaced by shot and shell, so soon
deformed by drifting smoke and the loud cries of the combatants.
The night passed off quietly. Nevertheless, some thirty thousand
Confederates, of all arms, were lying in camp within a radius of
eight miles from Gettysburg. Their vanguard had discovered the
presence of our cavalry,[34] and was waiting for the morning only to
brush it away.
[Sidenote: Heth comes down the Pike.]
Next morning Heth's division was marching down the Chambersburg
pike, looking for this cavalry, when its advance fell in with
Buford's vedettes. While they halted to reconnoitre, these vedettes
came back with the news that the enemy was advancing in force,
infantry and artillery filling the road as far as could be seen.
Warned that not a moment was to be lost, Buford at once sent off
word to Reynolds, who, after ordering the First Corps under arms,
and sending back for the Eleventh, himself set off at a gallop for
Gettysburg, followed only by his staff.
[Sidenote: He drives Buford.]
Buford's bold front had thus caused the enemy to come to a halt; but
soon after nine, supposing he had to do with cavalry alone, Heth
deployed his skirmishers across the pike, forming his two leading
brigades at each side of it; these troops then pushed forward, and
soon the crack of a musket announced that the battle of Gettysburg
had begun.
[Sidenote: Wadsworth comes to Buford's Aid.]
After an hour's stubborn fighting, Buford was being slowly but
surely pushed back over the first ridge, when a column of the
Union infantry was seen coming up the Emmettsburg road at the
double-quick. It was Wadsworth's division arriving in the nick of
time, as the enemy's skirmishers, followed by Archer's brigade,
were, even then, in the act of fording the run unopposed, and unless
promptly stopped would soon be in possession of the first range of
heights. It was really a neck-and-neck race to see who would get
there first.
[Sidenote: Reynolds forms the Division.]
[Sidenote: Charge of the Iron Brigade.]
[Sidenote: Reynolds falls.]
Reynolds was impatiently awaiting the arrival of his troops, who
were making across the fields for the ridge he was so desirous of
holding on the run. It was plain as day that he had determined to
contest the enemy's possession of Gettysburg here. Cutler's brigade
was the first to arrive. Hurrying this off to the right of the pike,
where it formed along the crest of the ridge under a shower of
balls, Reynolds ordered the next, as it came up, to charge on over
the ridge in its front, and drive Archer's men out of a wood that
rose before him crowning the crest and running down the opposite
slopes. It was done in the most gallant manner, each regiment in
turn breaking off from the line of march to join in the charge under
the eye of Reynolds himself, who, heedless of everything except
the supreme importance of securing the position, rode on after the
leading regiment into the fire where bullets were flying thickest.
Not only was the enemy driven out of the wood, but back across the
run, with the loss of about half the brigade, including Archer
himself. At the very moment success had crowned his first effort,
Reynolds fell dead with a bullet in his brain.[35]
[Sidenote: Evil Consequences.]
Nothing could have been more unfortunate at this time. With Reynolds
fell the whole inspiration of the battle of Gettysburg, but, worst
of all, with his fall both the directing mind and that unquestioned
authority so essential to bring the battle to a successful issue
vanished from the field. He had been struck down too suddenly even
to transmit his views to a subordinate. Disaster was in the air.
[Sidenote: Cutler is driven.]
This dearly bought success on the left was more than offset by what
was going on at the right, where Davis' Confederate brigade, after
getting round Cutler's flank, was driving all before it. Cutler had
to fall back to the Seminary Ridge in disorder.
Having so easily cleared this part of the line, Davis' men next
threw themselves astride the ridge, and seeing nothing before them
but Hall's battery, which was then firing down the Chambersburg
pike, they came booming down upon the guns, yelling like so many
Comanche Indians. Before the battery could be limbered up the
enemy were among the guns, shooting the cannoneers and bayoneting
the horses. It was finally got off with the loss of one of the
pieces.[36]
This success put the enemy in possession of all the Union line as
far down as the pike, and threatened that part just won with a like
fate. We had routed the enemy on the left, and been routed on the
right.
[Sidenote: The Ridge recovered.]
[Sidenote: Davis in a Trap.]
Fortunately, the Sixth Wisconsin had been left in reserve near the
Seminary a little earlier, and it was now ordered to the rescue.
Colonel Dawes led his men up on the run. This regiment, with two
of Cutler's that had turned back on seeing the diversion making in
their favor, drove the enemy back again, up the ridge, to where it
is crossed by a railroad cut, some two hundred yards north of the
pike. To escape this attack most of them jumped down into the cut;
but as the banks are high and steep and the outlet narrow, this was
only getting out of the frying-pan into the fire, since while one
body of pursuers was firing down into them from above, still another
had thrown itself across the outlet and was raking the cut from
end to end. This proved more than even Davis' Mississippians could
stand, and though they fought obstinately enough, all were either
killed, taken, or dispersed.
[Sidenote: Heth brought to a Standstill.]
Heth's two attacking brigades having thus been practically used up
after a fierce conflict, not with cavalry alone, with whom they had
expected to have a little fun, but with infantry, in whom they
recognized their old antagonists of many a hard-fought field, and
who fought to-day with a determination unusual even to them, Heth
hesitated about advancing to the attack again in the face of such
a check as he had just received, without strong backing up; but
sending word of his encounter to Lee, he set about forming the
fragments of the two defeated brigades on two fresh ones, where they
could be sheltered from the Union fire.
Yet Hill, his immediate chief, had told him only the night before
there was no objection in the world to his going into Gettysburg the
next day.
This success also enabled Doubleday[37] to reform his line in its
old position. The troops on the left had not been shaken, and
Cutler's men were now coming back to the front eager to wipe out the
disgrace of their defeat.
If the enemy's van had not been without cavalry to clear its march,
Heth must inevitably have got into Gettysburg first. As it was, the
unexpected resistance he had met with made Heth cautious. Lee's
orders to his lieutenants were not to force the fighting until the
whole army should be up. Pender was therefore forming behind Heth,
the artillery set at work, and all were impatiently looking out
for Rodes' appearance on the Carlisle (or Mummasburg) road, before
renewing the action.
[Sidenote: Eleven o'clock.]
This proved a most fortunate respite to the small Union force on Oak
Ridge, as, in consequence of it,--the state of things just pointed
out,--some hours elapsed before there was any more fighting by the
infantry, though the artillery kept up its annoying fire. Meanwhile
the two remaining divisions of the First Corps came on the ground.
Robinson's was left in reserve at the Seminary, with orders to
throw up some breastworks there; Doubleday's, now Rowley's, went
into line partly to the right and partly to the left of the troops
already there, thus extending both flanks considerably; and at the
extreme left, which was held by Biddle's brigade, two companies of
the Twentieth New York were even thrown out across the run, into
the Harman house and out-buildings, where they did good service in
keeping down the enemy's skirmish fire.[38]
[Sidenote: Rodes on Union Flank.]
Meantime, also, Pender's division had got into line. When formed for
the attack it considerably outflanked the Union left. And a little
later Rodes was seen coming down the Mummasburg road, or out quite
beyond the right of the First Corps. Clearly, the combat just closed
was child's play in comparison with what was about to begin.
[Sidenote: Oak Hill seized.]
These troops gave notice that they were shortly coming into action
by opening a sharp cannonade from Oak Hill, the commanding eminence
situated just beyond and in fact forming a continuation of Oak
Ridge, where the First Corps stood, though separated from it
somewhat.
This artillery fire from Oak Hill enfiladed the Union position so
completely that nothing was left for the right but to fall back to
Seminary Ridge, so as to show a new front to this attack. The centre
and left, however, kept its former position, with some rearrangement
of the line here and there, which had now become a very crooked one.
Twenty odd thousand men were thus waiting for the word to rush upon
between ten and eleven thousand.
[Sidenote: Eleventh Corps comes up.]
Before the battle could be renewed, however, the Eleventh Union
Corps came up through Gettysburg.[39] Howard, its actual head, was
now in chief command of the field, as next in rank to Reynolds.
He sent forward Schurz's and Barlow's divisions of this corps to
confront Rodes, leaving Steinwehr's in reserve on Cemetery Hill.
[Sidenote: Howard calls for Help.]
Having preceded his corps to the field, Howard had already notified
Meade, too hastily by half, that Reynolds was killed and the First
Corps routed--a report only half true, and calculated to do much
mischief, as it soon spread throughout the entire army. He also
sent off an urgent request to Slocum, who was halted in front of
Two Taverns, not five miles off, to come to his assistance with the Twelfth Corps.
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