The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 24

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 24

No one knows as yet just who owns the bonds in the several nations.

From Germany we hear that they are widely held. It is the policy of

the government of any nation to distribute a heavy debt as widely as

possible; and we have in recent history instances of great patriotism

in assuming debts of this kind. Now it is fair to say that the

more widely the debt is distributed, the greater its likelihood of

permanency. The larger the number of poor people who own it, the harder

it will be to lessen the burden of the nation. It follows that in this

case the immense interest charge is likely to persist as a permanent

encumbrance on the economic life of the country.

 

On the other hand, let us say that it turns out that the debt is not

very widely distributed after all, or that after the war it follows the

course of most national debts and passes into the hands of the rich.

Then we have the situation likely to promote class friction. The taxes

necessary to pay the interest will fall on the mass of people, who

will probably come to believe that they are taxed for the benefit of

the wealthy. Class jealousy will lead to suggestions of repudiation.

Such a course is more than ordinarily easy in Germany, France, and

Russia, where there are well organized socialist parties, already

keenly suspicious of the capitalists.

 

Thus, whether the debt is widely distributed or not, it contains a

menace to society. In one case it constitutes such a burden that it

absorbs the financial strength of the government. In the other it

invites the most formidable struggle of the poor against the rich that

the world has seen in a century.

 

Such a situation is bad enough in itself, but it does not directly

affect the question of peace, our main consideration at this time;

for the debt will exist as a result of the war, and nothing in the

view of the friends of peace can prevent it. But through whichever of

the two contingent courses it goes, the state will have difficulty in

continuing the old system.

 

Let us say that we have a permanent great debt with a huge interest

fund, and the state wishes to add to the taxes in order to keep up

its measures of preparedness. The result must be to produce uneasiness

in the minds of the taxpayers. In Germany, for example, the interest

charge and the provision for pensions on account of the present war

will probably be considerably more than a billion dollars a year.

Added to the ordinary expenses of government it will make a burden

more than double that of 1913. Can the government go on providing

armaments, that may lead to another war, without jeopardizing the

loans that are already issued? In the face of such heavy taxation it

would not be surprising if the people sold their holdings of bonds

to the capitalists and later turned toward repudiation. On the other

hand, it would be to the interest of the capitalists to favor moderate

expenditures for armaments and armies, lest the patience of the people

under their burdens might be exhausted.

 

But suppose the debt was not distributed widely in the first place,

and suppose it was repudiated after a class struggle, or for any other

reason scaled down. The result would be a severe blow to credit, and

in the future it might be so difficult to raise funds that war could

not be carried on. No nation can afford to contemplate war if it has

not borrowing capacity. If the debts of one war are repudiated those of

another may also be repudiated. It behooves the capitalists, therefore,

to support a policy which will make armed conflict impossible. While

bonds benefit the banker when issued up to a certain point, they can

in some conditions become his most serious difficulty. So many perils

await the capitalist from a renewal of struggles like the present, that

it is not too much to count upon him as a supporter of peace until the

financial situation in Europe shall become better than it will be for

many a day. It is his true interest to support a federated peace, which

will tend to make his bonds secure.

 

As to the influence of autocracy, the advocate of peace must admit

that it is by nature hostile to his system of coöperative peace.

Such coöperation must depend on mutual confidence and trust between

nations; and it is natural for distrust to exist between republican and

autocratic states. The whole trend of autocracy is to self-assertion.

As it exists in Germany today it could hardly be relied on to take its

place in any union of states which would involve the subordination of

individual national interests to the common good.

 

Granting this, the advocate of peace can assert that Germany must

eventually give up autocracy. As the only great nations that hold to

this relic of a departed age Germany and Austria-Hungary are becoming

anachronisms. They are set against the spirit of the twentieth

century. If they tide over the crisis that now confronts them they

will encounter more furious storms at a later time, and eventually

autocracy must be broken down. The argument rests on faith in progress.

It is the result of confidence in the innate qualities of human nature.

So many times in the past ages have the people risen against bad

government, that it is safe to say they will repeat the process until

all inequality shall have been reduced.

 

German autocracy, a survival of a past century, exists only because it

takes for its object the good government of a parliamentary system.

In intelligence and honesty it is not like the ancient system. The

resemblance is only in forms. The republican says: “I will give the

people just, intelligent, and honest government.” The German autocrat

says: “I will do all these things”; and he redeems his promise. His

brother of the eighteenth century had no such purpose, being so certain

of his position that he did not have to promise the people anything.

The German autocrat lives in fear of an overthrow. Perhaps some day he

will make a slip--it may be from the action of an unwise emperor or a

selfish party clique--and away will go the whole system.

 

Last summer a crisis arose in Berlin. The very life of the autocracy

seemed about to be taken. It was saved finally by a narrow margin,

and with the making of promises which seem a long step forward. The

people were assured that such was their meaning. If the promises are

broken, there will be a reckoning. It may be said that there will never

again be so good an opportunity to force the granting of parliamentary

reforms. That statement is contestable. The autocracy needs the support

of the people at present, in order to bring Germany through the crisis

that has arisen from the action of the autocracy, and it may seem from

that standpoint that the people never had and will never have an

equally good opportunity to strike a blow. But the call of patriotism

is strong in Germany, and if the liberally minded persons were to

stand deliberately for the defeat of the war credits unless they were

given the reforms they demanded, it is doubtful if the people would

support them. It is hard to carry a country through a great political

revolution while the very life of the country is threatened.

 

After war comes a time of questioning. The German people will have

reason to ask themselves what has been done to them. The burdens of

taxes, the loss of commerce, the wrecks of human life through maiming,

and the great gaps in population through death, all these things can

but come to the minds of the people. At that time the press must lose

something of its rigorous control, for it is impossible that when the

Germans get over the feeling that their country is in danger they will

continue to tolerate a press whose every word is dictated by the one

thought of keeping the people solidly united in war sentiment. If it

should happen that the empire has an emperor who is not trusted by the

people it may be that the questioning will sweep away many old doubts

and forms.

 

These things should not be taken as prophecy, but as possibilities

for tempering the opinion that Germany is destined to be permanently

autocratic. The advocate of an enduring peace has a right to think a

self-governing Germany well within the bounds of possibility before

another decade has elapsed. If such a thing happens, certainly one of

the most serious obstacles to peace will have been removed.

 

I shall venture to put one more argument into the mouth of the advocate

of peace. Probably he has not used it as I am going to use it, but it

works his way; for it shows that a tremendous fate threatens, unless

some coöperative movement is established to avert it. Stated briefly it

is this: Through the ages runs a law of unification in society, and it

seems probable that the world has today come to the point at which the

unifying force is likely to take a long stride forward, a force which

may operate in one of two directions. I mean that with the next century

unification seems imminent by conquest, if not by common consent.

 

It is not easy to say that the process of concentration in human

society is a law in the sense in which there is law in natural science.

But there is a general social tendency, seemingly irrepressible,

operating steadily from the beginning of history, for the political

units to be larger and ever larger. If this tendency is not a law it is

an extremely strong force; and we may well ask if it is not about to

take one of its great steps forward.

 

A glance at the past will show how the process has gone on. In ancient

times diminutive states were absorbed by larger but still very small

states, which in turn were welded into so-called confederacies, or

leagues, which at last became integrated states. The concentration

went forward in cycles, one empire rising in power until it ruled most

of its known world, and then it broke into pieces through its lack of

cohesive power. Thus it was with Babylon, Assyria, Persia, Greece, and

Rome. Whenever the bubble burst the process of unification began again

immediately, and on a larger scale. After the fall of Rome it was again

set in motion in an area that included most of Europe, the unifying

hand belonging to Charlemagne, king of the Franks. His personal valor

won the triumph of his will, but his empire fell away soon after he

relaxed his hold upon it.

 

Then began a rebuilding process. Feudal states evolved out of clashing

duchies, counties, and bishoprics. Immediately feudal states began to

devour one another. With each century the unit of government became

larger. At last rose the great power of Spain, so great that it became

a threat to other powers, and then followed a series of wars to decide

whether or not Spain should be the supreme state in Europe, and Spain

lost. A century later France seemed to be seeking to establish herself

in the same kind of supremacy, and again the combined force of Europe

was necessary to break her purposes. Still later came the Napoleonic

wars, in which Europe seemed for a moment to be subjected by one

central will, but again it was saved through great suffering. To some

people it seemed that the Napoleonic attempt would be the last.

 

Of these modern struggles in Europe it is seen that each has been

harder than the struggle that preceded it. That is because in each the

implements and organization of warfare were improved as compared with

the former struggle, and because states were stronger and more capable