The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 11

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 11

After he withdrew the union of the three emperors was dissolved. But

for his strong hand it could hardly have been formed. Russia and

Austria were at bottom rivals. If Germany supported Russia in her plans

for the Near East she would offend Austria, and if she lent herself to

Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if she favored Russia openly

she was likely to arouse the opposition of Great Britain, who was at

that time very suspicious of the tsar’s designs on Constantinople. It

was a delicate situation, and it was only good luck and Bismarck’s

character that kept it intact for more than fifteen years.

 

After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its existence, Italy

suppressing her dislike for Austria as well as she could in view of her

need of strong friends among the nations. But Russia fell away and in

1895 announced that she had formed a Dual Alliance with France, a thing

which Bismarck had been very solicitous to prevent. By holding Russia

in hand he had been able to isolate France in Europe, but her isolation

was now a thing of the past. The Dual Alliance confronted the Triple

Alliance and the result was peace. At the same time the rivalry of

Russia and Austria over Turkey became more energetic, which tended to

increase the probability of war.

 

Succeeding Bismarck came German statesmen who were not so steady as

he, and their weaker hold on the situation added to the gravity of

the prospects of peace. It can hardly be doubted that the fall of

Bismarck lessened the prospect that Europe would remain at peace. The

Balance of Power, which took so clear a form with the organization of

the Dual Alliance, was not as good a guarantee of peace as it seemed;

for while it made the checking of powers by powers more apparent, its

very existence was evidence of a state of stronger rivalry of nations

than existed before the Dual Alliance was formed. At the same time the

men who now guided the fortunes of Germany were not so convinced as

Bismarck that the country should have peace.

 

While these things happened Great Britain remained generally neutral.

She was busy with trade expansion and the development of her colonies,

especially in Africa; and her chief interest, so far as the schemes

of the Continental nations were concerned, was to see that none of

them interfered with her progress in that field of endeavor. Late

in Bismarck’s time, however, she became convinced that Germany was

becoming a rival both in trade and colonization. It is true that

France was also a rival, and between her and Great Britain occurred

some sharp passages; but France was not an aggressive nation and had

no strong military resources to back her ambitions in the field of

peaceful activities. Germany, on the other hand, was increasingly

militaristic and the logic of events seemed to indicate that she would

at some time in the future be willing to support her commercial and

colonial ambition with a formidable appeal to arms. British anxiety was

quickened when the young kaiser began to build a great navy, with the

avowed object of making it equal to the British navy. For centuries

it had been the key-note of British policy to have a navy that could

control the seas; and while there was nothing in the will of Father

Adam that gave Britons the dominion of the seas, the kaiser must have

known that he could not challenge their superiority on water without

arousing their gravest apprehension. During the Boer war (1899-1902)

Germany gave added offense to Britain. She showed sympathy openly for

the Boers, and it was generally believed in Great Britain that she took

advantage of the opportunity to try to form a grand alliance to curb

the power of the “Mistress of the Seas.” Rumor said that the plan was

defeated only by the refusal of France to lend her assistance unless

she received Alsace-Lorraine. If the report is true, it only shows what

a costly thing to Germany was the hatred that Bismarck created when he

put France to the humiliating dismemberment of 1871.

 

During this period Théophile Delcassé was head of the French foreign

office (1898-1905). He was a man of great original ability and was

desirous of restoring the prestige of France. When he came into office

the French public was excited over the Fashoda incident, a clash of

French and British interests in the Sudan which seemed to threaten

war. The British government took a strong attitude, as it was likely

at that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing with a weaker

nation. Delcassé realized that the true welfare of his country demanded

friendship with the one power which could help it against Germany, and

at the risk of denunciation at home he gave up all that Great Britain

demanded in the Sudan. He thus showed that he possessed that high trait

of statesmanship which consists in the ability to convert an opponent

into a firm friend.

 

The opportunity to which he was looking forward came when Germany set

her plans into operation during the Boer war. He not only held out for

the return of the lost provinces but, that failing, made overtures for

a better understanding with the British. It was a time when a friendly

hand was gladly received by the London government. The result was a

series of agreements which became known as the _Entente Cordiale_,

1904. They marked the reappearance of Great Britain as a leading power

in Continental affairs, after a long period of aloofness. She had

become an active part of the Balance of Power, and her strength was

thrown to the side which was bent on restraining the vast influence

of Germany. Her action caused great alarm at Berlin, where her motive

was interpreted as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of that city

apparently forgetting that they had provoked it by their unfriendly

attitude in the Boer war.

 

In the same year began the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905). At first

glance it would seem that this conflict threatened to weaken the

_Entente Cordiale_, for Japan was allied to Great Britain and Russia

was bound up with France by the Dual Alliance. But the result was

just the opposite. The _Entente_ was not only left intact, but it was

actually strengthened. When Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain ceased

to fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which made it possible for

her to draw nearer to the Muscovite power. At the same time, Russia,

always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her eyes with greater

eagerness than ever to the Near East, which brought her into a more

intense state of opposition to Austria and Germany. Delcassé seized

the opportunity offered him and succeeded in bringing together these

two great nations, which for many years had been continually ready to

fly at one another. He put into motion the negotiations out of which

was formed the Triple _Entente_ (1907) in which Great Britain, France,

and Russia announced that they had settled their differences and would

stand together in future crises.

 

The incidents that followed the culmination of Delcassé’s diplomacy

are very striking, but they must be deferred until I reach a later

stage of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe that it brought

the theory of the Balance of Power to its logical development. Delcassé

was in a world in which one great and most efficiently armed nation

stood in a position to turn suddenly on the rest of Europe and sweep

it into her lap. By her military and naval power, by her vast trained

army, by her readiness for instantaneous action, by her well planned

strategic railroads, and by her alliances with the middle-European

states she was in a threatening position. At a given signal she could

seize great domains, fortify herself, and defy all the world to drive

her out of what she had taken. There was hardly an intelligent German

who did not believe that this course would be followed in the near

future and who did not feel confident that it would make Germany

the dominating nation of the world. Against this system the Triple

_Entente_ was formed, as a means of balance. It was larger than the

Triple Alliance but not so effectively led.

 

And here I must observe that these two groups had come into existence

in the most natural way. Bismarck had founded the Triple Alliance as

a means of preserving peace, not as a means of aggression; but it had

become something more than he intended it to be. It had enabled Germany

to play such a part in European politics that the creation of another

great group as a balance was apparently demanded. Immediately that

her position was lowered Germany felt aggrieved that the combination

had been made against her. So powerful were her convictions about her

wrongs that she threw away all thought of a concert of the Great Powers

for the settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted to the Balance to

protect her; but she now considered it something more than a state of

equilibrium and she appealed to arms. Before this narrative recounts

the actual events by which she felt that she was justified in taking

this step, it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a series of

causes and events which for nearly a century has been an open menace to

European peace and stability.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI

 

THE BALKAN STATES

 

 

Viscount Grey has been criticized for not understanding the Balkan

problem. If his critics understood how complex is the story of the last

century in this part of Europe they would withold their strictures.

I, at least, do not blame any man for failing to carry in his mind

an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of races and religions

in the Balkan country have striven and hoped for during the recent

past. In this chapter the best that can be promised is an account of

the main facts of Balkan history. A more detailed narrative would be

confusing to the reader. A failure to mention the subject would leave

much unexplained that is essential to an understanding of the origin

of the present war. And we shall hardly know how to decide what kind

of a peace the future security of Europe demands, if we leave out of

consideration the proper disposition to be made of the small states of

the Southeast.

 

In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and began a series of conquests that

carried her to the very gates of the city of Vienna. That important

stronghold seemed about to fall into her hands in 1683, when an army

of Polish and German soldiers came to its rescue in the name of

Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched Hungary out of their

hands for the benefit of the Austrian power. This struggle proved the

highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. From that time to this,

wars of reconquest have followed one another, the pagans always playing

a losing game. But for a long time all that part of Southeastern Europe

that could be reached from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the

part that was easily reached from Germany was held by the Christians,

and the part that lay between, a broad belt of hilly country, was

continually in dispute. Across it armies fought back and forth, each

side winning and losing in turn, but with the general result in favor

of the Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier of their enemies.

 

The region held by the Turks was tenacious of its Christian faith and

recognized the religious authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople,