The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 16

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 16

Although Treitschke wrote many pamphlets on topics of current interest,

all bearing upon what he considered the destiny of Germany, he was

preëminently a historian. It was by telling the story of Germany since

the revival of national feeling after the battle of Jena that he wished

to serve best the generation in which he lived. For him it was the

historian to whom was committed the task of making the citizen realize

what place he had in the nation’s complex of duties and hopes.

 

He came upon the scene when history had become fixed upon the basis of

accuracy and detached research. Men like Leopold von Ranke had insisted

that history should deal with the cold exploitation of universal laws.

For them Treitschke was a bad historian, and they used their influence

to prevent his appointment at the University of Berlin. He was a

Chauvinist, undoubtedly, and his _History of Germany in the Nineteenth

Century_ is a highly colored picture of what he conceived the reader

should know about the history of his country. It is a work written to

arouse the enthusiasm of the people for their country, rather than

to instruct them in the universal laws of human development; and it

would be a sad day for the world if all history were written as he

wrote this. But it was a powerful appeal to national pride and energy.

It played a great part in the formation of the Germany with which

we are concerned in this chapter, the striving, self-confident, and

aspiring empire that set for itself the task of dominating the European

continent.

 

This chapter is not written to reconcile American readers to the German

side of the controversy that now engages the attention of all men. I

wish to enable the reader to have a clear view of the people with whom

we fight. It is they with whom we must deal in building up the system

out of which the future is to be constructed again; and we shall not

know how to deal with them if we do not see their point of view and

know what they are thinking about.

 

If in some of their ideals they are superior to other peoples, and if

their organization of individuals into the state has some elements

of strength not found in other systems, it is not for us to seek to

destroy the advantage they have won. It would be better for us to adopt

their good points, in order that we might the more surely defeat them

on the field of battle. Having won the victory we desire, we should

certainly not seek to destroy that which we cannot replace. Live and

let live, a principle which Germans have ignored in some important

respects, must be recognized after the military ambition of Germany is

broken, if we are to have an enduring peace.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VIII

 

THE FAILURE OF THE OLD EUROPEAN SYSTEM

 

 

Much has been written to prove that one side or the other was

responsible for the present war. Minute facts, as the words in a

dispatch, or the time at which the troops were mobilized, or whether

or not a preliminary summons of troops to the colors was in itself an

act of mobilization, have become the subjects of bitter debate. Such

questions will have to be settled by the historians of the future

years: they cannot be discussed here with any profit, since this book

is an appeal to the reason of men on each side of the controversy.

 

Back of the events of July, 1914, is a more fundamental cause of the

war. It is the breakdown of the systems of concert and balance to

which the powers had trusted themselves. Castlereagh and Metternich

allowed themselves to slip into these theories, when they set aside

the suggestion of a federated Europe, which came from Alexander I.

Granted that the tsar’s dream was too ethereal for a world steeped in

selfishness, it does not follow that a policy entirely devoted to the

balancing of selfishness with selfishness would have preserved peace.

 

On the other hand, we must admit that nations are not idealists.

Selfishness is their doctrine. So long as the project of a federation

is viewed idealistically it is practically impossible. But if it ever

comes to be admitted by the people who count in political things that

it is for the interests of the nations to adopt it, that is, if it is

brought within what we may call the sphere of selfishness, it ceases to

be idealistic and comes to be a subject worthy of the consideration of

the practical statesman.

 

Furthermore, the political philosopher has ever to answer the question,

“What about the future?” What are we going to do after the present

debauch of waste and murder is over? Are we to trust the world to

the same old forces that brought us this ruin? One says that human

nature is the same forever, that it learns only in the hard school of

experience, and that it must fight its wars as the price it pays for

being human nature. To such a man the Napoleonic wars did all that

could be expected of them when they so impressed the world with the

cost of war that a system was adopted which gave the world a measure

of peace for a hundred years. “What more can you ask?” said such a

philosopher to me. In humble responsibility to the throne of reason I

reply that we can try as intelligent beings to remove the war madness

permanently, making it our duty to posterity to do the best we can.

Some generation must make the start, or we shall wring our hands

forever.

 

In this chapter I wish to show in what way the old system crumbled

before the desire of world power. It seems a vicious system by virtue

of its innate qualities of selfishness, and it is all the more to be

feared because its subtle spirit gets control of our own hearts as

well as the hearts of other men. While our opponents--Germany and

Austria--were following the system to its bitter conclusion, our

friends--Great Britain, France, and Italy--were doing nearly the

same things, but in a slightly different way. And there is no reason

to expect that under the continuation of the balancing of great and

ambitious world powers we shall have more respect for the rights of

one another than we had in the past.

 

The system of Balance of Power flourished best in Bismarck’s time.

It was his strong personality that held together the Three Emperors’

League for a brief season and the Triple Alliance for a longer period.

Each of these groups had certain interests in common which gave them

coherence: Bismarck alone knew how to exploit these mutual advantages

and lessen the jars of clashing feelings. His objects were made easier

by the fact that most of the other nations of Europe at that time had

developed quarrels of their own. Great Britain and Russia were at

swords’ points over the Far Eastern question, and France and Great

Britain had not forgotten their century old antagonism, which only a

minor dispute was sufficient to set aflame.

 

Moreover, Great Britain was engaged in a vast task of empire building.

Manufactures increased rapidly in the United Kingdom, an ever growing

trade threw out ever expanding tentacles to the remotest parts of the

world, and the growth of the colonies produced greater prosperity at

home and abroad than the most hopeful Briton had previously thought

within the bounds of probability. She was too busy with this splendid

process of internal prosperity to take notice of what was happening on

the Continent, so long as her own interests were not threatened. From

her standpoint Bismarck’s policy of preserving peace through the means

of a German predominating influence was a welcome relief from other

burdens.

 

This state of affairs was prolonged for at least fifteen years after

the death of Bismarck. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s temperamental impetuousness

did not break up the balance that had been established, although many

prophets had foretold such a thing. As the corner-stone of the Triple

Alliance Germany was looked upon as the protector of European peace,

and the kaiser, it is said, was pleased to regard himself as the man

especially responsible for that policy.

 

It is difficult to say when and how this happy situation began to

be undermined and whose was the responsibility. One cause of the

rupture was the rapid growth of German manufactures and trade, which

brought about stern competition between the business interests of

Germany and Great Britain. The newspapers of the two nations, like

all other newspapers of modern times, were closely connected with the

capitalistic interests of the respective states, and voiced the alarm

and antipathy of the industrial classes. Thus the people of Germany

and the people of Britain were stimulated to a condition of mutual

distrust. They believed that each practiced the most disreputable

tricks of competition against the other, and each talked of destroying

the industry of the other. It is difficult to say who is responsible

for the beginning of commercial rivalry.

 

Late in the last century Germany began to enlarge her navy with the

evident purpose of making it rival the navy of Great Britain. Her

justification was found in the idea that a navy was necessary to

protect the great commerce that she was building up. At the same time

German writers began to make many criticisms on the British claim of

being mistress of the seas. “Freedom of the seas” became a phrase of

comfort in their mouths. It is not clear that it meant what it seemed

to say; for the seas were as free to the Germans in times of peace as

to any other people, and Germany’s plan to build a great fleet that

would defeat the British fleet would establish that same kind of rule

at sea that Great Britain through her naval superiority then held.

 

Now it is very certain that Germany had a perfect right to enter each

of these two fields of endeavor. The contests of industry are open to

all, and the laws of peace protect them. She had the right, also, to

build up her navy, although she should not have expected to overtop the

British navy specifically without arousing the hostility of the British

people. The insular position of the United Kingdom and its relations

with its colonies are such that a navy is its surest protection if

assailed in war; and to fall into a second position is to hold its life

at the permission of another state. Germany must have seen this phase

of the situation. Her statesmen were poor leaders of men if they did

not realize that they were entering upon a rivalry in which was the

possibility of great resistance.

 

Another phase of the opposition that was steadily rising against

Germany was the general alarm at the growth of her military power. Her

army and navy ever increased in size and readiness for that initial

rush to victory which is half the struggle in modern war. At the same

time German leaders did not disguise their desire for the enlargement

of German territory on the Continent. The Pan-German party made a great

deal of noise, and other nations were not reassured by being told that

the party was not as strong as its agitation seemed to indicate.

 

Now and again one read in some German paper an assertion to the effect