The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 23

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 23

This array of obstacles to enduring peace, is it not formidable?

Economic competition, the actual if false sense of patriotism, the

desire for nationality--which is liable to run into extreme assertions

and sometimes to run counter to the strongest economic interests--the

existence of autocratic government, and the powerful influence of

munition makers and professional warriors--these are some of the

obstacles against which those must contend who try to convince the

world that peace is the better way. They may well appal the stoutest

hearted friend of enduring peace.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER XI

 

ARGUMENTS FOR A FEDERATION OF STATES

 

 

The arguments against attempting to establish an enduring peace are

undoubtedly formidable, but they do not leave the idealist entirely

vanquished. On his side fight humanity and reason, and it is his

function to stand by humanity and reason. He has long ago formed the

habit of attacking obstacles. In this case the objections he meets are

all rooted in the opinions of men, and he loves to change opinions,

or, if he does not change them, to hammer away at them as long as life

lasts. For his fine optimism we can but have great respect, and in

this chapter I intend to summarize his arguments and give them to the

public in as strong a light of plausibility as possible. If the stolid

opposition of the “practical” world is not to be broken down, let it be

shaken as much as may be. The time of its defeat is written in the book

of fate. It may be that the time is near at hand.

 

In the first place, let me recall a statement made in the preceding

chapter. To get any desired reform adopted and carried out, it is

first necessary to get the people to imagine the reform in operation.

I mean that they must have a clear mental picture of themselves living

contentedly under the proposed plan. Let the proposition be made in

such a way that the effective people who direct the government can not,

or will not, in the mind’s eye see it in operation, and it will surely

fail. Let them imagine its successful use and they will most likely

find it unobjectionable. Likewise, if the people of the world could

imagine a great coöperative union to promote peace, with enough force

behind it to enforce the will of the union, if in their minds they

could see themselves adjusted into such a system, with all its economy

in taxes, human suffering, and ordinary governmental effort, it would

not be very difficult to make such a scheme work in actual experience.

 

The “practical” man has but little imagination. He has to be deceived

into the acceptance of reforms. Make him believe that a given plan

has been made to work and his objections are diminished, if not

overcome altogether. This is not said for scolding but as a sober

fact confronting the man who reasons his way through matters that

perplex him. The “practical” man is not responsible for his weakness,

and he is in the majority among men. On the other hand, the man with

imagination is not to be faint-hearted. If he can see and talk, he may,

by reiteration finally make his brothers see also.

 

Fundamentally his position rests upon the reasonableness of his

proposition: war is madness, brutality, useless waste of wealth

and life, and the negation of civilization. It proceeds from the

unnecessarily irritated state of the public mind. Reason demands that

she be allowed to have an opportunity to exert her influence in a

reasonable world over reasonable beings. Since law is the __EXPRESSION__ of

the will of reasonable beings, let law be given the supervision of all

the disputes which may possibly lead to war. How true all this sounds!

And the preacher of peace says boldly that it is more worth while to

plan, spend money, and take a chance in a great world effort to bring

such a reasonable situation to pass than to go on planning, spending,

and risking things in the efforts to make a system work that has ever

led us around in a circle to the same old end, war and misery.

 

The advocate of peace points to the duel. There was a time when every

man felt it his right and duty to settle his own quarrels. He was

his own judge and his own sheriff. The result was so bad that law

was created to enforce peace between individuals. The old condition

survived in the duel, but in most countries this at last was brought

under the authority of law. Private combat in its nature does not

differ from public combat, and if one was eliminated by the creation of

a law that was strong enough to forbid it, the other can be abolished

by creating a still stronger law, powerful enough to restrain states as

criminal law restrains individuals.

 

Kant’s argument for perpetual peace ran like this, but he, in sympathy

with Rousseau’s social contract theory, argued that the law that

restrained individuals was the result of agreement between individuals;

and he went further and argued that all that was necessary to secure

perpetual peace would be for the states to agree to establish a league,

or a federation, to enforce it.

 

Now there was a fallacy in Kant’s argument that has a bearing on the

subject immediately before us today. There is no reason to suppose that

any state ever arose from an agreement of individuals. The ordinary

process was growth out of several conditions. An enlarged family might

become a state, or one tribe might conquer another and enlarge itself

into a state. Kinship and force were probably the chief causes in

producing the state; and reason seems to have played a small part.

Similarly, law grew up, not as the result of reason, but as a body of

tribal customs, reasonably interpreted by the wise men of the early

state.

 

There is, therefore, no analogy between the proposed method of forming

a great super-state with its own body of law, the object of which is

to restrain the states from going to war, and the method by which the

early state was created. In fact, if one great nation were to conquer

the rest of the world and impose its peace on all the world, as it

would do, we should have a process more analogous to the origin of the

early state. And that is one way of having peace. Within the last years

it has seemed a horribly possible method; for if Mittel-Europa becomes

a fact, it will have such predominating power that it is difficult to

see what will stop its march to general authority.

 

Pointing out Kant’s fallacy weakens his argument as such, but it leaves

us in such a dilemma that we are prone to pronounce his suggestion

worth trying as an escape from conquest by one great power. For if the

world is tending toward unity through conquest, who can doubt that it

would be better to anticipate the process, save a great sum of human

suffering, and by agreement found the world federation which is the

same result to which ages of war will lead us. That we could have such

a super-state by contract is not to be doubted. It would be as possible

as the creation of the United States of America by agreement.

 

Another argument of the peace advocate is that the old system by which

the world was kept in equilibrium, the balance of power, has broken

down, and cannot be trusted to preserve the peace of the future. Its

chief characteristic was that several states mutually checked one

another. If one manifested an intention that was alarming to the rest

they combined to restrict the action of the aggressor. The several

states were with regard to one another in a condition mobile enough to

permit any state to shift from one side to another as the situation

demanded. Now this condition no longer exists. There has developed a

mid-continental alliance, apparently expecting to continue to act as

one state for practical purposes, which in itself threatens to dominate

Europe. To hold it in check calls forth all the united force of the

other states and then success is obtained only through the greatest

amount of preparedness. Such a condition is anything but the old system

which was to work through balance and concert of action.

 

The central position of the Germans and Austrians gives them an immense

advantage, if the world is to go on in its national rivalries. On

the west lie the two nations who are today doing most to hold them

in restraint, France and Great Britain. The former could never stand

against Germany alone, and the latter is remote enough from the German

frontier to make it improbable that her forces could reach that spot in

time to prevent the Germans from gaining the initial advantage which,

in a state of efficient preparation is the only military success that

either side can hope to win. In the face of a strong and threatening

Germany it would be very likely that these two nations would have to

make a more than formal alliance. Even if that happened, it is possible

that Germany would construe it as a threat and begin war.

 

The only other strong check on the central powers is Russia, now

in a sad state of change. What her future is going to be is still

problematic. It is a stupendous task for so large a nation, composed

of landlords and peasants for the most part, to pass from an autocracy

to a self-governing nation. It took France, a smaller country, from

1789 to 1879 to pass through the various changes and counter-changes by

which she reformed her government into a republic. It is safe to say

that in the Russian development the changes will come more rapidly, but

it is not impossible that in this country a period of prolonged unrest

is ahead. Under such circumstances Russia could hardly be counted on to

give much aid to the Western nations who wished to restrain Germany. In

fact, so fluid would be the state of her society that she might well

become the victim of German ambition and contribute valuable parts of

her empire to swell the resources of her aggressive western neighbors.

 

One insecure spot must be pointed out in this argument. It is the

continuous close alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary. If that

breaks down the whole argument fails. At the present time it is

impossible to say what may happen in this respect. Much will depend

on the new emperor of the Dual Empire. That he has a very difficult

problem before him is without question. On one hand is the intense

Hungarian aversion to absorption by Germany, on the other the

passionate desire for union by the German people in the Dual Empire. It

is supposed that the emperor does not favor absorption; but it seems

certain that he is not able at this time to take an open stand against

it.

 

The strong part Germany has taken in saving Austria from Russia gives

Germany a firm hold over the imagination of the Austrian people. It is

possible that financial aid has also been extended to such an amount

that Austria would be embarrassed if called on to pay back. Nor is the

kaiser in Berlin in a mood to brook defiance from Vienna. If, therefore

Kaiser Karl wishes to be free of his too intimate dependence on Kaiser

Wilhelm, he will find it to his advantage to conceal his desire for

the time being. It is probable that we shall not know the present true

state of feelings in Austria for several years after the war. But

unless she is very well Germanized, it would seem that she must soon