The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 21

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 21

But when one nation finds itself in strong competition with another

in the hope of controlling a sphere of trade, it is apt to seek

territorial annexation to gain the desired field of exploitation. The

competitor can only follow the same course. It is the only thing it can

do, if it is not willing to give up the contest. If it is strong enough

to dispute the will of the rival, its very sense of individuality

demands that it shall not tamely yield before the aggression of a

rival. When France acquired Morocco, Italy acquired Tripoli, and Great

Britain acquired the southern part of Persia, economic advantage was

a strong motive, but not the only motive. When Germany laid out the

field of her future expansion in Turkish lands and when she expected to

establish a permanent influence over the Balkans, the extension of her

sphere of commerce was a chief motive.

 

Probably the fundamental wrong here was the idea, widely held by the

present generation, that a nation has a right to establish bars around

her national territory to keep the trade of other nations out, so that

her own citizens shall have preferential advantages in the exploitation

of the territory. That idea is so firmly held today that one must be

a rash man who attempts to get the nations to give it up. But it is

a fundamental obstacle to permanent peace in the world. Probably it

is not too much to say that as long as the business men of the world

insist on dividing themselves into national groups with these national

preferences, so long may they expect business at recurring intervals to

be burdened with the waste and ruin of war.

 

Against the existing practice we may place the “open door” policy,

which we have known chiefly in connection with the trade of the

undeveloped nations. It means the free opening of the trade of a given

state to all the nations that may care to have it. We heard much of

the “open door” in China a few years ago, and most of the benevolent

governments approved of the suggestion. To have been perfectly logical

they should have applied the same idea to their own commerce; and if

the world ever comes to a perfect state of international comity, it is

likely that national tariff barriers will be broken down.

 

It is true, however, that we can have enduring peace and have national

protective tariffs, also. If nations agree that tariffs are one of the

unhappy excrescences of an unreasonable world, they may find it in

their hearts to tolerate such growths. To tolerate them would be, no

doubt, better than going to war. But when a state sets its eyes on a

certain part of the earth which it feels it must acquire in order to

enlarge the territory in which it can trade without fair competition,

the peace of the world is imperiled.

 

It is probable that this kind of motive played a large part in

Germany’s decision to begin the present war. For a long time her

industries had been developing at a rapid rate. Protected at home by

tariffs they were able to sell goods to the German people at high

prices, while they sold at cheap prices in foreign markets in order

to drive their competitors away. The volume of German trade increased

immensely, factories were multiplied, and large credits were extended

by the banks in order to support this great structure. At last the

situation became unsteady. The expansion of the foreign part of the

national trade at small profits was a clog on the home trade, which

could not be made to yield enough profit to keep the business of the

country in a healthy condition. Then the manufacturers and capitalists

came to the conclusion that it was to their interest for the country

to go into a war of conquest in which new national territory should

be laid at their feet for profitable exploitation. Thus, the large

business interests, usually supporters of peace, swung to the support

of the militarists. It is significant that the liberals, that party in

the Reichstag which speaks especially for the traders, capitalists,

and manufacturers, have been among the most outspoken advocates of

annexation.

 

In a powerful, if indirect, way the laborers are reached by this

argument. They see that if the manufacturers and transportation

companies expand their business wages are better and employment more

abundant, and this leads them to favor a policy of expansion. To what

extent the remote organs of the business world are thus reached it is

difficult to say. But it is evident that in a phase of human activity

which has been organized most intricately the influence of the initial

idea that a war of annexation helps business is far reaching.

 

We frequently encounter the assertion that economic laws are

unchangeable; but the statement is not true, as it is made. Many

economic processes that appeared fundamental in their time have changed

as the minds of men have taken new grips on human life. The world

has outgrown the mercantile school of economic ideas. The attitude

toward private property and monopolies, and the view of the right of

individual bargaining have been greatly modified in the process of

time. If a so-called economic law stands in the way of a reasonable

adjustment of human relations, it can be altered, if enough time and

effort be given to the attempt to change it. Although it may seem to be

fundamentally fixed in the minds of business men and laborers that a

war for annexation is in their interests, if reason shows that they are

mistaken, there should be a way of bringing reason to their minds, even

as it has come to ours.

 

Another obstacle to enduring peace is a false sense of patriotism. If

a man extols his own virtues we say he is a boaster: if he extols the

good qualities of his town, state, or nation, we say he is a patriot.

I am inclined to say that it is not permitted to a man to praise his

country--I do not say love his country--in any sense but that in which

he may praise himself, modestly and with reservations. At any rate, he

should praise and magnify his country in the most restrained spirit

possible. Patriotism does not demand national egotism in the good

citizen. Those writers and teachers who try to create a national spirit

should be careful lest they make men mere chauvinists.

 

Especially perilous is the doctrine that “self-preservation is the

first law of nature” as applied to nations. Times come when a man

is not justified in preserving his life. So to nations come crises

in which they are not permitted by the rules of morality to save

themselves by what appear to be the only means left. In the present war

Germany asserted that she was justified by this principle in adopting

the ruthless war of the submarine, since it was the only thing that

would save her from destruction. It is better for a state to go to

destruction, just as it is better for a man to go to his death, with

clean hands than to live foully.

 

It is but an extension of this doctrine for men of normal morality to

say they may do things for the benefit of the state which they may not

do for their own benefit. A statesman has no more right to make his

state steal another state’s lands than he has to take his neighbor’s

watch. It is not a virtue if he lies for his state. The state cannot

speak of itself: it speaks through its agents. It is sullied, even as

a man is sullied in his character, when its only voice, the words and

acts of its servants, is not true. Judged by the standards here set

up, the world’s diplomacy needs amendment, and if amended one of the

obstacles to peace will be removed.

 

A false sense of patriotism may lead to acts that imperil peace.

When France acquired Morocco her object was not wholly to extend

her economic interests. To increase the national strength was also

a motive. Likewise, Germany’s desire to establish control over the

territory southeast of her was not entirely economic in its origin. She

also wished to increase the glory and strength of the Fatherland. How

much we are to condemn this desire of a citizen for the glory of his

country it is hard to say; but it seems to be clear that such a desire

may manifest itself in such a way as to become a serious obstacle to

peace.

 

At the end of the present war the victorious nations will be in a

position to abate national glory in the interest of enduring peace.

Our own citizens are supposed to be particularly proud of the

achievements of the United States. If our efforts should contribute as

much as we wish to the triumph of our own side, we should be careful

lest we forget that we entered the war with the modest purpose of

making the world a fit place of habitation for _all_ people. Likewise

we should be justified in using our influence among our allies to see

that the desire of no statesman to enhance the glory of his nation

leads to action which may imperil peace in the future. When we shall

have fought long and suffered greatly our hearts are likely to become

harder than now, in the beginning of the war; and there is danger that

we shall forget early resolutions if we are not firmly committed to

them at the outset.

 

Another obstacle to enduring peace is the sense of nationality. The

older men of this generation who were students in Germany in their

youth acquired much respect for the passionate desire of Germans to

build up unity among all German speaking people. It was a sacred

idea to young men and imaginative writers. Long had North Germany

been disunited, stumbling forward under the lead of the Hapsburgs.

To be able to form a dominating group among all the Germans in the

world seemed no more than was their just due. We did not realize in

those days to what an end these people who lost so many opportunities

through internal weakness would put their strength when they had at

last developed it. And yet, it was the right of the Germans to unite

themselves into as strong a nation as they might form. The wrong came

in the improper extension of the idea. When men like Treitschke talk

about including Holland in the German Fatherland we may well ask where

nationality’s pretensions are taking us?

 

It was natural, also, that the sense of nationality should be

manifested in many other European countries. Each of the Balkan states

had its own phase of it. Russia had a large hope of uniting in her

control all the peoples of Slavic blood. Italy demanded Trieste as a

part of the Italian-speaking world. Greece lived for the acquisition

of Macedonia and the Greek Islands, and France never diminished her

pathetic longing for Alsace-Lorraine, where lived French-speaking

peoples.

 

Often the desire for nationality runs directly counter to economic

laws. For example, what are we to do when we have Austria holding on

to her only great Adriatic seaport as the essential outlet of her

trade to the sea, and nationality proclaiming that this port shall be

handed over to Italy? Moreover, different peoples are so intermixed in

some parts of Europe that it is impossible for any but a scientific

specialist to say which states, or sections of states, are occupied by

a majority of one race and which by a majority of another. If we are to

set out to divide Europe according to nationality we shall have a large

task on our hands. In the United States the principle of nationality

is not to be pleaded, since we are so intimately intermixed that it