2016년 4월 28일 목요일

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 3

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 3


Nor should we be deceived by the pallid pacifist. He has his
counterpart in every struggle; and in general he serves some good
purpose in a multitude of opinions. But the day of stress and world
crisis is not his _Day_; and the practical world loses little time in
putting him in his place. The pacifist does not represent the peace
movement in its freest and most significant form. The advocates of
peace today who are best serving its promotion are those who are out in
the armies bent on putting down that nation who is the most dangerous
enemy of peace.
 
These men are not mere pieces of machinery in a great driving process.
They are thinking men with political power in their hands, either
actually or potentially. War is a great schoolteacher. It has lasted
in our own time nearly as long as a course in college. The soldiers
who survive from the beginning of this conflict may now be considered
as more than half through their senior year. They know what war is
and what it means, and they know something about the necessary form
of coöperation that must exist in any society before the will of the
people can be carried into effect. They knew little about war four
years ago: they now know all the professors know. Behind the lines and
here in our homes one never sees man nor woman who does not admit that
it would be a blessing to make war impossible; but few of us have any
idea how to go about getting it made impossible. Many of us think we
shall never get people to act together in such a cause. But it seems
unreasonable to expect that men who have raided through “No Man’s
Land,” captured trenches and defeated great armies through organization
and initiative should quail before the inertia of opinion, perhaps the
chief obstacle confronting those who labor for a coöperative peace.
 
The example of the Russians is a useful point in this connection. At
the beginning of the war their armies were as machine-like as any
armies could be. The privates were generally peasants who did not know
why they fought, and who certainly had nothing to say about the origin
of the war. They were typical “cannon-fodder,” and as unthinking as
any modern soldier can be. They have learned much from less than three
years of war. They slowly acquired purpose, a sense of organization,
and leaders whom they follow. Having made this progress they overthrew
the imperial government, drove away the great nobles, put an ensign in
the place of a former grand duke and two exiles in the seats of the
highest officials, and stripped the highest born army officers of their
titles and insignia.
 
At the present writing they are holding out against all attempts to
overthrow them, they are playing the diplomatic game with Germany
without discredit,[1] and they are reported to be shaking the
foundations of autocracy in Austria. At any rate, it must be confessed
that a small group of the Russian “cannon-fodder” have made commendable
progress in the process of education during the last ten months. The
process seems to have been under the direction of the socialists, a
small but well organized group of intelligent persons who do not lack
initiative. It is they who are educating the Russian peasants into
political self-__EXPRESSION__.
 
[1] Since the above was written events have occurred in
Russia which seem to discredit the diplomacy of the
revolutionists; but the general situation is so unsettled
that no conclusions can be drawn at this time, February 27,
1918.
 
The possible results of this incident are tremendous. Nowhere else in
the world have the agricultural classes fallen into one party with
vigorous and trained leaders. If Russia is now embarking on an era of
representative government, as seems probable, she is passing through
a stage in which political parties are being crystallized. So far,
it does not appear that any considerable party is organized in the
vast empire on what we should call a conservative basis. It will be
an interesting experiment in political history if Russia has a great
peasant party in control of the administration.
 
The party that now controls Russia is committed to the idea of
a peace through the coöperation of the nations. It is true that
internationalism goes further than mere federation of nations; for it
also implies the socialization of industry, the equal distribution of
property. In short, it is the internationalism and unification of the
industrial classes in all nations for a combined opposition to capital.
With these aims we shall, probably, not be pleased. But they imply the
destruction of war; and it now seems possible that Russia will stand
before the world, at least until the radical elements fall before
conservatives, as the most prominent champion of coöperative peace.
 
As to the socialistic purpose of the internationalists, it stands
apart logically from that feature of their doctrine that relates
to the mere coöperation of nations. They would say, probably, that
coöperation is but incidental to their main desire, the unification of
the workers of the world. But it is right to expect that they would
support coöperation among the nations to obtain the destruction of
war, since it would make it easier for the world to accept their other
ideals. On the other hand the man who opposes internationalism as such,
could accept the aid of a radical Russia in obtaining federated peace,
without feeling that in doing so he was necessarily contributing to the
promotion of the socialistic features of internationalism.
 
This remarkable shifting of power in Russia has had its counterpart on
a less impressive scale in other countries. Whether it comes to the
point of explosion or not, there is in the minds of all--the thoughtful
people, the working-men, and all intermediate classes--a growing belief
that a new idea should rule the relations of nations among themselves.
From an age of international competition they are turning to the hope
of an era of international agreement; and it does not appear that their
influence will be unheeded when men come to face steadily the problems
the war is sure to leave behind it.
 
Most notable influence of all in behalf of a federated peace is the
position taken by President Wilson. In the beginning of this conflict
he had the scholar’s horror of warfare, and he has taken more than one
opportunity to suggest the formation of a league of nations to prevent
the outbreak of future wars. His address to Congress on January 22,
1917, was a notable presentation of the idea to the world. Enthusiastic
hearers pronounced the occasion a turning-point in history. Whether a
league of nations is established or not, according to the president’s
desires, his support of the idea has given it a great push forward.
He has taken it out of the realm of the ideal and made it a practical
thing, to be discussed gravely in the cabinets of rulers.
 
A year after the question has been brought forward, it should be
possible to form an opinion of the attitude of European nations in
regard to the suggestion. From all of them, including Germany and
Austria, have come courteous allusions to the idea of the president;
and the pope has given it his support. But it is not clear that all
are sincerely in favor of a logically constituted league that will
have power to do what it is expected to do. That President Wilson will
continue to urge steps in this direction is to be taken as certain. The
measure of his success will be the amount of hearty and substantial
support he has from that large class of people who still ask: “Can’t
something be done to stop war forever?”
 
When this page is being written the newspapers are full of a discussion
of the two speeches that came from the central powers on January 25,
1918, one from Chancellor von Hertling of Germany, and the other from
Count Czernin, of Austria. In the former is the following utterance:
 
“I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity shows,
toward every idea which eliminates for the future a possibility or
a probability of war, and will promote a peaceful and harmonious
collaboration of nations. If the idea of a bond of nations, as
suggested by President Wilson, proves on closer examination really
to be conceived in a spirit of complete justice and complete
impartiality toward all, then the imperial government is gladly
ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin
the examination of the basis of such a bond of nations.”
 
This very guarded utterance means much or little, as the German rulers
may hereafter determine. By offering impossible conditions of what
they may pronounce “complete justice and complete impartiality to all”
they may be able to nullify whatever promise may be incorporated in
it. On the other hand, the sentiment, if accepted in a fair spirit
and without exaggerated demands, may be a real step toward realizing
President Wilson’s desires. If, for example, Germany should insist,
as a condition for the formation of a “bond of nations,” that Great
Britain give up her navy, or dismantle Gibraltar, while she herself
retained her immense Krupp works and her power to assemble her army at
a moment’s notice, it is hardly likely the demand would be granted. We
can best know what Germany will do in this matter when we see to what
extent she is willing to acknowledge that her war is a failure and
that her military policy is a vast and expensive affair that profits
nothing. Moreover, there is a slight sneer in the chancellor’s words,
as though he does not consider the president’s idea entirely within
the range of the diplomacy of experienced statesmen; and this is not
very promising for the outcome--unless, indeed, the logic of future
events opens his eyes to the meaning of the new spirit that the war has
aroused.
 
Among our own allies the suggestion of our president has found a
kinder reception. Mr. Lloyd George has announced his general support
of the proposition, and Lord Bryce and others have given it cordial
indorsement. It seems that if the United States urges the formation of
a league of peace, she will have the coöperation of Great Britain. As
to the position of France and Italy, the matter is not so clear. They
probably are too deeply impressed by the danger they will ever face
from powerful neighbors to feel warranted in dismissing their armies,
unless the best assurance is given that Germany and Austria accept
federated peace in all good faith.
 
As the contending nations approach that state of exhaustion which
presages an end of the war, the question of such a peace becomes
increasingly important. Everything points to the conclusion that the
time has arrived to debate this subject. If the hopes of August, 1914,
that Armageddon would be succeeded by an era of permanent peace are to
be realized, they will not come without the serious thought of men who
are willing to dare something for their ideals. And if they come out
of the present cataclysm it is time to be up and doing. The sentiment
that exists in this country, and in other countries, must be organized
and made effective at th 

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