The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 1

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 1

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo

Author: John Spencer Bassett

PREFACE

 

 

This book was begun under the influence of the enthusiasm aroused by

President Wilson’s address to Congress on January 22, 1917. It was

then that he first gave definite utterance of his plan for a league,

or federation, of nations to establish a permanent peace. The idea

had long been before the world, but it was generally dismissed as too

impracticable for the support of serious minded men. By taking it

up the President brought it into the realm of the possible. In the

presence of the great world catastrophe that hung over us it seemed

well to dare much in order that we might avoid a repetition of existing

evils. And if the idea was worth trying, it was certainly worth a

careful examination in the light of history. It was with the hope of

making such a careful examination that I set to work on the line of

thought that has led to this book.

 

As my work has progressed the great drama has been unfolding itself

with terrible realism. New characters have come upon the stage,

characters not contemplated in the original cast of the play. At the

same time some of the old parts have undergone such changes that they

appear in new relations. I am not unmindful of the fact that events

now unforeseen may make other and radical changes in the _dramatis

personæ_ before this book is placed in the hand of the reader. But

always the great problem must be the same, the prevention of a return

to the present state of world madness. That end we must ever keep in

mind as we consider the arguments here advanced, and any inconsistency

discovered between the argument and the actual state of events will,

I hope, be treated with as much leniency as the transitions of the

situation seem to warrant.

 

As I write, many things indicate that the great conflict is approaching

dissolution. The exhaustion of the nations, the awakening voices of

the masses, the evident failure of militarism to lead Germany to world

empire, the rising spectre of the international solidarity of the

laborers, and many other portents seem to show that the world will soon

have to say “yes” or “no” to the plain question: “Shall we, or shall we

not, have a union of nations to promote permanent peace?”

 

The warning that they must answer the question is shouted to many

classes. Bankers are threatened with the repudiation of the securities

of the greatest nations, manufacturers may soon see their vast gains

swallowed up in the destruction of the forms of credit which hitherto

have seemed most substantial, churches and every form of intellectual

life that should promote civilization may have their dearest ideals

swept away in a rush toward radicalism, and even the German autocracy

is fighting for its life against an infuriated and despairing

proletariat. Are not these dangers enough to make us ask if the old

menace shall continue?

 

It is not my purpose to answer all the questions I ask. It is

sufficient to unfold the situation and show how it has arisen out of

the past. If the reader finds that mistakes were once made, he will

have to consider the means of correcting them. No pleader can compel

the opinions of intelligent men and women. It is enough if he lays

the case before clear and conscientious minds in an impersonal way.

More than this he should not try to do: as much as this I have sought

to do. If the world really lost the fruits of its victory over a world

conqueror at Waterloo, it is for the citizen of today to say in what

way the lost fruits can be recovered.

 

Many friends have aided me in my efforts to present my views to the

public, and among them Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, Dean of Columbia

University, deserves special acknowledgment. I am also under

obligation to Dean Ada C. Comstock, of Smith College, for very careful

proofreading. But for the opinions here expressed and the errors which

may be discovered I alone am responsible.

 

JOHN SPENCER BASSETT.

 

Northampton, Massachusetts,

February 5, 1918.

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

The nations of Europe fought a great war to a finish a hundred and two

years ago, defeating a master leader of men and ending the ambitions

of a brilliantly organized nation. They were so well satisfied with

their achievement that they imagined that peace, won after many years

of suffering, was a sufficient reward for their sacrifices. To escape

impending subjugation seemed enough good fortune for the moment. They

forgot that it was a principle and not merely a man they had been

contending against, and when they had made sure that Napoleon was

beyond the possibility of a return to power, they thought the future

was secure. But the principle lived and has come to life again. It was

the inherent tendency to unification in government, a principle that

appeals to the national pride of most peoples when they find themselves

in a position to make it operate to the supposed advantage of their own

country. It has been seized upon by the Germans in our own generation,

to whom it has been as glittering a prize as it was to the Frenchmen of

the early nineteenth century. To conquer the world and win a place in

the sun is no mean ideal; and if the efforts of the _Entente_ allies

succeed in defeating it in its present form, it is reasonably certain

that it will appear again to distress the future inhabitants of the

earth, unless sufficient steps are taken to bind it down by bonds which

cannot be broken.

 

This conviction has led to the suggestion that when Germany is beaten,

as she must be beaten, steps should be taken, not only to insure that

she shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other power coming

after her shall lay the foundations and form the ambition which will

again put the world to the necessity of fighting the present war

over again. When the North broke the bonds of slavery in the South

in 1865 it was filled with a firm determination that slavery should

stay broken. In the same way, when the nations shall have put down the

menace of world domination now rampant in Europe, they should make it

their first concern to devise a means by which the menace shall stay

broken.

 

To kill a principle demands a principle equally strong and inclusive.

No one nation can keep down war and subjugation; for it must be so

strong to carry out that purpose that it becomes itself a conqueror.

It would be as intolerable to Germany, for example, to be ruled

by the United States as it would be to the United States if they

were ruled by Germany. The only restraint that will satisfy all the

nations will be exercised by some organ of power in which all have

fair representation and in which no nation is able to do things which

stimulate jealousy and give grounds for the belief that some are being

exploited by others. This suggestion does not demand a well integrated

federal government for all the functions of the state but merely the

adoption of a system of coöperation with authority over the outbreak

of international war and strong enough to make its will obeyed. It is

federation for only one purpose and such a purpose as will never be

brought into vital action as long as the federated will is maintained

at such a point of strength and exercised with such a degree of

fairness that individual states will not question that will.

 

This principle of federated action for a specific purpose was adopted

by the United States in 1789, and though hailed by the practical

statesmen of Europe as an experiment, it has proved the happiest form

of government that has yet been established over a vast territory in

which are divergent economic and social interests. In it is much more

integration than would exist in a federated system to prevent war,

where the action of the central authority would be limited to one main

object. If it could be formed and put into operation by the present

generation, who know so well what it costs to beat back the spectre of

world conquest it might pass through the preliminary critical stages

of its existence successfully. At any rate, the world is full of the

feeling that such things may be possible, and it would be unwise to

dismiss the suggestion without giving it fair and full consideration.

 

The discussion brings up what seems to be a law of human activities,

that as the ages run and as men develop their minds they combine in

larger and larger units for carrying on the particular thing they are

interested in. And they make these combinations by force or through

mutual agreement. We have before us the consideration of the most

important form of this unifying process, the unification of nations,

which has generally come through force, but sometimes has come through

agreement.

 

In recent industrial history is a parallel process so well illustrating

the point at issue that I can not refrain from mentioning it. In his

book, _My Four Years in Germany_, Mr. James W. Gerard contrasts great

industrial combinations in the United States and Germany. In one

country are trusts, in the other great companies known as cartels.

The development of the trust we know well. It came out of a process

of competitive war. Some large manufacturer who possessed ability for

war, formed an initial group of manufacturers with the prospect of

controlling a large part of the market. He was careful to see that

his own group had the best possible organization, central control,

and a loyal body of subordinates. Then he opened his attack on his

smaller rivals, and in most cases they were driven into surrender or

bankruptcy. It was a hard process, but it led to industrial unity with

its many advantages.

 

The cartel began with co-operation. All the persons or companies

manufacturing a given article were asked to unite in its creation. They

pooled their resources, adopted common buying and selling agencies,

and shared the returns amicably. They proved very profitable for the

shareholders, and they strengthened the national industry in its

competition against foreigners. In the United States the trust has been

unpopular, despite its many economic advantages. The reason is the

battle-like methods by which it destroyed its rivals. The result was

the enactment of laws to restrain its development, laws so contrary

to the trend of the times that they have been very tardily enforced.

The cartel, established with the co-operation of the whole group of

manufacturers, aroused no antagonism and obtained the approval of the

laws. It is not necessary to say which is the better of these two methods of arriving at the same object.