The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 13

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 13

No treaty ends the march of time, and the Balkan situation continued

to develop along the old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in

accordance with a promise made to her at the Congress of Berlin. In

1885 East Rumelia declared herself united to Bulgaria, acting in

defiance of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The Powers did not

interfere for the same reason that they did not act when Wallachia

and Moldavia united in 1862. To attempt to undo the union would have

precipitated a general war. The Concert was stronger to prevent a given

action than to correct it after it was done. Serbia, however, took

the action of the two provinces as a menace and declared war against

the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about to throw herself on her

adversary when she suddenly made peace, evidently feeling she was not

strong enough to carry on the war alone.

 

Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did not mean to allow the

Balkan states to profit by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish

Empire. But for their restraint it seems that the Turk would have been

expelled from Europe before the end of the nineteenth century.

 

Their intention was clearly manifested in regard to the island of

Crete, whose population long suffered from Turkish oppression. In

1896 the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced to promise

reforms. The assurance proved empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in

behalf of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks fought heroically

but alone and were no match for Turkey in operations on land. They

made peace without success, but through the instrumentality of the

Great Powers the sultan agreed to allow Crete self-government under

an elected assembly. The powers let it be known that they would not

have the island annexed to Greece, which they did not mean to make a

preponderating influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a great Cretan

leader, Eleutherios Venezelos, whom his admirers call the Cavour of

Greece. Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the union of the

island with Greece in 1905, but again the Powers interposed, insisting

that the sovereignty of the sultan should not be abrogated. However,

they permitted the Greek king to appoint a representative to rule the

island as a Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to train the

Cretan soldiers and police. At last the Balkan war (1912-1913) brought

the completion of union, the Great Powers yielding their assent.

 

The explanation of the conduct of the Powers in this incident is to be

found in the delicate nature of the whole Balkan question. With Austria

and Russia keenly aroused and each of the Balkan states anxiously

looking for the moment when the rest of the sultan’s territory in

Europe was to be divided between them, it was evident that a little

thing could precipitate a serious conflict. It was in view of this

phase of the situation that the Balkans were called “the tinder-box of

Europe.”

 

It will be observed that while these things happened the Balkan states

were developing steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece,

Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally organized powers, it

became more and more evident that they were no longer mere pawns in the

diplomatic game, and the time was fast approaching when they would wish

to take parts on their own initiative. So assertive were they becoming

that it was certain that the time would soon come when the Great Powers

would tire of the process of holding conferences to keep these states

out of trouble. It is not an easy task to serve as custodian for a

“tinder-box.”

 

A fair warning of this kind of danger occurred in 1908. For

twenty-three years Bulgaria had remained undisturbed, giving herself

to a rapid process of educational and industrial development, in both

of which lines she had come under the influence of German methods.

Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish sovereignty and declared

herself an entirely independent state. At the same time, and evidently

by agreement with the German Empire, Austria-Hungary announced that

she would hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of her empire,

thus superseding the “occupation” that was authorized by the congress

of Berlin, in 1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury, but she

could do nothing alone. Her natural ally was Russia, then recovering

from the severe losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar been

ready for war it is doubtful if he would have drawn the sword in this

instance; for a world war would have resulted, and the nations were

not yet ready to think of such an undertaking. But Serbia nursed her

wrongs and to Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought how her

weakness had been flaunted in the face of the world. The day came when

the fire could no longer be smothered.

 

To understand Serbia’s feelings we must recall the national ideal by

which her hopes had been formed for many years. Most of the people

of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern

corner of Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them into a great

Serbia had long been spoken of in Serbia as the “Great Idea.” When,

therefore, Austria took definite possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina the

“Great Idea” seemed defeated forever. Rage and despair possessed the

Serbs wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the feeling of

the people, and vengeance was plotted. Probably it was the feeling that

this wide-spread hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough manner

that prompted Austria to make the heavy conditions that were demanded

as atonement for the crime of Sarajevo.

 

After Austria took the fateful step of 1908 Turkey still held the

territory just north of the Bosphorus, organized as the province of

Adrianople. She also had in Europe the provinces of Macedonia, Albania,

and the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these possessions

was the object of the Balkan states. In 1911 Italy began a war against

the sultan to gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their enemy

embarrassed, concluded that the hour of fate had come. They formed the

Balkan League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, and

made ready for war. Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who brought

the Concert of Europe to bear against the League. They gave the allies

fair notice that they would not permit them to take any of the sultan’s

territory in Europe, even though a war was won against him. The reply

to this threat shows how weak the Concert had become. It was voiced by

Montenegro, the smallest of the states, whose king immediately declared

war and called on his allies to aid him in driving the pagan out of

Europe. The call was accepted gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the

sultan, who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied his opponents.

 

In the war that followed Turkey was confronted by a united army of

nearly a million men. It was impossible to withstand them and in two

months most of Macedonia was lost, Constantinople was threatened,

and Turkey asked for an armistice. Negotiations began in London, the

Powers seemingly forgetting their empty threat that they “would not

permit at the end of the conflict any modification of the territorial

_status quo_ in European Turkey.” The allies demanded hard terms which

seemed about to be accepted by Turkey when by a _coup d’état_ the

“Young Turks,” a patriotic party of reformers, got possession of the

government at Constantinople and resumed the fighting. Although they

fought well, they could not withstand the large numbers that were

against them. Janina fell to the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a

Serbo-Bulgarian force, and Scutari was taken by the Montenegrins. The

Turks now yielded definitely and negotiations for peace were resumed.

 

Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the following interesting

situation: Austria-Hungary was dismayed at the prospect of having a

strong and permanent league organized in the Balkans; for it would

probably make it impossible for her to realize her desire to extend

her territory in that direction. She was especially unwilling to allow

Serbia and Montenegro to hold the conquered shore of the Adriatic,

since it was here that she designed to gain additional outlets to the

seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at the extension of Serbian

power, since she, also, did not relish the prospect of having a

strong state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with unexpected

short-sightedness, however, that she was willing to block Serbia in

order to promote the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable rival

in that quarter, if she were ever firmly established there. Both

states, therefore, appeared at London to limit the expansion of Serbia,

and Germany supported them, seemingly on the principle that she was

merely standing by the members of the Triple Alliance. It has been

supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir-apparent of Austria,

when he came to rule, would promote a vital union of the two great

Mid-Continental empires. If we accept this theory, we must conclude

that she had a still more vital reason for wishing Austria to have a

large Adriatic coast-line, with important commercial harbors.

 

These considerations ran exactly counter to Serbia’s hopes in Albania.

She had already occupied the Albanian port of Durazzo and expected to

make it the center of a fair commercial life. When ordered to withdraw

she did not dare refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to cut

off the possibility of her future growth. For a second time Austria had

given her a vital blow, and there was another wrong to be remembered

by those Serbians who were inclined to remember. By the decree of the

Powers Albania was made an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty,

and later on a German prince was appointed to rule it.

 

While these affairs were being discussed Montenegro besieged Scutari,

in northern Albania and continued operation until the place was

taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the Powers was well known.

Her courageous conduct won the admiration of lovers of brave men

everywhere. Eight days after the capture of Scutari, Austria announced

that she would enter the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy

and Germany declared they would support her. Throughout all Slavic

countries arose a cry of indignation. In Russia especially it was loud

and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was about to begin when

King Nicholas, of Montenegro, gave the world the assurance of peace by

withdrawing his army from Scutari.

 

Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by which the Balkan League was

dissolved and the hope disappeared that a strong power would arise

which would take the Near East out of the position of pawn for the

greed of the Great Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made an

ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the territory they would take

from Turkey, and the first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied

this region she asked her allies to make a new allotment. Bulgaria

raised strong objection, since the new demand, if granted, would mean

that her gains would be smaller than was first agreed. Angry speeches

led to war, and after a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced

to make peace without honor. While they were locked in the conflict

Turkey seized the opportunity to recover Adrianople, and eventually

held it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of the Balkan states

that Rumania entered this war for purely predatory purposes. She had

remained neutral during the common effort to drive the Turk out; but

now that Bulgaria was marching to sure defeat she came into the battle