The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 8
Like the other religious teachers of the day she was deeply impressed
by the calamities of the war. She knew of the tsar’s desire to
establish a régime of peace and came to believe she was divinely called
to induce him to take a conspicuous step in that direction. At first
Alexander, who was not always religious, refused to see her; but in
June, 1815, an interview was arranged while he was at Heilbron, on the
campaign. He was deeply impressed and asked her to remain near him.
When he went to Paris after the second defeat of Napoleon she was given
quarters near his palace, and it was there, in the following autumn,
that he drew up the plan of the Holy Alliance.
The “Alliance” was expressed in the spirit of a mediæval religious
brotherhood. The signatory sovereigns pledged themselves to take the
will of God for highest law, to give aid to an imperiled brother
sovereign, and to hold the Alliance as “a true and indissoluble
fraternity.” The constituent states were to make “one great Christian
nation” and their sovereigns were to act “as delegates of Providence”
in ruling their respective states. If such an ideal could have been
accomplished at all, a stronger grip of the church on the springs of
government would have been necessary than existed in that day. The tsar
proclaimed the Holy Alliance on November 26, 1815. It was signed by
all the states of Europe except Turkey, Great Britain, and the Papal
State. Great Britain’s refusal to sign was due to Castlereagh, to whom
the tsar seemed mentally unbalanced. He gave as his justification that
the prince-regent, ruling in the place of his insane father, had no
authority to sign, but said that he would support the principles of the
Alliance. As it was to be a union of Christian states the sultan was
not invited to sign. The Pope was not asked because of his overwhelming
influence in matters connected with religion. Frederick William, of
Prussia, was a religious man and is believed to have signed in good
faith. Metternich advised the emperor of Austria to sign but said that
the document was mere verbiage.
In all I have said hitherto about the tsar’s idea of preserving peace
no definite plan has been mentioned. His most specific utterance was
to ask for a league of nations, but he said nothing of its powers, its
specific organization, or the limits of its action. The suggestion
was vague, probably because the mind of its author was itself vague.
If taken seriously it could be made to serve as the foundation of a
unified state of Europe which might hold all other states under its
hand, a unified state largely under the domination of Russia. That its
author had no such object in view is not to be doubted for an instant;
but who could tell how long he would remain in his existing state of
mind, and how soon he might be succeeded by a tsar of far other spirit?
As a plan for permanent peace the Holy Alliance was impossible, not
only because it was cast in religious forms and thrown to a world in
which the authority of religion had lost much of its ancient hold on
the minds of men of influence, but because its indefinite form made it
a possible instrument of greater evils than war.
Beneath its defects, however, was the great idea of a unified Europe,
in which justice has the place of suspicion and intrigue, in which runs
one law, one order, and one obedience to the majesty of the state.
Alexander not only believed in such an ideal, but he was willing to
cast his nation into the melting-pot in order to fuse such a state.
He could have given no better proof of his support of his ideal. Of
course, it was ahead of the time, how much so it is hard to say. The
widespread popular longing for permanent peace would have gone far in
accepting unification of the states, and in this sphere of opinion the
religious cast of the scheme was not a great disadvantage. The thing
which stood firmly in its way was the dull practicality of the upper,
ruling class. If it could have passed these lions in the way, it might
have had a chance of working its way forward into some acceptable form
of a league in perpetuity. But it is a big _if_ that I have used. Upper
ruling classes know more about government than the lower classes, and
that is a source of conservatism. The lower classes, knowing little,
usually act upon their impulses; the members of the upper, ruling
class, having information in varying degrees, usually strike an average
of mediocre enlightenment, and it is a difficult thing for a new idea
to gain possession of them. In 1815 the upper, ruling class was well
settled in power in Europe, and it was most convinced of its superior
wisdom. It never accepted the tsar’s plan; and failing to get its
acceptance the plan was futile.
CHAPTER IV
EUROPE UNDER THE CONCERT OF THE POWERS
Having disposed of Alexander’s plan for a federation of nations it now
remains to consider the other plan which, under the name of “Concert of
Europe,” was adopted by Castlereagh and Metternich, though not for the
same purpose as that which had inspired the tsar. Its fundamental idea
had been in the positions taken by Pitt and Castlereagh when replying
to the tsar’s proposals, but it found its official basis in a Treaty
of Alliance signed by Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia at
Paris, November 20, 1815, the same day they accepted the Holy Alliance.
Its chief provisions were as follows: 1. The Powers bound themselves to
see that the second treaty of Paris, regulating affairs between France
and the allies, was executed. 2. They agreed to meet from time to time
to take cognizance of the state of affairs in Europe. 3. They promised
to suppress any recurrence of the revolutionary activity of France. 4.
They settled upon the quota of men and supplies that each nation should
furnish in case common action became necessary. 5. They undertook to
“consolidate the intimate tie which unites the four sovereigns for the
happiness of the world.” The most important of these provisions for the
purpose of this inquiry was the second, taken in connection with the
fifth.
The first meeting that may be said to have been called under the
agreement was the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818. It was called
to determine whether or not France should be relieved of her garrisons
of occupation, a matter which was soon adjusted. Alexander I saw his
opportunity and urged that the sovereigns should take steps to make the
Holy Alliance a more vital kind of league. But Castlereagh interposed,
as in former meetings, and turned the efforts of the tsar aside without
arousing his displeasure. This may be considered the last gasp of the
Holy Alliance, as it was the complete triumph of the Concert over
it. At the same time France was admitted to the alliance of the four
powers, which henceforth was known as the Quintuple Alliance. But if
ever a question were to come up in which France was at variance with
the four other Powers over matters connected with her obligations
assumed in recent treaties, these four Powers would continue to act
in their old capacity. Mr. W. A. Phillips remarks that the Quadruple
Alliance still survived as “a rod in pickle for a France but doubtfully
disciplined.” For us, who are chiefly concerned to see the result of
the attempt to take the affairs of Europe under the protection of the
great Powers, it is sufficient to remember that France gave no further
trouble of the kind anticipated, and that the Quintuple Alliance, as
the formal __EXPRESSION__ of the Concert of Europe, had other problems to
consider.
The first arose out of revolutions in Spain and Naples, where armed men
seized the power and forced the kings to accept liberal constitutions.
Alexander I and Metternich looked on with different feelings. The
former had been encouraging the liberals in Italy and was not greatly
shocked by the revolution there, but he was deeply concerned over
the upheaval in Spain and would have led a Russian army thither to
suppress it. The suggestion alarmed Metternich, who did not relish
the idea of Alexander’s marching through Austrian lands with a great
body of men. He did what he could to discourage the expedition against
Spain. At the same time he believed that Naples should be disciplined,
since its revolution endangered the safety of Austrian possessions in
Italy. It is amusing to see how self-interest ran across the currents
of the general good as proclaimed in the Concert of Europe.
The tsar thought the situation warranted calling another conference of
the Quintuple Alliance. Metternich objected, being chiefly concerned
by the seeming certainty that the tsar would wish to carry into the
situation his well-known views in support of liberalism. To him it
seemed sufficient that the powers should agree severally to give their
arms to the suppression of revolution, without meeting in conference.
After much discussion a conference was called, at Troppau, but it was
regularly attended by only three of the five powers. The suppression
of constitutional government was not popular in Great Britain, and
her government took no official part in the conference. France held
aloof also; she was so much under the protection of Great Britain that
she did not dare risk British displeasure by allying herself with the
forces of repression.
Did the absence of two nations from Troppau presage the dissolution of
the Alliance? Castlereagh gave a negative reply. His nation, he said,
was not bound beyond her treaty obligations, the terms of which were
clear and specific. They were embodied in the Treaties of Chaumont
and Paris. He considered the project of dealing with revolution in
its present form as beyond the meaning of these agreements. “If,”
he said, “it is desired to extend the Alliance so as to include all
objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change
its character to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should
see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk
of seeing the Alliance move away from us without our having quitted
it.” These frank words show that the Alliance was strained but not
broken. It would seem that a system like that of which we speak should
have at bottom some broad common principles. In purpose it should
be harmonious. As between the prevailing British idea of liberty
and Metternich’s ideas of legitimacy there was no ground for mutual
support; and out of this divergence of views was to grow the disruption
of the Alliance, as we shall soon see.
Up to this time the two ideas that had run side by side were the tsar’s
plan for a league to secure coöperation of a general nature and the
British plan limiting common action to a few specific matters, chiefly
connected with the repression of France in case she wished to return
to a policy which would threaten the peace of Europe. As it became
increasingly apparent that France was no longer a menace this type
of union became less important, and the British ardor for it cooled,
especially since it was becoming more and more certain that the
Alliance was being used to support repression.
At the same time a change was passing through the mind of the tsar. In
all he had done he had been supported by liberal ministers, against
whose influence at his court Metternich did not hesitate to intrigue.
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