The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 12

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 12

Montenegro aside, the first group to become a state was Serbia, whose

hardy mountain inhabitants rose in revolt in 1804. A number of brave

leaders appeared and valley by valley the Turks were forced out of

the country. The Serbs were practically independent for a time,

but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, and the constant

preparedness that was necessary to repel any attack he might launch was

a source of much expense and anxiety to the people.

 

In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination of Turkey, rose in

revolt. Great sympathy was aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite

of the disposition of the Great Powers to allow Turkey a free hand to

preserve her territory intact, lest one of them gain over-balancing

territory, public opinion forced them to intervene. The first to

show sympathy was Russia, who had an interest in making herself the

protector of the Christians in Turkey. The other powers resented

her assistance to the Greeks, and finally Great Britain and France

united in a project of intervention, sending a joint fleet to the

Mediterranean which destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1827.

The stubborn sultan remained unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered

the war openly, having come to an agreement with the other Powers. She

sent an army across the border which carried all before it, and the

sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adrianople, in which Turkey

recognized the independence of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an

autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty. At the same time Wallachia

and Moldavia, where Rumans lived, were recognized as independent

under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sovereign and three dependent

but locally autonomous states stood forth out of the confused and

misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in Europe.

 

The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars and Albanians, with Bosnia

and Herzegovina, claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their

national habitat, remained in an unredeemed condition and were governed

by agents appointed by the sultan. Montenegro retained her position of

practical independence, which Turkey had been forced to acknowledge in

1799. These arrangements were confirmed in a more formal treaty in 1832.

 

The successes of this period quickened the spirit of nationality in

the Balkans. Just as the Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for

their classical culture and sought to revive the language and ideals of

the remote past, so the Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient

culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish masters. Serbs, Rumans,

and Bulgars made grammars of their own languages, gathered up what was

preserved of their ancient literatures and traditions, taught their

children to revere the national heroes, and sought in many other ways

to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The Slavic portion turned

to Russia for support, whom they called their “big brother,” while

the Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and France, whom they

considered kindred descendants of the ancient Romans. To their national

hopes in these things was added the desire for religious independence.

They disliked being under the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch

of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sultan, and looked forward

to a time when they might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction

not limited by the Patriarch.

 

In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance in the region of the

Balkans, hoping to gain at last what Peter the Great had declared was

essential to her progress, a window looking out on the Mediterranean.

Great Britain and France came to the help of the sultan and the

Crimean War followed. After a hard struggle it ended in Russia’s

defeat, and at the Conference of Paris, 1856, the affairs of the

Balkans were again up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned

to the side of the Turk, although it was modified by the restraining

hand of his two allies. The purport of the treaty was to reduce the

power of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the Balkans

states were checked. The protectorate the tsar had established over

Wallachia and Moldavia was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had expected

independence, remained under the rule of the sultan, while Greece, who

had desired a large portion of Macedonia, was forced to continue in

her old boundaries. This crisis was not the last in which the vexed

Balkan question, seemingly near solution, was made to give way before

the complicated problems of the general European situation. Looking

backward we may well say that if Russia had secured her wish, expelled

the Turk from Constantinople and liberated the Balkan states, the

fortunes of France would not have been lessened, and Great Britain,

safe through her supremacy at sea, would not have lost any of the

strength she had in India. At the same time the sore spot of European

relations would have been healed, and we should probably have had no

war in 1914.

 

Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same stock and wished to unite as

one kingdom. They made their desires known in the negotiations that

resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the Powers did not mean to create

a large state on the borders of Russia which might prove a bulwark

of influence for the tsar, and accordingly they denied the request.

The two states found a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the

conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to select rulers each chose

Alexander John Cuza simultaneously, and after hesitating two years the

Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus was formed the united kingdom

of Rumania; and its formation illustrated a weak point in the Concert

of Europe. However much the Powers might interfere to prevent the

consummation of an act they considered dangerous, they would think

twice before trying to punish a Balkan state, since in doing so they

might set off an explosion in the very system they were working to keep

peaceful. Rumania understood this phase of the matter and took her

chances. Her firm course had its reward.

 

The influence of Great Britain was now paramount at Constantinople.

The sultan was satisfied with his ally, since he knew that of all the

Powers he had least to fear from this state, which had no territories

in that part of the Mediterranean and was committed to the preservation

of his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from the Bosphorus.

To justify herself for defending the Turk, Great Britain gave the

world assurances that the sultan was about to become good. Under her

insistance a series of reforms was announced, but they did not go far

in the realization. Some of the promises referred to the government of

the Balkans, but they were as fruitless as the others. Meanwhile French

and British merchants found large profits in Turkish trade.

 

The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence in the Southeast,

and in 1877 he began another war against Turkey. He thought the time

favorable for such action. Impeded for a while at Plevna, in Bulgaria,

he at last swept the enemy before him and took Adrianople on January

16, 1878. His successes created great enthusiasm among the Serbs,

Bulgars, and Rumans, who flocked to his victorious standard. The

panic-stricken sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano signed a treaty

which granted all that was demanded of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and

Rumania were recognized as completely independent, Bulgaria as an

autonomous tributary province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were assured

of important administrative reforms. Russia was awarded some territory

not strictly in the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the prestige she

now had as liberator of Christian states.

 

The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great Britain and Austria, both

of whom felt that they had major interests at stake. They got a

congress of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin, 1878, which revised

the treaty in what they were pleased to call the interest of European

peace. Complete independence was announced for Serbia, Rumania,

and Montenegro, and the sultan accepted the fact of their perfect

sovereignty. By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to include

Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making one great buffer province between

the Turkish and the Christian states. The three parts were now

left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autonomous but under Turkish

suzerainty, and the other two less independent.

 

To create a “Big Bulgaria” as a bulwark against Turkey had been

Russia’s chief hope in the war. Her initial success awakened enthusiasm

in all the Balkan people, and the results were expressed in the way

in which they rallied to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an

opportunity had come to found a strong Balkan confederacy which would

play an important part in the development of the Near East. The hand of

Russia seemed strong enough to hold these nascent states to one policy,

allay their incipient jealousies, and bring them to a great common

ideal. If such a course could have been adopted the future of Europe

would have been profoundly altered. It was defeated by that Concert of

Europe which was supposed to exist in order that the world might be

spared the burden of war. It was really prevented through the operation

of the forces of national selfishness, safely esconced in the system

which we have called the Concert of Europe.

 

The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a large part at the Congress

of Berlin. This nation had long looked upon the region that separated

her from the Adriatic as a sphere through which she was justified in

extending her power at the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that

the time had come to realize her plans. If she waited, Russia would

acquire such an influence as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her

eyes were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some time in revolt

against Turkish misgovernment. Her influence was such that the congress

gave her the right to occupy and administer the two provinces under

the reservation of sovereignty to the sultan. The inhabitants, who

were largely Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, although they

did not relax their cherished hopes of independence. They were pawns

thrown to Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia. The transaction

only whetted the Austrian appetite for more and deepened the Serbian

resentment for Austria.

 

Great Britain had her advantage out of the bargain also. She retained

her position of paramount friend at Constantinople, justifying herself

with the assurance that the sultan would carry out reforms in his

empire. She seemed to think that the “Sick Man of Europe” would cure

himself under her guidance and then defend himself against states

that tried to oust him from his seat of power. To enable her to watch

the bedside of her patient from a convenient position, as well as

to safeguard the Suez Canal, Great Britain was given the right to

occupy and administer the island of Cyprus under nominal authority of

Turkey. To be perfectly fair we must admit that there is little moral

difference between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria’s gain in

Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear that in this case the Concert

of Europe was a concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also worth

while to note that two of the Great Powers took no benefit from the

agreement. France was slowly recovering from the war of 1870-1871

and was in no condition to fight, although in 1881 she established

a protectorate over Tunis. The German Empire, newly founded and not

yet fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in no condition to

undertake a stiff encounter. There were many Germans who wished that