The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 4

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 4

Every general war in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire has

brought humanity there to a state of exhaustion similar to that which

now exists. So it was with the Thirty Years’ War, with the wars

inaugurated by Louis XIV to establish the predominance of France,

and with the Napoleonic wars a century ago. Each of these struggles,

it will be observed, extended to a larger portion of Europe than its

predecessor; and it was because the common interests of nations were

progressively stronger; for it was ever becoming so that what concerned

one state concerned others. In the present war the interrelations of

nations is such that Japan and the United States have been brought into

the conflict, along with China and several of the smaller American

states. If the conflict recurs in the future it may be expected to

involve a still wider area.

 

There is evidence that in each of these struggles the humane men then

living were filled with the same longing for permanent peace that

many men feel today.[2] The feeling was especially strong during

the last stages of the Napoleonic wars and immediately after they

ended. Singularly enough it was strongest in Russia, due, however

to the accident that an enthusiastic and idealistic tsar was ruling

in that country. He had received his ideals from a French tutor who

was deeply imbued with the equality theories of the revolution that

swept over his own country. The tsar accepted them with sincerity and

spent several years of conscientious effort in his attempts to have

them adopted. More singularly still, they found their only sincere

indorsement, among the rulers who had the right to indorse or reject,

with the king of Prussia, who at that time was a very religious man.

Most peculiar of all they found very strong opposition in England,

where practical statesmen were in power. As I read the history of that

day and reflect on what has been the train of events from the battle of

Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium in 1914, it is hard to keep from

wishing that a better effort had been made in 1815 to carry out the

suggestion which the tsar urged on his royal brothers in Europe.

 

[2] See below, pp. 46-62.

 

The defeat of Napoleon was purchased at immense sacrifices. To the

people of the day the most desirable thing in the world seemed to be

a prevention of his reappearance to trouble mankind. They took the

greatest care to keep his body a prisoner until he was dead; but they

did not seriously try to lay his ghost. Probably they did not think,

being practical men, that his spirit would walk again in the earth.

They were mistaken; for not only has the ghost come back, but it has

come with increased power and subtlety. In fact, it was an old ghost,

and having once inhabited the bodies of Louis XIV, Augustus Cæsar, and

Alexander of Macedon, as well as that of Napoleon I, it knew much more

than the grave gentlemen who undertook to arrange the future of Europe

in practical ways in 1815.

 

As we approach again the re-making of our relations after a world war,

it is worth while to glance over the things that were done in 1815,

to understand what choice of events was presented to the men of that

day, and what results came from the course they deliberately decided to

follow. Thus we may know whether or not the course proved a happy one,

and whether or not it is the course that we, also, should follow. And

if it is not such a course, we ought as thinking people to try to adopt

a better.

 

We should always remember that the conditions of today are more

suitable to a wise decision than the conditions of 1815. We have, for

one thing, the advantage of the experience of the past hundred years.

There is no doubt in our minds as to how the old plan has worked and

how it may be expected to work if again followed. It led to the Concert

of Europe and the Balance of Power, both of which served in certain

emergencies, but failed in the hour of supreme need. Indeed, it is

probable that they promoted the crash that at last arrived.

 

Another advantage is that we have today in the world a vastly greater

amount of democracy than in 1815. The people who pay the bills of Mars

today can say what shall be done about keeping Mars in chains; and that

is something they could not do in 1815. It is for them to know all his

capers, and his clever ways of getting out of prison, and to look under

his shining armor to see the grizzly hairs that cover his capacious

ribs; and having done this to decide what will be their attitude toward

him.

 

It is not the business of an author to offer his views to his reader

ready made. Enough if he offers the material facts out of which the

reader may form his own opinions. That is my object in this book. I

do not disguise my conviction that some of the fruits of the war that

ended at Waterloo were lost through the inexperience of the men who

set the world on its course again. Whether or not the men were as

wise as they should have been is now a profitless inquiry. My only

object is to set before the reader as clearly as I can the idea of a

permanent peace through federated action, to show how that idea came up

in connection with the war against Napoleon, how it was rejected for a

concerted and balanced international system, what came of the decision

in the century that followed, and finally in what way the failure of

the old system is responsible for the present war. If the reader will

follow me through these considerations, he will be prepared to examine

in a judicial spirit the arguments for and against President Wilson’s

suggested union of nations to end war.

 

As these introductory remarks are written, we seem to be girding up

our loins again with the firm conviction that we cannot talk of peace

until Germany knows she is beaten. The decision is eminently wise. But

if it is worth while to fight two or ten years more to crush Germany’s

confidence in her military policy, how much ought it not to be worth to

make the nations realize that if they really wish to destroy war they

can do it by taking two steps: first, end this struggle in a spirit of

amity; and second, make an effective agreement to preserve that state

of amity by preventing the occurrence of the things and feelings that

disturb it. That is the task as well as the opportunity of wise men,

who can govern themselves; and it is for their information that this

volume is written which undertakes to point out “The Lost Fruits of

Waterloo” and the conditions under which we may seek to recover them.

It is not a book of propaganda, unless facts are propagandists. It is

not a pacifist book, although its pages may make for peace, if God

wills. It is only a plain statement of the lessons of history as they

appear to one of the many thousands of puzzled persons now habitants of

this globe who are trying to grope their ways out of this fog of folly.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II

 

EARLY ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE

 

 

Those who have tried to point the world to universal peace may be

divided into two schools: one advocating a form of coöperation in

which the final reliance is to be reason, the other looking forward to

some effective form of common action behind which shall be sufficient

force to carry out the measures necessary to enforce the common will.

It is convenient to describe the former group as advocating a league

of peace, since we are generally agreed that a league is a form of

concert from which the constituent members may withdraw at will, and

in which does not reside power to force them to do what they do not

find reasonable. The second group wish to have a federation, if by that

term we understand a united group in which exists power sufficient to

preserve the common cause against any possible disobedient member.

To form a league is easier than to form a federation. States are

tenacious of sovereignty. The Swiss cantons, the Dutch provinces, and

the original thirteen states of North America are the most striking

illustrations of states that were willing to submit themselves to the

more strenuous process of union. They acted under stress of great

common peril, and their first steps in federation were short and timid;

but none of them have regretted that the steps were taken. It was the

good fortune of these groups of states that they were able to unite

at the proper time and that their actions were not overclouded by the

counsel of “practical statesmen” to whom ideals were things to be

distrusted.

 

In other states in periods of great distress from war men lived who

dreamed of coöperation to promote peace, but their voices were too weak

for the times. The most notable early advocate of this scheme was the

Duke of Sully, if we may accept the notion that he wrote the work known

as the _Grand Design_ of Henry IV. In that plan was contemplated a

Christian Republic, composed of fifteen states in Europe, only three of

which were to have a republican form of government. They were to give

up warring among themselves and to refer to a common council, modeled

on the Ionic League, all matters of interstate relation that were of

importance to the “very Christian Republic.” The only war this republic

was to wage was the common war to expel the Turks from Europe. It was

after Henry’s death that Sully published the plan with the assertion

that his former master had formed it just after the treaty of Vervins,

1598.

 

Whether it was the work of king or duke, no attempt was made to put it

into force. In 1598 Europe was in the throes of a long and hopeless

struggle for religion. Cities were destroyed, men and women were

butchered, and the safety of states was threatened. The _Grand Design_

represents the reaction of either Henry’s or Sully’s mind against such

a terror. It was a thing to be desired, if it could have been attained.

One of the marks of peace that it displayed was the attitude it took

towards the branches of the Christian faith. Complete tolerance was to

exist for the three forms, Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism.

This was a kind of idealism that was then unattainable; but in the

course of time it has been achieved. I should not like to say the day

will not come when the other side of the scheme, interstate peace, will

also cease to be too ideal for realization.

 

The next important suggestion of union for peace was made by William

Penn in 1693 in an _Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of

Europe_. At that time the Continent was racked with war--a result of

the ambition of Louis XIV to raise France to a dominating position

among the other nations--, the Palatinate had been devastated, and

the will of the “Grand Monarch” was the dreaded fact in international

politics. Penn realized that great sacrifices were ahead; for it was as

true then as now that when a strong state rises to a position in which

it can threaten universal rule, there is nothing for the other states

but to combine and fight as long as they can.

 

Penn’s proposal was that the sovereigns of Europe should form a Great

Diet in which all their disputes should be adjusted. If any state

refused to submit to the judgment of the diet and appealed to arms,