The Battle of Gettysburg 2
Across this valley, again, the western ridge, which looks highest
from the town, has what Cemetery Hill has not, namely, a thin fringe
of trees skirting its entire crest, thus effectually masking the
view in that direction; and it is further distinguished by the
cupola of the Lutheran Seminary,[4] seen rising above trees at a
point opposite the town, and giving its name to this ridge--Seminary
Ridge. Both ranges of heights are quite level at the top, and easily
traversed; so also the slopes of both are everywhere easy of ascent,
the ground between undulating, but nowhere, except far down the
valley, badly cut up by ravines or watercourses. Indeed, better
ground for a fair stand-up fight it would be hard to find; for all
between the two ridges is so clear and open that neither army could
stir out toward its opponent without being detected at once--the
extreme southern part of the valley excepted. In this respect I take
the liberty of observing that the actual state of things proved very
different from that conveyed in some of the published accounts,
wherein Cemetery Ridge is represented as a sort of Gibraltar.
A very brief survey, however, suggests that an army could be
perfectly hid behind the trees of Seminary Ridge, as well as better
sheltered from artillery fire, while one stretched out along the
bare and treeless summit of Cemetery Ridge would be without such
screen or protection.
The description must be a little farther pursued, if the battle is
to be at all intelligently followed.
Enough for the two main ridges enclosing Gettysburg and its valley.
We come now to that most striking feature of the landscape, notably
on the side of Cemetery Ridge, but more or less characteristic of
both sides of the valley. This is the group of hills standing off
from Cemetery Ridge at either end, just as if, at some remote time,
this ridge had formed a continuous chain, the summits of which
had been cleanly shaved off at the centre, leaving these isolated
clusters to show where the wasting forces had passed. From different
points of view we may see one or both of them rising above the
ridge like giant watch-towers set at the extremities of some high
embattled wall.
[Sidenote: Culp's Hill.]
[Sidenote: Rock Creek.]
Let us first take the northernmost cluster, formed of Wolf's,
McAllister's, and Culp's hills. It is seen to be thrown back behind
Cemetery Hill, to which Culp's Hill alone is slenderly attached by a
low ridge, so making an elbow with it, or, in the military phrase, a
refused line. Between Culp's Hill and Wolf's Hill flows Rock Creek,
the shallow stream so often mentioned in connection with the battle,
its course lying through a shaggy ravine.[5] The ravine and stream
of Rock Creek threw Wolf's Hill somewhat out of the true line of
defence, but the merest novice in military art sees at a glance why
the possession of Culp's Hill was all-essential to the security of
Cemetery Hill, since there is little use in shutting the front door
if the back door is to be left standing open.
[Sidenote: The Round Tops.]
[Sidenote: The Devil's Den.]
The same is just as true of the southernmost group, composed of
Little and Great Round Tops, two exceedingly picturesque summits,
standing up above the generally monotonous contours about them in
strong relief. They also were wooded from base to summit, and they
show, even more distinctly than the first group, where the crushing
out or denuding forces have been at work, in shelves or crevices of
broken ledge at the highest points, in ugly bowlders cropping out on
the slopes, in miry gullies crawling at their feet, but most of all
in the deformed heap of ripped-up ledges, topped with coppices and
scattered trees, thrust out from Little Round Top and known as the
Devil's Den.[6]
When it is added that the way is open between the two Round Tops to
the rear of Cemetery Ridge, the importance of holding them firmly
becomes self-evident; and inasmuch as the greatest natural strength
of this ridge lay at its extremities, or flanks, _so its weakness
would result from a neglect to occupy those flanks_.
[Sidenote: The Swale.]
This line was assailable at one other point. As it approaches Little
Round Top the ridge sinks away to the general level around it, or so
as to break its continuity, thus leaving a gap more or less inviting
the approach of an enemy. The whole extent of this crooked line, at
which we have just glanced, is about two and a half miles.
[Sidenote: Emmettsburg Road.]
Down below, in the valley, there is another swell of ground, hardly
worth dignifying by the name of ridge, yet assuming a certain
importance, nevertheless, first because it starts from the town
close under Cemetery Hill, thence crossing the valley diagonally
till it becomes merged in Seminary Ridge, at a point nearly opposite
to the Round Tops, and next because the Emmettsburg road runs on
it. In brief, its relation to the battle was this: it ran from the
Union right into the Confederate right, so traversing the entire
front of both armies. It had an important part to play in the second
day's battle, as we shall soon see, for, though occupying three
days, Gettysburg was but a series of combats in which neither army
employed its whole force at any one time.
[1] Gettysburg is the county seat of Adams County; is one hundred
and fourteen miles west of Philadelphia. Pennsylvania College is
located here.
[2] The National Cemetery was dedicated by Abraham Lincoln, Nov.
19, 1863; it is a place of great and growing interest and beauty.
The National Monument standing on this ground, where sleeps
an army, was dedicated by General Meade in 1869. The monument
itself was designed by J. G. Batterson, of Hartford, Conn., the
statuary by Randolph Rogers. In 1872 the cemetery was transferred
to the national government. A large part of the adjoining ridge
is in charge of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association,
a corporation formed under the laws of Pennsylvania for the
preservation of the field and its landmarks. No other battle-ground
was ever so distinctly marked or so easily traced as this.
[3] Shells remain sticking in the walls of some buildings yet. A
memorial stone at the steps in front of the Lutheran church, on
Chambersburg street, indicates the spot where Chaplain Howell, of
the 90th Pennsylvania Volunteers, was shot dead while entering the
church, then being used as a hospital.
[4] The Lutheran Seminary was used both as a hospital and
observatory by the Confederates. Lee's headquarters were in a little
stone house quite near the seminary buildings, which are not more
than half a mile from the centre of Gettysburg.
[5] In 1863 all these hills were much more densely wooded than now,
so forming an impenetrable screen to their defenders.
[6] The bowlder-strewn strip of ground lying between Devil's Den and
Little Round Top is the most impressive part of the field, I think.
II
THE MARCH INTO PENNSYLVANIA
[Sidenote: Lee in Maryland.]
It is in no way essential to relate in detail how Lee's army,
slipping away from ours on the Rappahannock,[7] and after brushing
out of its path our troops posted in the Shenandoah Valley, had been
crossing the Potomac into Maryland since the 21st of June, by way of
the Cumberland Valley, without firing a shot.[8]
[Sidenote: His Bold Strategy.]
A very unusual thing in war it is to see an army which has just
been acting strictly on the defensive suddenly elude its adversary
for the purpose of carrying the war into that enemy's country! It
marks a new epoch in the history of that war, and it supposes wholly
altered conditions. In this particular instance Lee's moves were so
bold as almost to savor of contempt.
It is enough to know that Lee was now in Pennsylvania, at the head
of seventy thousand men, before our army reached the Potomac in
pursuit of him, if following at a respectful distance be called a
pursuit.
[Sidenote: State of his Army.]
At no period of the war, their own officers said, had the
Confederates been so well equipped, so well clothed, so eager
for a fight, or so confident of success; and we may add our own
conclusions, that never before had this army taken the field so
strong in numbers, or with such a powerful artillery.[9]
[Sidenote: Superiority as Marksmen.]
The infantry were armed with Enfield rifles, fresh from British
workshops, and it is probable that no equal number of men ever knew
how to use them better. Indeed, we consider it indisputable that
the Confederates greatly excelled the Union soldiers as marksmen.
Most of them were accustomed to the use of firearms from boyhood; in
some sections they were noted for their skill with the rifle. The
Confederates, therefore, were nearly always good shots before they
went into the army, while the Union soldiers mostly had to acquire
what skill they could after going into the ranks. In the South the
habit of carrying arms was almost universal: in the North it was not
only unusual, but unpopular as well as unlawful.
[Sidenote: Superiority in Cavalry.]
Man for man, the Confederate cavalry was also superior to the Union
horse, because in one section riding is a custom, in the other a
pastime rarely indulged in. Consequently, it took months to teach
a Union cavalryman how to ride,--a costly experiment when your
adversary is already prepared,--whereas if there is anything a
Southerner piques himself upon, it is his horsemanship.[10]
[Sidenote: Cavalry Advance.]
[Sidenote: Cumberland Valley raided.]
Lee's cavalry had preceded the infantry by nearly a week, reaching
Chambersburg on the 16th, seizing horses and provisions for the use
of the army behind them, and spreading consternation to the gates of
Harrisburg itself. Having loaded themselves with plunder unopposed,
they then fell back upon the main army, thus leaving it in some doubt whether this raid accomplished all it designed, or was only the prelude to something for which it was serving as a mask.
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